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1.1 Introduction  
 
People are not born democratic; they need to learn “how to do democracy”. This insight accurately 
describes the challenge of democratic transformation/consolidation of post-communist societies. 
The lack of civic and political engagement in post-communist countries is perceived as one of the 
hardships of democratic development in the region. Although formal institutions in the post-
communist region are displaying attributes of consolidated democracies, citizens generally feel 
distant from political life, are unaware of political decisions and means to influence politics, feel 
generally apathetic and pessimistic, and are thus not willing to use their political rights for which 
they have struggled so hard (Ramonaitė, 2006b: 93). The new democracies seem to be fragile in 
terms of the penetration of the political system from below, exposing a disparity between 
democratic rules on the one hand and peoples’ political attitudes on the other hand (Pollack et al., 
2003: 31).  
Admitting that an institutional approach does not provide a full answer to the question why 
citizens feel detached from politics in post-communist societies, theorists often recoil on cultural 
arguments. The cultural-based approach derives from the deeper reflections on the communist past 
and the continuity of both social and personal memories. As Howard (2003) notices in his resonant 
study The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, citizens in Eastern European 
countries are less likely to engage actively in civil society practices than people from other post-
authoritarian countries, and especially, Western democracies. A possible explanation for that, some 
authors assume, is the fact that post-communist societies are less trusting than other (Mishler and 
Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Lovell, 2001; Bădescu and Uslaner, 2003, 
Markova, 2004; Kornai, Rothstein, and Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2006).  
It has been debated that communism had stronger and more significant effects on trust than 
other types of autocratic regimes (for instance, in Latin America, Spain, Portugal or Greece), 
because of the unique features of the Soviet-style communist system1 (Traps, 2009: 64). Unlike 
other authoritarian regimes, communism exerted an extensive brutal power on all realms of citizens’ 
lives. The communist system usurped, suppressed or even destroyed political, economic and civil 
societies, whereas other authoritarian systems in Europe mainly focused on political control (more 
about the differences between authoritarian regimes in Linz and Stepan, 1996). Given this, it is 
suggested that communism had a profound negative impact on trust as well as on the abilities to 
cooperate for a common good (Sztompka, 1993).  
                                                 
1 It is argued in the literature that some cultural patterns of Soviet-based communism were also rendered to some of the 
national communist systems, for instance, in former Yugoslavia countries, although I admit the institutional differences 
between these types of communism (Linz and Stepan, 1996). 
 
A few authors claim that the lack of trust (between citizens and in institutions) has led to the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Instead of functioning on trust, the regime could only rely on 
force and fear, which eventually became too costly to maintain the system (Warren, 1999; Markova, 
2004). Hereby, on the one hand, it is admitted that distrust infused the collapse of the communist 
regime. On the other hand, the prevalence of distrustful attitudes in the contemporary post-
communist societies, these authors warn, has at the same time formidable consequences on the 
economic growth and enrichment of democracy. Therefore, the experiences of post-communist 
societies are of particular interest in the academic debate. This region is perceived as a “testing 
ground” for the role of trust for political engagement (Misztal, 1996: 9). 
Following a cultural-based approach, in this dissertation I consider trust in a wider context 
of political culture. Some literature suggests that trust adheres to political culture as one of the main 
values or beliefs, as an important individual and collective resource that endows citizens with 
meaningful orientations in civic/political life. It is popularly argued that political stability depends 
on the congruency between political culture and political institutions, implying that democracy, 
besides certain juridical and political arrangements, is also sustained by efficacious citizens who 
support and trust their institutions (Norris, 1999). However, this argument has received criticism in 
contemporary studies, leading authors to admit that political distrust could also have a positive 
impact on democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008; Hardin, 2006). Moreover, and arguably more important, 
the role of social trust for democratic sustainability is still underresearched, although there are some 
hints in the literature that social trust indeed fosters the democratic attitudes and thus facilitates the 
process of increasing democraticness. For instance, Putnam in his well-known studies (1993; 2000) 
renewed the famous claim of Alexis de Tocqueville that social trust is essential for democratic 
society. Nonetheless, the substantial empirical support for this claim is still missing. This 
dissertation aims to fill this gap.   
Acknowledging that in post-communist countries the levels of social trust are dramatically 
low, I assume that citizens’ willingness and readiness to participate in politics in post-communist 
Europe is thus greatly undermined by low levels of social trust. As Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) 
observe, countries in transition from socialism face particular problems in developing trust. In 
comparison to Western democracies, trusting relationships did not extend beyond the circle of 
family and friends. In sum, issues of social trust raised in the literature and in practice leads us to 
wonder: to what degree does social trust function (or not) as a collective resource of political action 
in post-communist societies? 
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 1.2 Research questions 
 
In this thesis I raise three sets of research questions that derive from considering trust as both 
explanandum and explanans.  
Firstly, the nature of social trust in post-communist societies remains a controversy and a 
reference point in comparing social interactions between new and old democracies. Therefore, one 
of my core research questions in this dissertation is: why are levels of social trust in post-communist 
societies so low? This question will be addressed by discussing how communist legacies affected 
the essence of trust and, moreover, how social trust developed in the period of political/social 
transformation after the collapse of Soviet Union (chapter 3). 
Secondly, I ask: what are the causal mechanisms between social trust and political 
participation? Do trusters tend to participate in politics more actively than others, and, if so, what 
kind of participation they are more inclined to choose? I consider this set of questions both from a 
theoretical and empirical point of view (in chapter 2 and chapter 4 respectively). 
Thirdly, I ask: how is social trust related to different types of political efficacy, and how and 
to what extent does a sense of efficacy lead to participation? In other words, does social trust have 
an indirect effect on participation via political efficacy? Thus specifically, I aim to establish the 
mediated effect of social trust (X) on political participation (Y) via political efficacy (M) (Figure 
1.1). I intend to explore this relationship in a broader set of democracies, and in addition zoom into 
the more specific Lithuanian case2 (chapters 4–7). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The expected causal mechanism between social trust (predictor), political participation 
(outcome) and political efficacy (mediator) 
  
                                                 
2 A separate section of this chapter elaborates more on the scope and case selection of the study.  
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1.3 Relevance of the study 
 
This section explains why the research questions are of academic and public interest. I maintain that 
the exploration of social trust and its connection to political participation in the former communist 
democracies is relevant for at least three reasons. The first reason is related to the empirical 
evidence of strikingly low levels of political participation in the post-communist region, the second 
point emphasizes the efforts to understand the weakness of civil society through the lens of social 
trust from both a historical and contemporary perspective, and the third point is directed to the 
empirical gaps this study aims to fill.  
Firstly, the post-communist region witnessed a dramatic decline of electoral participation 
since its democratization in the early 1990s. As Kostelka (2014) notices in his newest empirical 
research, as of 2013, parliamentary elections turnout rates in post-communist societies are 
approximately 56%, and this is a considerably lower level than the West European standard, which 
is oscillating around 75% (or about 73%, if we exclude countries with compulsory voting). 
Moreover, the average voter turnout in post-communist countries dramatically decreased by about 
25 percentage points between the 1990s and 2010. This is a record level decline for the region in the 
whole electoral history.  
Even a bigger contrast is apparent, when it comes to protest actions. It seems that protest 
activity is not yet replacing traditional forms of participation in former communist countries, as 
Inglehart (1990) would predict. He asserted that the levels of political participation in democracies 
would not only increase, but would do so in specific ways, particularly, by the means of contentious 
politics. The European Values Survey (EVS) data demonstrates that in the post-communist societies 
only a relatively insignificant part of the respondents reported to have attended a lawful 
demonstration in the past.3 At the same time, more than half of the respondents in some countries 
across the post-communist region admitted that they would never participate in such activity, 
ranging from 37 % in Slovenia to 68 % in Romania and Slovakia.  
The low levels of participation correspond with comparatively low levels of social trust. 
According to the EVS (2008) data, only around one fifth of the respondents (ranging from 13 to 
33%) in the post-communist societies agreed with the statement that most people can be trusted. To 
give a reference point, the levels of social trust in mature democracies ranges from 27% in France to 
as high as 76% in Denmark.   
                                                 
3 As the data of the European Value Study (2008) shows, only very few respondents admitted to having participated in 
demonstrations or boycotts. Boycotts – 2% in Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, 3% in Estonia, 4 % in Latvia 
and Poland; demonstrations - 4% in Hungary, 5% in Estonia and Slovakia, 8% in Lithuania, 9% in Poland, 12% in 
Czech Republic, 13% in Slovenia and 17% in Latvia.  For comparison, the turnout in demonstrations in mature 
democracies is higher, to give a few examples: in Denmark - 34%, France - 45%, Spain - 38%, Italy - 39%, Luxemburg 
– 36%, Belgium – 30%, Netherlands – 22%, Sweden – 23%.  
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 Secondly, many authors are specifically concerned with the lack of a revival or, in some 
cases, the emergence of civil society in post-communist countries. Although civil society has been 
acclaimed for its role in abolishing communism, recent developments, especially in terms of civic 
and political engagement and civic initiatives from below, are worrisome. Academic debates call 
into question why people who managed to achieve the common goal of overthrowing the 
communist regime, became more distant, apathetic and absent from civic and political actions.  
The formation of a vivid civil society is crucial for the democratic consolidation in post-
communist societies (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Civil society endows one with the vigilance against 
political usurpation that is likely to happen in a country without democratic traditions, as some 
examples of the post-Soviet bloc demonstrate. Moreover, because of the weak civil society citizens 
also lack representation and political “leverage” that could be provided by active voluntary 
organizations (Howard, 2002). Besides that, the socialization function of networks of civil society is 
important –they teach skills of democratic participation and convey democratic attitudes. The fact 
that post-communist countries have lower levels of organizational membership basically means 
hampered civic skills that are vital to supporting democratic systems.  
Apart from the development of civil society, the formation of social capital (another element 
which strongly relies on social trust) in post-communist countries has also gained a particular 
interest (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998; Rose, 2000; Dowley and Silver, 2002; Bădescu and 
Uslaner, 2003; Letki, 2003; Haerpfer, Wallace, and Raiser, 2005; Lasinska, 2013). Acknowledging 
the weakness of civil networks, several authors direct their attention to trust as a moral imperative 
of social capital. From this point of view, social trust is conceived to be a bridging element of a 
society, a foundation of peoples’ solidarity and commonness (Uslaner, 2002; Seligman, 1997). A 
few scholars claim that with regard to the evolution of social trust, there are substantial differences 
between the conceptualizations of social capital in Western and post-communist democracies. The 
problem here is that while in Western-based interpretations social capital is associated with a 
cooperative environment (networks) and a generalized (impersonal) sense of trust, whereas in 
Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter: CEE) due to the historical legacy social capital and 
generalized trust might not be related with each other.  
To go further, this insight also suggests that the relationship between social trust and 
political participation might be different from the one in mature democracies. For instance, Letki 
(2003) has identified only a weak impact of social trust on citizens’ political participation in CEE. 
Together with her colleague she argues that it is necessary “to go beyond the assumptions put 
forward in models developed in Western liberal democratic contexts” (Letki and Evans, 2005: 525). 
The contrasting patterns of participation “between East and West” are also acknowledged by other 
authors (Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock, 1998; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Van 
 
Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007; Smith, 2009; Vráblíková, 2014; Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 
144; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014). Thus, casting a light on social trust might contribute to the 
existing theories on political participation in post-communist societies and highlight the differences 
in predicting participation between mature and post-communist democracies.   
The third point entails that this research is particularly relevant because the connections 
between social trust and political efficacy are insufficiently investigated in the post-communist 
region and lack empirical support. Roughly speaking, political efficacy, as a set of political-
psychological orientations that explain political participation, has gained its popularity mostly from 
studies in the United States (Lane, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991) 
and in other Western countries (Finkel, 1985; 1987; Klandermans and Oegema, 1987; Simon et al., 
1998; Morrel, 2003; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013; Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 
2010; della Porta and Reiter, 2012; Quintelier and Van Deth, 2014). The post-communist societies 
are still underresearched in this respect, except for a few more recent scholars. These scholars 
basically assert in choir that post-communist citizens generally do not feel that they are able to 
effectively participate in politics (see, for instance, Mierina, 2011; Padget, 1999; Pollack et al., 
2003; Hutcheson and Korosteleva, 2006; Armingeon, 2007). Yet, based on these studies, it is hardly 
possible to make any inferences on the mediating effects of political efficacy on political 
participation in the whole post-communist region, because of (1) the limited number of cases in 
most of the studies and (2) the limited operationalization of the concept of political efficacy in most 
of the studies, tapping only some aspects of it. 
 
1.4 Theoretical background 
 
Social trust as a resource of human interactions is one of the central concepts I employ in this study 
to explain the peculiarities of political activism in different political contexts. The theoretical 
debates on trust in post-communist societies very well comply with the sociological literature that 
emphasizes social trust as a facet of fraternity (or brotherhood), instead of only concentrating on 
liberty and equality (Newton, 1999b: 4-5). The uncertain times of post-modernity, some writers 
argue, lead the social sciences to search for the basis of social cooperation, integration and 
obligations between the members of a society, and this is where trust is given a crucial role as a 
valuable asset of social life (Misztal, 1996: 3). From different perspectives this idea is embedded in 
a number of books and studies, of which some were even revolutionary in social sciences: starting 
from classical theorists, such as Durkheim (1997 [1893]), Simmel (1950), Luhmann (1979; 1988) 
and continuing with the more contemporary authors as Giddens (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam 
(1993; 2000), Misztal (1996), Seligman (1997), Sztompka (1999), Warren (1999), Uslaner (2002), 
Hardin (2002, 2006) and many others. Despite differences in theoretical nuances of conceptualizing 
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 Secondly, many authors are specifically concerned with the lack of a revival or, in some 
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few scholars claim that with regard to the evolution of social trust, there are substantial differences 
between the conceptualizations of social capital in Western and post-communist democracies. The 
problem here is that while in Western-based interpretations social capital is associated with a 
cooperative environment (networks) and a generalized (impersonal) sense of trust, whereas in 
Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter: CEE) due to the historical legacy social capital and 
generalized trust might not be related with each other.  
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Together with her colleague she argues that it is necessary “to go beyond the assumptions put 
forward in models developed in Western liberal democratic contexts” (Letki and Evans, 2005: 525). 
The contrasting patterns of participation “between East and West” are also acknowledged by other 
authors (Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock, 1998; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Van 
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The third point entails that this research is particularly relevant because the connections 
between social trust and political efficacy are insufficiently investigated in the post-communist 
region and lack empirical support. Roughly speaking, political efficacy, as a set of political-
psychological orientations that explain political participation, has gained its popularity mostly from 
studies in the United States (Lane, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991) 
and in other Western countries (Finkel, 1985; 1987; Klandermans and Oegema, 1987; Simon et al., 
1998; Morrel, 2003; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013; Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 
2010; della Porta and Reiter, 2012; Quintelier and Van Deth, 2014). The post-communist societies 
are still underresearched in this respect, except for a few more recent scholars. These scholars 
basically assert in choir that post-communist citizens generally do not feel that they are able to 
effectively participate in politics (see, for instance, Mierina, 2011; Padget, 1999; Pollack et al., 
2003; Hutcheson and Korosteleva, 2006; Armingeon, 2007). Yet, based on these studies, it is hardly 
possible to make any inferences on the mediating effects of political efficacy on political 
participation in the whole post-communist region, because of (1) the limited number of cases in 
most of the studies and (2) the limited operationalization of the concept of political efficacy in most 
of the studies, tapping only some aspects of it. 
 
1.4 Theoretical background 
 
Social trust as a resource of human interactions is one of the central concepts I employ in this study 
to explain the peculiarities of political activism in different political contexts. The theoretical 
debates on trust in post-communist societies very well comply with the sociological literature that 
emphasizes social trust as a facet of fraternity (or brotherhood), instead of only concentrating on 
liberty and equality (Newton, 1999b: 4-5). The uncertain times of post-modernity, some writers 
argue, lead the social sciences to search for the basis of social cooperation, integration and 
obligations between the members of a society, and this is where trust is given a crucial role as a 
valuable asset of social life (Misztal, 1996: 3). From different perspectives this idea is embedded in 
a number of books and studies, of which some were even revolutionary in social sciences: starting 
from classical theorists, such as Durkheim (1997 [1893]), Simmel (1950), Luhmann (1979; 1988) 
and continuing with the more contemporary authors as Giddens (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam 
(1993; 2000), Misztal (1996), Seligman (1997), Sztompka (1999), Warren (1999), Uslaner (2002), 
Hardin (2002, 2006) and many others. Despite differences in theoretical nuances of conceptualizing 
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 trust, this whole academic “branch” basically argues that social trust is a fundament of solidarity 
(civil society), good governance (democracy), social/economic prosperity (market economy/social 
welfare), and, moreover, it manifests itself as a prerequisite for collective action in modern 
societies. Yet in a more intrinsic sense, trust is a notion on which the paradigms of Marx and Weber 
clash. Trust is a hallmark for finding a balance between individual freedom, a selfish (entirely 
rational) attitude towards others and collective responsibility, civic consciousness and moral 
determination (Misztal, 1996: 9). The nature of trust reveals that human actions are not classified 
entirely on a calculative and conflictive basis, instead people are able to affiliate and cooperate with 
each other like moral actors.  
Trust is a multidisciplinary concept as it is related, among other fields, to sociology and 
political theory, political and social psychology, economic and organizational behaviour. As Misztal 
(1996: 1) notices, the concept of trust derived from philosophical and political writings. In these 
writings, trust is usually considered as an important indication of social relations in transition from 
pre-modern to modern societies. Political theory literature focuses on how trust was transformed 
from traditional kinship-based relations to a more generalized impersonal level, which is a 
backbone of individualised (post)industrial society. Early academic debates were centred on the 
moral value of trust and in this sense trust was set in contrast to a hostile modern environment. 
Later, political scientists and philosophers started to advocate an economized or more rational 
concept of trust, arguing that (1) trust is a vital prerequisite for rationalizing economic relations and 
for adjusting the division of labour; (2) trust is a trait which enables social cohesion, cooperation 
and gives an impulse to democratic (market) institutions. Moreover, some academics theorize, (3) 
trust in people functions as a counter-response to institutional monopoly and thus it is a desirable 
attribute of modern political society (Sztompka, 1999; Warren, 1999).  
Trust as a concept was particularly revived in the social capital literature. In recent decades 
the concept captured so much attention that it ironically was nicknamed “panacea” which is able to 
cure the inefficiency of society and institutions (see, for instance, Lovell, 2009). Putnam (1993) 
suggested that social capital would facilitate cooperation in communities based on mutual 
obligations and responsibility and thus it would help to confront social disorders, for instance crime, 
poverty, conflicts. From the individual level perspective, the stocks of someone’s social capital 
increase his/her sense of control, personal access to information and thus enhance skills and power 
(Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009; Paxton, 2002; Uslaner, 2002).  
Although less explicitly, trust also features in the modern civil society literature, starting 
with Almond and Verba (1963; 1989), who were followed by Wolfe (1989), Dahl (1989), Seligman 
(1992), Inglehart (1990; 1997) and many others. Civil society is defined in this sociological 
tradition as “a moral order whose cooperative principles and mutual self-help serve as a 
 
counterweight to the demoralizing tendencies of the modern market and state” (Hearn, 1997: 66).  
According to this view, trust sustains rules of solidarity and belongs to a certain set of social 
obligations that also include participatory attitudes, tolerance, respect for human rights, citizenry 
duties and perceived common responsibility. The theories argue that these psychological and 
cultural resources are conducive to democracy, as it was already noticed by Alexis de Tocqueville 
almost two centuries ago. It is also worth saying that in the most recent sociological trends, the civic 
culture theories have regained their importance, while the social capital literature suffers from 
criticism of being poorly theoretically embedded (Durlauf, 2002; Hean et al., 2003).  
In their classical study The Civic Culture Almond and Verba (1963) characterize types of 
political culture and assert that democracy goes along well with the Participant type. Possessing 
values of participant political culture, individuals are not only affected by the government (as the 
passive recipients), but also feel able to influence it in various ways (as active participants). The 
empirical evidence in the study also suggests that high levels of institutional and social trust 
contribute to the effectiveness of democracy and complementarity between citizens and the state. 
Years later, Verba with his colleagues Schlozman and Brady in Voice and Equality (1995) conclude 
that political participation, on the one hand, is strongly predicted by a sense of political efficacy, 
and, on the other hand, by individual’s social characteristics, including trust and social connections. 
Similar conclusions are also drawn in Putnam’s famous book Making Democracy Work (1993), in 
which he notices that in more trustful communities a sense of efficacy of common citizens is 
generally higher, compared to citizens in a less trustful environment ([1993] 2001: 147-149). 
The findings of civic culture and social capital literatures make me presuppose that social 
trust and political efficacy are related categories that both positively affect political participation. 
Taking post-communist societies into account, the literature suggests that a reluctance to participate 
in political life is a result of the low levels of social trust and high levels of perceived political 
helplessness (an opposite feeling to efficacy). While political efficacy is a relatively explicit 
concept, social trust is a much more ambiguous, multi-layered, culturally and psychologically 
bounded; its role for political participation is still questioned. Some studies find a positive 
relationship between social trust and institutionalized political participation (Kaase, 1999; Putnam, 
1993; 2000; Rossteutscher, 2008; Marien and Christensen, 2013), and others find weak, non-
significant or even negative connections (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Milner, 2000; Van Deth, 2001; 
Muhlberger, 2003; Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Armingeon, 2007; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 
2009; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Hooghe and Quintellier, 2014; Kim, 2014). On the other hand, 
several studies show that there is a positive association between social trust and participation in 
unconventional/protest politics (Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; 
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the concept captured so much attention that it ironically was nicknamed “panacea” which is able to 
cure the inefficiency of society and institutions (see, for instance, Lovell, 2009). Putnam (1993) 
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obligations and responsibility and thus it would help to confront social disorders, for instance crime, 
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increase his/her sense of control, personal access to information and thus enhance skills and power 
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Although less explicitly, trust also features in the modern civil society literature, starting 
with Almond and Verba (1963; 1989), who were followed by Wolfe (1989), Dahl (1989), Seligman 
(1992), Inglehart (1990; 1997) and many others. Civil society is defined in this sociological 
tradition as “a moral order whose cooperative principles and mutual self-help serve as a 
 
counterweight to the demoralizing tendencies of the modern market and state” (Hearn, 1997: 66).  
According to this view, trust sustains rules of solidarity and belongs to a certain set of social 
obligations that also include participatory attitudes, tolerance, respect for human rights, citizenry 
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cultural resources are conducive to democracy, as it was already noticed by Alexis de Tocqueville 
almost two centuries ago. It is also worth saying that in the most recent sociological trends, the civic 
culture theories have regained their importance, while the social capital literature suffers from 
criticism of being poorly theoretically embedded (Durlauf, 2002; Hean et al., 2003).  
In their classical study The Civic Culture Almond and Verba (1963) characterize types of 
political culture and assert that democracy goes along well with the Participant type. Possessing 
values of participant political culture, individuals are not only affected by the government (as the 
passive recipients), but also feel able to influence it in various ways (as active participants). The 
empirical evidence in the study also suggests that high levels of institutional and social trust 
contribute to the effectiveness of democracy and complementarity between citizens and the state. 
Years later, Verba with his colleagues Schlozman and Brady in Voice and Equality (1995) conclude 
that political participation, on the one hand, is strongly predicted by a sense of political efficacy, 
and, on the other hand, by individual’s social characteristics, including trust and social connections. 
Similar conclusions are also drawn in Putnam’s famous book Making Democracy Work (1993), in 
which he notices that in more trustful communities a sense of efficacy of common citizens is 
generally higher, compared to citizens in a less trustful environment ([1993] 2001: 147-149). 
The findings of civic culture and social capital literatures make me presuppose that social 
trust and political efficacy are related categories that both positively affect political participation. 
Taking post-communist societies into account, the literature suggests that a reluctance to participate 
in political life is a result of the low levels of social trust and high levels of perceived political 
helplessness (an opposite feeling to efficacy). While political efficacy is a relatively explicit 
concept, social trust is a much more ambiguous, multi-layered, culturally and psychologically 
bounded; its role for political participation is still questioned. Some studies find a positive 
relationship between social trust and institutionalized political participation (Kaase, 1999; Putnam, 
1993; 2000; Rossteutscher, 2008; Marien and Christensen, 2013), and others find weak, non-
significant or even negative connections (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Milner, 2000; Van Deth, 2001; 
Muhlberger, 2003; Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Armingeon, 2007; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 
2009; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Hooghe and Quintellier, 2014; Kim, 2014). On the other hand, 
several studies show that there is a positive association between social trust and participation in 
unconventional/protest politics (Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; 
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 Kim, 2014). Thus the connection between social trust and the variances of political participation is 
yet not clear.  
Adding to that, the social capital and civic culture theories also suggest that social trust 
might have an indirect effect on political participation, mediated by the sense of political efficacy. 
Following this reasoning, efficacy is acquired through social trust, which in turn eventually leads to 
political participation. In sum, drawing from the literature, I expect two types of relationships 
between social trust and political participation: (1) the direct effect, implying that trusters are more 
inclined to participate in politics, and (2) the indirect effect, which is mediated through political 
efficacy, suggesting that the more people trust each other, the more they feel efficacious to 
participate in politics.  
 
1.5 Scope of the study and case selection: heterogeneity and homogeneity of the post-
communist region  
 
This study focuses on the established European democracies for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. The practical reasons refer to the European Social Survey (hereafter: ESS) 2008 dataset, 
which is used in the analysis and mainly comprises European Union (EU) countries. To analyze the 
effects of social trust in a comparative view, the mature and post-communist democracies are 
chosen. The adjective “mature” is used to describe advanced liberal democracies that achieved a 
high level of institutional and economic development since the first and the second waves of 
democratization (Huntington, 1991).4 Hence, as mature democracies, the old EU countries are 
selected that became members of the organization before 2004. Cyprus is also included in the 
sample, despite its arguable limitations of being mature. In addition, I also include Norway and 
Switzerland as both countries are linked to the EU by many bilateral agreements and are 
acknowledged as fitting the criteria of mature democracies. Germany in this sample is split in West 
(mature) and East (post-communist) parts. 
My sample of the post-communist countries consists of the countries that became EU 
member states in 2004 and 2007 (except for East Germany). I deliberately chose not to include 
other post-communist countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, because the non-democratic nature of 
their institutions could influence the causal mechanisms between trust and participation. Basically, 
my study is orientated to the applicability of the theoretical inferences to the democratic context. 
Democratic institutions are thus considered a constant variable in this study.  
                                                 
4 European countries from the third wave of democratization where transition to democracy took place in the 1970s, 
namely, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, are considered as being outliers among mature democracies in terms of economic 
development and quality of democratic institutions. 
 
There is discussion among scholars to what extent post-communist democracies can be 
treated as homogenous. The history of a few decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall demonstrated a 
variety of trajectories followed by the post-communist countries. The differences of these pathways 
are widely discussed in the academic literature (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; 
Clark, 2002; Przeworski, 1991; Huntington, 1991; Holmes, 1997; Bunce, McFaul, and Stoner-
Weiss, 2009; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998; Elster, Offe, and Preus, 1998; Ekiert and Hanson, 
2003; Norkus, 2008; 2012).  
The students of transitology refer to a spectre of explanations for the diversity of the  
outcomes in the post-communist region: the pre-communist conditions (urban vs. rural); the nature 
of the communist rule (national vs. bureaucratic); the degree of political, economic and societal 
freedom under communism; the proximity to the West; national homogeneity/heterogeneity of 
societies; the mode of transition (pact/imposition/reform/revolution); constitution-making and 
speed/depth of the reforms; the timing of the first free parliamentary elections; and other so-called 
path dependency effects of institutional choices. These factors, authors argue, help to explain the 
stark variance between the countries in terms of institutional design (Elster, Offe and Preus, 1998), 
party systems and political cleavages (Kitschelt et al., 1999), and type of capitalism and socio-
economic development (Norkus, 2008; Lane and Myant, 2007). More importantly, as Pollack and 
his colleagues (2003: 10) observe, there are also differences in national political cultures deriving 
from the experiences with communism: in some cases where communism was imposed from 
abroad, the basic national cultures have survived (as they were in a persistent opposition to the 
regime), while in other countries, where communism was “self-employed”, the political cultures in 
terms of democratic acceptance were severely damaged.  
Apparently, a wide spectre of causal variables, mentioned above, account for the varying 
levels of democraticness of the post-communist countries. However, even rigid institutionalists, like 
Elster, Offe, and Preuss in their book Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies (1998: 306 – 
307) conclude that “the most significant variable for the success of the transformation is the 
compatibility of the inherited world views, patterns of behaviour and basic social and political 
concepts with the functional necessities of a modern, partly industrial, partly already post-industrial 
society. Thus what matters most is the social and cultural capital and its potential for adjusting the 
legacies of the past to the requirements of the present” (quoted in Kopstein, 2003: 235).  
The accomplishment of some post-communist countries in adopting democracy is 
manifested by their accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The membership of the EU is an 
essential hallmark to recognizing some post-communist states as established consolidated 
democracies. This formal acknowledgment also helps to distinguish the advanced post-communist 
countries from the cases that can be defined as “democracies with adjectives” or even authoritarian 
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Switzerland as both countries are linked to the EU by many bilateral agreements and are 
acknowledged as fitting the criteria of mature democracies. Germany in this sample is split in West 
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My sample of the post-communist countries consists of the countries that became EU 
member states in 2004 and 2007 (except for East Germany). I deliberately chose not to include 
other post-communist countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, because the non-democratic nature of 
their institutions could influence the causal mechanisms between trust and participation. Basically, 
my study is orientated to the applicability of the theoretical inferences to the democratic context. 
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4 European countries from the third wave of democratization where transition to democracy took place in the 1970s, 
namely, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, are considered as being outliers among mature democracies in terms of economic 
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There is discussion among scholars to what extent post-communist democracies can be 
treated as homogenous. The history of a few decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall demonstrated a 
variety of trajectories followed by the post-communist countries. The differences of these pathways 
are widely discussed in the academic literature (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; 
Clark, 2002; Przeworski, 1991; Huntington, 1991; Holmes, 1997; Bunce, McFaul, and Stoner-
Weiss, 2009; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998; Elster, Offe, and Preus, 1998; Ekiert and Hanson, 
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of the communist rule (national vs. bureaucratic); the degree of political, economic and societal 
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societies; the mode of transition (pact/imposition/reform/revolution); constitution-making and 
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stark variance between the countries in terms of institutional design (Elster, Offe and Preus, 1998), 
party systems and political cleavages (Kitschelt et al., 1999), and type of capitalism and socio-
economic development (Norkus, 2008; Lane and Myant, 2007). More importantly, as Pollack and 
his colleagues (2003: 10) observe, there are also differences in national political cultures deriving 
from the experiences with communism: in some cases where communism was imposed from 
abroad, the basic national cultures have survived (as they were in a persistent opposition to the 
regime), while in other countries, where communism was “self-employed”, the political cultures in 
terms of democratic acceptance were severely damaged.  
Apparently, a wide spectre of causal variables, mentioned above, account for the varying 
levels of democraticness of the post-communist countries. However, even rigid institutionalists, like 
Elster, Offe, and Preuss in their book Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies (1998: 306 – 
307) conclude that “the most significant variable for the success of the transformation is the 
compatibility of the inherited world views, patterns of behaviour and basic social and political 
concepts with the functional necessities of a modern, partly industrial, partly already post-industrial 
society. Thus what matters most is the social and cultural capital and its potential for adjusting the 
legacies of the past to the requirements of the present” (quoted in Kopstein, 2003: 235).  
The accomplishment of some post-communist countries in adopting democracy is 
manifested by their accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The membership of the EU is an 
essential hallmark to recognizing some post-communist states as established consolidated 
democracies. This formal acknowledgment also helps to distinguish the advanced post-communist 
countries from the cases that can be defined as “democracies with adjectives” or even authoritarian 
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 regimes – mostly, post-Soviet states – Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and eastwards. As I have 
already mentioned, I decided not to include the latter post-communist countries in this study, as I 
find it methodologically confusing to compare very different institutional settings. Moreover, one 
should also assert a formidable homogenizing impact of the EU structures on the member states and 
their institutional development. In this sense the EU countries can be compared, as they at least 
formally have a common image how democracy should function.  
The consolidation of democracy in the post-communist EU members is acknowledged by 
the European Commission and Freedom House reports. In the annual Freedom House surveys the 
countries are prized as free liberal democracies and ranked highly on the democraticness scale. 
However, there is some variation in terms of political rights and civil liberties across the region (see 
Table 1.1). In the years 2010 – 2013, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia were leaders in terms of democratic development, scoring the highest grade 1 (on a scale 
of 1 to 7 with 1 as the highest level of achievement and 7 the lowest). Bulgaria and Romania are 
struggling with the high levels of corruption, as well as properly ensuring freedom of press and 
minority rights. More alarming is the fact that some countries, namely, Hungary and Latvia, have 
actually regressed on the democraticness scale over the recent years. As the reports show, Latvia is 
still not able to solve the problem of “non-citizens”5 whose political rights are restricted. Hungary is 
criticized for radicalization of the political system on the nationalistic basis as well as for the unfair 
mechanisms of mobilizing political power in one party’s hands. The experts admit that political 
processes in Hungary are particularly worrying as it unfolds the traces of authoritarian manners in 
the current government, while support for democracy is still not fully entrenched in citizens’ 
political culture. 
 
Table 1.1 Freedom House scores on political rights and civil liberties indexes, 2010 - 2013 
Country 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Politica
l rights 
Civil 
libertie
s 
Status Politica
l rights 
Civil 
libertie
s 
Status Politica
l rights 
Civil 
libertie
s 
Status Politica
l rights 
Civil 
libertie
s 
Status 
Bulgaria 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 
Czech Rep 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 
Estonia 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 
Hungary  1 1 Free 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 2 Free 
Latvia 2 1 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 
Lithuania 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 
Poland 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 
Romania 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 
Slovakia 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 
Slovenia 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 
Source: Freedom House, 2010-2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-
scores (Retrieved, February 10/2014). Grades: 1 = highest; 7 = lowest. 
 
So far, in the paragraphs above, I have discussed a series of aspects that can be attributed to the 
heterogeneity of the post-communist region (except for the homogenizing effect of the EU 
                                                 
5 So-called “non-citizens” (residents without citizenship) comprise 15% of Latvia’s population – those who immigrated 
during the Soviet period and the majority of whom are ethnic Russians (Freedom House report, 2013).  
 
institutions). Below I argue that because of certain factors and legacies, the CEE countries share 
some specific problems that make this region conceptually clearly distinguishable from the more 
mature Western democracies. 
When talking about post-communism as a theoretical paradigm, authors point to two 
competing perceptions of this notion: post-communism as a situation and post-communism as a 
condition (Gill, 2001: 202). Post-communism as a situation appeals to a temporary period after a 
country has ceased to be communist and implies nothing about the nature of the society and 
political institutions except for its origins. Post-communism as a condition is a perspective which 
highlights some qualities and specific features that are evident in the post-communist societies. 
These perspectives are quite different, but not necessarily exclusive, as Gill admits. For formal 
political and economic institutions, post-communist as a situation might be applied, acknowledging 
the success of democratization in some post-communist countries and the efficiency of their 
institutions, for instance, in fighting against the economic crisis. The notable example here is 
Estonia, which proved to be institutionally more prosperous and effective than many mature 
democracies.  
I argue that post-communism as a condition quite accurately describes the realm of culture, 
or more specifically, the political culture in the former communist societies. I draw upon the notion 
that the nature of society has been deeply transformed by the communist regime, which was unique 
compared to other authoritarian/totalitarian regimes. The utterly paternalistic character of the state 
diminished any private initiative, swept peoples’ ability to cooperate and to aggregate their needs 
collectively. The state declared itself as being responsible for any affairs and kept its citizens in a 
permanent immaturity. As many surveys demonstrate, it resulted in regional “phenomena” of self-
helplessness, fatigue, paranoia, cynicism, distrust and other “diseases” of civil society that are 
particularly common to the post-communist countries.  
The developments of political culture in Central and Eastern Europe also more accurately 
reflect the so-called “14 point model” of post-communism (Holmes, 1997: 15). This model 
envisages post-communism as a condition that comprises: “assertion of independence and the rise 
of nationalism; near absence of the culture of compromise; high expectations of leaders; cynicism 
towards, and/or mistrust of, political institutions; rejection of teleologism and grand theories; an 
ideological vacuum; moral confusion; comprehensive revolution; temporality; dynamism; 
instability; a widespread sense of insecurity; unfortunate timing; and legitimation problems” (Gill, 
2001: 201, referred to Holmes, 1997).  I argue that some aspects of this model are still relevant to 
post-communist political culture today and are evident in the daily life of the CEE countries.  
Based on that, I assert that the post-communist region faces some specific shared problems 
that allow conceptually grouping these countries together. Given that culture might be inert and 
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 resistant to rapid changes, as the culturalists tend to believe, I assume that the traumatic experiences 
of communism still exert a strong homogenizing effect on national political cultures.  
 
1.6 Design and outline of the dissertation  
 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The next chapter (chapter 2) elaborates on the 
theoretical background and the conceptualization of the variables employed in this study. It 
presents the theoretical accounts for social trust, which is the focal concept of this study. I will 
furthermore discuss the perspectives to analyze the causal relationships between: (1) social trust 
and participation, (2) social trust, political efficacy and participation. Chapter 2 also provides an 
overview of the previous work on how the central variables of the study are related in both mature 
and post-communist democracies. At the end of the chapter I formulate the hypotheses I aim to test 
in this study. 
Chapter 3 focuses on social trust in communist and post-communist contexts. I scrutinize 
the development of social trust from a historical and contemporary perspective. The aim of this 
chapter is to explain the ways in which social trust was impaired under the communist regime and 
deteriorated during the early stages of the post-communist transition. Considering contextual 
factors, I will contrast the “evolution” of social trust in post-communist and mature democracies. 
Furthermore, I elaborate on the assumptions of the link between social trust and political 
participation in post-communist societies. 
In chapters 4 and 5 the relationship between social trust, efficacy, and political participation 
is empirically tested using the ESS. The relationship between social trust and political action cannot 
be explained in a contextual vacuum, therefore I find a comparative approach between mature and 
post-communist European democracies in this regard valuable. My attempt to empirically answer 
the third set of research questions (how is social trust related to different types of political efficacy, 
and how and to what extent does a sense of efficacy lead to participation?) is framed by two 
empirical steps. First of all, chapter 4 focuses on individual level regression models in order to 
explore the differences and similarities between the individual-level mechanisms accounting for 
political participation in two country-sets. Hence I investigate whether the Western-based 
theoretical claims on social trust and participation are applicable to the post-communist region. 
Does the effect of social trust on political participation differ between post-communist and mature 
democracies?  
Second, a multi-level analysis is conducted in chapter 5 to examine the effects of contextual 
factors on political participation. The question here is to what extent social trust as a cultural 
phenomenon and post-communism as a political legacy shape individuals’ decisions to participate 
in politics or not. Thus, I wonder: how could social trust, as individual characteristic and cultural 
 
phenomena, be helpful in explaining the differences in political participation levels between the 
two country-sets?  
 Chapter 6 zooms into more detail at the relationships between trust, efficacy and political 
participation in Lithuania. This Baltic state was chosen as it provides an exemplar case of a post-
communist country that is characterized by relatively low levels of both social trust and political 
participation. Moreover, the Lithuanian case will be analyzed because I had the favourable 
opportunity to use the national post-election survey (2012), which quite accurately measures all the 
central variables that are discussed in this dissertation and thus fills the gap of an insufficient 
operationalization of these variables in the ESS study. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the empirical results and provides the general conclusions on the 
causal mechanisms between social trust and political participation in a comparative perspective of 
post-communist and mature democracies. Following that, the theoretical improvements are 
suggested. The final chapter also discusses the implications of my findings and suggestions for 
future research.
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6 Slightly different versions of section 2.4 of this chapter were included in the articles that have been published in 
Sociopedia.isa (Gaidytė, 2013) and Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review (Gaidytė, 2012).  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Some people assume that what applies to advanced democracies in terms of democratic 
developments is also appropriate to the post-communist region. In this chapter, I focus on general 
theories of political participation, efficacy and social trust, presupposing that the relationship 
between the variables should work in the same way for all democratic societies. For this reason, I 
mainly refer to what we already know from the literature based on the experiences of Western 
democracies.  
One of the coryphées of democracy theories, Dahl (1971), maintains that citizens’ political 
activity is indeed the pivotal indicator of the quality of democracy revealing its actual state and 
“health”. By means of participation citizens shape rules, create and assess institutions and exert 
their fundamental rights to be involved in the decision making processes that directly affect their 
well-being. As Drèze and Sen (2002: 359) elegantly put in, “Participation (…) [has] intrinsic value 
for the quality of life. Indeed, being able to do something through political action − for oneself and 
for others − is one of the elementary freedoms that people have reason to value.” 
The literature proposes a variety of actions that are defined as political activity. During 
recent decades, the spectrum of what we call today political participation has expanded (Norris, 
2002a; Teorell, Torcal, and Montero, 2007; Rosanvallon, 2008; Van Deth, 2014). Citizens are now 
active in more different ways compared to previous generations, because the contemporary political 
system is diffused in terms of the decision-making process and thus it “requires” more than only 
traditional avenues to influence it (Hooghe, 2014).  
Competing theories tend to emphasize different levels of analysis of political participation, 
referring to opportunities, goals and motivations of citizens who get involved or restrained from the 
action (for instance, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1982; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). 
Due to the complexity of social reality, no theory is fully capable of explaining the peculiarities of 
political participation in a particular society.  
In the following sections I do not aim to analyze all the existing approaches to political 
participation. My major task here is to provide the possible explanations of the modes of political 
participation by two determinants that are central to this monograph – social trust and a sense of 
political efficacy. This theoretical chapter explains how these predictors presumably affect political 
action in mature and post-communist democracies. 
The key independent variable I am focusing on in this chapter is social trust. Referring to the 
seminal studies of sociologists and political scientists (Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1990; Fukuyama, 
1995; Putnam, 1993; 2000; Misztal, 1996; Seligman, 1997; Sztompka, 1999, Warren, 1999; 
 
Uslaner, 2002; Hardin, 2002, 2006), I argue that trust is a fundamental feature of democracy, a 
prerequisite for collective action and socio-economic prosperity in modern societies. In order to 
connect the concept of social trust with political participation and political efficacy, first of all I will 
explicate what this notion entails and through what elements trust might be linked to collective 
action.  
Apparently, there is no consensus among social scientists about the nature, functions and the 
objects of trust. Nonetheless, in this chapter I will try to engage in a theoretical discussion and 
polemic on different questions related to trust. First, how can we describe trust using different 
theoretical approaches – is it a rational or moral account? Following that, what are the differences 
between trust in people we know personally and trust in people we do not know? Moreover, does 
social trust overlap with political trust? Finally, what is the relationship between trust and 
democracy? Should we have a certain level of trust in people and political institutions in order to 
maintain democracy? I will seek for the answers of these questions in the sections to come. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. I will firstly distinguish between two different modes 
of political participation, namely, activities in party and movement-based politics. Second, I will 
describe the concept of political efficacy and theorize how its dimensions are related to the modes 
of participation. Third, I will elaborate on trust as a sociological category, disentangling its notions 
and elements. Most importantly, this section outlines the distinction between generalized and 
particularized trust. I will also distinguish between social and political trust. Subsequently I will 
briefly discuss the dialectics of trust and liberal democracy, displaying the nature of trust in mature 
democracies. Finally, I will explain the links between political participation, political efficacy and 
social trust, referring to civic culture and social capital literatures.  
 
2.2 Two modes of political participation: party and movement politics 
 
In democracies citizens have a wide range of instruments that they can use to influence political 
decision-making or “bring about a policy change”. The literature suggests different ways to define 
forms or types of political participation, including the most commonly used classifications of 
conventional vs. unconventional activity, electoral vs. non-electoral, institutional vs. non-
institutional participation (contentious/protest politics), individual vs. collective, formal vs. informal 
engagement, and others (Kaase and Marsh, 1979; Tarrow, 1998; Norris, 2002a; Micheletti, 2003; 
Van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007; Tilly, and Tarrow, 2007; Van Deth, 2014). The 
traditional classifications, however, recently gained criticism for not mirroring the real 
developments and character of a political society in which unconventional political participation has 
become almost as conventional as other forms of political activity (Klandermans, 2003: 670; 
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Teorell, Torcal, and Montero, 2007: 343). Therefore, I will use the labelling proposed by 
Klandermans (2013), who distinguishes between participation in party and movement politics.7  
In this theoretical framework, party politics participation refers to so-called more 
institutionalized forms of political actions, such as voting, party membership, campaigning, 
contacting politicians via letters and directly, and doing voluntary work for a political party.8 All 
these activities, regardless of occurring in between or during elections, are driven by 
representational logic – it means that citizens try to influence elected representatives (Teorell, 
Torcal, and Montero, 2007: 341). In other words, participation in party politics contains more 
formal venues to influence politics and it is more routinized, and most often adjusted to particular 
electoral cycles. Movement participation, in contrast, encompasses a range of less formalized means 
of political actions, like signing petitions, demonstrating, striking, joining civic and political 
initiatives, boycotting and “buycotting” – and other (also, more radical) ways citizens try to make 
their voice heard. Movement politics mainly involves forms of protesting and it is more flexible 
than electoral cycles.  
Traditional (conventional) theories emphasize the vital role of participation in party-
based/electoral politics in nurturing democracies. Especially voting is prised as a sine qua non of 
political participation (Milner, 2002: 81). A wealth of empirical evidence illustrates that non-voters 
only very seldom take part in other active forms of politics (for instance, Norris, 2002a). Numerous 
scholars argue that movement politics is also important for a democratic political system. Much 
research suggests that citizens are generally becoming more critical (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; 
Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999; 2011). They do not rely just on elections and instead they use non-
conventional forms for putting pressure on governors. Movement politics enters as a response to the 
lack of the institutional ways to influence politics in between elections, which roughly take place 
every 4-5 years (Dalton, 2008; Hay, 2007). Additionally, via movement participation citizens’ 
preferences and dissatisfaction with policies are conveyed in more alert, vigorous ways that attract 
public attention. Protesters are just as interested in politics as the ‘traditional’ participants; they are 
generally younger and capable to invest more time in political actions; moreover, most of them are 
well-educated (della Porta, 2012). All in all, democratic experiences demonstrate that movement 
politics serves as an additional political leverage of citizens that (with some exceptions) has positive 
effects on the quality of democracy. 
                                                 
7 The terms “party politics” I use interchangeably with “participation in party politics”; the same holds for 
“movement politics” and “participation in movement politics”.  
8 Some authors (for instance, Teorell, Torcal and Montero, 2007) treat the item of contacting politicians as a 
separate mode besides party and protest-based participation. However, I will include this activity in party politics 
participation (as it is done, for example, by van der Meer and van Ingen (2009) and Hooghe and Quintelier 
(2014).  
 
Uslaner (2004) notices that individuals involving in protest actions are primed by post-
materialist values. Inglehart (1990; 1997: 211 - 213) also asserts that the quantity of protests has 
increased because people put emphasis on values such as equality, human rights, environment and 
peace. Protests prove to be an efficient mean of political action in terms of acquiring attention of the 
governments and forcing them to solve issues that could conflict with the pragmatic economic 
interests. Moreover, post-materialists are more likely to join protests because they are less accepting 
political hierarchical authority and the channels of conventional participation (Benson and Rochon, 
2004: 440).  
Broadly speaking, all existing theories of political participation more or less reflect the 
classical quote of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995: 269) arguing that people fail to participate 
in civic life “because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked”. This short 
and very felicitous phrasing reveals three explanatory layers of political participation: (1) resources, 
including political opportunities/constraints (openness/closeness of the system), time, money, 
political information/knowledge, civic skills (political efficacy), status, and education, (2) 
motivations and other psychological and social characteristics (civic-mindedness – political interest, 
social trust, grievances, absence of political cynicism), (3) recruitment networks (mobilizing 
structures, formal and informal networks of social embeddedness). 
There is a huge literature and ample empirical evidence on how external and material 
resources and recruitment networks enhance participation, both in party politics (see among many 
others: Almond and Verba, 1963; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Teixeira, 1987; Rosenstone and Hanson, 
1993; Dalton, 1996; Van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007; for an overview of the literature: 
Geys, 2006) and movement politics (e.g. Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Boekkooi, 2012; Walgrave and 
Wouters, 2014), but in this study I will focus only on individual skills (efficacy) and attitudes 
(social trust). As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995: 22) observe in their book Voice and 
Equality, actors do not participate solely out of material benefits, but also because of other reasons, 
for instance, satisfying a sense of civic duty, desiring to influence policy, enjoying the other people 
involved. The findings of their study in American political involvement suggest that participation, 
besides demographic characteristics, is also determined by a sense of perceived political efficacy 
and social characteristics, such as trust in fellow citizens. I will elaborate on these variables in the 
following sections. 
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2.3 Political efficacy as a predictor of participation in party and movement politics 
 
A sense of political efficacy9 is thought to be one of the decisive predictors leading to political 
activity (Lane, 1959; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 
1985; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Warren, 1999; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van 
Stekelenburg, 2008; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009; della Porta and Reiter, 2012). The notion 
is derived from psychology, where the concept of self-efficacy is widely used. Bandura (1977) 
describes self-efficacy as individual confidence in one’s capability to attain certain goals. In the 
political context, self-efficacy means an individual’s belief that s/he is powerful to act in some 
manner to seek for political aims – aims orientated towards change or stability in a certain political 
system. 
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) in their seminal study The Voter Decides conceptualize 
perceived political efficacy as an individual conviction that one’s political action might have an 
influence on the political processes and is worth being a civic duty. As they (1954: 187) put it, 
political efficacy is the “feeling that political and social change is possible and that the individual 
citizen can play a part in bringing about this change”. Similarly, Gamson (1968) suggests that 
political efficacy is one’s belief that it is possible to alter political conditions or make significant 
inputs in the political system. From a slightly different angle, Almond and Verba (1963) define 
one’s political competence (or, in other words, political efficacy) as a key political skill which 
endows individuals with the ability to reasonably act in the political system. In sum, democratic 
theories maintain that people who have a sense of political efficacy are more likely to participate in 
politics than those who are lacking this feeling (Pateman, 1970).  
Although in a wide range of studies political efficacy is analyzed as a one-dimensional 
category, Lane (1959) distinguishes between two types: internal and external. As Niemi, Craig, and 
Mattei (1991: 84) define it, internal efficacy is a conviction about “one’s own competence to 
understand and participate effectively in politics”. So this is a subjective, inner-based motivation to 
participate in politics. It is related to the more general notion of self-efficacy: the individuals’ 
“judgements of their capabilities to organise and execute courses of action required to attain 
designated types of performances” (Bandura, 1986: 391). In political realms it is translated as 
individuals’ “belief that one can produce effects through political action” (Bandura, 1997: 483).  
Traditional theories suggest that internal political efficacy (also known as subjective 
competence or political awareness) is linked to political interest, which shows the amount of 
attention people pay to politics. Without a minimum of political interest citizens would even not be 
                                                 
9 By the notion of political efficacy I mean perceived political efficacy (in contrast to formal/institutionally 
“prescribed” efficacy as described, for instance, in Karp and Banducci, 2008), and I use these terms 
interchangeably.  
 
aware of the opportunities how to contribute to collective decisions (Martín and Van Deth, 2007). 
Internal political efficacy and political interest are defined as the key determinants of whether or not 
citizens would be willing to participate in political action (Guo and Moy, 1998; Fiske, Kinder, and 
Larter, 1983). Internal efficacy is assumed to foster participation in both party and movement 
politics, as it unfolds individual’s awareness of political issues and points towards the ways how to 
influence politics (Gamson, 1968: 48; Sheerin 2007; Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, 2008; 
della Porta and Reiter, 2012). 
External efficacy, on the other hand, is a conviction that the government (or the system in 
general) is responding to one’s demands (Balch, 1974; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991: 85). Put it 
simply, external efficacy expresses the feeling, whether the voice of common people is heard: so 
this is an outer-based motivation to be politically active. External efficacy is believed to be closely 
associated with political trust10, but not necessarily (Fraser, 1970; Shingles, 1988; Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 2003; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999: 257-61). Hypothetically, one may think that one’s voice 
will be heard (high external efficacy), but that institutions are not trustful (low political trust). Or 
the other way around: institutions are trustful, but common people, however, cannot influence them 
(for instance, in benign authoritarian regimes). The available empirical evidence suggests that 
citizens who are more politically trusting and who believe that the government is responsive to 
public demands are more inclined to embark on traditional political activities (Hooghe and Marien, 
2013). Politically distrustful citizens with a high internal and external efficacy tend to engage more 
into movement politics than trustful citizens, because protest is traditionally conceived as an action 
directed against elite-based institutions, or, elite-challenging (for instance, Gamson, 1968: 48; 
Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 1999; Kaase, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Hooghe and Marien, 2013). 
People who protest are generally dissatisfied with political and economic conditions or the way the 
government deals with it (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996).  
Table 2.1 displays the relationship between the types of political participation and the 
dimensions of political efficacy. The dimensions prescribed to both external and internal efficacy 
are hypothetical (drawn from the literature) and not necessarily form one single dimension. 
                                                 
10 In the Eastonian theoretical framework of political system political trust is defined as a component of political support 
(Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999; Zmerli and Newton, 2008, Marien and Hooghe, 2011). Political support is one of the 
relational channels between the citizens and the state: the citizens exert demands and control for the responsiveness of 
institutions/politicians by simultaneously giving their support (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995). Political support is 
measured by the system’s legitimacy and trust. It is also said that political trust is a pivotal element that ensures 
legitimacy of the system. Otherwise, it would be difficult to accept the legitimacy of a political system and ensure 
democratic process when citizens do not believe political institutions and politicians (Camões, 2003).  
 
Chapter 236   |
 
2.3 Political efficacy as a predictor of participation in party and movement politics 
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Table 2.1 Political participation and political efficacy 
The dimensions of political 
efficacy and its meanings 
Low internal political efficacy  
• Politics is complicated 
• Politics is boring 
• Politics is not 
relevant/important  
 
High internal political efficacy 
• Politics is easily 
understandable 
• Politics is interesting 
• Politics is relevant/important  
 
Low external political efficacy 
 Citizens have no influence 
on what the government 
does  
 Government is not 
responsive to citizens 
demands 
Optional:  
 Political institutions are not 
trustful 
Citizen is not willing to vote or 
participate in movement politics 
(demonstrations, protests, boycotts, 
etc.).  
Citizen is not willing to vote, but 
prefers forms of movement politics.  
High external political efficacy 
 Citizens have an influence 
on what the government 
does  
 Government is responsive 
to citizens demands 
Optional:  
 Political institutions are 
trustful 
Citizen prefers participation in party 
politics (voting) over movement 
politics.  
Citizen participates both in party 
and movement politics.  
Source: adjusted by the author, using the model from a study of Sheerin (2007: 42). 
 
At the same time, however, recent studies imply that protesters do not necessarily distrust political 
institutions more than people who are active in party politics. Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 
(2005) argue that in mature Western societies (they refer to Belgium as an example), people who 
are involved in politics are not necessarily divided between supporters and opponents of the 
political system, the former following the electoral route and the latter engaging in protest 
behaviour. Instead, they choose different political means to express their demands, depending on 
their assessment of the situation, timing and issues they are concerned about. Thus more recent 
research suggests that people might very well choose both strategies to act, instead of selecting only 
traditional or protest activities (Uslaner, 2004). 
So far I have highlighted the individual characteristics, or, more precisely, the aspects of 
political efficacy, that lead to a greater political engagement. But individual resources and civic 
skills, different authors argue, are not sufficient to explain participation. Besides that, individuals 
are socially and emotionally embedded in social networks (communities) that provide citizens with 
the resources that can be invested in political actions (Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van 
Stekelenburg, 2008). Social trust is thought to be one of these resources that spur political 
participation. 
 
 
2.4 Social trust as a predictor of participation in party and movement politics 
 
2.4.1 The notion of trust  
 
Since social trust is a very abstract and rather ambiguous notion, several theoretical frameworks and 
approaches conceptualizing trust in sociological literature have been developed. Among the many 
typologies11 used, we can identify a key distinction regarding the notions of trust: trust as a moral or 
emotional trait deriving from a very early socialization phase vs. trust as a rational response that is 
learned with a set of normative rules. In addition, I will discuss a third perception: trust as a cultural 
rule.  
 
Moral perception of trust  
 
According to the first approach, trust is a disposition that hinges on emotions, self-perceptions, as 
well as ideals and values pursued in social relations (Wolfe, 1976); and it is as much an 
interpretation of oneself as of the other (Frederiksen, 2011: 8). This approach considers trust as an 
inevitable and natural feature of every human, which evolves from interactions with and 
interdependence among other humans in the society. We create ourselves as human beings through 
communication and interaction, and trust is a vital prerequisite of being social (Markova, 2004: 3-4; 
Habermas, 1984).  
This perception of trust is essential to Durkheim’s (1983 [1997]) notion of “collective 
conscience” – a specific type of common moral beliefs that allow for social order and lead to social 
and economic integration (“solidarity”). Durkheim believed that trust is a ground on which 
collective conscience is built, and these two concepts go hand in hand ensuring social order by 
putting moral constraints on individuals’ actions (Misztal, 1996: 46). Trust facilitates collective 
behaviour and actions, as it organizes our choices according to certain habits and cultural norms we 
are used to and do not need to reflect upon all the time.  
The moral approach to trust has been dominant in the so-called Weberian sociology, where 
trust is perceived as an inherent, religion-based feature of culture. Indeed, Simmel, following a 
Weberian way of thinking, was the first scholar who integrated and analytically conceptualized trust 
as a sociological subject in his two main studies: Philosophie des Geldes (1900, [The Philosophy of 
Money]) and Soziologie (1908, [Sociology: Investigations on the Forms of Sociation]). According 
to Simmel, trust is evidently one of the most important synthetic forces within society and without it 
society itself would disintegrate (1950: 326). Metaphorically speaking, trust helps to convert the 
                                                 
11 In the literature trust is categorized as a moral trait (Uslaner, 2002), emotion (Rotter, 1971), a relationship (Hardin, 
2006), an action (Sztompka, 1999), one of the elements of social capital (Putnam, 1993). See more: Nannestad, 2008. 
Some categories, however, are intertwined, for instance, emotional and moral perceptions of trust.  
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communication and interaction, and trust is a vital prerequisite of being social (Markova, 2004: 3-4; 
Habermas, 1984).  
This perception of trust is essential to Durkheim’s (1983 [1997]) notion of “collective 
conscience” – a specific type of common moral beliefs that allow for social order and lead to social 
and economic integration (“solidarity”). Durkheim believed that trust is a ground on which 
collective conscience is built, and these two concepts go hand in hand ensuring social order by 
putting moral constraints on individuals’ actions (Misztal, 1996: 46). Trust facilitates collective 
behaviour and actions, as it organizes our choices according to certain habits and cultural norms we 
are used to and do not need to reflect upon all the time.  
The moral approach to trust has been dominant in the so-called Weberian sociology, where 
trust is perceived as an inherent, religion-based feature of culture. Indeed, Simmel, following a 
Weberian way of thinking, was the first scholar who integrated and analytically conceptualized trust 
as a sociological subject in his two main studies: Philosophie des Geldes (1900, [The Philosophy of 
Money]) and Soziologie (1908, [Sociology: Investigations on the Forms of Sociation]). According 
to Simmel, trust is evidently one of the most important synthetic forces within society and without it 
society itself would disintegrate (1950: 326). Metaphorically speaking, trust helps to convert the 
                                                 
11 In the literature trust is categorized as a moral trait (Uslaner, 2002), emotion (Rotter, 1971), a relationship (Hardin, 
2006), an action (Sztompka, 1999), one of the elements of social capital (Putnam, 1993). See more: Nannestad, 2008. 
Some categories, however, are intertwined, for instance, emotional and moral perceptions of trust.  
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Hobbesian state of nature from something that is brutish and selfish into something that is more 
efficient, pleasant and altogether more peaceful (Newton, 2001: 202).  
To sum up, seen from a moral point of view, trust holds an element of “faith”, which is 
endogenous, attached to religion and even mystical, having nothing to do with practical knowledge 
or personal experiences (Simmel, 1950:318; Uslaner, 2002). Trust has a unique, metaphysic nature, 
therefore some theorists expect that trust is relatively consistent over different phases of 
individual’s life (e.g. Seligman, 1997; Uslaner, 2002). 
 
Rational perception of trust 
 
The second approach would suggest that trust is more of a rational choice and this choice is highly 
motivated by maximizing utility (Coleman, 1990; Misztal, 1996). Placing trust is making a bet 
about the future, about the uncertain actions of others that are always associated with risk (Kollock, 
1994: 317). If we define trust as a bet, we believe that placing trust in someone means expecting 
particular results from him/her though we cannot really control or predict his/her actions 
(Sztompka, 1999: 31). In this sense, the risk would be realized if the persons we trust would behave 
contrary to our expectations. Thus, trust becomes a cognitive response, because the individual 
thinks about the risk in the situation (Kee and Knox, 1970). By trusting we risk not only to make 
wrong predictions regarding the actions of others, but also to suffer moral and material damage. In 
contrast, trust as a moral trait of personality refers to the general inclination towards trust in people, 
despite the risk it may bring (Hardin, 2006: 17). 
Risk derives from taking some actions or making some deals in advance. The imperative of 
advance is obviously risky, since one can never be absolutely sure about the deeds of other 
individuals. In frequent social interactions we usually do not have all knowledge we need for 
trusting other people. Here, Simmel argues, trust emerges as a leap of faith, or the suspension of 
uncertainty (Simmel, 1950: 318; Möllering, 2001). This “mystical” and irrational step is also 
acknowledged by Luhmann (1979: 25), who admits that at least a minimum level of trust (wishful 
trust) is necessary in order to invoke any social cooperation, any relation per se, because in the 
sphere of social relations, most actions are committed “in advance”, i.e., based on expectations of 
particular responses. In this sense, it is suggested that a purely rational basis of trust would not 
enable the mechanism of the leap of faith and thus would suspend any social interaction (Luhmann, 
1979:40). 
Following the rational choice approach, we are inclined to take risks and place trust only if 
the person we are dealing with is perceived as trustworthy; hence trust evolves as not only an 
individual emotion, but also a relationship (Hardin, 2002). Kollock (1994, 318–319) maintains that 
 
to be trustworthy means to become committed to particular exchange partners, and this commitment 
can be treated as a response to the possible risk of trust. Thus, placing trust as making a bet is 
grounded in the anticipation of mutual utility (Gambetta, 1988). It implies a certain level of 
predictability of social actions: when we trust someone, we organize our actions according to the 
most probable utility-based behaviour of other actors (Hardin names it “encapsulated interest”). 
This idea is reminiscent of the Pareto-optimum situation of the Prisoners’ dilemma in game theory: 
the actor is led to trust the other actor presuming that in the future, the latter would be interested in 
further cooperation (reciprocity). Therefore, the mechanism of trust enables confidence in mutual 
utility in situations in which mutual utility cannot be immediately or simultaneously realized. 
Putnam (1993) describes trusting others in this situation as “short-term altruism” based on “long-
term self-interest”.  
Moreover, Putnam (1993) claims that when we are placing trust in a certain person in a 
certain context, our calculations encompass not only the return from this concrete person (with 
whom we might never have anything to do again), but also the return from potential other people 
who are members of the community. So in the case of one social action we have not only two-sided 
reciprocity (interaction between actors A and B), but multilateral reciprocity (interaction of actor A 
with B, Y, X and other actors). A trust building process implies the following presumption: I, actor 
A, expect that every member of society in the same circumstances would act towards me in the 
same way I trust and act towards actor B. To describe this interaction, Putnam uses the term of 
general reciprocity. It implies the durable interchange when an action is plausibly not rewarded 
immediately in the concrete moment, but contains mutual trust that the action will be rewarded in 
future. One may therefore argue that trust itself is not something very rational, even if we can define 
it in rational terms, but that it is essential for rational decision-making to function. 
Finally, the rational-choice approach also considers the function of the alternative of trust – 
distrust, when the risk of trusting is large and potential losses exceeds potential gains (Misztal, 
1996; Hardin, 2002). Distrust, as the opposite of trust, might be described as a rational reaction 
(vigilance) to certain social situations and contexts (Žiliukaitė, 2005b; Levi and Stoker, 2000). 
To sum up, scholars admit that despite the different approaches towards trust, it is 
impossible to clearly define trust as only rational or, in opposite, as a purely moral trait, when we 
take into account any social interaction. More importantly, as political psychologists observe, 
“people do not always act the way rational choice assumptions suggest they should act” (Tufiş, 
2008: 118). The rational account of trust does not explain why people risk to cooperate even not 
knowing much about each other. Quoting Lewis and Weigert (1985: 972), “Trust in everyday life is 
a mix of feeling and rational thinking”. Trust may include a rational and moral basis at the same 
time, while the “weight” of these dimensions may vary depending on different situations: in some 
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Hobbesian state of nature from something that is brutish and selfish into something that is more 
efficient, pleasant and altogether more peaceful (Newton, 2001: 202).  
To sum up, seen from a moral point of view, trust holds an element of “faith”, which is 
endogenous, attached to religion and even mystical, having nothing to do with practical knowledge 
or personal experiences (Simmel, 1950:318; Uslaner, 2002). Trust has a unique, metaphysic nature, 
therefore some theorists expect that trust is relatively consistent over different phases of 
individual’s life (e.g. Seligman, 1997; Uslaner, 2002). 
 
Rational perception of trust 
 
The second approach would suggest that trust is more of a rational choice and this choice is highly 
motivated by maximizing utility (Coleman, 1990; Misztal, 1996). Placing trust is making a bet 
about the future, about the uncertain actions of others that are always associated with risk (Kollock, 
1994: 317). If we define trust as a bet, we believe that placing trust in someone means expecting 
particular results from him/her though we cannot really control or predict his/her actions 
(Sztompka, 1999: 31). In this sense, the risk would be realized if the persons we trust would behave 
contrary to our expectations. Thus, trust becomes a cognitive response, because the individual 
thinks about the risk in the situation (Kee and Knox, 1970). By trusting we risk not only to make 
wrong predictions regarding the actions of others, but also to suffer moral and material damage. In 
contrast, trust as a moral trait of personality refers to the general inclination towards trust in people, 
despite the risk it may bring (Hardin, 2006: 17). 
Risk derives from taking some actions or making some deals in advance. The imperative of 
advance is obviously risky, since one can never be absolutely sure about the deeds of other 
individuals. In frequent social interactions we usually do not have all knowledge we need for 
trusting other people. Here, Simmel argues, trust emerges as a leap of faith, or the suspension of 
uncertainty (Simmel, 1950: 318; Möllering, 2001). This “mystical” and irrational step is also 
acknowledged by Luhmann (1979: 25), who admits that at least a minimum level of trust (wishful 
trust) is necessary in order to invoke any social cooperation, any relation per se, because in the 
sphere of social relations, most actions are committed “in advance”, i.e., based on expectations of 
particular responses. In this sense, it is suggested that a purely rational basis of trust would not 
enable the mechanism of the leap of faith and thus would suspend any social interaction (Luhmann, 
1979:40). 
Following the rational choice approach, we are inclined to take risks and place trust only if 
the person we are dealing with is perceived as trustworthy; hence trust evolves as not only an 
individual emotion, but also a relationship (Hardin, 2002). Kollock (1994, 318–319) maintains that 
 
to be trustworthy means to become committed to particular exchange partners, and this commitment 
can be treated as a response to the possible risk of trust. Thus, placing trust as making a bet is 
grounded in the anticipation of mutual utility (Gambetta, 1988). It implies a certain level of 
predictability of social actions: when we trust someone, we organize our actions according to the 
most probable utility-based behaviour of other actors (Hardin names it “encapsulated interest”). 
This idea is reminiscent of the Pareto-optimum situation of the Prisoners’ dilemma in game theory: 
the actor is led to trust the other actor presuming that in the future, the latter would be interested in 
further cooperation (reciprocity). Therefore, the mechanism of trust enables confidence in mutual 
utility in situations in which mutual utility cannot be immediately or simultaneously realized. 
Putnam (1993) describes trusting others in this situation as “short-term altruism” based on “long-
term self-interest”.  
Moreover, Putnam (1993) claims that when we are placing trust in a certain person in a 
certain context, our calculations encompass not only the return from this concrete person (with 
whom we might never have anything to do again), but also the return from potential other people 
who are members of the community. So in the case of one social action we have not only two-sided 
reciprocity (interaction between actors A and B), but multilateral reciprocity (interaction of actor A 
with B, Y, X and other actors). A trust building process implies the following presumption: I, actor 
A, expect that every member of society in the same circumstances would act towards me in the 
same way I trust and act towards actor B. To describe this interaction, Putnam uses the term of 
general reciprocity. It implies the durable interchange when an action is plausibly not rewarded 
immediately in the concrete moment, but contains mutual trust that the action will be rewarded in 
future. One may therefore argue that trust itself is not something very rational, even if we can define 
it in rational terms, but that it is essential for rational decision-making to function. 
Finally, the rational-choice approach also considers the function of the alternative of trust – 
distrust, when the risk of trusting is large and potential losses exceeds potential gains (Misztal, 
1996; Hardin, 2002). Distrust, as the opposite of trust, might be described as a rational reaction 
(vigilance) to certain social situations and contexts (Žiliukaitė, 2005b; Levi and Stoker, 2000). 
To sum up, scholars admit that despite the different approaches towards trust, it is 
impossible to clearly define trust as only rational or, in opposite, as a purely moral trait, when we 
take into account any social interaction. More importantly, as political psychologists observe, 
“people do not always act the way rational choice assumptions suggest they should act” (Tufiş, 
2008: 118). The rational account of trust does not explain why people risk to cooperate even not 
knowing much about each other. Quoting Lewis and Weigert (1985: 972), “Trust in everyday life is 
a mix of feeling and rational thinking”. Trust may include a rational and moral basis at the same 
time, while the “weight” of these dimensions may vary depending on different situations: in some 
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situations, it is rationality that becomes a determinant of trust, and in some other situations it is 
morality.  
 
Trust as a cultural rule 
 
Alongside the moral and rational interpretations of trust, Sztompka (1999: 66–68) distinguishes the 
third perception of trust as a cultural rule. From this point of view, trust is conceived as a prescribed 
norm: individuals are expected to behave according to the norm of trust/distrust. Put it differently, 
an individual’s decision to trust or distrust someone depends on the pre-existent cultural context, 
where normative rules encourage or refrain from trust. Trust is not treated as an entirely voluntary 
individual choice (based on morality or rational calculations), but as a cultural phenomena, or social 
fact, in the sense of Durkheim. Sztompka (1999: 66) points out that if rules demanding trust are 
shared by a community and trust is a perceived external obligation, then these rules exert a strong 
pressure on actually giving trust. And the other way around, if a culture implies suspicion and 
distrust, the rules of this culture impose the withdrawal of trust. In other words, people take into 
account a general level of trustworthiness in a particular context and based on that they make their 
decision to trust others or not (Hardin, 2002). 
Trust as a cultural rule might transform the origins of trust, for instance, decrease rational 
calculations, and vice versa, suspend the moral inclination of trust. To give an example, I have been 
socialized in a distrustful post-communist society, but the general atmosphere of trust in the 
Netherlands, where I live now, encourages me to act in a trusting manner. Thus one may say that 
the emphasis on the particular context provides more insight into how the normative system of 
society acts as a powerful factor influencing decisions of trust.  
 
2.4.2 Social trust: generalized vs. particularized 
 
When I talk about social trust in this dissertation, I refer to the general dimension of it, as opposed 
to particular(ized) trust. Following most scholars, I use generalized (also known as “impersonal” or 
“thin”) trust interchangeably with social trust.12 Usually, generalized trust is measured by the 
question that first appeared in a study in post-war Germany in 1948: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
Indeed, the aim of this question is to measure the trust level between strangers and not particularly 
inside specific groups (Delhey and Newton, 2005: 311). Defined like this, trust is measured by an 
abstract scope of the fellow citizens with whom the bonds may be direct and indirect, but generally 
                                                 
12 Although I also admit that social trust is a more acute term to describe personal relationship, whereas 
generalized/general trust in sociological literature might also contain other forms of trust (see, for instance, Bartuškaitė 
and Žilys, 2011). 
 
it refers to trust in the citizenry as a whole. It aims to establish the horizontal relationship of civic 
trust (Newton, 1999b).  
In contrast to generalized or impersonal trust, we can talk about particularized, or in-group, 
specific (“thick”) trust (Zmerli and Newton, 2011; Sztompka, 1999; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel, 
2011). Empirically, it is measured by a set of different questions across various studies (for 
instance, the questions refer to trust in family members, neighbours, trust in people you know or 
have ever met, trust in people of the same ethnicity, religion, age and so on). These questions 
display certain levels of particularized trust vested in identifiable individuals or groups, so it is 
tightly related to the information (or expectations, prejudices) and experiences we possess. In the 
academic literature some scholars tend to conceptualize trust only within a framework of 
particularized trust, pointing out that for the real, substantive trust we need to have certain 
knowledge about a trustee (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Given this, generalized trust, which is 
not based on particular knowledge, is only a normative construct (Offe, 1999; Hardin, 2002) 
However, Uslaner (2002) rejects this argument, claiming that generalized trust can actually 
exist when it is founded on a moral, rather than rational, calculative basis. Seen like this, 
generalized trust appeals to a regularly honest behaviour of a trustee. The perceived trustworthiness 
of strangers rests on the idea that human actions are intrinsically motivated. As Seligman (1997: 43) 
puts it, generalized trust is a belief in the goodwill of others.  
Fukuyama (1995) elaborates on this idea and proposes the notion of the radius of trust, 
which encompasses a circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. As Delhey, 
Newton and Welzel (2011) observe, “with respect to civic cooperation the radius of trust is 
important because the wider it is, the more inclusive is the circle of cooperation”. Hence, 
generalized trust expresses a wide radius of perceived trustees in whom the truster is ready to vest 
his/her trust.  
Unlike generalized trust, particularized trust has a strategic function. Particularized trust is 
based on knowledge or experiences. It emerges in particular groups and usually does not overcome 
the boundaries of this specific group. In other words, it embraces only a narrow radius of trust. In 
contrast, generalized trust is extended trust in people who differ from us and about whom we have 
no particular knowledge. By endowing generalized trust, I admit that people may have different 
beliefs, but at the same time belong to the same narrative of fundamental values (Fukuyama, 1995: 
153; Uslaner, 2002: 17).  
The question here arises to what extent generalized and particularized trust can be 
compatible. In Putnam’s account both forms of trust do not necessarily conflict with each other and 
particularized trust in small, identity-based groups can spill-over to generalized levels. Following 
this line, particularized and generalized trust are mutually supportive; if you honestly trust someone 
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Alongside the moral and rational interpretations of trust, Sztompka (1999: 66–68) distinguishes the 
third perception of trust as a cultural rule. From this point of view, trust is conceived as a prescribed 
norm: individuals are expected to behave according to the norm of trust/distrust. Put it differently, 
an individual’s decision to trust or distrust someone depends on the pre-existent cultural context, 
where normative rules encourage or refrain from trust. Trust is not treated as an entirely voluntary 
individual choice (based on morality or rational calculations), but as a cultural phenomena, or social 
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shared by a community and trust is a perceived external obligation, then these rules exert a strong 
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account a general level of trustworthiness in a particular context and based on that they make their 
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Trust as a cultural rule might transform the origins of trust, for instance, decrease rational 
calculations, and vice versa, suspend the moral inclination of trust. To give an example, I have been 
socialized in a distrustful post-communist society, but the general atmosphere of trust in the 
Netherlands, where I live now, encourages me to act in a trusting manner. Thus one may say that 
the emphasis on the particular context provides more insight into how the normative system of 
society acts as a powerful factor influencing decisions of trust.  
 
2.4.2 Social trust: generalized vs. particularized 
 
When I talk about social trust in this dissertation, I refer to the general dimension of it, as opposed 
to particular(ized) trust. Following most scholars, I use generalized (also known as “impersonal” or 
“thin”) trust interchangeably with social trust.12 Usually, generalized trust is measured by the 
question that first appeared in a study in post-war Germany in 1948: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
Indeed, the aim of this question is to measure the trust level between strangers and not particularly 
inside specific groups (Delhey and Newton, 2005: 311). Defined like this, trust is measured by an 
abstract scope of the fellow citizens with whom the bonds may be direct and indirect, but generally 
                                                 
12 Although I also admit that social trust is a more acute term to describe personal relationship, whereas 
generalized/general trust in sociological literature might also contain other forms of trust (see, for instance, Bartuškaitė 
and Žilys, 2011). 
 
it refers to trust in the citizenry as a whole. It aims to establish the horizontal relationship of civic 
trust (Newton, 1999b).  
In contrast to generalized or impersonal trust, we can talk about particularized, or in-group, 
specific (“thick”) trust (Zmerli and Newton, 2011; Sztompka, 1999; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel, 
2011). Empirically, it is measured by a set of different questions across various studies (for 
instance, the questions refer to trust in family members, neighbours, trust in people you know or 
have ever met, trust in people of the same ethnicity, religion, age and so on). These questions 
display certain levels of particularized trust vested in identifiable individuals or groups, so it is 
tightly related to the information (or expectations, prejudices) and experiences we possess. In the 
academic literature some scholars tend to conceptualize trust only within a framework of 
particularized trust, pointing out that for the real, substantive trust we need to have certain 
knowledge about a trustee (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Given this, generalized trust, which is 
not based on particular knowledge, is only a normative construct (Offe, 1999; Hardin, 2002) 
However, Uslaner (2002) rejects this argument, claiming that generalized trust can actually 
exist when it is founded on a moral, rather than rational, calculative basis. Seen like this, 
generalized trust appeals to a regularly honest behaviour of a trustee. The perceived trustworthiness 
of strangers rests on the idea that human actions are intrinsically motivated. As Seligman (1997: 43) 
puts it, generalized trust is a belief in the goodwill of others.  
Fukuyama (1995) elaborates on this idea and proposes the notion of the radius of trust, 
which encompasses a circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. As Delhey, 
Newton and Welzel (2011) observe, “with respect to civic cooperation the radius of trust is 
important because the wider it is, the more inclusive is the circle of cooperation”. Hence, 
generalized trust expresses a wide radius of perceived trustees in whom the truster is ready to vest 
his/her trust.  
Unlike generalized trust, particularized trust has a strategic function. Particularized trust is 
based on knowledge or experiences. It emerges in particular groups and usually does not overcome 
the boundaries of this specific group. In other words, it embraces only a narrow radius of trust. In 
contrast, generalized trust is extended trust in people who differ from us and about whom we have 
no particular knowledge. By endowing generalized trust, I admit that people may have different 
beliefs, but at the same time belong to the same narrative of fundamental values (Fukuyama, 1995: 
153; Uslaner, 2002: 17).  
The question here arises to what extent generalized and particularized trust can be 
compatible. In Putnam’s account both forms of trust do not necessarily conflict with each other and 
particularized trust in small, identity-based groups can spill-over to generalized levels. Following 
this line, particularized and generalized trust are mutually supportive; if you honestly trust someone 
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you know, you most probably will elaborate your trust in strangers (Putnam, 1993: 180). This is the 
core idea of Putnam (who follows the Tocquevillian tradition) about a civic society: the activities in 
your own group foster trust, which spills over to a generalized level of trust. Zmerli and Newton 
(2011) conclude from their empirical research that most generalized trusters are also particularized 
trusters, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Thus, as they say, particularized trust is a 
prerequisite, but not a sufficient cause of generalized trust. Nevertheless, the authors are quite 
optimistic about the possibilities to develop generalized trust within a diverse society.  
Uslaner, however, argues that generalized trust most probably does not evolve from 
particularized trust, because particularized trusters tend to engage in activities with their own group 
only, thus limiting social contacts with strangers. Generalized trust is a moral inclination, based on 
optimistic and altruistic values, whereas particularized trust is more egoistic and reciprocal. The 
latter has no moral force, thus it is fragile and easy to destroy (Levi, 1998: 81). Due to their adverse 
nature, these two types of trust, Uslaner claims, actually conflict with each other, rather than 
mutually support each other. The more a person is a particularized truster, the less s/he relies on 
strangers or people different to her/him. This type of trust requires trustees to be just like trusters: I 
only trust someone who is similar to me. At the same time, I am suspicious about people outside the 
circle, therefore I demand evidence that they share the same values. Thus, it is more likely that 
particularized trust will impose discriminative attitudes on individuals towards those who do not 
clearly belong to “them” (Offe, 1999: 64).   
Various theories suggest that generalized social trust is desirable for democracy because it 
promotes a democratic political culture and reduces fractionalization of a society (Inglehart, 1997; 
Paxton, 2007; Putnam, 1993). It encourages tolerance for pluralism and a variety of lifestyles, 
which is inevitable for the implementation of fundamental human rights and freedoms in 
democratic regimes (Misztal, 1996; Sztompka, 1999; Newton, 1999a; 1999b; Uslaner, 2002; 
Mishler and Rose, 2005). Moreover, generalized trust allows for peaceful conflict resolution, 
compromise and consensus, because when people trust each other, they are committed to the same 
democratic values and principles (Žiliukaitė, 2005b: 87; Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992). With the 
persistence of generalized social trust it becomes more likely that citizens obey laws and rules and 
do not abuse the rights of other people. Eventually, it is also more likely that a society with higher 
levels of trust will reject any undemocratic alternatives (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998). In fact, 
this insight is very important when talking about the consolidation of democracy in post-communist 
countries. Mishler and Rose (2005: 1053) suggest that from a cultural perspective, distrust in 
society and democratic institutions not only undermines their legitimacy, but “also threatens to 
increase support for undemocratic regimes”.  
 
From the civic culture perspective, generalized trust sustains a cooperative social climate, 
civic norms and a regard for public interests (Putnam, 1993; Zmerli and Newton, 2008: 706). With 
their strong emphasis on public interest, trustful societies are more likely to engage into collective 
action and pursue social-welfare policies (Uslaner, 2002: 40). Countries with many generalized 
trusters have generally better functioning governments, a stronger economic growth and more open 
market economies (see, for instance, Hirsch, 1977; Zak and Knack, 2002; Inglehart, 1997; Paxton, 
2002).  
 
2.4.3 Determinants of social trust 
 
In this section I consider the determinants of social trust, taking into account individual, societal and 
institutional mechanisms.  
First, at the individual level, social trust is more often a feature of people who are educated 
and have a higher socio-economic status (Inglehart, 1997; Uslaner, 1999; Putnam, 2000). Trust 
increases with education because more educated people presumably are more knowledgeable, 
tolerant and less bounded by prejudices (Vasilache, 2010). Offe (1999) notices that the rich, the 
more powerful and well-informed people are more inclined to trust, because they are less vulnerable 
to the potential losses of trust. These people are more likely to survive the disappointment of 
falsified trust investment, because they can switch to alternative resources (like money or power), 
whereas people lacking these resources are in a greater risk to suffer from a breakdown of the trust 
relations. Simply put: poverty makes people risk-averse. Similarly, Delhey and Newton (2003: 96) 
note that: “Those who have been treated kindly and generously by life are more likely to trust than 
those who suffer from poverty, unemployment, discrimination, exploitation and social exclusion”. 
Furthermore, the better-off are more trusting because they are surrounded by trustworthy people 
like themselves (Zmerli and Newton, 2011). This aspect is very important, as the question that 
measures social trust (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”) is about how individuals judge the trustworthiness 
of others (Zmerli and Newton, 2011:1). Hence, contextual conditions are no less important than 
individual propensities. 
Second, at the societal level, the literature suggests that generalized social trust is a 
characteristic of individualist cultures, which stand in opposition to collectivist societies (Triandis, 
2004). While collectivist cultures are in-group and family centered, individualistic values promote 
equality across different sections of society and thus encourage a generalized sense of trust. These 
attitudes are especially common to Protestant cultures (Wolfe, 1989; Inglehart, 1997). Inglehart 
(1997; 1999; 2008) argues that modern, economically developed societies steadily turn from 
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(2011) conclude from their empirical research that most generalized trusters are also particularized 
trusters, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Thus, as they say, particularized trust is a 
prerequisite, but not a sufficient cause of generalized trust. Nevertheless, the authors are quite 
optimistic about the possibilities to develop generalized trust within a diverse society.  
Uslaner, however, argues that generalized trust most probably does not evolve from 
particularized trust, because particularized trusters tend to engage in activities with their own group 
only, thus limiting social contacts with strangers. Generalized trust is a moral inclination, based on 
optimistic and altruistic values, whereas particularized trust is more egoistic and reciprocal. The 
latter has no moral force, thus it is fragile and easy to destroy (Levi, 1998: 81). Due to their adverse 
nature, these two types of trust, Uslaner claims, actually conflict with each other, rather than 
mutually support each other. The more a person is a particularized truster, the less s/he relies on 
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2.4.3 Determinants of social trust 
 
In this section I consider the determinants of social trust, taking into account individual, societal and 
institutional mechanisms.  
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relations. Simply put: poverty makes people risk-averse. Similarly, Delhey and Newton (2003: 96) 
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like themselves (Zmerli and Newton, 2011). This aspect is very important, as the question that 
measures social trust (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”) is about how individuals judge the trustworthiness 
of others (Zmerli and Newton, 2011:1). Hence, contextual conditions are no less important than 
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Second, at the societal level, the literature suggests that generalized social trust is a 
characteristic of individualist cultures, which stand in opposition to collectivist societies (Triandis, 
2004). While collectivist cultures are in-group and family centered, individualistic values promote 
equality across different sections of society and thus encourage a generalized sense of trust. These 
attitudes are especially common to Protestant cultures (Wolfe, 1989; Inglehart, 1997). Inglehart 
(1997; 1999; 2008) argues that modern, economically developed societies steadily turn from 
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materialist, or security based, values to post-materialist values, such as individual’s autonomy and 
self-expression. Due to rising economic prosperity individuals put survival values in the second 
plan and give priority to individual-improvement values. Social trust with its modern connotation 
strengthens the post-materialist normative set (and vice versa), which is oriented towards the society 
based on humanist ideas. Social trust evolved along such emphasized values as personal freedom, a 
sense of control and efficacy, promoting a healthy environment, human rights, peace, equality, life 
satisfaction, and happiness. At first glance, these world views do not seem to be directly related to 
trust, but trust is in fact the essential component of social prosperity, leading to common 
understanding and solutions for “making the world a better place”. As Monroe (1991) puts it, social 
trust contributes to creating a global identity that emphasizes inclusive human values.  
Another important societal prerequisite that might encourage or reduce social trust is 
social/ethnic diversity. Some authors (Allport, 1954; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008) claim that 
diversity increases the odds of having social contacts with different people, so people become 
accustomed to “strangers”. But the adverse effect is also possible: diversity (especially, conflict-
based) might deter people from cooperation and shelter them under their own circles (Delhey, 
Newton, and Welzel, 2011; Hooghe et al., 2009). 
Social capital theorists (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Norris, 2002a) claim 
that social trust is generated by the interaction of individuals in civic networks. We learn to trust 
when communicating with others in civic associations that represent a segment of a society. The 
contacts with the members of an association allow for the process of generalization of social trust in 
people you do not know (Stolle, 2002). It also teaches us how to safely project trust in others and it 
has a heuristic function: “if others have learned similar lessons, then trust will in fact become 
generalized throughout the society” (Levi, 1996: 48). However, this argument has received criticism 
as well (Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Stolle, 1998): firstly, not all civic associations breed social 
trust, and secondly, social trust might even decrease because of the associational “localism” and 
distance created towards others outside the networks. Very interesting evidence in this regard was 
demonstrated by Stolle (1998), who found out in her research that joining associations indeed 
increases social trust for a short time, but in a long run social trust tends to shrink between the 
members of different civic associations. She concludes that in the initial stage members strengthen 
trust bonds with each other, but after some time their trust does not generalize to “outsiders” of a 
particular association.  
Uslaner’s (2002) idea is that activities do not lead to trust, but vice versa, trust leads to 
different activities. It means that if you are particularized truster, you are likely to choose 
cooperation in narrow groups with people who are similar to you. And if you are a generalized 
truster, you tend to participate in different types of associations, cutting across social cleavages. 
 
These associations might include people who are different from you, but you need to agree with 
them upon important decisions.  
Another group of authors (Foley and Edwards, 1998; Delhey and Newton, 2005) suggests 
that social trust stems from informal social networks, or, face-to-face interactions with people you 
know – family, friends, neighbours. These tight and strong relations, according to the authors, 
actually teach us “the virtue of trust”.  
Thirdly and finally, the quality of institutions and legal norms are thought to be a crucial 
prerequisite of social trust – or even the factor which makes trust “generalized” as such (Coleman, 
1990; Levi, 1996; Offe, 1999, Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Warren, 1999, Misztal, 2001; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Institutions and fair legal systems are thought to reduce risks related to 
trust and create favourable conditions for spreading trust at the generalized level. First, efficiently 
protected rights of individuals and well-functioning mechanisms of damage compensation make it 
more likely for individuals to trust others compared with the social contexts where rights are abused 
and legal norms are inefficient (Sztompka, 1999; Warren, 1999; Jong-sung You, 2012). In this 
sense, a democratic environment creates an ability to anticipate the future and thus trust could 
become a “rational gamble”, a voluntary choice. In totalitarian societies, contrarily, trust may cause 
huge losses because of the lack of anticipation. Second, as Offe (1999) observes, institutions 
provide normative reference values that can be relied on in order to justify the rules created by 
institutions. Institutions are endowed with a certain spirit, a certain moral setting which prescribes 
preferred ways to conduct for people in the community. If institutions are available to effectively 
ensure the compliance of the citizens to the values, it implies that citizens should trust their fellows 
as they are involved in the same institutions. This involvement creates commitment to the norms 
and values represented by these institutions (Offe, 1999: 65-67). However, if citizens feel in doubt 
about the moral inclination of the institutions, they most probably will neither elaborate loyalty 
towards them, nor towards fellow citizens. 
In sum, contextual variables matter as much as individual ones to explain why some people 
display high levels of generalized trust, whereas others do not. On the aggregate level, the former 
variables might thus also explain why in the more unequal and less prosperous societies the levels 
of social trust are generally low, and why welfare states are more trusting (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2002; Uslaner, 2002). Although it is obvious that so-called winners (or better-off) are more trusting, 
we cannot neglect contextual effects. Trust is embedded in institutional structures; and country level 
characteristics such as inequality or corruption have a profound negative effect on establishing a 
culture of trust of a society. In the next section, I turn to a question that is closely related to the 
institutional theory of social trust, namely, what is the relationship between social and political 
trust? 
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preferred ways to conduct for people in the community. If institutions are available to effectively 
ensure the compliance of the citizens to the values, it implies that citizens should trust their fellows 
as they are involved in the same institutions. This involvement creates commitment to the norms 
and values represented by these institutions (Offe, 1999: 65-67). However, if citizens feel in doubt 
about the moral inclination of the institutions, they most probably will neither elaborate loyalty 
towards them, nor towards fellow citizens. 
In sum, contextual variables matter as much as individual ones to explain why some people 
display high levels of generalized trust, whereas others do not. On the aggregate level, the former 
variables might thus also explain why in the more unequal and less prosperous societies the levels 
of social trust are generally low, and why welfare states are more trusting (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2002; Uslaner, 2002). Although it is obvious that so-called winners (or better-off) are more trusting, 
we cannot neglect contextual effects. Trust is embedded in institutional structures; and country level 
characteristics such as inequality or corruption have a profound negative effect on establishing a 
culture of trust of a society. In the next section, I turn to a question that is closely related to the 
institutional theory of social trust, namely, what is the relationship between social and political 
trust? 
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2.4.4 Social and political trust 
 
In academic writing, social trust and institutional trust are sometimes conflated within the more 
abstract notion of political trust (Heywood and Wood, 2011: 148). However, these are two different 
analytical categories. Thus I separate these notions in this dissertation and refer to social trust as 
trust between people and political trust as trust in political institutions.  
Compared to social trust, political trust13 rests on a vague and partial understanding 
(Giddens, 1990: 179), because the relationship between truster (individual) and trustee (institution, 
politician) is not direct or equal. Political trust can be learned through primary contact (personal 
experience with the institutions), but as Newton (2001: 205) observes, it is usually learned 
indirectly and at a distance – through media. Indeed, media play a crucial role in establishing pillars 
of political trust, providing us with information to make judgments about politicians and 
institutions. We may not know the people in government personally, but we believe that we have 
sufficient information to make expectations and judgments about them. Unlike some forms of social 
trust, political trust is always related to expectations, so in this sense it is a strategic, but not 
moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2002). Conceptualized in this manner, political trust applies to actions of 
some institution or politician being in line with my normative expectations, even if I do not check 
these actions permanently. Therefore, political trust is sometimes understood as a psychological 
orientation, having both affective and evaluative aspects (Norris, 1999).  
There is a rich literature discussing the dialectics of political trust and liberal democracy, 
and I would like to make a brief detour into that to argue how social and political trust are related 
(and I find this philosophical literature helpful in this regard). To begin with, in liberal political 
thinking, trust is a fairly controversial notion (Warren, 1999; Hardin, 2006; Rosanvallon, 2008). 
Although sociological theories consider political trust and democracy as mutually supportive, 
according to liberal philosophy, the roots of the liberal system lie, in fact, in distrust. The French 
philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon (2008) maintains that distrust is a natural and legitimate component 
of democracy, and it functions as a protective mechanism, enabling society to control the 
democratic processes alongside the formal rules.  
Following the thought of liberal philosophy, distrust is a necessary condition for institutions 
not to override their authority or abuse the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens. Historically, the 
institutionalisation of distrust in the political system was tightly related to economic liberalism. The 
Constitution of the United States (1787) has primarily anchored the legal mechanisms of distrust in 
                                                 
13 Some authors think that, when we talk about institutions and systems, the term trust is inappropriate and should be 
replaced with more neutral terms such as reliance or confidence (for instance, Dalton, 1999; Sapsford and Abbott, 
2006). On the other hand, the term political trust is also widely used and discussed (Mishler and Rose 2001, Newton, 
2007; Van der Meer, 2010).   
 
the realm of economics: it inscribes protective mechanisms on behalf of economic liberties against 
the intervention of the state in economic relations. These mechanisms have been transferred to the 
more abstract sphere of politics, first of all, by means of the “division of powers”, allowing 
institutions to compete with each other for power and thus restraining each other’s possibilities for 
systemic usurpation. Moreover, distrust is also institutionalized through additional “safeguards”: a 
multi-party system, election rules, the right to competition, monitoring, and formalities that regulate 
the time span and periodicity of office terms (Benn and Peters, 1959: 281).  
However, the constitutional rules and formal safeguard mechanisms alone are not sufficient 
to avoid the abuse of power by institutions. Democracy also encompasses a wide range of resistance 
forms that could be used by society against the government, and these forms surpass the limits of 
formal rules (Warren 1999; Rosanvallon, 2008). People are not only just voters (passive 
participants), but also active quality controllers (critical citizens) of the political system. The 
philosopher refers to this kind of interaction, when citizens maintain the control levers through 
protest, as “counter democracy” (Rosanvallon, 2008).  
Permanent distrust in the political system exerted by the people is arguably one of the 
fundamental substantial ideas for democracy to truly work. Braithwaite and Levi (1998) label the 
democratic project as “institutionalized distrust”. Hardin (2006: 152) acknowledges that distrust is 
one of the key conditions for modern democracy. Power inequality between state institutions and 
common people is too immoderate (unbalanced), but we have no alternatives to these institutions. 
We are dependent on them. Institutionalized distrust implicates institutional accountancy - so called 
“agencies of accountability” that may enforce trustworthiness of the system. These agencies (courts, 
police, controllers, examination boards, media, etc.) put pressure on persons, institutions, or systems 
that are our targets of trust (Sztompka, 1999: 47). Yet enforcement agencies must be trustworthy 
themselves. If citizens do not trust these agencies, they will not trust their officials to fulfill their 
duties (Dasgupta, 1988: 50).  
It should be clarified that institutionalized political distrust (substantial distrust) is not the 
same as political distrust in concrete political institutions (formal distrust). To avoid confusion, it is 
expedient to differentiate between these two forms of political distrust. Formal political (dis)trust 
would be expressed towards, for instance, the parliament, the government, or concrete politicians. 
Substantial political distrust refers to the permanent distrust (or “healthy” suspicion) of institutional 
politics or of the system as such. Hence, in liberal thinking, political participation – voting, writing 
petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts – is the expression of substantial political distrust. We 
participate in elections in order to control the powers of institutions and express our substantial 
distrust in them. Thus, exposing substantial political distrust does not imply that we also feel formal 
political distrust at the same time.  
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Following this distinction, many authors actually believe that social trust and formal 
political trust are mutually reinforcing (Gambetta, 1988; Burt, 1992; Putnam, 1993, Sztompka, 
1999; Misztal, 1996; Levi, 1998). Some of them (Sztompka 1999, Warren, 1999; Rothstein and 
Stolle, 2002) even think that political trust indeed gives an impulse for social trust to emerge. It is 
argued that trust in a certain system as a set of values empowers us to trust citizens of this system, 
as we all belong to the same setting of normative rules and general morality. Farrell and Knight 
(2003) suggest that institutions create rules and sanctions for people to behave in a trustworthy 
manner, thereby fostering trust. Similarly, Levi (1996: 51) argues, “governments provide more than 
the backdrop for facilitating trust among citizens; governments also influence civic behaviour to the 
extent they elicit trust or distrust towards themselves”.  
We can also talk about the positive effect of social trust on political trust. As Putnam (2000) 
observes, if people are willing to trust strangers, they will also trust politicians and political 
institutions.  
However, there is empirical evidence questioning the link between social and political trust. 
For instance, institutional theories argue that social trust has nothing to do with political trust and 
the latter depends on citizens’ evaluations of the political and economic performance of the 
government (Parry, 1976; Mishler and Rose, 2005; Zmerli and Newton, 2008). In other words, 
political trust is a consequence of institutional performance, but not a result of social trust. This 
insight is also displayed by empirical research showing that political and social trust are weakly 
correlated (Newton, 1999a; Kaase, 1999; Uslaner, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2003). For instance, 
referring to extensive research, Uslaner (2002) points out that social trust has no significant 
influence on political trust at the individual level. Moreover, according to this research, 
particularized trust even has a negative effect on trust in government (the same results were found 
in the study of Zmerli and Newton, 2011). It would confirm Fukuyama’s claim that private (or 
particularized) trust is a substitute for the lack of institutional trust.  
To sum up, political trust and social trust are different in their foundations and functions, 
and there is no clear empirical evidence whether these two types of trust are directly connected. On 
the other hand, social trust and political trust relate to the same phenomenon – democratization. 
Both types of trust emerged due to the institutional and cultural shifts that took place along the 
modernization processes. In a more systemic way, social trust and political trust accomplish and 
sustain each other. These forms of trust are both positively associated with life satisfaction and 
happiness, education, income and civic engagement (Zmerli and Newton, 2011:77). Similarly, 
although emphasizing the different nature of political trust, Newton and Norris (2000) argue that 
this relationship is apparent at the aggregated societal level. Thus, it means, that at the contextual 
level, in the long run social and political trust are likely to adjust to each other. Newton (2001) 
 
refers to Finland as an example: in some historical moment, this country suffered from low levels of 
political trust, but it was soon recovered with a strong help of social trust. At the same time Newton 
(2001: 210) hypothesizes, that a country with equally severe political distrust and low social trust is 
likely to experience a greater problems in building or recovering political trust.  
So far, we have discussed a series of theoretical aspects about political participation, 
efficacy, social trust and its associate – political trust. The following section aims at integrating 
these variables in a coherent framework and at demonstrating the relationships between them.  
 
2.5 Connecting social trust with political efficacy and political participation  
 
For an answer to the question how political participation, political efficacy and social trust might be 
related, I mainly refer to two major literatures: social capital and political/civic culture. These 
approaches are not necessarily conflicting. In fact, studies of social capital developed as a 
theoretical branch of civic culture literature. However, there are a few conceptual aspects that allow 
distinguishing between these two approaches. The main differences are embedded in the projection 
of the relationship between an individual and a state. In this respect, social capital theories advocate 
for a prominent role of social cohesion, which somewhat stands against hierarchical institutional 
power. In contrast, the political/civic culture literature focuses on the complementarity between 
individual freedom/choices and institutional development/the quality of democracy. Keeping this 
difference in mind, I will discuss each approach separately below.   
 
2.5.1 Social capital  
 
The social capital literature most particularly addresses the reciprocal relations between social trust 
and collective actions (Coleman, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Putnam, 1993; 2000; Norris, 2002b; Van 
Deth et al., 2002). Broadly speaking, this relationship constitutes the core of the social capital 
concept, which aims to explain how social interactions may strengthen democratic institutions, or 
“make democracy work”.  
In his ground-breaking study Making Democracy Work Putnam defines social capital (the 
term was coined by Bourdieu14) as a possession which does not contain material assets, but 
connections among individuals: it is “features of social organization such as trust, norms, and 
                                                 
14 Bourdieu (1986: 241) defines three forms of capital: “Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of 
the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital 
can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into 
money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain 
conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications; and as social 
capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital 
and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility”. 
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Following this distinction, many authors actually believe that social trust and formal 
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networks that can improve the efficiency of the society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993: 
167). As it clearly flows from the definition, trust is an integral component of social capital.15 Trust 
works in concert with norms/obligations and social networks: “the causal arrows among civic 
involvement, reciprocity, honesty and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti” (p. 137). 
This relationship is circular: the more an individual trusts, the more s/he tends to cooperate and is 
exposed by civic norms, and vice versa, civic engagement and shared norms lead to new trust 
relationships. It constitutes a so-called social spiral with social trust and political action at both 
ends. Hence, in Putnam’s view trust is one of the mechanisms that produces and maintains social 
capital.  
In line with the concept, active membership in organizations and involvement in voluntary 
associations are considered to be crucially important to transform trust from an individual 
characteristic to a collective resource. Indeed, emphasis here is put on voluntary organizations (with 
an institutional setting), but not private circles like friends or family (Klandermans, Van de Toorn, 
and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Formal social networks are suggested to function as “schools of 
democracy” where “citizens learn to participate by participating” (Pateman, 1970: 105). The 
argument of Almond and Verba (1963) states that “Individuals can be expected to “generalize” 
from experiences outside political life to politics; if they have participated within non-political 
authority structures they will expect to do so in the political sphere also” (in Pateman, 1989: 72). 
Hence, when citizens participate in small-scale civic associations, they are taught habits of 
cooperation and thus are able to socialize into larger political involvement (Putnam, 1993, 2000; 
Newton, 1997; Fukuyama, 2001; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2010).  
Social organizations provide resources necessary for collective actions (Almond and Verba, 
1963; Paxton, 2002; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). The horizontal 
networks ensure that these resources, both material and cognitive/psychological, could be equally 
accessed by citizens. Subsequently, the resources and the shared norms (as social trust) empower 
people to solve more complicated problems in dealing with the institutional structures (Putnam, 
1993). So here the connection between social trust and political efficacy enters. Putnam observes 
that in more trustful communities a sense of political efficacy of ordinary citizens is higher. He 
explains this phenomena referring to the egalitarian nature of the society. If the societies’ structure 
is horizontal and based on trust, people feel more powerful and capable of influencing political 
issues, because they would expect that other people would behave similarly to them. This idea 
                                                 
15 There is a disagreement on the definition of social trust and some authors claim that Putnam’s proposed 
conceptualization is too narrow, favouring only social networks. Halpern (2005: 9-19), for instance, systemizes the 
existing definitions of social capital into a theoretical triangle which includes social networks, norms (in a wider sense, 
reciprocity, trustworthiness and trust) and sanctions (which also might include institutions). Seen from this angle, trust 
“loses” its role as separate component of social capital and is conceived as an integral part of norms. Different 
dimensions of social capital, however, are intertwined (Hardin, 2002). 
 
implies that political efficacy in the social capital concept indeed connects the ends of social spiral, 
that is, social trust and political action. In contrast, in vertical and distrustful societies people 
perceive themselves being exploited, submissive and dependent, therefore their sense of political 
efficacy is constrained. I will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter when I elaborate on the 
distrustful nature of post-communist societies. 
 
2.5.2 Political/civic culture approach  
 
In the civic/political culture16 literature social trust, political efficacy and participation are 
interlinked less explicitly. Here, social trust is defined as a premise of social cooperation which 
leads to political engagement, respect for human rights, citizenry duties, perceptions of the common 
good and common responsibility. As Almond and Verba (1989: 4) put it, civic culture is a culture 
“in which there is a substantial consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions <…>, a 
widespread tolerance of plurality of interests and belief reconcilability, and a widely distributed 
sense of political competence and mutual trust in the citizenry”. Lijphart (1989: 38) adds that 
general social and interpersonal relations are closely related to the political orientations, and the 
relationship is so close that “cooperativeness and social trust are called a component of the civic 
culture”. 
The narrower concept of political culture does not include social trust explicitly. The 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Sills, 1968: 218; quoted in Freeman, 1986: 327 – 
328) defines political culture as “the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and 
meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern 
behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a 
polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and 
subjective dimensions of politics. Political culture is the product of both the collective history of a 
political system and the life histories of the members of the system and thus it is rooted equally in 
public events and private experience”. Referring to this definition, social trust adheres to political 
culture as one of the values, as an individual and collective resource which endows individuals with 
the meaningful orientations in political life.   
In their key study The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963) are specifically interested in 
the relationship between generalized social trust in people and cooperativeness in politics. The 
                                                 
16 There is no clear distinction between the notions of political and civic culture. Almond and Verba (1989) suggest that 
civic culture is a wider and more idealistic concept (aka civic virtue) and political culture is an element (a prerequisite) 
of it, and it is more “practical” and “operationalizational” in political science. Political culture combines cognitive, 
affective and evaluative orientations towards political objects and aims at establishing links between the public and the 
government. Some types of political culture (e.g. a participatory political culture) are conducive for civic culture and 
some are not. 
Chapter 252   |
 
networks that can improve the efficiency of the society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993: 
167). As it clearly flows from the definition, trust is an integral component of social capital.15 Trust 
works in concert with norms/obligations and social networks: “the causal arrows among civic 
involvement, reciprocity, honesty and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti” (p. 137). 
This relationship is circular: the more an individual trusts, the more s/he tends to cooperate and is 
exposed by civic norms, and vice versa, civic engagement and shared norms lead to new trust 
relationships. It constitutes a so-called social spiral with social trust and political action at both 
ends. Hence, in Putnam’s view trust is one of the mechanisms that produces and maintains social 
capital.  
In line with the concept, active membership in organizations and involvement in voluntary 
associations are considered to be crucially important to transform trust from an individual 
characteristic to a collective resource. Indeed, emphasis here is put on voluntary organizations (with 
an institutional setting), but not private circles like friends or family (Klandermans, Van de Toorn, 
and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Formal social networks are suggested to function as “schools of 
democracy” where “citizens learn to participate by participating” (Pateman, 1970: 105). The 
argument of Almond and Verba (1963) states that “Individuals can be expected to “generalize” 
from experiences outside political life to politics; if they have participated within non-political 
authority structures they will expect to do so in the political sphere also” (in Pateman, 1989: 72). 
Hence, when citizens participate in small-scale civic associations, they are taught habits of 
cooperation and thus are able to socialize into larger political involvement (Putnam, 1993, 2000; 
Newton, 1997; Fukuyama, 2001; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2010).  
Social organizations provide resources necessary for collective actions (Almond and Verba, 
1963; Paxton, 2002; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). The horizontal 
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authors observe that deficiency of social trust in some countries inhibits political participation. They 
claim (1963: 494) that without social trust, “the society divides up into closed and relatively hostile 
camps” and “lack of ability to cooperate politically reflects a more general inability to enter 
political bargains, to collaborate and to aggregate interests”. So one of the concluding remarks of 
the study is that social trust contributes to the involvement of citizens in the political system to the 
extent it creates an atmosphere conducive to bargaining and consensus building. Contrarily, 
societies with low levels of social trust are prone to suffer from political cleavages. This idea was 
borrowed by Inglehart (1990: 44) whose research on advanced industrial countries demonstrated 
that stable democracy is primarily related to a political culture of civicness, which is also measured 
by social trust (and two other components: life satisfaction and societal change). 
The ability of political cooperativeness depends not only on social trust, but also on 
subjective political competence: the perception of whether one can do something about unjust 
national law or local regulation. A person’s belief in his/her competence is described as a key 
political attitude which enables citizens to influence political decisions, or, at least provides with a 
psychological feeling that (different) voices are heard by the government (Almond and Verba, 
1963: 257). In this sense it is suggested that social trust and political competence go hand in hand 
ensuring that citizens are “involved and active in politics, informed about politics and influential” 
(p. 474). Thus they can keep the political elite accountable and responsive.   
To conclude, the civic/political culture approach suggests that social trust makes political 
participation worthwhile. Social trust is at the heart of all political processes because of its moral 
implications (Dunn, 1993). Political participation cannot be only rationally driven; it requires 
sociability and “willingness to give”. Without trust, as a moral stimulus, political cooperation (even 
possessing political competence) would not be possible. Thus, social trust is equally important for 
political engagement as is political efficacy. 
 
2.5.3 Conclusion: the relationships between social trust, political efficacy, and participation  
 
In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical aspects that are relevant to the purpose of my 
dissertation, that is to investigate whether there is a link between social trust and political 
participation and, if so, whether this link passes through a sense of political efficacy. These research 
questions call into debate why it is important to focus attention particularly on the mediation effects 
of internal and external political efficacy in the analysis of the relationship between social trust and 
political participation.  
From the theoretical perspective, I seek to illuminate how attitudes, in this case – social 
trust, might transform into skills, or political efficacy, in particular. For this purpose, unlike other 
 
authors, I decide to not include external settings as mediating variables (for instance, associations), 
as I am interested how attitudes and skills are related. In the theoretical framework I place social 
trust before political efficacy as I assert that culture stands before the skills you learn. The first 
substance is steadier and thus influences the latter which is less resistant to change. It resembles the 
“funnel effect” – social trust, as a cultural substance, narrows to certain practical skills, that, in turn, 
affect your choices of actions. This is the causal story of my dissertation: social trust is a cause, 
while political efficacy and participation is a result.  
All in all, we might hypothetically consider several positive effects of social trust on 
participation (level 1) and of social trust on political efficacy as the underlying mechanism 
(mediating variable) between social trust and political participation (level 2). First, while placing 
trust in other individuals and receiving this trust reciprocally, we feel a moral duty to be involved in 
common affairs (Putnam, 1993; Seligman, 1997). I have argued that social trust leads individuals to 
participate in the pursuit of the commons, as trust provides us with assurance that political action 
will be worthwhile, appreciated, and at least potentially effective. In return, successful cooperation 
based on trust gives people satisfaction in what they do (Putnam 1993; Fishkin, 1995: 148). 
Political action endows us with a sense of belonging to a collective identity, the feeling of being a 
part of a larger community and pride for struggling for good and right values (Klandermans, 2003). 
This is presumed to be the direct effect of social trust on political participation.  
Second, while trusting, people are more inclined to socialize with each other, thus they more 
likely acquire political knowledge and information in general about the subjects to be acted on and 
the methods to employ such actions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Milner, 2002). Based on political 
knowledge, citizens yield initiatives more easily (Stolle, 2002). Thus, these insights reveal the 
mediation effect by internal political efficacy between social trust and political participation.  
Third, trust empowers us politically as we believe that institutions we deal with are fair and 
that people are going to behave by the rules. Moreover, when we trust people, we expect them to act 
in a similar manner and it gives us a sense of control (predictability). Confidence in the motives of 
others encourages and facilitates participation (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert, 2004). If we are sure that 
the rules are not going to be violated, we feel more certain about involvement in political life. In 
this way, we expect a second indirect effect: socially trusting people develop a feeling of external 
political efficacy, which in turn fosters participation.  
However, these patterns between social trust, political efficacy and participation highlighted 
in the literature are mostly applicable to party politics activities, while movement participation in 
regard to social trust is a “forgotten side” (Valencia, Cohen, and Hermisilla, 2010). The notable 
exceptions in the social movement literature, for instance, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), 
Klandermans (1984; 1997), Benson and Rochon (2004), come through with a few hints on how 
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protest politics and social trust could be related. These authors acknowledge that the specificity of a 
protest action is first of all embedded in social interactions. People do not make decisions (to 
protest) in a vacuum. Even to a greater extent than party participation, movement participation 
relies on social connectedness: only people decide on whether to protest and which strategies to 
employ, whereas the setting of the elections is determined by institutions. Social trust is particularly 
important for facilitating mobilization (for persuasion to participate), as protest politics is usually 
more risky. As Benson and Rochon (2004) notice, the costs of taking part in a demonstration may 
be relatively small, or may entail arrest and prosecution, depending on the democraticness of the 
regime and the atmosphere of the protest/demonstration (for instance, whether some of the 
protesters become violent, how the police reacts, etc). Social trust reduces risks of participation. It 
leads to optimistic estimates about the likelihood of success, because it allows to form expectations 
about the actions of others (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988). People engage in collective actions 
because they trust others will do so as well. And the odds of the success of a protest action are 
directly related to how many people participate (Klandermans, 1984). 
Another important dimension is that trust induces empathy for people who are protesting. 
Movement politics is chosen by grieved people who are about to suffer (or suffering) from the 
decisions of the government. But in practice not only the (directly) affected join the protests, but 
also citizens who sympathize with the protesters and share their grievances. In this sense trust is 
closely related to a shared politicized collective identity, which is one of the most decisive 
psychological resources of movement politics (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).  
To sum up, social trust functions as a mobilizing force of movement participation. As 
Coleman (1990: 304) states, “a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive 
trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that 
trustworthiness and trust”. Thus, I assume that social trust gives one initiative to take part in a 
protest action. Implicitly the idea also suggests that political efficacy is an explaining mechanism 
between social trust and protesting.  
The alternative approach to the connection between trust and participation posits that social 
trust may work as “double-edged sword”, meaning that trusting people can remain passive, because 
they believe that others can be trusted to participate (and “do the job”) for them (Pattie, Seyd, and 
Whiteley, 2003: 458). The scholarly literature also distinguishes between different associations of 
social trust and the modes of political participation, for instance, empirically supporting the 
negative links between social trust and participation in political parties/campaigns (Hooghe and 
Marien, 2013; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009). However, 
drawing from the social capital literature, the initial assumption is that the relationship between 
 
social trust and political participation, despite their modes, follows the same logic as with civic 
participation. Yet, I will get back to this question later, when discussing the empirical results.  
Informed by the literature on the presumable relations between the modes of participation, 
efficacy and trust in democratic societies, I assume that the links between the variables work as 
displayed in Figure 2.1. 
First, Figure 2.1 shows that I expect a direct positive effect of social trust on participation in 
both party and movement politics. Second, external and internal efficacy mediates between social 
trust and both types of political participation, meaning that more trusting people are more 
efficacious and thus tend to engage in politics more often. However, I acknowledge that the 
mediating effect of external efficacy between social trust and protest participation could be two-
sided: social trust might enhance external efficacy and thus reduce protest participation, or, 
alternatively, social trust leads to external efficacy and thus increases the probability to participate 
in protest actions.  
Finally, it should be noted that the relationships depicted in Figure 2.1 entail individual-level 
effects. In addition, a positive link between social trust at the aggregate level and participation at the 
individual level would be expected to apply as well, that is to say, a citizen in a more socially 
trusting country displays higher levels of political activity than a citizen in a country with low levels 
of social trust. I will further elaborate on this in chapter 5. 
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empirically probe the relationships as depicted in Figure 2.1. While the assumptions are promising, 
they certainly need further empirical testing, especially in the post-communist context. Do these 
mechanisms work out differently in post-communist societies and are there some deviations in this 
regard from the mature democracies? So far, none of these relations were strongly confirmed by 
empirical research in former communist countries. This leads to the following research questions I 
will address in the empirical part of this dissertation (chapters 4, 5 and 6), namely, to what extent 
social trust affects the modes of participation, and to what extent the same patterns occur in mature 
and post-communist democracies? But before turning to these empirical chapters, let me first in 
chapter 3 address the question why the levels of social trust are actually lower in post-communist 
democracies. More specifically, what is the nature of social trust in post-communist societies and 
how is it different from more mature democracies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 |Trust in post-communist 
democracies17
                                                 
17 Slightly different versions of this chapter have been published in Sociopedia.isa (Gaidytė, 2013) and Lithuanian 
Foreign Policy Review (Gaidytė, 2012). 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The collapse of communism in 1989/1990 resulted in the emergence of a new political, economic 
and social order. It had a profound impact on cultural and psychological orientations, political 
values, as well as on the relationships between individuals. In various empirical-based studies it is 
demonstrated that the shock of the exit from the communism negatively affected citizens’ well-
being and health, and increased levels of crime, economic inequality, and unemployment. These 
developments prompted a general sense of insecurity and triggered distrust in people and 
institutions. These processes were tightly related to the shattered peoples’ behavioural patterns, 
cultural templates and value systems. Therefore, many scholars attribute the problem of distrust to a 
wider context of “cultural trauma” (Sztompka, 2002), “demoralization” (Sapsford and Abbot, 
2006), or “anomie” (Haerpfer, Wallace, and Abbott, 2013).  
As we already observed in the previous chapter, trust stands for a democratic political 
culture and vibrant, participatory civil society. These dimensions of the quality of political life are 
of vital importance in young and less experienced post-communist democracies. The literature 
notices that the hardship of democratic transition and consolidation was and still is tightly related to 
the weakness of post-communist civil society, which was destructed (or in some cases – even 
absent) during the authoritarian and totalitarian rule (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Paldam and Svendsen, 
2000; Letki and Evans, 2005; Howard, 2003). Therefore, following these authors, I raise the 
question: does social trust function in post-communist societies in the same manner as in mature 
plural democracies or are there some cultural/psychological obstacles that restrain citizens from 
civic and political engagement (Letki and Evans, 2005; Lasinska, 2013; Imbrasaitė, 2004).  
Civil society has been acclaimed for its role in abolishing communism (Letki and Evans, 
2005; Misztal, 1996). This begs the question what happened to the spontaneous “rebirth” of post-
communist civil society which managed to overthrow the communist regime? Why people who 
achieved their common goal – democracy – became more distant, apathetic and absent from civic 
and political participation? These questions undoubtedly refer to the changes within societies and to 
the foundations of people’s relations in general. 
Although the literature admits that the outcomes of democratization of the post-communist 
countries vary, some socio-cultural tendencies are common for the whole region. As Bjørnskov 
(2004: 1) observes, “Post-communist societies are less trusting than others”. And they have a good 
reason for that. Along the total political usurpation, the communist regime implemented different 
policies of civic subjugation: acted upon the massive collectivization and economic de-
privatization, which resulted in a lack of business orientated initiatives, destruction of spontaneous 
 
civil society, constant surveillance of people, depriving them from the personal freedom and a sense 
of privacy. As a result, communism significantly ruined social trust.  
This argument is also empirically proved. Numerous studies show that former communist 
countries tend to be characterized by low levels of trust (Sztompka, 1999; Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; 
Howard, 2003; Bădescu and Uslaner, 2003; Kornai, Rothstein and Rose-Ackerman, 2004; 
Žiliukaitė et al., 2006; Tufiş, 2008; Lewandowski and Znoj, 2009; Vasilache, 2010; Mierina, 2011; 
Lasinska, 2013). The World Value Survey data (2005 – 2007), for instance, indicate that in most 
post-communist societies only about one fifth of the respondents (between 18 to 24 percent) agreed 
with the statement that most people could be trusted. These levels are depressingly low, if we 
compare them with some of the Western countries. For instance, in the Netherlands generalized 
social trust is indicated at the level of 56 percent. More importantly, as Mierina (2011: 138) 
observes, the dynamics of the levels of social trust are very inert and do not reflect the rapid 
changes of political transformation. Even more shocking is the fact that in several countries, like 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, the level of social trust has decreased over time, comparing 
with the aftermath of Communism. Furthermore, many studies proved that the low levels of social 
trust are matched with political distrust, cynicism, alienation, intolerance, inefficacy, apathy, 
fatalism, longing for authoritarian rule, the intensity of political cleavages, skepticism and political 
passivity (see, for instance, Howard, 2002; Brown and Whitefield, 2005; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 
2013).  
Some authors claim that distrust is a symptomatic feature of transformation itself 
(Sztompka, 1999). Some academics argue that the transformational period was the most turbulent in 
terms of values shift: so-called homo-sovieticus cultural orientations were destroyed and this 
vacuum of values was filled with the old traditional values (for instance, religiosity), on the one 
hand, and western liberal values on the other hand (Galasinska and Galasinski, 2010). The revival 
of traditional values could explain the raise of extreme right-wing attitudes such as nationalism, 
chauvinism, homophobia, xenophobia, and anti-semitism (for instance, Minkenberg, 2015). 
Another group of authors are inclined to think that the lack of trust originated from the 
previous oppression of the communist regime (Rose, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Lovell, 2001; 
Markova, 2004; Traps, 2009; Vasilache, 2010). The literature argues that distrust was instilled 
through the personal experiences and conveyed to the temporary behavioural patterns as a part of 
the communist socialization. Some scholars go even further, emphasizing the absent conditions of 
generalized trust in the pre-communist years and the lack of modernization afterwards 
(Kochanowicz, 2004).  
However, it is difficult to differentiate between these potential legacy effects, as these are 
most probably not mutually exclusive: the life under communism may very well have attenuated 
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levels of trust and the collapse of communism may have furthered this (Epperly, 2012). Therefore it 
is expedient to consider the nature of trust and transformation of it, while taking into account the 
historical as well as contemporary context of post-communism.  
The central question I am to answer is: what is the nature of social trust in post-communist 
societies and how is it different from more mature democracies? For this aim, in this chapter I 
firstly describe the general conditions of trust in pre-communist societies. Second, I will elaborate 
on the development of trust under the communist regime. I will try to explain in what ways trust 
was eroded at a wider societal level causing the emergence of particularized-trust societies. Thirdly, 
I will disentangle the conditions of trust during the exit of communism and transition to democracy. 
Finally, I will focus on the contemporary environment of trust, looking at the post-communist social 
capital formation processes, civil society and trust in political institutions.  
 
3.2 The transformation of trust in three historical phases  
 
3.2.1 The pre-communist phase 
 
Historically, all post-communist nations were under the rule of despotic (usually, non-titular) 
governments, which induced political distrust in alien rule and instilled the conditions for 
particularized (rather than generalized) trust between individuals to emerge, basically due to a 
hierarchical model of the society where powerful elites exploited the uneducated peasants and 
slaves (North, 1981).  
In the 18th and 19th centuries, when Western societies experienced liberation movements 
against absolute monarchies and nation states were created, most Central and Eastern European 
countries underwent quite different processes. For example, as early as 1721, large parts of the 
territories of Estonia and Latvia were incorporated into the Russian Empire. Poland’s and 
Lithuanian’s territories lost their independence after three partitions, the last taking place in 1795. 
The territories of the modern Czech and Slovak Republics, as well as Slovenia, Croatia and 
Romania belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but, due to the social unrests and uprisings, the 
civic and political rights of these nations were particularly restricted, while the serfs were 
emancipated quite late. Bulgaria’s territories were under the Ottoman rule for nearly five hundred 
years and it gained its full independence only in the beginning of 20th century. Compared to that, the 
geopolitical situation of Hungary was ambiguous: the Hungarians experienced the era of European 
empires from both dominant and subservient positions over this period of time (Rossbach, 2008).  
Although after World War I, the newly established nation states began to develop their 
(pseudo)democratic systems (with reservations – general and equal elections, electoral competition, 
and peaceful change of governing parties), this process did not reach the consolidation phase and 
 
did not become the “only game in town”. Societies remained mostly traditional; most people 
continued to live in rural areas, on semi-subsistence farms. The lives of common people in such 
agricultural economies were based on survival: in order to survive, the villagers would share a 
common responsibility to help each other in terms of food, healthcare, even education (self-
organized schools with often voluntary teachers). As Hosking (2004) notices, such mutual aid was 
driven not only by altruism, but more by self-interest in the absence of institutionally provided care. 
As a consequence, the number of social contacts in such traditional agrarian societies was limited; 
trust was bounded only within the circle of people with whom one was familiar, while foreigners 
and strangers (those you couldn’t keep a close watch on) were distrusted (Kochanowicz, 2004).  
Moreover, common people did not perceive political trust, or trust in the government as a 
relevant issue, since the government was far from individuals. As Kochanowicz (2004: 69-70) 
notices, the pre-modern states mostly relied on coercion, but not on confidence. One may disagree 
with me on this point and assert that during the period of the national independence movements in 
Eastern and Central Europe that took place in the beginning of the 20th century and after World War 
I, societies became more active and more engaged with politics and it made them more politically 
trustful. However, this is true only for a narrow circle of educated elites, while common people 
were still detached from politics. Thus, historically, because of the lack of institutional 
democratization and a critical public sphere, trust has been diminished (di Palma, 1991: 50). 
To make a comparison, in Western societies, particularized (or thick, bonding) trust was 
gradually transformed into more generalized (thin, bridging) trust along with the process of 
modernization and institutional democratization. As will be explained in more detail below, this 
transformation of trust has never really taken place during the communist regime.   
 
3.2.2 Trust during the Communist rule  
 
This section explains how the communist rule shaped the development of trust. The discussion is 
structured around three indicative features of the communist period: 1) “liquidation” of civil 
society; 2) political and economic control which has led to the legitimization of the regime from the 
top; 3) the formation of the so-called niche society which functioned on the basis of particularized 
(personal) trust. 
To begin with, the independent civil society was destroyed along the implementation of the 
communist regime. Almost all pre-communist organizations were abolished or transformed into 
ideological ones. For instance, the Church was constricted, especially in Soviet republics, and 
believers were prosecuted; political parties, unions, charities were dissolved or stripped of their 
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ideological ones. For instance, the Church was constricted, especially in Soviet republics, and 
believers were prosecuted; political parties, unions, charities were dissolved or stripped of their 
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independence; private enterprises were closed18. Moreover, the old elite was also prosecuted, a lot 
of them got imprisoned, killed or were forced to emigrate. In this way the communist party could 
establish its monolithic authority which was sustained by a series of declarative “civic” institutions, 
like trade unions, artists’ or writers’ guilds, student organizations – all of them were state owned 
and served as a mechanism of indoctrination. As Geremek (1992), a famous Polish historian and 
politician, observed, suppressing the civic space was of vital importance to ensure the endurance of 
the communist rule. The liquidation of the autonomous civil society basically meant that there was 
no ground for generalized social trust to emerge in the newly constructed Soviet society. As Völker 
and Flap (2001: 424) notice, “communism taught people not to trust relative strangers (…) since all 
state-sponsored associations have collapsed and (…) except for the church, hardly any voluntary 
organizations exist in the new situation”.  
The communist system supplanted voluntary activity by forcing citizens to join and 
participate in mandatory, state-controlled organizations (Howard, 2002: 160). Many organizations, 
like pioneer movements, were aimed to recruit the youth to the Communist party and participation 
in it often confronted with the values of resistance of the citizens. At the same time it was too risky 
not to engage into the state-controlled organizations, because it also provided various public goods 
to their members and their families (Kubik, 2000; Ekiert and Foa, 2011; Inglot, 2008). Mihajlov 
calls such a system the actual unfreedom, when by participating in communist mobilization the 
individuals were forced to actively support their slavery (1986: 4 – cited in di Palma, 1991: 57). 
Since the voluntary participation was of a declarative nature, eventually it made people feel 
apathetic about collective aspirations.  
The absence of autonomous civil society restrained any independent political discourse. The 
latter fell under control of the state institutions. Only official opinion could circulate through the 
media, whereas and independent expression of opinion was dangerous. Thus the regime 
systematically politicized peoples’ everyday life. As Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013) notice, citizens 
were not simply expected to accept the rule of the communists, but rather to embrace and embody 
the precepts of socialism. The regime tried to make sure that the values of homo sovieticus would be 
adopted during socialization process, including kindergartens and schools, work places, party 
meetings and so on. The system is very well described in the book Iron Curtain of Applebaum 
(2012), using the example of East Germany. A desire to shape people’s attitudes (instead of only 
being interested in ruling over them) is a very symptomatic feature of the communist regime, which 
at a large extent makes this regime profoundly different from other authoritarian rules. 
                                                 
18 The pace of the restrictions or liquidation of civil society differed across the communist bloc. For instance, to be sure, 
Poland and Hungary kept the most autonomy in the realm of civil society (Ekiert and Foa, 2011; Ekiert, Kubik, and 
Wenzel, 2013).  
 
The Communist party claimed to truth as an ideologically superior power. Thereby, the 
regime presented itself as totally trustworthy, so it was considered an act of disloyalty or even a 
crime to overtly doubt the trustworthiness of the political system, the Communist party and state 
institutions (Markova, 2004: 8). The Communist party required trust from citizens placing this 
category in opposition to fear: if an individual did not trust the system, he/she became an enemy of 
the regime. Perceived fairness, coercion and repression were aimed to substitute the lack of real 
political trust in states’ authority. Any revolts or protest actions against the regime were brutally 
suppressed – as it was in the cases of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Prague Spring in 
1968. 
  Methodologically, the institutional system was also organized on the imitation of “trust”: 
no checks and balances mechanisms, no political competition, no fair and free elections, no 
institutional “safeguards”. In this sense, political trust had no conditions to evolve because it did not 
depend on evaluations or governments’ responsiveness. In addition, there was no real elite 
circulation: the nomenklatura took control over all appointments. This meant that party apparatchiks 
would appoint themselves or their fellows (Traps, 2009: 65). 
The prescribed and only nominal political trust (without any legal realm for suspicion) 
concurrently generated very high expectations from the state. Substantially, there was low real trust 
in the one-party communist system among citizens, but there was a high level of expectations in 
regard to what the state should offer or provide (Kochanowicz, 2004: 72).  
As Rose (1994: 18) notices, citizens in general were not allowed to involve in the 
assessment of political structures, since the Communist party insisted that it alone knew best how 
society ought to be ruled and there was no need for individuals to expressing their views through 
elections or through any civic engagement that would be organized independently from the state. 
Only fictional forms of participation existed – such as voting in elections – designed to foster the 
appearance of democratic legitimacy (Geremek, 1992). But in reality, popular participation in 
politics became largely involuntary and completely formulaic (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2012). 
Using this facade, the institutionalized lie was instilled: people were driven to act as the system 
expected (di Palma, 1991: 66).  
The state determined the narrow range of life choices – in work, consumption, amenities – 
to which people were entitled (di Palma, 1991: 61). Due to the planned state economy and huge 
resources used for the military policy (the industrial-military sector accounted for 60 percent of the 
GDP), people faced scarcity of all necessities. These conditions created a series of negative effects 
on public and private lives. First, struggling for goods deprived people from spare time. In line with 
Inglehart’s argumentation, the scarcity and ongoing efforts to ensure the basic needs left little room 
for any independent civic action (Geremek, 1992: 4).  
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Second, the economic shortages created the perfect conditions for corruption. Bribing 
became the most effective way to obtain food, health care, housing, a car, a phone-line, recreation, 
education and other goods. Usually bribing was not committed using cash money (there was not 
much you could buy for money in the deficient state market), but by exchanging goods or services. 
For instance, someone who belonged to state “apparatchiki” (so-called bureaucrat apparatus) at the 
state institution (ministry) would collect vouchers for pursuing furniture and s/he could exchange 
these vouchers for a possibility to buy a car or get a phone line installed at home. For clarity, these 
goods were of deficit in the Soviet system, and one should stand in line and wait for years to obtain 
them. But if you had the means to bribe or you could rely on some influential relations, this line 
could be “reduced”.  
Given an outspread and commonly acknowledged system of corruption, we can identify an 
ambiguity of a proclaimed equality of the communist society. In theory, the minimal economic and 
social security benefits were available to all people. But in reality, the people were not equal in 
terms of the access to these elementary requirements, and thus, paraphrasing Orwell’s famous 
quote, “all people were equal, but some of them were more equal than others”. 
Despite the formally required political trust, the communist state insisted that citizens be 
suspicious in terms of social trust. An atmosphere of fear of politically disloyal citizens was created. 
The state aimed at maintaining permanent distrust in social relations and at shattering wider 
networks of trust within society, since these networks might have initiated opposition to the 
communist regime. There was no real trust in vertical relations (trust in employees, higher party 
members, professors at universities, etc.), but at the same time, there was dependence on them 
based on fear. Obviously, communist social engineering was psychologically grounded. Referring 
to historical colonial uprisings and revolutions, the regime realized that successful revolutions were 
those which were capable of mobilizing not only the masses (at the horizontal level), but also the 
middle classes and elites (at the vertical level). Therefore, the communist regime did everything it 
could to destroy real trust at the vertical level, thereby preventing vertical social partnerships, which 
might function as an opposition to the formal regime. Based on fear and dependence, these vertical 
social ties instead functioned as the backbone of the regime and guaranteed its stability (Sztompka, 
1999: 152–153).  
The strict hierarchy and the actual inequality made citizens to become very suspicious about 
others in terms of their carrier achievements, purchased deficit goods, holidays or trips to foreign 
countries. It usually meant that a person who enjoyed such benefits (that were usually not accessible 
to common people), complied with the system – relayed on influential acquaintances, or, even more 
likely, was cooperating with (or infiltrated in) the security police. The security network was 
 
widespread in the communist societies and aimed to ensure that private lives of citizens were neatly 
controlled.  
The spying mechanisms were most actively applied before 1953, but to some extent 
(depending on the situation in the countries and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union) the persecution lasted also after the death of Stalin until the collapse of the regime (and in 
some post-soviet countries – till nowadays). The state systematically invaded privacy, intimacy and 
relations of trust (Outhwaite and Ray, 2004: 158). The aim to destruct the natural social ties at that 
time could be exemplified by some “heroic” stories, for instance, a story of Pavlik Morozov, a 14-
year-old-boy, who was made a hero because of denouncing his anti-communist parents to 
authorities, who were subsequently executed by NKVD (Holmes, 1997: 267-8, referred in 
Outhwaite and Ray, 2004: 158). Similar propaganda stories were used in other Soviet republics and 
satellite countries. The aim of such propaganda was to dismantle personal relations, make society 
more atomized and people more conformists, able to serve the needs of the Party and be loyal to the 
Communist ideology. 
There was a variety of favourable conditions to implement the permanent surveillance and 
control citizens. As it was already noted, citizens belonged to the same state-owned networks, let it 
be work places, out-door activities, universities, schools, etc. The workers were dependent on their 
superiors who would prepare the reports on them to the secret services. Even the most intimate 
spheres of people’s lives were controlled, including marriage, raising children, lifestyle, 
celebrations and others. Any deviation from the Soviet style of living was dangerous, especially 
efforts to imitate Western lifestyle and fashion, such as listening to rock music, wearing jeans or 
growing long hear for men (hippie culture was treated as anti-soviet, thus dangerous to the regime). 
Any of such actions could have been reported to the security police which was infiltrated in the 
inner social circles, including friends, colleagues, and family members. Even trusting family 
members could result in a wide specter of betrayal (Vasilache, 2010). As Hosking (2004, 56-60) 
notices, the Soviet housing system created a perfect environment for surveillance. Due to the 
scarcity and demand of the skilled individuals in the bigger cities, the communal apartments (so-
called komunalki), where a few families would share one flat, became very popular. The communal 
apartment was linked to an authority system which supervised the behaviour of its members. Such 
closed proximity in which people lived and thin walls of the rooms ensured that all family events 
would be known by everyone and all conversations might well be overheard (especially in a 
common kitchen which was a general place for social meetings). Hosking writes that normally one 
or more members of such apartment would be reporting regularly to the security police in order to 
gain some extra free space or other forms of privilege. Such a situation caused great distress to 
people, because there was no privacy. People were forced to live together in the squeezed places 
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despite their different social backgrounds and would face a variety of demoralizing practices as 
alcoholism, cheating, stealing from neighbours, lack of hygiene and others.19 Subsequently, 
paranoid mental disorders became very common in the Soviet Union. Although from the late 1950s 
and onwards the number of communal apartments was reduced and people could settle in private 
flats, fear and distrust in the closest environment had left a trace in peoples’ consciousness.  
At this point, the question arises how people managed to survive given these hostile political 
conditions. Here we come to the third distinguishable feature of the communist society: niche-
society. There was no generalized trust at a wider societal level, so people basically relied on 
personal relations and tried to stay within closed circles of trustees. Kochanowicz (2004) thoroughly 
describes the “preservation” of traditional particularized trust in communist societies, arguing that 
the Western-conceived modernization of trust actually has never taken place under the communism. 
According to Kochanowitcz (2004), communist societies retained strong elements of the 
traditional social organization and cultural legacies of the rural society. Roughly speaking, 
communist modernization just transferred peasant traditions to the cities. Even a large part of urban 
workers commuted from villages, hence the traditional family structure still prevailed. Moreover, 
the pre-war urban culture (the axis of individualism-based modernization) was also destroyed by the 
regime (Kochanowicz, 2004: 74). The peasant cultural-type cities meant that generalized social trust 
was not evolving, as it was supposed to evolve in industrial individualist societies where, due to 
many social contacts, partial morality (particularized trust) was replaced with more generalized 
morality (generalized trust). With this peasant culture, the real trust-based contacts remained limited 
while other social contacts with less familiar people and strangers included more distrust, as was the 
case in traditional societies. Trust remained of personalistic or communal nature. Due to the harsh 
economic and political conditions people would invest and be embedded only within small family 
circles and did not pass beyond these circles. Some authors note that the traditional organization of 
the family was tightly related to very egoistic attitudes towards those outside the family circle; this 
behaviour, lacking the perception of the common good, is described as “amoral familism”20 
(Tarkowska and Tarkowski, 1991). As Kochanowicz (2004: 75) puts it, 
 
                                                 
19 The scenes of such life in the communal apartments were picturesquely portrayed in the movie “East-West” 
(French: Est – Ouest), 1999, which tells the story about the Russian re-émigré and his French wife who, after 
believing in honesty of Stalin’s invitation “to return to the Motherland”, arrived from abroad and settled down in 
Odessa (Ukrainian part of the Soviet Union) in 1946. 
20 The term was coined by Edward C. Banfield and used in the book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958). 
Focusing on mafia families in Southern Italy, the author notices that due to the lack of common social norms the family 
needs are put over the interests of the citizenry, and this percept is called “amoral familism”.  
 
 
The economics of shortage and the lack of a notion of the common good during Communism legitimised a particular 
understanding of honesty which enabled shirking, cheating, and petty stealing from the workplace as long as it led to 
supplying the family with things necessarily for survival and functioning in society.  
 
The withdrawal into the close circle of family and friends meant a conscious defensive reaction 
against the state’s usurpation. Because of the high politicization of the public sphere, many people 
could express themselves openly only within closed circles of trusted friends and family (Howard, 
2002: 162). It was the only safe mean to preserve customs, own language, cultural habits and 
personality in general, which was impossible in public and institutional life (Wojcicki, 1981: 102- 
103). Families were functioning as certain secret shelters or “niches” that transformed society into a 
so-called “niche society” – a society of small groups distanced from the state (Wetiz, 1997: 388; 
quoted in O’Kane, 2004: 195). 
Moreover, as I already mentioned, the economy of shortages and political unfairness also 
demanded to rely on personal trust and mutual assistance networks for the exchange of basic goods 
(Letki and Evans, 2005). Most deals were done only with the help of friends, relatives or 
colleagues. The ethos of informal exchange in political and economic realms, or, blat, became a 
central feature of the hidden scene of the regime (Ledeneva, 1998). Personal trust basically replaced 
institutional distrust; dependence on the spoken word became more important than reliance on 
(uncertain) institutions. Simultaneously, the out-group trust was very low (Pehlivanova, 2009). The 
hostile attitudes towards outside groups enabled the ethos of double-morality which helped 
individuals to handle internal conflicts by applying different moral standards for people who were 
inside or outside their group. Given these circumstances, stealing, lying, and manipulating for 
family needs was treated moral. This double-morality ethos is best described by a popular saying in 
the Soviet Union: “Everyone who does not steal, is stealing from his own family” (Zsolnai and 
Gasparski, 2002). 
 
3.2.3 Anti-communist revolutions: the role of social trust 
 
If hypocrisy and distrust was prevalent at the societal and political level, one would ask how the 
anti-communist revolution could occur in so neatly controlled societies. How people managed to 
cooperate with each other to overthrow the regime from below? Here we should turn back to the 
discussion about civil society and stress two essential points: 1) a parallel anti-political civil society 
emerged in the last decade of the Communist regime in almost all communist countries; 2) this civil 
society was based not on formal relations, but merely on personal relations and particularized trust. 
Formally, there was no separation between the state and society under the communist 
regime. But informally a parallel civil society was being formed on the basis of “underground” and 
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3.2.3 Anti-communist revolutions: the role of social trust 
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“unofficial” networks of social relations (Rose, 1994: 22). There were a few mobilizing channels of 
such networks. Most of them were embedded within the official organizations: cultural, academic 
circles, unions, underground church movements, arts’ and writers’ guilds, various ethnographic, 
green-movement knots, folklore, marching groups, bands etc. Although formally these 
organizations were subordinated to the regime, some of them were duplicitous and provided space 
for activities sheltered from direct political interference. Hence, the inner informal circles within the 
organizations could arise where opinions would be more openly expressed.  
Another important mobilization channel were various subcultures, not bounded by any legal 
networks – hippies, punks and other youth movements who shared the same taste in music (usually, 
rock music which was conceived as a symbol of Western freedom), literature, movies, clothing, 
lifestyle. All these small circles were much closed: you could only get into such circles based on 
personal trust and the recommendations of the trusters (Kavaliauskaitė and Ramonaitė, 2011). The 
development of such secret networking was a long process. First, individuals would look for 
someone similar to them, non-conformists. Further, different methods were elaborated to attract the 
dissidents – using a hidden (Ezop) language, secret coding, social testing. For instance, telling anti-
soviet jokes and anecdotes (in a subtle way) could have helped to identify who are the “right” 
persons in the company21. The secret communication maintained in the small groups that were 
hidden from the official eyes further strengthened the formation of niche society. 
For more open conversations people would gather to private places where they would 
involve into “kitchen politics” (this space actually became more private after Stalin’s death). It was 
unofficial free space where people could develop counter-totalitarian ideas. Geremek (1992) argues 
that face-to-face primary groups became a substitute for civil society. In the academic discourse this 
parallel civil society is defined as being anti-political, or functioning in opposition to the state, 
emphasizing peoples’ political disaffection. Civil society was perceived as an alternative to the 
totalitarian system. Outhwaite and Ray (2004) claim that these networks based on personal relations 
spurred the independence movements and were responsible for the collapse of Communism in the 
whole region. 
Kavaliauskaitė and Ramonaitė (2011) elaborate on this argument in their edited study The 
Non-Soviet in the Soviet World: The Origins of the Contentious Politics under Non-Liberal Regime 
(in Lithuanian: Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant: nepaklusniųjų tinklaveikos galia). The book draws on the 
independence movement of Sąjūdis which emerged in 1988 in Lithuania. The authors claim that 
civil society back then was not that weak and passive as it is common to believe. In contrary, the 
                                                 
21 Here is an example of such an anti-soviet anecdote: “Why don’t we have any meat in the stores? It’s because we are 
marching towards Communism with such speed, that no cattle can catch up with us” (Interview with the writer 
Zaborskaitė, cited in Ivanauskas, 2011:128).  
 
niche-society managed to become a self-organized one to defend itself against totalitarian regime. 
Face-to-face personal relations (as a response to a collective threat) helped to build a shared identity 
and played a decisive role for protest actions to occur. The study concludes, that based on personal 
trust, the informal underground circles were capable of mobilizing dissidents from below to a more 
centralized network which later transformed into the widespread revolutionary movement.  
 To sum up, the communist regime generated very peculiar specifics in regard to trust. 
Communism contributed to particularized trust, instead of generalized. Rephrasing Fukuyama 
(1995), the trust radius was limited only to the family or friends circles and did not spill over to the 
generalized level. We might say that trust turned out to be pragmatic and selfish in the sense that it 
was related to some expectations for the self; this trust also involved a higher perception of risk of 
social action, as it was connected with fear and low trustworthiness of not-familiar people. In 
contrast, in democratic systems, social trust originates from the spill-over of real trust in family 
circles and is consequently related more to the perceived notion and benefits of the common good, 
which is at the core of social capital. This also holds for political engagement. Although the 
networks of the dissidents managed to work in clandestine and eventually mobilized for the 
resistance against unjust power, the collective actions at that time were driven not by generalized, 
but by particularized social trust. 
In the following section I raise questions concerning the development of trust after the 
collapse of communism. What happened with trust during the phase of transition to democracy? 
Did the new democratic rules induce a sense of social trust? What communist era legacies on trust 
we can identify in the contemporary post-communist societies? 
 
3.2.4 Trust during transition to democracy  
 
As I already discussed in chapter 1, the transition period from communism to democracy is usually 
conceptualized from the institutional perspective, focusing on the implementation of political and 
economic reforms. Therefore, one may argue that the symptoms of trust transformation I describe 
below are only applied for the early stages of democratization.22 However, based on empirical data, 
I am inclined to think that the trauma of distrust is a long lasting phenomenon and that communist 
experiences, as well as the lessons from the transition, very well contributed to the nature of trust in 
contemporary societies.  
                                                 
22In this section my focus is on trust during political and economic transition which conditionally took place between 
1989 –1998/2001 when the post-communist countries were invited to join the European Union and democratic regime 
was believed to be institutionalized (Norkus, 2008).  
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To begin with, the destruction of the communist regime manifested very high expectations 
and idealistic hopes related to democracy. There was, as Geremek (1992) observes, the fascinating 
time when the world in peoples’ eyes was changing rapidly and dramatically. This initial phase, 
marked by patience towards the new national elite and (radical) political and economic reforms, 
was titled as a period of “extraordinary politics” (Balcerowicz, 1995). However, the “shock 
therapy” did not bring a better life, as it was assumed. For most people it resulted in economic 
hardship and increased insecurity. Therefore, despite the short period of the so-called partial 
solidarity immediately preceding and following the proclaimed political independence and free 
elections in post-communist societies, the antinomy of trust and fear remained and was even 
sharpened due to traumatic transformation processes.  
During transition the relationship of trust anticipated much too high costs because of the 
lack of legal mechanisms that could compensate associated risks. Because of unstable institutional, 
economic, and social conditions trust among society members became much more risky (Sztompka, 
1992). On the one hand, you could not rely on the personal-based agreements as it was common 
under the communist rule. On the other hand, the legal mechanisms were also not reliable. The 
courts were not functioning properly; political institutions were not perceived as trustworthy: they 
seemed to be nominal and subordinated to certain clans and cliques. So basically, people were 
forced to buffer against their high-risk and low-trust environment (Lehmbruch, 2012).  
The explanation for that is that communist political capital and politics-based social 
relations were actually transformed into economic capital during the early years of transition; this 
was made possible by the unfair mechanisms of privatisation, which benefited the old nomenklatura 
(Howard, 2003). As a result, some of the old Communist party members became businessmen or 
managers of state-owned companies, some of them remained in politics, and these communist 
legacy-based relationships created the background for the establishment of influential oligarchic 
clans in most of post-communist societies. Alongside the decadent reputation of political, economic 
and social structures, these new informal political and economic clans also decreased the reputation 
of the political system and induced distrust (Kochanowicz, 2004: 79). 
Moreover, distrust and social antagonism escalated due to the increased inequality. The 
transition abruptly dismantled the existing political and economic system, which basically meant 
the loss of jobs and savings for a lot of people. Meanwhile, the members of the old elite, which 
turned into the new rich businessmen, were showing off the expensive lifestyles. Lots of them 
earned by providing goods or services in the market, however, it was commonly believed that the 
rich men had taken advantages from speculations, exploiting and deceiving. In result, there was a 
huge gap between rich and poor, dividing society into so-called winners and losers of transition: 
winners could enjoy the benefits from the newly discovered western markets, while losers were 
 
forced to struggle for a work place (unemployment rate increased dramatically) and money (having 
a job did not yet insured a steady income).  
Because of the deficit of the legal regulation, a vast amount of crimes was actually 
committed during the first years of transition, among them – con-related frauds (for instance, 
persuading people to sell their land and real estate for a cheap price, or make them investing in the 
fraud concerns), and racketeering. Moreover, to have one’s own business became a very risky 
choice, because of the pressure of criminals. The anti-legalist culture, undoubtedly, contributed to a 
huge damage of trust: most people felt that their social trust was abused.  
A sense of distrust was also reinforced along the aspect that society inherited a very 
paternalistic view of the state. The state was perceived as being responsible for all spheres of life, 
since, during the post-communist transformation, citizens were hardly used to taking responsibility 
for their own actions in personal as well as in social, economic, and political realms. For all failures, 
the state was to be blamed. But the free market did not guarantee any basic social needs anymore. It 
resulted in a huge moral panic and fear. As Tufiş (2008: 118) observes, “The state’s total 
involvement in all the sectors of society during the communist regime resulted in the dramatic 
reduction of risks associated with daily life. Under the new regime, democratic rules have required 
the withdrawal of the state from the society, letting the individual to confront these risks alone”. 
The communist experience and post-communist traumas naturally placed the state and the people in 
opposition. 
Overall, most people felt they were let down by the new system. Compared to their idealistic 
hope in the beginning of the transition, the realities afterwards have fallen short (Howard, 2002). 
The expectations of citizens were not rewarded by quick results and desired political outcomes, the 
short successes of private business actions were often replaced by economic set-backs, corruption, 
and bribery, since styles of behaviour in the old regime still remained omnipresent during the 
transformation process. Although political and economic reforms rapidly took place, cultural 
patterns, identities, values, and attitudes did not undergo any sudden changes and remained 
reserved, based on suspicion and passivity.  
Similarly, Sztompka (2004) emphasizes the long-lasting trauma of the social and cultural 
change: the despotic previous government and rapid political, economic, social reforms undermined 
trust both as a common action and as an organisational ability. These basic aspects of trust 
transformation have conditioned, according to Sztompka (1998), the formation of a specific culture 
in the post-communist region – a culture of suspicion, or culture of cynicism, as he calls it (he 
actually borrows this term from Stivers, 1994). Like the culture of trust, the culture of suspicion is 
also a product of institutional and national narratives, and it affects relationships at the political, 
economic, and social levels. At the political level, the culture of suspicion results in distrust in 
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formal institutions and lack of motivation to engage with the political system by any means of 
political participation. It also means a growing gap between political elites and citizens, the state 
and the society, as the latter have no motivation or feel inefficient to control the actions of the 
former. If there is always a suspicion, you cannot feel you can make a difference! At the economic 
level the culture of suspicion manifested itself in corruption, bribing and shadow economy, since 
people, if they want to achieve their goals, do not trust legal institutions and do not trust other 
individuals to commit their duties without any “favour” (bribe). At the societal level, suspicion 
strengthens only particularized trust, or limited trust to one’s family or group.  
As mentioned before, the mainstream of cultural theories underlines the modern substance 
of trust, creating the antinomy between trust and risk. Risk, in fact, is a self-reflexive notion, since 
one decides on the trustworthiness of another subject: whether it is expedient to take risks and what 
gains or losses trust might produce (Coleman, 1990). In the communist regime and later on in post-
communist societies, this antinomy of trust and risk hardly makes sense. The communist regime and 
the so-called trustworthiness of the communist regime were grounded in the mechanisms of 
coercion, terror, and fear. The unpredictable situation did not allow for any reasonable-based 
evaluation of trustworthiness, which is why it did not include any “making a bet” mechanism. 
Therefore, while trust in democracy is opposite to risk as a self-reflexive notion (which also 
includes responsibility for one’s decisions), under post-communist conditions, trust comes in 
opposition to fear. Fear brings about passivity, non-involvement, and non-communication 
(Markova, 2004: 8).  
To sum up, the transition increased the actual inequality leading to social alienation. For 
many people the independence, unfortunately, meant increasing helplessness, lack of perspectives, 
and a sense of insecurity. Thus, post-communist citizens continued isolating themselves within the 
limited circle of family and friendship-based networks who have earned their personal trust. 
 
3.3 Trust, civil society and social capital in the contemporary post-communist region 
 
In this section I address the role of trust and the development of civil society and social capital in 
the post-communist region. My argument here is based on the presumption that low levels of trust 
are related to the low levels of political/civic engagement and low stocks of social capital in 
general. Civil society is run autonomously, but is legally protected by the law. Usually it is 
structured around the formally established networks of peoples’ relations – organizations, 
associations, groups, clubs, movements, etc. (Howard, 2003: 35). Social capital is a broader concept 
than civil society, as it encompasses all relations between people, not only public activities framed 
by the legal setting.  
 
The overthrow of the communist regime was indisputably considered as a triumph of civil 
society. However, different studies stress the characterization of the weakness of civil society as a 
distinctive element of post-communist democracy (Howard, 2002). So why a seemingly strong civil 
society became so weak after democracy was established, given that democratic institutions should 
have facilitated the conditions for civil society to flourish? Howard (2002: 161-163) gives several 
possible explanations for that: 1) the legacy of distrust in communist organizations; 2) post-
communist disappointment; 3) the persistence of family and friendship-based networks. I will 
elaborate on each argument below. 
First, negative experiences with communist organizations escalated distrust in the latter-day 
organizations. As it was already discussed, under the communist regime, the voluntary 
organizations were discredited, as participation in them was usually obligatory. There was no inner 
motivation or desire to join the organizations back then, thus the pressure instilled antipathy for so-
called voluntary activities. For most of the citizens civic organizations are still associated with 
undemocratic attitudes and strict hierarchical structure. Howard (2003: 38-39) notices that in 
contemporary post-communist society, civic organizations “sacrifice” because of the still-alive 
perceived antinomy between individuals and the state. People treat organizations as a part of state 
institutions, including trade unions, and they are reluctant to participate claiming for apolitical civil 
society. As a result, civic organizations also try to place themselves in opposition to the state, 
whereas in mature democracies the relationship between civil society and state is more interactive 
(Howard, 2003: 38- 39; referring, for instance, to Walzer, 1998).  
Second, disappointment in the post-communist transition made people apathetic about civic 
activities. Citizens’ faith in democracy fell short, as willing to participate in the “civic fabric”. Like 
in communism, participation still resembled subordination to someone’s will, especially given a 
corrupt and anti-legal culture in the transition period. Moreover, common threat is not relevant 
anymore, so there is no need to organize for collective actions. The achieved collapse of the 
communism created a certain vacuum of orientations and goals. The solidarity of people during the 
transition was disrupted; people were struggling for survival in a very hostile economic 
environment, so it left a little room for shared idealistic goals and values.  
Third, instead of joining organizations, people prefer spending their private time as they 
used to do, in their own private circles. As Howard (2002: 163) put it, “Unlike in many Western 
societies – where voluntary organizations have become a central part of the social and political 
culture, and where people join organizations in order to meet new people and to expand their 
horizons through public activities – in post-communist societies, many people are still invested in 
their own private circles, and they simply feel no need, much less desire, to join and participate in 
civil society organizations.” So supposing that in Western democracies people participate in 
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organizations because of their needs and desires, people in post-communist societies assume that 
their social needs are already fulfilled in family-based circled.  
The systemic suppression of civil society over half of the century has made it difficult for 
new organizations to emerge and get rooted (Rose, 1994). To compensate the passivity of the 
citizens, many organizations in the post-communist region were in fact created with the financial 
support from the West. The benefits of such initiative have been quite disputable in the literature. 
Western organizations have been accused of interference and efforts to create civic society “from 
above”. On the other hand, the sponsors would argue for the need to teach democracy. However, as 
many authors notice, the problem is, how to really measure the strength of civil society, as many of 
organizations in reality are nominal, of exaggerated size and activities. As Howard (2003: 52) 
notices, statistically civil society might seem strong, but it is organized from above and thus missing 
real participation of ordinary citizens. 
Authors link the weakness of civil society and low levels of citizens’ involvement in East-
Central Europe with the low stocks of social capital expected to be crucial for the success of 
democratic consolidation in post-communist countries (Newton, 1999b; Dowley and Silver, 2002; 
Letki and Evans, 2005, Bădescu and Uslaner, 2003; Lasinska, 2013). There is a causal relationship: 
social capital cannot be produced and maintained through the absent civic networks and, in return, 
the vacuum of social capital discourages people to act collectively. As Pehlivanova (2009) 
observes, most participation takes place in activities involving tight social circles, less in any kind 
of formal organizations, and least in any kind of political or governmental institutions. Referring to 
Putnam’s theory, we might assume that social capital in post-communist societies is emerging 
around bonding (particularized), but not bridging (generalized) trust. 
Yet, the study of Dowley and Silver (2002) suggests that social capital in post-communist 
countries does not seem to contribute to democratic development: there is no significant correlation 
between democratization and social capital in 7 post-communist countries they investigated. 
Therefore it might very well be that social capital as a human resource is largely politically 
irrelevant (Gibson, 2001).  
Some authors even go further by arguing that civic engagement in the post-communist 
societies has nothing to do with trust. For instance, Zmerli, Newton, and Montero (2007) find no 
significant effect of associational involvement on social trust. It is hypothesized that the decision to 
participate in organizations still remains an involuntary choice, most likely, that “someone asked to 
participate”, and it is conceived as a duty. In this respect, a few researchers suggest that 
participation in post-communist societies might be less natural, but imitable. For instance, data used 
in the study of Bădescu, Sum and Uslaner (2004) reveal that members of organizations in the 
Eastern bloc are less active than those in the West. Activists are less willing to cooperate with 
 
people or groups from outside their organizations. Moreover, the same study shows that participants 
are treated by the general public as less trustful than the rest of the respondents. Furthermore, the 
authors discuss that trust not necessarily contributes to participatory effectiveness. The empirical 
evidence of the study reveals that some civic organizations are not democratic inside. Being active 
in an organization is not a key to participation and decision making process. Trust thus might not be 
a predictor of democratic support in general (Letki and Evans, 2005). Hence, these theoretical 
assumptions call into question, whether social capital as indicated in the West societies really 
contributes to political participation in the post-communist region. 
 
3.3.1 Some empirical evidence of levels of trust in post-communist societies 
 
To further support the theoretical points above, I refer to the few empirical studies on trust in post-
communist societies. As it was mentioned in the beginning, the most comprehensive research on 
trust in post-communist societies was done by Mierina (2011). She uses the WVS data (2005 – 
2007), which shows that only one quarter of the respondents in post-communist societies tend to 
trust people in general: 22.2 % in Bulgaria, 19.0 % in Poland, 20.3 % in Romania and 18.1 % in 
Slovenia. It is worth noting that during the democratization period, in some countries generalized 
trust went down: in Bulgaria from 30.4 (1993) to 22.2 % (2007), in Czech Republic from 30.2 % 
(1993) to 23.9% (2001), in Estonia from 27.6 % (1993) to 23.9 % (2001), in Lithuania from 30.8 % 
(1993) to 24.9 % (2001). Similar results using the WVS datasets (waves 1990-2005) are also 
attained by Horne (2013). Thus, the authors demonstrate the post-communist trust deficit appears to 
have increased between the first and second wave (WVS), and actually widened even more between 
the second and third wave (1999 – 2004). Although in more recent years some positive 
developments concerning social trust have also been observed (for instance, Ramonaitė, 2006b), 
most of the studies are less optimistic or at least emphasize the differences between post-communist 
countries (and between the datasets) in this regard (Horne, 2013).  
In another study, Undiscovered Power: Map of the Civil Society in Lithuania, Žiliukaitė and 
Ramonaitė (2006: 234) have found a significant difference between generalized and particularized 
social trust in Lithuania. The results of the fieldwork (Lithuanian Values 2005) indicate that out of 
1010 respondents only 7.2 % expressed trust in strangers (people whom the respondents have not 
met before). In comparison, about 75 % of respondents trust people they actually know, 59 % trust 
their neighbours, 84 % trust relatives and almost 98 % trust their family. The numbers illustrate that 
most people are attached to particularized trust and rely on the close-knit ties with family and 
friends, which existed in communist societies. Similar findings were also discussed by Bădescu and 
Uslaner (2003) and Vasilache (2010) in Romania and Pehlivanova (2009) in Bulgaria. 
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Furthermore, Letki’s (2003) study on 11 post-communist countries shows that although 42% 
of the respondents would expect help and support from other people, almost 80% of them are afraid 
that others may take advantage of them. At the same time, over 70 % of the respondents do not 
believe in unselfish cooperation. It strengthens the assumptions of family-centred particularized 
trust. 
When talking about social trust in former communist countries, Vasilache (2010: 11) notices 
some interesting variation within trust, pleading for a conservation of the traditional social structure. 
Based on her research in Romania, she concludes that in younger groups of friends, one best friend 
is enough to be a catalyst of trust, while in groups of older people, only communities of 10 or more 
friends increase trust. It suggests that “these communities of older people are reminiscences of the 
communist period groups of friends which cultivated a somehow semi-clandestine trust”. Vasilache 
(2010: 12) also finds a negative correlation between the frequency of social meetings and the 
existence of someone to discuss personal and intimate matters with. The results incline that there 
are two levels of socialization, preserving the communist tradition of relationships: the extended 
group of friends, bound by superficial relationships, and the confident(s), usually only one. 
Moreover, the results of the same study show that trust is correlated with compliance (the 
importance of doing what is told and following rules) and less significantly with tolerance (the 
importance of understanding different people). This evidence-based insight matches with the 
theoretical premise that in post-communist societies trust might be related to fear and less to risk. 
However, lacking more empirically-backed evidence in other post-communist societies, this 
paradox of trust still remains a subject for further research. 
Post-communist countries have also consistently lower levels of organizational membership. 
In post-communist societies individuals are on average engaged in less than one organization 
(organizational membership level is 0.91), compared to post-authoritarian regimes (2.39 
organization for one person) and far beyond older democracies (Howard, 2002: 159). Hence, as 
Howard (2002: 160) envisages, communism, as prior regime type, is “the most powerful and 
statistically significant factor”. 
Recent empirical studies prove that the low levels of social trust are accompanied by distrust 
towards political institutions. Referring to the Standard Eurobarometer Study (2012 Fall), only a 
few respondents express some level of trust in political parties (14 % in Bulgaria, 8 % in Czech 
Republic, 16 % in Estonia, 6 % in Latvia, 13 % in Lithuania, 9 % in Romania and Slovenia). The 
parliament is trusted by one fifth of the respondents on average, varying from 9 % in Czech 
Republic to 30 % in Slovakia. 
On the other hand, almost all post-communist societies are distinguished by a comparatively 
high trust in the president, varying from 30 % in Bulgaria to around 70 % in Poland and Lithuania. 
 
The scholars notice that these tendencies illustrate longing for authoritarian (or “strong hand”) 
politics and societal will to follow strong leaders (Sztompka 1999; Rose, 2001; Ramonaitė 2007). 
The reliance of providentialism, as Tufiş (2008) and Sztompka (2002) observe, is also reflected by 
the higher levels of trust in Church and international institutions. But as the authors explain, citizens 
tend to idealize these institutions as they have no detailed understanding how they really work. 
Finally, in his comprehensive studies on post-communist countries, Uslaner (2003; 2008) 
provides empirical evidence that in former communist countries a general climate of political 
distrust and atomized (in-group) societal trust are tightly related to corruption, inequality and 
expectations for the future. His longitudinal findings show that in almost all post-communist 
societies generalized trust significantly correlates negatively with perceived corruption of 
politicians and perceived inequality. The results of the research disclose that the more the system is 
perceived as unequal, the less social trust exists in the society. Uslaner explains this by saying that a 
sense of inequality diminishes a feeling of control and this drives down generalized trust in people. 
When lacking trust in the system and in people around, individuals often see only one way of 
achieving their goals – bribery and corruption. Consequently, high level of corruption leads to a 
higher economic inequality (Uslaner, 2008: 11). Obviously, these processes create a long lasting 
vicious circle, which is very damaging to the quality of post-communist democracy. 
 
3.4 Summary and concluding remarks   
 
The present chapter viewed trust in a historical perspective and analyzed the nature of trust in 
contemporary post-communist societies. To sum up the considerations on trust in post-communist 
societies, three observations can be made.  
First, scholars suggest that social trust in post-communist democracies lacks attitudes based 
on good will and mostly relies on particularized trust. Due to the communist experience, social trust 
became limited to the “strategically egoistic” attitude in order to fulfill one’s needs, even by using 
illegal methods. This perception of social trust has become pervasively and robustly attached to 
rational calculations. Based on that, social trust did not generalize to wider societal levels. The 
evidence from different studies also suggests that trust in strangers is deeply set apart from trust in 
family.  
Second, low generalized trust in the Eastern bloc is accompanied with a weak civil society 
and low levels of social capital. The nature of trust has maintained the stratification of the post-
communist society along the inner social circles of close family and friends, thus preserving cultural 
legacies of the so-called niches. Some studies reveal that trust is not even necessarily related to 
participation in civic organizations at all and does not contribute to the effectiveness of democracy. 
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Third, social trust in post-communist societies is weakly associated with self-reflexiveness 
due to placing trust against fear. The exposure of fear restrains post-communist citizens from active 
political engagement, prompts political alienation, and perverts the state-society relationship. The 
escalation of fear weakens citizens’ vigilance towards the political system, political institutions, and 
rules. Fear creates a general atmosphere of suspicion which prevents political actions.  
Having analyzed the development and nature of trust in pre-communist societies, I will now 
focus my attention (again) on participation in party and movement politics. I further investigate how 
individual social trust predicts political engagement. Does social trust, as individual stimulus, lead 
to political participation in the same way in mature and post-communist democracies? Or are there 
some differences in this regard and social capital theories cannot be applicable to the same extent in 
contrasting cultural settings? And following that, what is the role of context? In this case, how post-
communism, as a condition, affects individuals’ willingness to participate? These questions are 
addressed in the chapters to come.
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4.1 Introduction  
 
The question how to explain political engagement in post-communist European democracies and 
what is the role of social trust arises as an unresolved issue in comparative political sociology. The 
empirical puzzle different authors try to solve derives from the observed patterns of voting and 
protesting across Europe: post-communist societies reveal lower levels of participation in politics 
than their western neighbours. As voting trends show (Table A1 in Appendix A), in more than two 
decades, electoral turnout in post-communist societies has declined from about 77% on average in 
the early nineties, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet empire, to about 56% on average today. 
Thus, there is a striking gap in this regard compared to the more mature democracies. In these 
democracies, turnout has also somewhat declined, but not so strongly. Overall, the average voting 
turnout in mature Western democracies currently fluctuates around 70%.  
Moreover, according to the ESS and EVS surveys, (Table A2 in Appendix A) other means 
of “doing politics”, namely, demonstrating, also dramatically decreased during the past decades in 
post-communist societies (Letki, 2003; Howard, 2003; Ramonaitė, 2006b; Bernhagen and Marsh, 
2007; Kostadinova and Power, 2007; Van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007; Pietrzyk-Rieves, 
2008; Van Deth and Vráblíková, 2013; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014). According to the EVS, the 
difference between the post-communist and mature democracies is really huge: taken together, 
approximately 9% of the respondents in post-communist democracies have once attended a lawful 
demonstration, while about 26% of the respondents in mature democracies reported to have done 
so. The difference in the trend over time is also rather striking: the percentage has dropped with 
more than 13% in the post-communist region since 1990, whereas in mature democracies the levels 
of demonstrating have been more or less stable during the same time period.   
In this chapter I specifically address the three-folded question whether social trust has both 
(1) a direct influence and (2) an indirect influence on political participation, mediated by efficacy, 
and (3) whether these effects differ between mature and post-communist societies, as well as among 
post-communist societies. Put differently, to what extent does social trust lead to political 
engagement in old and young democracies, either directly or via political efficacy, and do we find 
the same patterns between different sets of countries?  
A few authors have already compared the patterns of political participation; however, the 
empirical results are quite ambiguous. For instance, Bernhagen and Marsh (2007: 1) show that “the 
factors explaining election turnout have a largely similar impact in old and new democracies” in 
terms of socio-demographic, attitudinal and mobilization-related characteristics of citizens. On the 
other hand, the same study proves that the causes of protest participation are different between the 
two sets of countries. Their results show that social trust is a more significant predictor of political 
 
engagement in mature democracies (taken both party-based and movement politics) than in post-
communist ones. Moreover, the authors conclude that “some differences in political engagement 
cannot be accounted for without reference to contextual variables specific to the post-communist 
democracies <…>.”  
However, the existing literature has paid only limited attention to how social trust can both 
directly and indirectly affect different types of participation in mature and post-communist 
democracies. Some recent studies have indicated the links between participation, social trust and 
political efficacy (for instance, Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009). 
Nonetheless, there is still a gap in the current research regarding the questions to what extent 
political efficacy mediates between social trust and political engagement and whether such 
mediation patterns are the same in the two country-sets. This is still a rather new area of research in 
post-communist studies, although there are a few hints on this subject in the works of Mierina 
(2011), Pierobon (2008), Mishler and Rose (2005), Armingeon (2007) and the already mentioned 
study of Bernhagen and Marsh (2007). 
The general theoretical claim of this chapter is that social trust was systematically impaired 
during the Communist era, thus I assume that citizens’ motivation to participate in politics is 
weakened due to the loss of this essential element of social connectedness. In addition to that, I 
expect that social trust has an impact on political efficacy: the less citizens trust fellow people, the 
less they feel politically efficacious, which in turn will make them less willing to participate in 
politics. In my view, social trust helps to increase efficacy: the mutual growth of these values is 
perceived as a process of adapting to (or socializing into) democracy. 
Building on the arguments put forward in the previous chapters, I will test these 
expectations on the influence of social trust and political efficacy on citizens’ political activities. 
Empirically, the direct and indirect effects of social trust are estimated in two country-sets (15 
mature and 12 post-communist societies24) with individual level regression models using the ESS 
data of 2008. Moreover, the models are tested in the post-communist countries separately to 
investigate the similarities and differences between them in this regard.    
First, this chapter will briefly resume the theoretical accounts for social trust and political 
participation and provide the literature overview on how these variables are empirically connected 
in mature and post-communist democracies. The subsequent section will describe the data and 
methods used. Then, the results will be presented. After displaying the descriptives and the cross-
country differences in political participation, social trust and political efficacy, the direct and 
                                                 
24 Countries/societies included as mature/established democracies are: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Germany-West, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Post-communist democracies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany-East, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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indirect effects of social trust on participation are tested in mature and post-communist democracies 
with logistic regression analyses. The conclusion section will summarize and interpret the results.  
 
4.2 Theoretical perspectives and hypotheses  
 
Traditionally, when explaining political participation, the literature refers to individual resources 
and democratic values individuals possess (Almond and Verba, 1963; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Dalton, 2004). In addition to that, the social capital literature 
proposes a culture-based interpretation of why individuals engage in politics, namely it points to 
social attitudes and social connectedness. One of the main questions the social capital theorists are 
concerned with is: does social trust stimulate political actions and does it provide a sense of 
readiness to participate in political life? My research interest goes beyond this general question and 
addresses the pattern between social trust and participation in a comparative view between old and 
new European democracies.  
I review two kinds of literatures in my attempt to answer my research questions. First, this 
study builds further on general literature that provides important theoretical insights based on the 
experience of mature democracies (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993; 2000). Second, I also 
rely on more specific literature that scrutinizes the predictors of political participation in post-
communist societies (Letki, 2003; Smith, 2009; Uslaner, 2004; Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer, and 
Wittrock, 1998; Barnes and Simon, 1998).  For each research question, I formulate hypothetical 
claims. 
 
The first claim: there is a positive effect of social trust on political participation 
  
To begin with, there is an ongoing debate on the link between social trust (or social capital in a 
more general sense) and political engagement. In social capital theories, social trust is conceived as 
one of the causes of individuals’ willingness to participate in politics (i.e. it has a direct effect). The 
explanation of this assertion is that trusting people care for each other and thus feel a moral duty to 
be involved in common affairs (Putnam, 1993; 2001; Misztal, 1996; Seligman, 1997). It is argued 
that social trust leads individuals to participate in the pursuit of the commons, as trust provides us 
with the assurance that political action will be worthwhile. In return, successful cooperation based 
on trust gives people satisfaction in what they do (Putnam, 1993; Fishkin, 1995: 148). Political 
action endows us with a sense of belonging to a collective identity and pride for struggling for good 
and right values (Klandermans, 2003). 
So far, previous studies have shown that associational membership (which is a component of 
social capital) is tightly related to political activity (Van Deth, 2001; Krishna, 2002a, 2002b; 
 
Teorell, Torcal, and Montero, 2007). However, the relationship between social trust and political 
participation is more ambiguous, as different studies find different types of relationships. Talking 
about party politics, several studies find positive links between social trust and voting (Kaase, 1999; 
Putnam, 1993; 2000; Rossteutscher, 2008; Rubenson, 2005; Roller and Rudi, 2008; Hooghe and 
Marien, 2013). Regarding other forms of party politics participation, the effect of social trust differs 
from positive (Marien and Christensen, 2012; Roller and Rudi, 2008) to negative or non-existent 
(Muhlberger, 2003; Van Deth, 2001; Armingoen, 2007; Uslaner, 2008; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; 
Hooghe and Quintellier, 2014; Kim, 2014). Concerning protesting, some of these studies prove that 
there is a positive effect of social trust on movement politics (Roller and Rudi, 2008; Hooghe and 
Marien, 2013; Kim, 2014; on political consumerism – Armingeon, 2007).  Thus, the existent 
empirical evidence unveils that the relationship highly depends on what means of party politics – 
voting or other, like, contacting politicians and campaigning, – and movement politics we take into 
account.  
 Some scarce evidence on how trust contributes (or not) to citizens’ political involvement in 
post-communist societies can be detected. Mierina (2011) and Barnes and Simon (1998) conclude 
that social trust has a positive impact on participation in a few post-communist societies, suggesting 
that the effect of trust on political activity is related to a country’s level of democraticness. 
However, Letki (2003), Letki and Evans (2005), Uslaner (2004), Armingeon (2007) find no positive 
or no significant effect of social trust on most of the political activities in post-communist societies.  
 Despite contrasting findings in the literature, my expectation is as follows:  
 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between social trust and political action: voting (H1a), party 
politics (H1b) and movement politics (H1c) participation. 
 
The second claim: no cross-national differences in the positive effect of social trust 
 
The social capital approach relies on the universal character of the causal relationship between 
social trust and political participation, although the aspects of this approach are rooted in stable, 
Western democracies. Nevertheless, as it was already mentioned, a universal, positive association 
between social trust and political action is not evident at all, meaning that this relationship can 
depend on the institutional environment. In other words, the literature also suggest that social trust 
may not function in the same way (as a stimulus for participation) in countries that  
have had a totalitarian and/or authoritarian regime (see similar argumentation in Van der Meer and 
Van Ingen, 2009). The same logic would also apply to post-authoritarian Southern European 
countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus, referring to our dataset). 
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A relevant study in this regard was carried out by Armingeon (2007) who compares 
different predictors for different modes of political participation between Western and Eastern 
European democracies. The study reveals that at the individual level, most of the predictors work 
more or less in the same way in Western and Eastern Europe. However, party politics activities 
(except for voting) are more significantly predicted in mature democracies. The same also applies to 
social trust: Armingoen shows that social trust is a more significant predictor of different forms of 
political participation (for instance, party politics, consumerism, voting) in the West than in the 
East. To sum up, although the differences in predictions between the country-sets are not very 
remarkable, there are some reasons to believe that social trust, as an individual characteristic, could 
play a different role in spurring political action. 
However, for the sake of comparison, I will test whether hypothesis H1 holds in all of the 27 
European societies that are in my dataset. This will allow us to see whether the associations of these 
variables vary cross-nationally. Thus, I predict that: 
 
H2: The individual level effect of social trust on political action (H2 a-b-c) is positive in all 
countries.  
H3: The individual level effect of social trust on political action (H3 a-b-c) is similar in mature and 
post-communist democracies. 
  
The third claim: the association between social trust and political action is explained by 
political efficacy  
 
As I already discussed in chapter 2, social capital and civic society literatures assume that social 
trust fosters political efficacy. For example, Putnam (1993) observes that people in more trustful 
societies and individuals who possess higher levels of trust feel more aware of the capabilities to 
influence the government. Certainly, political efficacy has been cited as one of the decisive factors 
explaining whether and how citizens participate (Lane, 1959; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954; 
Warren, 1999; Morrell, 2005; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008; della 
Porta and Reiter, 2012).  Following the conceptualization presented in chapter 2, I distinguish 
between internal and external efficacy (Lane, 1959). Internal efficacy is self-understood 
competence to influence political outcomes, whereas external efficacy reflects on perceived 
government’s responsiveness (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991).  
Three aspects are of interest here: 1) how different dimensions of political efficacy lead to, 
or restrain people from, the different types of political participation; 2) how social trust is related to 
different dimensions of political efficacy; 3) are the patterns of the relationship between social trust, 
 
internal and external dimensions of political efficacy and types of political participation similar or 
different between old and new European democracies?   
With regard to the first aspect, a few studies indicate that confidence in governmental 
institutions and the perception that the government responds to one’s demands induces individual’s 
willingness to participate in institutional (party/electoral) political activities (Marien and 
Christensen, 2013). On the other hand, political distrust and disappointment in government’s 
policies, some research show, bring people to the streets and encourage them for protest activities 
directed against elite-based institutions (Braun and Hutter, 2013; Kaase, 1999; Norris, 1999; 
Rosanvallon, 2008; Hooghe and Marien, 2013). Yet, some evidence also demonstrates that political 
distrust not necessarily is an attitude of protesters (for instance, Van Stekelenburg, 2014), but all in 
all, politically distrusting people tend to protest more than politically trusting. However, it is less 
clear whether this theoretical account also holds for the post-communist democracies.  
Internal efficacy, several studies showed, has a less ambiguous effect on political 
participation, meaning that it positively contributes to all modes of participation (Almond and 
Verba, 1989; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). It encourages 
conventional participation, as efficacious individuals are more aware of and more interested in 
politics. Internal efficacy might also foster protests activities, as an efficacious citizen not only 
learns about the political outcomes and consequences, but also knows how to (effectively) influence 
those outcomes (Gamson, 1968: 48; Sheerin, 2007).   
There is not much research on the second aspect, thus on how social trust is connected to 
political efficacy or variables related to efficacy, except for the well-known study of Putnam (1993) 
and a few other studies. Andersen and Pammett (2009), for instance, observe that low levels of trust 
in societies very robustly correlate with low levels of political efficacy. Drawing on the already 
mentioned empirical research in the USA, Uslaner concluded that social trust does not directly lead 
to participation, but instead it robustly correlates with one’s sense of efficacy, which is an assumed 
mediator between trust and participation (2008: 115–160).  
The relationship between social trust and political efficacy has been also (although less 
thoroughly) investigated by Almond and Verba (1963), Van Deth and Scarbrough (1998), Roller 
and Rudi (2008), Anderson (2010), Hooghe and Marien (2013), and Hsung (2014). Other authors 
provide some hints on how social trust positively contributes to political literacy and awareness 
(Milner, 2002), self-confidence, and also to political support and political trust (Newton, 1999a; 
Norris, 2002a).   
The literature suggests several ways how political efficacy can explain why trust fosters 
participation. First, while trusting, people are more inclined to socialize with each other, they are 
more likely to acquire political knowledge and information in general about the subjects to be acted 
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(Milner, 2002), self-confidence, and also to political support and political trust (Newton, 1999a; 
Norris, 2002a).   
The literature suggests several ways how political efficacy can explain why trust fosters 
participation. First, while trusting, people are more inclined to socialize with each other, they are 
more likely to acquire political knowledge and information in general about the subjects to be acted 
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on and the methods to employ such actions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Milner, 2002). Based on 
political knowledge, citizens yield initiatives more easily (Stolle, 2002). Second, trust empowers us 
politically as it makes sure we believe that institutions we deal with are fair and that people are 
going to behave by the rules. Moreover, when we trust people, we expect them to act in a similar 
manner and it gives us a sense of control (predictability). Sustained confidence in the motives of 
others encourages and facilitates participation (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert, 2004). If we are sure that 
the rules are not going to be violated, we feel more certain about involvement in political life. Thus, 
I expect socially trusting people to develop a feeling of political efficacy (Andersen and Pammett, 
2009).  
Even to a greater extent than party participation, movement participation relies on social 
connectedness, as people decide on whether to protest and what strategies to employ (whereas the 
setting of the elections is determined by institutions). Trust is crucially important to facilitate 
mobilization and mitigate the risk of protesting. As Benson and Rochon (2004) notice, the costs of 
taking part in a demonstration may be relatively small, but it also may entail being arrested and 
prosecuted, depending on the democraticness of the regime or the general atmosphere of the 
protest/demonstration. Trust leads to optimistic estimates about the likelihood of success, because it 
allows forming expectations about the actions of others (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988). 
The alternative approach to the connection of trust and participation posits that social trust 
may work as “double-edged sword”, meaning that trusting people can remain passive, because they 
believe that others can be trusted to participate (and “do the job”) for them (Pattie, Seyd, and 
Whiteley, 2003: 458). However, this approach is not mainstream in political sociology, it neither 
receives sufficient empirical support.  
Based on the assumptions suggested in the literature and previous research, I have 
formulated the following hypotheses. These hypotheses have been introduced and discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2. All hypotheses are summarized in Figure 4.1.  
H4: External efficacy mediates between social trust and voting (H4a) and party politics 
activities (H4b). However, I expect that the effect of external efficacy, as a mediating variable, on 
movement politics activities (H4c) is negative.  
H5: Internal political efficacy plays a mediating role between social trust and voting (H5a), 
participation in party politics (H5b) and between social trust and participation in movement politics 
(H5c). 
 
Figure 4. 1 Causal links between social trust, external and internal efficacy and party/movement 
politics participation   
 
The hypotheses I have formulated in this section are tested in the two-country groups: mature and 
post-communist societies. Thus, the third interesting aspect is the comparison of the interplay 
between social trust, political efficacy and political participation between mature and post-
communist democracies. As I have already pointed out above, the existing literature does not 
illuminate this relationship in a comparative perspective, although the different levels of 
participation between these two country-sets are acknowledged by several authors (Rueschemeyer, 
Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock 1998; Bernhagen and March, 2007; Armingeon, 2007; Pierobon, 
2008; Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 144). Thus, it has remained poorly understood and a topic for 
controversial debates, whether and to what extent the predictors explaining engagement in party and 
movement politics in more mature, older democracies differ from younger post-communist ones. 
Does social trust lead to protest and movement politics in the same way in both types of countries, 
or does it work out differently in post-communist societies?  
 
4.3 Research design  
 
4.3.1 Data and measurements  
 
Data and sample. To test the hypotheses empirically, I will use the data from the fourth wave of 
the European Social Survey (ESS; 2008),25 which provides extensive information on different 
modes of participation, social trust and political attitudes, including those that represent political 
efficacy. The year 2008 was selected for two reasons. First, it embraces the largest number of 
                                                 
25 The European Social Survey is a cross-national attitude survey. Starting in 2002, the survey has been held every two 
years in many European countries, with round 4 (2008) covering more than 30 nations. 
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European post-communist democracies (compared to the ESS datasets of 2002, 2010 and 2012). 
Second, I decided to choose this dataset to avoid the timing of the economic crisis that broke out a 
year later and which might have profoundly altered the standard rates of political participation in 
each democracy. 
In this research 26 established European democracies countries were chosen26, most of them 
members of the EU, plus Norway and Switzerland, which are linked to the EU by many bilateral 
agreements and are internationally acknowledged as fitting the highest democratic standards. 
Overall, 15 countries in the sample represent mature democracies (28 744 respondents) and 12 
(including East Germany) are from the post-communist region (20 747 respondents) (see Table 4.1 
for an overview of the number of respondents per country). So in total we have 27 societies, as 
Germany is entered in the analysis as two different societies: Germany is split to Western Germany, 
which followed the Western-based political and cultural developments, and Eastern Germany, 
which experienced communism and thus is expected to be substantially different from the Western 
part. As I have explained in the section on the case selection in chapter 1, I chose only those post-
communist countries that belong to the EU, as it allows controlling for the development of political 
regimes: all countries are formally recognized established democracies (fitting the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria27). 
In the descriptive analysis that compares countries, the figures are based on the weighed 
data required by the ESS sample design. Design weights in combination with population size 
weights are applied. The main propose of the design weight is to avoid a possible selection bias, and 
population size weight insures the proportional representation of the countries, despite differences 
in their population (The ESS Documentation Report, 2008). 
 
4.3.2 Dependent variables  
 
As theorized in chapter 2, I distinguish between participation in party and movement politics, which 
are the dependent variables. As it has a comprehensive list of political activities, the rich ESS data 
provides the possibility to refine this dichotomy and conceptually distinguish three different types 
of participation. Due to behavioural specifics involved in different forms of political participation, 
many authors suggest separating between voting and other institutionalized forms of participation 
                                                 
26 Countries included as mature democracies are: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany (split 
in West and East Germany), Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Post-communist democracies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. N.B. Data for Austria, Italy, Luxemburg and Malta is not available.  
27 Copenhagen criteria are the set of political, economic and the Community acquis criteria that the countries must meet 
in order to join the EU. In practice it means that a country, as the EU member, demonstrates stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Retrieved, February 
15/2013, from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm 
 
(see, for instance, Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Armingoen, 2007). Voting is 
the most regular and the most prominent form of participation and for many people it is the primary 
mean of participating in politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Thus, refining the 
conceptualization employed in the theoretical part (chapter 2), I differentiate between voting and 
participation in other party politics activities28. I also keep participation in movement politics as a 
separate variable.  
The decision to make a distinction between voting and other modes of party politics 
participation is also based on an inspection of the distribution of the data, which shows that 
involvement in these activities is highly skewed: the majority of the respondents (around 80 per 
cent) did not participate in other party politics activities, except for voting.  
I measure voting with the question: “Did you vote in the last [country] national election in 
[month/year]? Yes/No?” (variable name: vote).  
Other party politics participation activities are tapped with these items: 1) Contacted 
politician or government official last 12 months (variable name: contplt29) 2) Worked in political 
party or action group last 12 months (wrkprty); 3) Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker 
(badge); 4) Member of a political party (mmbprty). Answers: yes=1; no=0. The dichotomized 
scoring to measure participation in these activities is applied: 1 is given to the respondents who 
participated in at least one of the mentioned activities, and they get a 0 score if they did not 
participate in any of the activities. 
Participation in movement politics is gauged by three indicators: 1) Signed a petition in last 
12 months (sgnptit); 2) Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months (pbldmn); 3) 
Boycotted certain products in last 12 months (bctprd). The answer categories consist of “yes” (1) 
and “no” (0). As the distributions are skewed again (around 70 per cent of the respondents did not 
participate in any activity), the dichotomized scoring was employed, 1 meaning participation in at 
least one movement activity, and 0 indicating non-participation.30  
 
4.3.3 Independent variables 
 
Social trust 
 
The ESS 2008 survey operationalizes social trust by using three questions that combine the original 
question of generalized trust (used in West Germany in 1948) and its later adaptations by 
                                                 
28 Voting is thus not considered a component of participation in party politics. The latter variable only includes all other 
institutionalized forms of political participation.  
29 I also include the original variable names of the ESS database for the ease of the replication of the analyses. 
30 Although dependant variables are skewed, we decided not to apply log transformation, which is not a neat solution 
here (score 0 would still comprise the largest category).  
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Rosenberg (1956), who added the other two questions to form a more reliable trust scale (in Zmerli 
and Newton, 2008). 
 The respondents are asked to indicate on a 0 to 10 scale31, where 0 means the lowest and 10 
the highest agreement, whether they agree with these statements: 
1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people? (ppltrst) 
2) Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair? (pplfair) 
3) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out 
for themselves? (pplhlp) 
The first question is assumed to be the most precise one to measure the generalized level of 
social trust and, despite some criticism, the usage of this formulation of the question is 
academically defended (for instance, Uslaner, 2002). I follow Zmerli and Newton (2008), who 
suggest using the three-item scale of generalized trust. I argue that the above-mentioned questions 
are related to each other in the sense that they represent three notions associated to the category of 
trust: trustworthiness, honesty, and altruistic attitudes. 
A principal component analysis of the three trust questions show that they load on one 
dimension quite strongly, the first component explaining between 58.7 and 78.3 per cent of the 
variance in each of the 26 countries (Table 4.1). This indicates a single dimension, therefore my 
decision is to summate each individual’s responses to the three questions and divide the number by 
three. In the cases where only answers to one or two questions are provided, accordingly one score 
or the sum of the score divided by two are counted. I label the new scale variable Rosenberg trust 
index.  
  
                                                 
31 The ESS survey employs an eleven-point rating scale to answer these questions and compared to other surveys, it is 
more accurate. To compare, World Value Survey (also European Value Survey) uses dichotomized answers for the 
question of generalized trust (Yes/No). The International Social Survey Programme employs a 4-point Likert scale. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Principal component analysis of three-item Rosenberg trust scale  
Country General 
trust 
Fairness Helpfulness Eigenvalue  % of 
variance 
explained by 
single factor 
N of 
respondents 
(not weighted) 
Belgium .81 .80 .73 1.82 60.65 1760 
Cyprus .88 .88 .85 2.28 75.87 1215 
Denmark .83 .84 .74 1.94 64.78 1610 
Finland .83 .84 .76 1.97 65.74 2195 
France .76 .80 .73 1.76 58.71 2073 
Germany-West .78 .80 .79 1.87 62.37 1784 
Greece .89 .90 .87 2.35 78.28 2072 
Ireland .79 .80 .76 1.85 61.74 1764 
Netherlands .83 .85 .74 1.95 65.13 1778 
Norway .82 .83 .74 1.90 63.41 1549 
Portugal .83 .81 .76 1.91 63.68 2367 
Spain .84 .80 .76 1.93 64.30 2576 
Sweden .81 .83 .74 1.90 63.19 1830 
Switzerland .81 .83 .78 1.95 64.84 1819 
United Kingdom .81 .85 .78 1.98 65.89 2352 
Bulgaria .85 .88 .82 2.16 72.09 2230 
Croatia .87 .86 .82 2.16 71.94 1484 
Czech Republic .87 .86 .78 2.09 69.74 2018 
Estonia .81 .81 .74 1.85 61.60 1661 
Germany-East .77 .82 .82 1.93 64.48 967 
Hungary .82 .80 .79 1.95 65.15 1544 
Latvia .79 .83 .74 2.01 66.98 1980 
Lithuania .89 .89 .84 2.30 76.67 2002 
Poland .78 .82 .75 1.84 61.28 1619 
Romania .86 .91 .87 2.32 77.19 2146 
Slovakia .87 .88 .81 2.18 72.55 1810 
Slovenia .83 .84 .77 1.98 66.11 1286 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Note: Data weight is applied. 
 
Variables associated with political efficacy  
 
The ESS 2008 survey does not provide the items that were originally used in the American 
Elections Studies to measure external political efficacy (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991). The 
closest indicator to it is political trust, which expresses diffuse political support (in D. Easton’s 
sense), and refers to the perceived trustworthiness of the governmental institution and assumingly 
renders a feeling that the respondent’s voice is heard.  
I operationalized political trust by measuring trust in the most important institutions of a 
political system using this question: “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally 
trust each of the institutions I read out”. The following institutions were presented: a) the country’s 
parliament (trstprl); b) the legal system (trstlgl); c) the police32 (trstplc); d) politicians (trstplt); e) 
political parties (trstprt). The answer categories ranged thus from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete 
                                                 
32 I also include trust in the police as an indicator of political trust, as it is done by a few authors, for instance by Marien 
(2011). Nevertheless, I have to emphasize that in some countries trust in police and trust in other governmental 
institutions might be less strongly associated. Studies admit that trust in the police is comparatively higher across the 
European countries compared to trust in other political institutions (Marien, 2011).   
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(2011). Nevertheless, I have to emphasize that in some countries trust in police and trust in other governmental 
institutions might be less strongly associated. Studies admit that trust in the police is comparatively higher across the 
European countries compared to trust in other political institutions (Marien, 2011).   
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trust). In Table 4.2 a principal component analysis shows that the responses form a single 
dimension, although trust in the police loads to a relatively lower degree. The single factor explains 
more than 60 percent of the total variance, and yields a reliable scale with a Cronbach’s α of 0.88. 
Similar factor loadings are found in mature and post-communist democracies, although in the latter 
the components form a somewhat stronger single dimension (explaining 69.9% of the variance). 
The general score of political trust for each individual is the mean of five items. If individuals at 
least provided an answer on two items (out of five), the sum of the scores by the appropriate 
number of valid answers is counted; otherwise (if there is only one item or none) the case is 
missing.   
 
Table 4.2 Principal component analysis for political trust  
Observed measures Factor loading 
 All countries Mature democracies Post-communist 
democracies 
Trust in parliament .85 .83 .87 
Trust in the legal system .81 .78 .82 
Trust in the police .71 .66 .72 
Trust in politicians .89 .88 .89 
Trust in political parties .86 .85 .87 
Variance explained, % 67.97 64.53 69.89 
Eigenvalue 3.40 3.23 3.49 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Note: Data weight is applied.   
 
As it was theorized, internal political efficacy is related to political awareness (which is sometimes 
described as political sophistication, but the latter term has a broader scope) and one’s perceived 
understanding of political issues and self-efficacy, a psychological orientation which expresses a 
perceived ability to participate in an effective manner (to have a control over your life). 
Unfortunately, the ESS questionnaire does not include questions that accurately measure internal 
political efficacy.33 In line with some other studies (for instance, Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 140), I 
use political awareness as a proxy variable representing internal efficacy, assuming that the 
association between these two variables is very strong. Political awareness is defined as the extent 
an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered (Zaller, 
1992: 21). 
Political awareness at the individual level is measured taking into account two indicators: a) 
“How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what is going on?” 
                                                 
33 Internal efficacy is operationalized in the International Social Survey Programme 2006 (“Role of Government“) with 
the questions “Would you agree with the statement that people like me have no say what government does” and “Would 
you agree with the statement that average citizen can influence politics”. Unfortunately, the ISPP 2006 data does not 
include the questions about political participation. The European Values Survey questionnaire operationalizes self-
efficacy, as a proxy of internal political efficacy, with the question “How much freedom of choice you feel you have 
over the way your life turns out”, but also does not include some of the important variables discussed in this chapter.   
 
(polcmpl) (1 = frequently; 2 = regularly; 3 = occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never); b) “How difficult 
or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues?” (poldcs) (1 = very difficult, 2 = 
difficult; 3 = neither difficult, nor easy; 4 = easy; 5 = very easy). These items correlate (Pearson’s r 
= 0.47), which allows us to make a single score variable. The cases with an answer to only one 
question are also taken into account.  
Another important variable included in the analysis is political interest, considered as one of 
the most decisive factors of political participation (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Van Deth and Elff, 
2004). Political interest is measured in the ESS survey with a standard question: “How interested 
would you say you are in politics?” (polintr) (1 = not at all interested; 2 = hardly interested; 3 = 
quite interested; 4 = very interested). Although political interest is sometimes conflated with 
political awareness, I keep these two variables in my analysis separate.    
 
Social embeddedness  
 
The social capital literature assumes that people can be mobilized through networks. First of all, I 
refer to ‘secondary organizations’ as networks of formal social embeddeness that are presumed to 
be crucial for political participation (Putnam, 1993). Thus I include social embeddedness in the 
research as a control variable. The ESS measures the participation in (voluntary) associations using 
this question: “Worked in another [than political] organisation or association last 12 months” 
(wrkorg).  
In addition, I include two other types of associational participation: membership in labour 
unions and religious (church) attendance. Social capital literature suggests that participation in these 
(semi-)hierarchical traditional organizations also may foster face-to-face contacts and function as a 
stepping stone to political participation (Newton, 1999b; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2001; 
Warren, 2001; Norris, 2002a).  Trade union membership (mbtru) is measured as a dichotomous 
variable (1 = yes; 0 = no). Religious attendance (rlgatnd) measured how often respondents attend 
religious services apart from special occasions. Answers ranged on a seven-point scale from 
“never” (1) “to more than once a week” (7). Due to the different nature and function of these 
organizations, I keep all three variables (social embeddedness, union membership and church 
attendance) separate.   
 
Individual socio-demographic characteristics  
 
A standard set of demographic variables was included in the analysis: education, income, age and 
gender. Education, Almond and Verba (1963: 370 – 371) argue, is a “many-sided” experience 
which increases “an individual’s potentiality to participate”. Similarly, Dalton (2004) defines 
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religious services apart from special occasions. Answers ranged on a seven-point scale from 
“never” (1) “to more than once a week” (7). Due to the different nature and function of these 
organizations, I keep all three variables (social embeddedness, union membership and church 
attendance) separate.   
 
Individual socio-demographic characteristics  
 
A standard set of demographic variables was included in the analysis: education, income, age and 
gender. Education, Almond and Verba (1963: 370 – 371) argue, is a “many-sided” experience 
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education as one of the most important resources to participate. Moreover, education is positively 
related to social trust (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). In the ESS data education level (edulvla) of 
respondents is measured as follows: 1 = “Less than lower secondary education”; 2 = “Lower 
secondary education completed”; 3 = “Upper secondary education completed”; 4 = “Post-secondary 
non-tertiary education completed”; 5 = “tertiary education completed”.  
Furthermore, financial stability and higher income rates are believed to promote political 
engagement, as richer people do not need to spend all their time and energy to ensure their survival 
needs, so they possess more socio-economic resources that could be invested in participation 
(Inglehart, 1997).  The original question to measure household’s income (Household’s total net 
income, all sources) was not chosen because of many missings of this variable. Instead, following 
Hooghe and Quintelier (2014), the perceived income was considered.  Correlation between the two 
variables is 0.50. I measured perceived income with a question about how the respondents “feel 
about household’s income nowadays” (hincfel). The answer categories are ranked from 1 = “Very 
difficult on present income” to 4 = “Living comfortably on present income”.  
Moreover, we assume that respondent’s age adds to the inclination to participate in politics: 
the older you get, the more knowledge and experience about political life you receive. We measure 
age in the ESS data with the variable “Respondent‘s exact age in years” (agea). Finally, empirical 
studies show that gender might be important to anticipate the odds of participation: men are 
presumed to be more active in politics than women (Kaase and Barnes, 1979; Almond and Verba, 
1963). Gender is coded as a dichotomous variable (gndr): (0) = Female, (1) = Male.  
The overview of descriptive statistics of all variables is shown in the Appendix A (Table A3 
and Table A4).  
 
4.3.4 Descriptives  
 
Before answering the research questions, I first investigate the cross-national differences in the 
levels of political participation, social trust and political efficacy. Table 4.3 depicts the descriptives 
on the items that tap the three categories of political participation. As I have already pointed out in 
the introduction of this chapter, voter turnout in post-communist countries is in general on a 
systematically lower level than in mature democracies. For the specific sets of countries in this 
study, the gap is overall 10%. In particular, Lithuania (49%), Czech Republic (58%), Latvia (63%) 
and Estonia (65%) display alarmingly low levels. Although there is considerable variation with 
regard to the other activities related to party politics, on average we also discern a striking 
difference here: whereas in mature democracies about 22% of the respondents have at least engaged 
in one activity, in post-communist democracies this figure is only 14%. 
 
The gap is even more striking when we consider protesting. With on average 41% of the 
people having engaged in at least one protest activity in the previous year, the results lend support 
to the argument that participation in movement politics is nowadays quite common in Western 
democracies. Despite some exceptions, Central and Eastern European democracies show a quite 
different picture: the figure is on average only 13%.  
 
Table 4.3 The country-means of party politics and movement in post-communist and mature 
democracies  
 Voting Party politics activity Movement politics activity 
 
Country 
VOTE CON
T 
WP WB PM TOT PET PDE
M 
BOY
C 
TOT 
Belgium .92 .15 .04 .07 .05 .23 .28 .07 .11 .33 
Cyprus .93 .20 .09 .07 .14 .27 .06 .02 .06 .32 
Denmark .94 .19 .05 .11 .09 .31 .34 .09 .22 .48 
Finland .83 .21 .04 .15 .07 .33 .32 .02 .30 .48 
France .78 .15 .04 .11 .02 .24 .34 .15 .28 .49 
Germany-West .85 .17 .04 .05 .04 .22 .30 .08 .34 .49 
Greece .88 .11 .04 .03 .08 .16 .04 .06 .14 .18 
Ireland .79 .23 .05 .10 .05 .31 .24 .10 .14 .33 
Netherlands .86 .14 .03 .05 .05 .22 .23 .03 .09 .29 
Norway .86 .21 .06 .26 .07 .43 .38 .07 .22 .48 
Portugal .74 .07 .01 .03 .02 .11 .05 .04 .03 .08 
Spain .82 .10 .03 .05 .01 .14 .17 .16 .08 .27 
Sweden .91 .15 .04 .18 .07 .31 .47 .06 .37 .61 
Switzerland .65 .12 .05 .07 .06 .22 .38 .08 .25 .48 
United Kingdom .70 .17 .02 .06 .02 .22 .38 .04 .24 .47 
Total (mature) .83 .16 .04 .09 .06 .25 .27 .07 .19 .39 
Bulgaria .73 .05 .04 .03 .06 .11 .06 .04 .03 .10 
Croatia .79 .07 .05 .06 .12 .21 .24 .08 .17 .31 
Czech Republic .58 .16 .02 .04 .04 .20 .15 .05 .07 .19 
Estonia .65 .11 .03 .05 .05 .19 .08 .02 .06 .12 
Germany-East  .78 .17 .04 .04 .02 .21 .32 .07 .20 .43 
Hungary .80 .09 .01 .01 .01 .10 .07 .02 .06 .11 
Latvia .63 .12 .01 .04 .01 .15 .06 .07 .05 .14 
Lithuania .49 .05 .03 .02 .04 .10 .09 .04 .02 .12 
Poland .73 .07 .03 .04 .01 .11 .07 .02 .04 .11 
Romania .68 .11 .06 .04 .06 .18 .03 .04 .03 .08 
Slovakia .78 .07 .02 .02 .02 .10 .22 .02 .07 .26 
Slovenia .73 .11 .03 .04 .05 .16 .09 .02 .05 .13 
Total (post-
communist) 
.70 .10 .03 .04 .04 .15 .12 .04 .07 .18 
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: Entries are means from 0 to 1 having performed the activity. Data weighted with design weight. Voting: VOTE 
voted last national election. Party politics participation: CONT contacted politicians or officials, WP worked political 
party or action group, WB Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker, PM party member, TOT total party politics 
participation (country mean).  
Movement politics participation: PET sign petition, PDEM public demonstration, BOYC boycotted products out of 
ethical/political concerns, TOT total movement politics participation (country mean).  
 
In the chapter 5, I will elaborate in more detail on explaining the differences between country 
means. For now, however, I focus on causal relationships between individual-level variables. 
Hence, I merely show these differences between the two sets of countries to underline my 
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expectation that the individual predictors explaining engagement in party and movement politics in 
mature democracies not necessarily have similar effects in the younger post-communist ones. 
I shift my attention now to the explanatory factors (see Table 4.4). These figures underline 
again what I have pointed out in previous chapters: in the new democracies, the level of social trust 
is at a much lower level. Likewise, even though there are again remarkable differences within each 
country set, in the post-communist region people have generally a much lower level of trust in 
political institutions. The differences are vast: overall, the levels of social and political trust are both 
more than 1 point lower (on a 0-10 scale). These figures make also immediately clear why it 
important to test the hypotheses on the effect of individuals’ trust and efficacy on political 
participation separately for the two types of countries: the presumed causal relationships between 
these variables might indeed work out differently, due to the profoundly different contexts in which 
they operate.  
 
Table 4.4 Country-level amount (mean scores) of independent variables 
  
Social trust 
score  
 
Country Political 
trust 
Political 
awareness  
Political 
interest 
Social 
embedded-
ness  
Union 
member-
ship 
Religious 
attend-
ance 
Belgium 5.27 (1.62) 4.70 (1.77) 2.69 (0.89) 2.38 (0.87) 0.21 (0.41) 0.50 (0.50) 2.06 (1.37) 
Cyprus 4.54 (2.01) 5.34 (1.95) 3.37 (1.11) 2.36 (1.04) 0.07 (0.05) 0.36 (0.48) 3.66 (1.19) 
Denmark 6.79 (1.58) 6.52 (1.58) 3.30 (0.86) 2.90 (0.77) 0.25 (0.43) 0.84 (0.37) 2.11 (1.14) 
Finland 6.32 (1.53) 6.19 (1.58) 2.90 (0.89) 2.46 (0.79) 0.34 (0.47) 0.72 (0.45) 2.31 (1.16) 
France 4.91 (1.62) 4.46 (1.73) 2.88 (0.88) 2.53 (0.90) 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.40) 1.95 (1.25)  
Germany-W 5.35 (1.68) 4.96 (1.70) 3.13 (0.82) 2.74 (0.82) 0.26 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46) 2.48 (1.39) 
Greece 3.65 (1.93) 3.64 (1.99) 2.89 (0.99) 2.05 (0.92) 0.04 (0.20) 0.16 (0.37) 3.33 (1.15) 
Ireland 5.88 (1.60) 4.38 (1.76) 2.91 (0.96) 2.53 (0.92) 0.17 (0.37) 0.43 (0.50) 3.78 (1.61) 
Netherlands 5.93 (1.55) 5.65 (1.54) 2.97 (0.87) 2.67 (0.78) 0.26 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) 2.26 (1.58) 
Norway 6.51 (1.47) 5.79 (1.61) 3.05 (0.77) 2.49 (0.78) 0.28 (0.45) 0.66 (0.47) 2.06 (1.15) 
Portugal 4.17 (1.84) 3.47 (1.78) 2.58 (0.90) 1.94 (0.89) 0.03 (0.16) 0.16 (0.37) 3.18 (1.75) 
Spain 4.93 (1.61) 4.38 (1.81) 2.70 (1.00) 1.97 (0.87) 0.10 (0.29) 0.12 (0.33) 2.42 (1.59) 
Sweden 6.37 (1.52) 5.56 (1.68) 2.94 (0.86) 2.63 (0.81) 0.27 (0.44) 0.75 (0.43) 2.04 (1.16) 
Switzerland 5.90 (1.65) 5.75 (1.56) 3.02 (0.88) 2.63 (0.87) 0.13 (0.34) 0.19 (0.39) 2.48 (1.40) 
UK 5.52 (1.70) 4.59 (1.87) 2.93 (0.94) 2.54 (0.90) 0.07 (0.25) 0.42 (0.49) 2.16 (1.57)  
Total 
(mature) 
5.27 (1.76) 4.73 (1.85) 2.92 (0.92) 2.47 (0.91) 0.16 (0.37) 0.31 (0.46) 2.33 (1.48) 
Bulgaria 3.63 (2.10) 2.18 (2.03) 3.09 (1.01) 2.30 (0.95) 0.02 (0.13) 0.48 (0.50) 2.64 (1.20) 
Croatia 4.14 (2.09) 2.98 (1.96) 2.87 (1.04) 2.02 (0.93) 0.09 (0.29) 0.36 (0.48) 3.42 (1.52) 
Czech Rep. 4.82 (2.02) 3.58 (1.95) 2.66 (0.95) 1.87 (0.76) 0.09 (0.29) 0.41 (0.49) 1.76 (1.24) 
Estonia 5.37 (1.79) 4.27 (1.93) 2.88 (0.83) 2.41 (0.82) 0.05 (0.22) 0.56 (0.50) 2.17 (1.07) 
Germany-E 5.09 (1.85) 4.43 (1.81) 3.03 (0.85) 2.74 (0.82) 0.24 (0.45) 0.52 (0.50) 1.79 (1.17) 
Hungary 4.32 (1.93) 2.92 (1.93) 2.90 (0.99) 2.20 (0.92) 0.05 (0.22) 0.41 (0.49) 2.31 (1.32) 
Latvia 4.80 (2.05) 2.76 (1.86) 2.84 (0.89) 2.26 (0.77) 0.03 (0.17) 0.51 (0.50) 2.46 (1.23) 
Lithuania 4.33 (2.03) 2.83 (1.86) 2.68 (0.85) 2.12 (0.77) 0.05 (0.21) 0.31 (0.46) 3.06 (1.17) 
Poland 4.23 (1.82) 3.31 (1.66) 2.82 (0.96) 2.29 (0.85) 0.06 (0.24) 0.26 (0.44) 4.15 (1.29) 
Romania 3.65 (2.31) 3.66 (2.39) 2.86 (0.89) 2.25 (0.90) 0.03 (0.16) 0.26 (0.44) 3.29 (1.40) 
Slovakia 4.31 (2.01) 4.06 (2.03) 3.00 (0.93) 2.36 (0.83) 0.06 (0.23) 0.55 (0.50) 3.17 (1.81) 
Slovenia 4.71 (1.97) 4.12 (1.92) 2.91 (0.94) 2.41 (0.84) 0.02 (0.44) 0.49 (0.50) 2.74 (1.45) 
Total  
(post-comm) 
4.29 (2.05) 3.47 (2.02) 2.87 (0.94) 2.29 (0.88) 0.08 (0.27) 0.36 (0.48) 3.06 (1.60) 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
  
 
4.4 Analysis and results 
 
4.4.1 Methods of analysis  
 
The research questions involve explanatory factors at the individual level and the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, therefore logistic regression analysis was chosen as the most appropriate 
method. This allows to predict the probability of participation in party and movement politics, given 
social trust, certain values representing political efficacy (political awareness, political trust), 
political interest and social embeddedness as independent variables. A logistic regression provides a 
coefficient “b”, which indicates each individual variable’s contribution to the dependent variable: 
an increase or decrease in the logit of the dependent variable when the independent variable 
increases one unit (Marien and Christensen, 2013). In the tables, I will provide the “exp(B)”, which 
is the change in the odds ratio associated with a one unit increase in the independent variable34.  
 
4.4.2 Individual-level regression on voting and party politics activities  
 
My first hypothesis dealt with the assumption that social trust has a positive effect on voting, party 
politics and movement politics. The analysis for each form of participation contains two models 
(two steps): the first model includes socio-demographic variables and social trust, and in the second 
step I add a set of variables associated to political efficacy, as well as social embeddedness. I run 
individual-level regression analysis separately in mature and post-communist democracies.  
Model 1a (mature democracies) and Model 1b (post-communist democracies) in Table 4.5 
examine the impact of individual level factors and social trust on voting. This model explains 8 
percent of the variation in voting in mature democracies and 6 percent in post-communist ones.35 
The main interest lies here in the effect of social trust. As expected, Model 1a demonstrates that 
there is a direct significant effect of social trust on the propensity to vote in mature democracies, 
although compared to other variables (like one’s perceived financial situation), the effect is rather 
modest (exp(B)=1.067). Social trust also directly impacts voting in post-communist societies 
(exp(B)=1.058), as we see in model 1b. The exp(B) indicates that holding all other variables 
constant, the odds of voting increases by 7% or 6% respectively, when increasing one unit on the 
social trust scale. Thus hypothesis H1a is confirmed.  
Moreover, the pattern of social trust affecting individual’s inclination to vote is 
comparatively similar in both country-sets (H3a). Additional analyses also demonstrate that the 
effect of social trust on political action (H2a) is positive and significant in almost all countries, 
                                                 
34 Odds ratios less than 1 are negative coefficients, whereas greater than 1 express positive coefficients.   
35 Please note, however, that we need to interpret this pseudo R-square with caution, it is not equivalent to the R-square.  
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expectation that the individual predictors explaining engagement in party and movement politics in 
mature democracies not necessarily have similar effects in the younger post-communist ones. 
I shift my attention now to the explanatory factors (see Table 4.4). These figures underline 
again what I have pointed out in previous chapters: in the new democracies, the level of social trust 
is at a much lower level. Likewise, even though there are again remarkable differences within each 
country set, in the post-communist region people have generally a much lower level of trust in 
political institutions. The differences are vast: overall, the levels of social and political trust are both 
more than 1 point lower (on a 0-10 scale). These figures make also immediately clear why it 
important to test the hypotheses on the effect of individuals’ trust and efficacy on political 
participation separately for the two types of countries: the presumed causal relationships between 
these variables might indeed work out differently, due to the profoundly different contexts in which 
they operate.  
 
Table 4.4 Country-level amount (mean scores) of independent variables 
  
Social trust 
score  
 
Country Political 
trust 
Political 
awareness  
Political 
interest 
Social 
embedded-
ness  
Union 
member-
ship 
Religious 
attend-
ance 
Belgium 5.27 (1.62) 4.70 (1.77) 2.69 (0.89) 2.38 (0.87) 0.21 (0.41) 0.50 (0.50) 2.06 (1.37) 
Cyprus 4.54 (2.01) 5.34 (1.95) 3.37 (1.11) 2.36 (1.04) 0.07 (0.05) 0.36 (0.48) 3.66 (1.19) 
Denmark 6.79 (1.58) 6.52 (1.58) 3.30 (0.86) 2.90 (0.77) 0.25 (0.43) 0.84 (0.37) 2.11 (1.14) 
Finland 6.32 (1.53) 6.19 (1.58) 2.90 (0.89) 2.46 (0.79) 0.34 (0.47) 0.72 (0.45) 2.31 (1.16) 
France 4.91 (1.62) 4.46 (1.73) 2.88 (0.88) 2.53 (0.90) 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.40) 1.95 (1.25)  
Germany-W 5.35 (1.68) 4.96 (1.70) 3.13 (0.82) 2.74 (0.82) 0.26 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46) 2.48 (1.39) 
Greece 3.65 (1.93) 3.64 (1.99) 2.89 (0.99) 2.05 (0.92) 0.04 (0.20) 0.16 (0.37) 3.33 (1.15) 
Ireland 5.88 (1.60) 4.38 (1.76) 2.91 (0.96) 2.53 (0.92) 0.17 (0.37) 0.43 (0.50) 3.78 (1.61) 
Netherlands 5.93 (1.55) 5.65 (1.54) 2.97 (0.87) 2.67 (0.78) 0.26 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) 2.26 (1.58) 
Norway 6.51 (1.47) 5.79 (1.61) 3.05 (0.77) 2.49 (0.78) 0.28 (0.45) 0.66 (0.47) 2.06 (1.15) 
Portugal 4.17 (1.84) 3.47 (1.78) 2.58 (0.90) 1.94 (0.89) 0.03 (0.16) 0.16 (0.37) 3.18 (1.75) 
Spain 4.93 (1.61) 4.38 (1.81) 2.70 (1.00) 1.97 (0.87) 0.10 (0.29) 0.12 (0.33) 2.42 (1.59) 
Sweden 6.37 (1.52) 5.56 (1.68) 2.94 (0.86) 2.63 (0.81) 0.27 (0.44) 0.75 (0.43) 2.04 (1.16) 
Switzerland 5.90 (1.65) 5.75 (1.56) 3.02 (0.88) 2.63 (0.87) 0.13 (0.34) 0.19 (0.39) 2.48 (1.40) 
UK 5.52 (1.70) 4.59 (1.87) 2.93 (0.94) 2.54 (0.90) 0.07 (0.25) 0.42 (0.49) 2.16 (1.57)  
Total 
(mature) 
5.27 (1.76) 4.73 (1.85) 2.92 (0.92) 2.47 (0.91) 0.16 (0.37) 0.31 (0.46) 2.33 (1.48) 
Bulgaria 3.63 (2.10) 2.18 (2.03) 3.09 (1.01) 2.30 (0.95) 0.02 (0.13) 0.48 (0.50) 2.64 (1.20) 
Croatia 4.14 (2.09) 2.98 (1.96) 2.87 (1.04) 2.02 (0.93) 0.09 (0.29) 0.36 (0.48) 3.42 (1.52) 
Czech Rep. 4.82 (2.02) 3.58 (1.95) 2.66 (0.95) 1.87 (0.76) 0.09 (0.29) 0.41 (0.49) 1.76 (1.24) 
Estonia 5.37 (1.79) 4.27 (1.93) 2.88 (0.83) 2.41 (0.82) 0.05 (0.22) 0.56 (0.50) 2.17 (1.07) 
Germany-E 5.09 (1.85) 4.43 (1.81) 3.03 (0.85) 2.74 (0.82) 0.24 (0.45) 0.52 (0.50) 1.79 (1.17) 
Hungary 4.32 (1.93) 2.92 (1.93) 2.90 (0.99) 2.20 (0.92) 0.05 (0.22) 0.41 (0.49) 2.31 (1.32) 
Latvia 4.80 (2.05) 2.76 (1.86) 2.84 (0.89) 2.26 (0.77) 0.03 (0.17) 0.51 (0.50) 2.46 (1.23) 
Lithuania 4.33 (2.03) 2.83 (1.86) 2.68 (0.85) 2.12 (0.77) 0.05 (0.21) 0.31 (0.46) 3.06 (1.17) 
Poland 4.23 (1.82) 3.31 (1.66) 2.82 (0.96) 2.29 (0.85) 0.06 (0.24) 0.26 (0.44) 4.15 (1.29) 
Romania 3.65 (2.31) 3.66 (2.39) 2.86 (0.89) 2.25 (0.90) 0.03 (0.16) 0.26 (0.44) 3.29 (1.40) 
Slovakia 4.31 (2.01) 4.06 (2.03) 3.00 (0.93) 2.36 (0.83) 0.06 (0.23) 0.55 (0.50) 3.17 (1.81) 
Slovenia 4.71 (1.97) 4.12 (1.92) 2.91 (0.94) 2.41 (0.84) 0.02 (0.44) 0.49 (0.50) 2.74 (1.45) 
Total  
(post-comm) 
4.29 (2.05) 3.47 (2.02) 2.87 (0.94) 2.29 (0.88) 0.08 (0.27) 0.36 (0.48) 3.06 (1.60) 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
  
 
4.4 Analysis and results 
 
4.4.1 Methods of analysis  
 
The research questions involve explanatory factors at the individual level and the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, therefore logistic regression analysis was chosen as the most appropriate 
method. This allows to predict the probability of participation in party and movement politics, given 
social trust, certain values representing political efficacy (political awareness, political trust), 
political interest and social embeddedness as independent variables. A logistic regression provides a 
coefficient “b”, which indicates each individual variable’s contribution to the dependent variable: 
an increase or decrease in the logit of the dependent variable when the independent variable 
increases one unit (Marien and Christensen, 2013). In the tables, I will provide the “exp(B)”, which 
is the change in the odds ratio associated with a one unit increase in the independent variable34.  
 
4.4.2 Individual-level regression on voting and party politics activities  
 
My first hypothesis dealt with the assumption that social trust has a positive effect on voting, party 
politics and movement politics. The analysis for each form of participation contains two models 
(two steps): the first model includes socio-demographic variables and social trust, and in the second 
step I add a set of variables associated to political efficacy, as well as social embeddedness. I run 
individual-level regression analysis separately in mature and post-communist democracies.  
Model 1a (mature democracies) and Model 1b (post-communist democracies) in Table 4.5 
examine the impact of individual level factors and social trust on voting. This model explains 8 
percent of the variation in voting in mature democracies and 6 percent in post-communist ones.35 
The main interest lies here in the effect of social trust. As expected, Model 1a demonstrates that 
there is a direct significant effect of social trust on the propensity to vote in mature democracies, 
although compared to other variables (like one’s perceived financial situation), the effect is rather 
modest (exp(B)=1.067). Social trust also directly impacts voting in post-communist societies 
(exp(B)=1.058), as we see in model 1b. The exp(B) indicates that holding all other variables 
constant, the odds of voting increases by 7% or 6% respectively, when increasing one unit on the 
social trust scale. Thus hypothesis H1a is confirmed.  
Moreover, the pattern of social trust affecting individual’s inclination to vote is 
comparatively similar in both country-sets (H3a). Additional analyses also demonstrate that the 
effect of social trust on political action (H2a) is positive and significant in almost all countries, 
                                                 
34 Odds ratios less than 1 are negative coefficients, whereas greater than 1 express positive coefficients.   
35 Please note, however, that we need to interpret this pseudo R-square with caution, it is not equivalent to the R-square.  
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except for Cyprus, Greece (note: both countries apply compulsory voting) and Latvia (see Table A5 
in appendices).  
When we add other variables in Models 2a and 2b the explained variance increases to 16% 
and 17% respectively in old and new democracies. We see that social trust loses its significance in 
both country-sets, hence, in line with my claim that the variables I included have a mediating effect. 
It is important to note that in regard to voting, the sizes of the effects of the independent variables 
are more or less similar in both mature and post-communist democracies. After controlling for other 
characteristics, there is no difference anymore (see model 2) with regard to gender: in both country 
sets, ceteris paribus, being a man decreases the propensity to vote, although this effect is only 
significant in post-communist countries. 
I have also explored the mediation effects of political trust and awareness (that serve as 
proxies of external and internal efficacy in the ESS dataset) in more detail by using the Process 
macro for SPSS, written by Hayes (2013: see also Preacher and Hayes 2008).36 The results show 
that in post-communist countries there is no direct effect of social trust on voting, whereas there is a 
significant indirect effect via political trust (H4a). Thus, we can conclude that in post-communist 
societies social trust indeed leads to more political trust (or, in other words, to external political 
efficacy), which in turn fosters electoral participation. Political awareness (or internal political 
efficacy) is positively related with voting, but does not work as the suggested mediator (H5a), due 
to the fact that social trust does not increase political awareness.  
In mature democracies, I found no direct effect of social trust either. Political trust is a 
significant mediator (H4a), meaning that social trust in this country-set also enhances voting, 
because it leads to political trust. However, there is no significant indirect effect of social trust via 
political awareness for mature democracies; therefore H5a is rejected.  
When it comes to other party-politics activities (that not include voting), we again observe 
very similar patterns between mature and post-communist democracies. Models 1c and 1d (see 
Table 4.5) demonstrate that social trust has a positive and significant direct effect on party politics 
participation in both country-sets, thus hypothesis H1b (direct effect of social trust on party politics 
participation) is again tentatively supported. However, taken together with the socio-economic 
                                                 
36 This macro is freely available at Hayes’s website: http://www.afhayes.com/introduction-to-mediation-moderation-
and-conditional-process-analysis.html. This method has the ability to estimate models with dichotomous outcomes and 
more than one mediator and adjusts all paths for the potential influence of covariates not proposed to be mediators in 
the model. Thus, it allows to simultaneously testing the direct and indirect effects of social trust via both types of 
efficacy on participation in one model, while controlling for all confounding variables. 
 
 
 
 
characteristics, social trust explains only the modest 5 (in mature democracies) and 4 (in post-
communist democracies) percent of the variation.  
Furthermore, in Models 2c and 2d, when we include addition variables, the explanatory 
capacity increases to 21 and 17 percent of the variance for the old and new democracies, 
respectively. Social embeddedness has a pronounced effect in both mature (exp(B) = 4.348) and 
post-communist (exp(B) = 6.743) democracies on inclination to participate in party politics, even 
when we control for other variables. It might be due to the fact that participation in other (than 
political) organizations and participation in political campaigning/decision-making process actually 
coincide.  
Additional analyses, based on Hayes’ Process macro mediation test, also show that there is 
no direct effect of social trust on party politics participation in mature democracies (see Table 4.6). 
Moreover, neither political trust nor political awareness has a mediation effect in mature 
democracies. This means that the fact that social trust has no direct effect anymore is due to the 
inclusion of the other variables (political interest, union membership, embeddedness, and religious 
attendance). Political trust has not even any effect at all on party politics participation in mature 
democracies. However, in post-communist countries, hypothesis H3a is confirmed: there is no 
direct effect of social trust on participation, but the indirect effect via political trust (proxy of 
external efficacy) is significant. Thus, with regard to the relationship between social trust, political 
trust, and participation at the individual level, we find the first difference between mature and post-
communist democracies. 
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no direct effect of social trust on party politics participation in mature democracies (see Table 4.6). 
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attendance). Political trust has not even any effect at all on party politics participation in mature 
democracies. However, in post-communist countries, hypothesis H3a is confirmed: there is no 
direct effect of social trust on participation, but the indirect effect via political trust (proxy of 
external efficacy) is significant. Thus, with regard to the relationship between social trust, political 
trust, and participation at the individual level, we find the first difference between mature and post-
communist democracies. 
  
Mature and post-communist democracies compared |   101
Chapter
4
 
Table 4.5 Parameter estimates from individual-level regression models on participation in voting 
and party politics 
 Voting  Party politics participation 
 Mature democracies 
(n=15) 
Post-communist 
democracies  
(n=12) 
Mature democracies 
(n=15) 
Post-communist 
democracies (n=12) 
 Model 
1a 
Model 
2a 
Model 
1b 
Model 
2b 
Model 
1c 
Model 
2c 
Model 
1d 
Model 
2d 
Constant 0.179**** 
(0.093) 
0.077**** 
(0.108) 
0.195**** 
(0.093) 
0.055**** 
(0.114) 
0.047**** 
(0.083) 
0.027**** 
(0.100) 
0.033**** 
(0.095) 
0.015**** 
(0.146) 
Age 1.031**** 
(0.001) 
1.023**** 
(0.001) 
1.023**** 
(0.001) 
1.014**** 
(0.001) 
1.007**** 
(0.001) 
0.999 
(0.001) 
1.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.992**** 
(0.002) 
Gender  
(female = ref) 
1.123*** 
(0.034) 
0.955 
(0.037) 
0.950 
(0.033) 
0.872**** 
(0.036) 
1.183**** 
(0.029) 
0.898*** 
(0.032) 
1.459**** 
(0.041) 
1.282**** 
(0.045) 
Education 1.285**** 
(0.014) 
1.121**** 
(0.015) 
1.208**** 
(0.016) 
1.078** 
(0.017) 
1.298**** 
(0.011) 
1.104**** 
(0.012) 
1.327**** 
(0.018) 
1.149*** 
(0.021) 
Perceived financial 
situation 
1.238**** 
(0.021) 
1.145**** 
(0.022) 
1.237**** 
(0.020) 
1.133**** 
(0.021) 
1.106**** 
(0.020) 
0.995 
(0.021) 
1.162**** 
(0.026) 
1.031 
(0.028) 
Social trust 1.067**** 
(0.009) 
0.990 
(0.011) 
1.058**** 
(0.008) 
1.007 
(0.009) 
1.062**** 
(0.008) 
0.987 
(0.010) 
1.043**** 
(0.010) 
0.997 
(0.011) 
Political trust  1.080**** 
(0.010) 
 1.139**** 
(0.009) 
 0.986 
(0.009) 
 1.090**** 
(0.011) 
Political awareness   1.152**** 
(0.021) 
 1.162
**** 
(0.021) 
 1.199**** 
(0.020) 
 1.116**** 
(0.027) 
Political interest  1.547**** 
(0.023) 
 1.701
**** 
(0.024) 
 1.579**** 
(0.021) 
 1.524**** 
(0.029) 
Embeddedness  1.565**** 
(0.039) 
 1.990
**** 
(0.095) 
 4.348**** 
(0.036) 
 6.743**** 
(0.067) 
Trade union 
membership 
 1.508**** 
(0.039) 
 1.294
**** 
(0.040) 
 1.492**** 
(0.032) 
 1.401**** 
(0.052) 
Religious attendance  1.169**** 
(0.013) 
 1.148
**** 
(0.012) 
 1.067**** 
(0.011) 
 1.065**** 
(0.015) 
         
Nagelkerke pseudo 
R2 
0.087 0.157 0.064 0.168 0.053 0.208 0.041 0.166 
N 25 497 25 497 18 212 18 212 27 344 27 344 18 967 18 967 
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
To sum up, the empirical evidence corroborates the theoretical argument that socially trusting 
people indeed tend to participate more in electoral and party-based activities, such as voting, 
campaigning, or being member of political parties. It holds for both mature and post-communist 
democracies. Moreover, political trust, as the proxy of external efficacy, proves to fully mediate 
between social trust and voting/other party politics activities in post-communist democracies. It 
means that the more individuals trust others, the more they are politically trusting (externally 
efficacious) and thus involve in politics. However, in mature democracies this relationship is only 
apparent for voting. In the subsequent section, I scrutinize if similar or different patterns predict 
protest activities in the West and in the East.  
  
 
Table 4.6 Parallel multiple mediation analyses examining indirect effects of social trust on voting, 
party politics, and movement politics via political trust and political awareness 
 Mature democracies Post-communist democracies 
 Unstandardized 
b-coefficient 
SE (B) Unstandardized 
b-coefficient 
SE (B) 
Voting      
Direct effect -0.0101 0.0106 0.0070 0.0089 
Indirect total effect 0.0295* 0.0041 0.0388* 0.0030 
Indirect effect via political trust  0.0298* 0.0041 0.0384* 0.0029 
Indirect effect via political awareness  - 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
     
Party politics participation     
Direct effect -0.0133 0.0097 -0.0026 0.0114 
Indirect total effect -0.0056 0.0038 0.0260* 0.0035 
Indirect effect via political trust -0.0054 0.0037 0.0257* 0.0035 
Indirect effect via political awareness -0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 
     
Movement politics participation     
Direct effect 0.0783* 0.0087 0.0616* 0.0111 
Indirect total effect -0.0221 0.0033 -0.0036 0.0033 
Indirect effect via political trust -0.0220 0.0033 -0.0039 0.0033 
Indirect effect via political awareness -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 
     
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.05. Results are based on 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples. For the statistical controls that were 
included, see Tables 4.5 and 4.7. 
 
4.4.3 Individual-level regression analysis of movement politics participation 
 
Table 4.7 replicates the analysis for movement politics participation. Model 1e (mature 
democracies) and Model 1f (post-communist democracies) show the impact of socio-demographic 
characteristics and social trust on protest activities. The results lend support to hypothesis H1c. As 
expected, Model 1e demonstrates that there is a significant effect of social trust on the propensity to 
protest in mature democracies. The odds of being engaged in movement politics are 1.12 larger if 
one increases one unit on the social trust scale. The pattern of social trust affecting individual’s 
inclination to protest is similar in both country-sets. However, although also highly significant, the 
effect is somewhat smaller in post-communist societies (Model 1f). In these countries, the odds of 
protesting increases by a factor of 1.08 when increasing one unit on the social trust scale 
(exp(B)=1.08). Furthermore, the results show that, in both the “West” and “East”, young people, 
higher educated and those who are financially well off are more likely to participate. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that in post-communist societies, men tend to engage in movement politics more 
often than women, whereas in Western democracies the reverse is true.  
When the other variables are added (Models 2e and 2f in Table 4.7), the explained variance 
increases to 22 and 16 percent in mature and post-communist democracies, respectively. 
Interestingly, the results show that the effects of social trust do not significantly decrease in both 
country-sets. It gives support for our assumption that in movement politics, an individual indeed 
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Table 4.5 Parameter estimates from individual-level regression models on participation in voting 
and party politics 
 Voting  Party politics participation 
 Mature democracies 
(n=15) 
Post-communist 
democracies  
(n=12) 
Mature democracies 
(n=15) 
Post-communist 
democracies (n=12) 
 Model 
1a 
Model 
2a 
Model 
1b 
Model 
2b 
Model 
1c 
Model 
2c 
Model 
1d 
Model 
2d 
Constant 0.179**** 
(0.093) 
0.077**** 
(0.108) 
0.195**** 
(0.093) 
0.055**** 
(0.114) 
0.047**** 
(0.083) 
0.027**** 
(0.100) 
0.033**** 
(0.095) 
0.015**** 
(0.146) 
Age 1.031**** 
(0.001) 
1.023**** 
(0.001) 
1.023**** 
(0.001) 
1.014**** 
(0.001) 
1.007**** 
(0.001) 
0.999 
(0.001) 
1.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.992**** 
(0.002) 
Gender  
(female = ref) 
1.123*** 
(0.034) 
0.955 
(0.037) 
0.950 
(0.033) 
0.872**** 
(0.036) 
1.183**** 
(0.029) 
0.898*** 
(0.032) 
1.459**** 
(0.041) 
1.282**** 
(0.045) 
Education 1.285**** 
(0.014) 
1.121**** 
(0.015) 
1.208**** 
(0.016) 
1.078** 
(0.017) 
1.298**** 
(0.011) 
1.104**** 
(0.012) 
1.327**** 
(0.018) 
1.149*** 
(0.021) 
Perceived financial 
situation 
1.238**** 
(0.021) 
1.145**** 
(0.022) 
1.237**** 
(0.020) 
1.133**** 
(0.021) 
1.106**** 
(0.020) 
0.995 
(0.021) 
1.162**** 
(0.026) 
1.031 
(0.028) 
Social trust 1.067**** 
(0.009) 
0.990 
(0.011) 
1.058**** 
(0.008) 
1.007 
(0.009) 
1.062**** 
(0.008) 
0.987 
(0.010) 
1.043**** 
(0.010) 
0.997 
(0.011) 
Political trust  1.080**** 
(0.010) 
 1.139**** 
(0.009) 
 0.986 
(0.009) 
 1.090**** 
(0.011) 
Political awareness   1.152**** 
(0.021) 
 1.162
**** 
(0.021) 
 1.199**** 
(0.020) 
 1.116**** 
(0.027) 
Political interest  1.547**** 
(0.023) 
 1.701
**** 
(0.024) 
 1.579**** 
(0.021) 
 1.524**** 
(0.029) 
Embeddedness  1.565**** 
(0.039) 
 1.990
**** 
(0.095) 
 4.348**** 
(0.036) 
 6.743**** 
(0.067) 
Trade union 
membership 
 1.508**** 
(0.039) 
 1.294
**** 
(0.040) 
 1.492**** 
(0.032) 
 1.401**** 
(0.052) 
Religious attendance  1.169**** 
(0.013) 
 1.148
**** 
(0.012) 
 1.067**** 
(0.011) 
 1.065**** 
(0.015) 
         
Nagelkerke pseudo 
R2 
0.087 0.157 0.064 0.168 0.053 0.208 0.041 0.166 
N 25 497 25 497 18 212 18 212 27 344 27 344 18 967 18 967 
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
To sum up, the empirical evidence corroborates the theoretical argument that socially trusting 
people indeed tend to participate more in electoral and party-based activities, such as voting, 
campaigning, or being member of political parties. It holds for both mature and post-communist 
democracies. Moreover, political trust, as the proxy of external efficacy, proves to fully mediate 
between social trust and voting/other party politics activities in post-communist democracies. It 
means that the more individuals trust others, the more they are politically trusting (externally 
efficacious) and thus involve in politics. However, in mature democracies this relationship is only 
apparent for voting. In the subsequent section, I scrutinize if similar or different patterns predict 
protest activities in the West and in the East.  
  
 
Table 4.6 Parallel multiple mediation analyses examining indirect effects of social trust on voting, 
party politics, and movement politics via political trust and political awareness 
 Mature democracies Post-communist democracies 
 Unstandardized 
b-coefficient 
SE (B) Unstandardized 
b-coefficient 
SE (B) 
Voting      
Direct effect -0.0101 0.0106 0.0070 0.0089 
Indirect total effect 0.0295* 0.0041 0.0388* 0.0030 
Indirect effect via political trust  0.0298* 0.0041 0.0384* 0.0029 
Indirect effect via political awareness  - 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
     
Party politics participation     
Direct effect -0.0133 0.0097 -0.0026 0.0114 
Indirect total effect -0.0056 0.0038 0.0260* 0.0035 
Indirect effect via political trust -0.0054 0.0037 0.0257* 0.0035 
Indirect effect via political awareness -0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 
     
Movement politics participation     
Direct effect 0.0783* 0.0087 0.0616* 0.0111 
Indirect total effect -0.0221 0.0033 -0.0036 0.0033 
Indirect effect via political trust -0.0220 0.0033 -0.0039 0.0033 
Indirect effect via political awareness -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 
     
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.05. Results are based on 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples. For the statistical controls that were 
included, see Tables 4.5 and 4.7. 
 
4.4.3 Individual-level regression analysis of movement politics participation 
 
Table 4.7 replicates the analysis for movement politics participation. Model 1e (mature 
democracies) and Model 1f (post-communist democracies) show the impact of socio-demographic 
characteristics and social trust on protest activities. The results lend support to hypothesis H1c. As 
expected, Model 1e demonstrates that there is a significant effect of social trust on the propensity to 
protest in mature democracies. The odds of being engaged in movement politics are 1.12 larger if 
one increases one unit on the social trust scale. The pattern of social trust affecting individual’s 
inclination to protest is similar in both country-sets. However, although also highly significant, the 
effect is somewhat smaller in post-communist societies (Model 1f). In these countries, the odds of 
protesting increases by a factor of 1.08 when increasing one unit on the social trust scale 
(exp(B)=1.08). Furthermore, the results show that, in both the “West” and “East”, young people, 
higher educated and those who are financially well off are more likely to participate. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that in post-communist societies, men tend to engage in movement politics more 
often than women, whereas in Western democracies the reverse is true.  
When the other variables are added (Models 2e and 2f in Table 4.7), the explained variance 
increases to 22 and 16 percent in mature and post-communist democracies, respectively. 
Interestingly, the results show that the effects of social trust do not significantly decrease in both 
country-sets. It gives support for our assumption that in movement politics, an individual indeed 
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relays on his/her fellow citizens and thus we observe an independent effect of social trust, even 
when we include a set of other variables.  
 The analysis using Hayes’ (2013) Process macro (see Table 4.6) confirms that there is no 
significant indirect effect of social trust on participation via the mediators (political trust and 
awareness) on protesting in mature countries. This is in line with our expectations that political trust 
most of the time works in contradiction to participation in movement politics.  
Moreover, Table 4.6 shows that social trust does not lead to political awareness (or internal 
efficacy), in neither post-communist nor mature democracies, neither in the context of voting, as we 
have observed earlier, nor in the context of protesting. The reason why remains a topic for future 
research: how social trust is connected to political awareness in mature and post-communist 
democracies?  
Let us get back to the table 4.7 once more. We see that most additional variables (political 
awareness, political interest and social embeddedness) have significant effects on the propensity to 
be active in movement politics. Most importantly, in contrast to my previous findings on 
participation in institutionalized politics, we have to conclude that political trust has a negative 
effect on participation in movement politics. However, this effect is only significant in mature 
democracies. It is also interesting to note that the more often individuals attend religious services 
(presumably, the more they interact with other religious people), the less they are inclined to 
embark on protest activities: that is relevant for both country-sets, but only in mature democracies 
this negative effect is significant.  
All in all, the causal relationships and effect sizes are indeed generally quite similar in post-
communist and mature democracies. In line with my earlier finding, the only notable difference is 
that embeddedness exerts a much stronger influence in post-communist countries (exp(B) = 5.179) 
compared to the mature  democracies (exp(B) = 2.896). It leads to the conclusion that in post-
communist countries associational activities at a greater extent fosters movement politics. We also 
might presuppose that post-communist citizens participate in movement politics less because indeed 
they are also less involved in civic organizations.  
To sum up, social trust proves to exert a positive significant effect on all types of 
participation. In common language, it means that trust in fellows brings citizens closer to political 
affairs. Social trust makes people more politically trustful, leading them for institutionalized 
participation in post-communist democracies, while in mature democracies this indirect causal 
relationship is only found for voting. For movement politics, however, social trust has its own 
independent, direct effect without mediation in both country-sets. Following this finding, we might 
also assume that political efficacy, both internal and external, is a multidimensional concept. It 
relates to social trust in different ways, given different participation channels. Social trust leads to 
 
political efficacy in the context of voting, but it does not lead to efficacy in the context of 
protesting.  
 
Table 4.7 Parameter estimates from individual-level regression models on participation in 
movement politics 
Participation in movement politics  
 Mature democracies (n=15) Post-communist democracies (n=11) 
 Model 1e Model 2e Model 1f Model 2f 
Constant 0.103**** (0.074) 0.126**** (0.086) 0.031**** (0.114) 0.026**** (0.127) 
Age 0.992**** (0.001) 0.986**** (0.001) 0.993****  (0.001) 0.981**** (0.002) 
Gender (female = ref) 0.884***  (0.026) 0.670**** (0.029) 1.150***   (0.040) 0.973      (0.043) 
Education 1.363**** (0.010) 1.204**** (0.011) 1.453**** (0.018) 1.274**** (0.020) 
Perc. financial situation 1.199****(0.018) 1.101**** (0.019) 1.220**** (0.026) 1.141**** (0.027) 
Social trust 1.122**** (0.007) 1.081**** (0.009) 1.076**** (0.010) 1.064**** (0.011) 
Political trust  0.945**** (0.008)  0.987       (0.011) 
Political awareness   1.046***   (0.017)  1.117**** (0.026) 
Political interest  1.600**** (0.019)  1.452**** (0.028) 
Embeddedness  2.896**** (0.037)  5.179**** (0.067) 
Trade union membership  1.479**** (0.029)  1.514***  (0.043) 
Religious attendance  0.883**** (0.010)  0.984       (0.015) 
     
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.117 0.220 0.072 0.160 
N 27 318 27 318 18 909 18 909 
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
All in all, the relationships predicting participation are generally quite similar in post-communist 
and mature democracies. However, so far I have investigated differences only between two country-
groups: mature and post-communist democracies. But as it was already mentioned in the 
introduction, the decision to pool countries together as “mature democracies” was normative. It is 
important to underline that the Southern European democracies included in this analysis are 
relatively young: the democratic transition in these countries took place in late seventies and 
eighties during the third wave of democratization (Linz and Stepan, 1995). Thus Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain are considered less advanced on the scale of democraticness compared to their 
Western counterparts. Therefore, I perform an additional analysis to scrutinize whether the 
inclusion of the Southern European countries has significantly altered the results (Table 4.8).  
For this reason I have replicated the regression models (Model 1) of participation in party 
and movement politics for two separate country-sets, namely: (1) Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain and (2) the remaining 11 mature democracies: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. These additional 
analyses lead to the same conclusions. The results (see Table 4.8) show that in 11 mature 
democracies social trust exerts a direct and significant effect on voting and party politics activities, 
whereas in Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Spain the effect of social trust is not significant. In sum, the 
size of the effect of social trust is not considerably different if we put the countries together (n=15) 
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relays on his/her fellow citizens and thus we observe an independent effect of social trust, even 
when we include a set of other variables.  
 The analysis using Hayes’ (2013) Process macro (see Table 4.6) confirms that there is no 
significant indirect effect of social trust on participation via the mediators (political trust and 
awareness) on protesting in mature countries. This is in line with our expectations that political trust 
most of the time works in contradiction to participation in movement politics.  
Moreover, Table 4.6 shows that social trust does not lead to political awareness (or internal 
efficacy), in neither post-communist nor mature democracies, neither in the context of voting, as we 
have observed earlier, nor in the context of protesting. The reason why remains a topic for future 
research: how social trust is connected to political awareness in mature and post-communist 
democracies?  
Let us get back to the table 4.7 once more. We see that most additional variables (political 
awareness, political interest and social embeddedness) have significant effects on the propensity to 
be active in movement politics. Most importantly, in contrast to my previous findings on 
participation in institutionalized politics, we have to conclude that political trust has a negative 
effect on participation in movement politics. However, this effect is only significant in mature 
democracies. It is also interesting to note that the more often individuals attend religious services 
(presumably, the more they interact with other religious people), the less they are inclined to 
embark on protest activities: that is relevant for both country-sets, but only in mature democracies 
this negative effect is significant.  
All in all, the causal relationships and effect sizes are indeed generally quite similar in post-
communist and mature democracies. In line with my earlier finding, the only notable difference is 
that embeddedness exerts a much stronger influence in post-communist countries (exp(B) = 5.179) 
compared to the mature  democracies (exp(B) = 2.896). It leads to the conclusion that in post-
communist countries associational activities at a greater extent fosters movement politics. We also 
might presuppose that post-communist citizens participate in movement politics less because indeed 
they are also less involved in civic organizations.  
To sum up, social trust proves to exert a positive significant effect on all types of 
participation. In common language, it means that trust in fellows brings citizens closer to political 
affairs. Social trust makes people more politically trustful, leading them for institutionalized 
participation in post-communist democracies, while in mature democracies this indirect causal 
relationship is only found for voting. For movement politics, however, social trust has its own 
independent, direct effect without mediation in both country-sets. Following this finding, we might 
also assume that political efficacy, both internal and external, is a multidimensional concept. It 
relates to social trust in different ways, given different participation channels. Social trust leads to 
 
political efficacy in the context of voting, but it does not lead to efficacy in the context of 
protesting.  
 
Table 4.7 Parameter estimates from individual-level regression models on participation in 
movement politics 
Participation in movement politics  
 Mature democracies (n=15) Post-communist democracies (n=11) 
 Model 1e Model 2e Model 1f Model 2f 
Constant 0.103**** (0.074) 0.126**** (0.086) 0.031**** (0.114) 0.026**** (0.127) 
Age 0.992**** (0.001) 0.986**** (0.001) 0.993****  (0.001) 0.981**** (0.002) 
Gender (female = ref) 0.884***  (0.026) 0.670**** (0.029) 1.150***   (0.040) 0.973      (0.043) 
Education 1.363**** (0.010) 1.204**** (0.011) 1.453**** (0.018) 1.274**** (0.020) 
Perc. financial situation 1.199****(0.018) 1.101**** (0.019) 1.220**** (0.026) 1.141**** (0.027) 
Social trust 1.122**** (0.007) 1.081**** (0.009) 1.076**** (0.010) 1.064**** (0.011) 
Political trust  0.945**** (0.008)  0.987       (0.011) 
Political awareness   1.046***   (0.017)  1.117**** (0.026) 
Political interest  1.600**** (0.019)  1.452**** (0.028) 
Embeddedness  2.896**** (0.037)  5.179**** (0.067) 
Trade union membership  1.479**** (0.029)  1.514***  (0.043) 
Religious attendance  0.883**** (0.010)  0.984       (0.015) 
     
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.117 0.220 0.072 0.160 
N 27 318 27 318 18 909 18 909 
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
All in all, the relationships predicting participation are generally quite similar in post-communist 
and mature democracies. However, so far I have investigated differences only between two country-
groups: mature and post-communist democracies. But as it was already mentioned in the 
introduction, the decision to pool countries together as “mature democracies” was normative. It is 
important to underline that the Southern European democracies included in this analysis are 
relatively young: the democratic transition in these countries took place in late seventies and 
eighties during the third wave of democratization (Linz and Stepan, 1995). Thus Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain are considered less advanced on the scale of democraticness compared to their 
Western counterparts. Therefore, I perform an additional analysis to scrutinize whether the 
inclusion of the Southern European countries has significantly altered the results (Table 4.8).  
For this reason I have replicated the regression models (Model 1) of participation in party 
and movement politics for two separate country-sets, namely: (1) Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain and (2) the remaining 11 mature democracies: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. These additional 
analyses lead to the same conclusions. The results (see Table 4.8) show that in 11 mature 
democracies social trust exerts a direct and significant effect on voting and party politics activities, 
whereas in Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Spain the effect of social trust is not significant. In sum, the 
size of the effect of social trust is not considerably different if we put the countries together (n=15) 
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or if we leave only 11 of them instead: exp(B)=1.07 and exp(B) 1.17 respectively for voting and 
exp(B)=1.06 and exp(B) 1.05 for other party politics activities. Also for movement politics, the size 
of the exerted effect of social trust is very similar. The conclusion follows that at the individual 
level the patterns between the variables do not vary remarkably.  
 
Table 4.8 Parameter estimates from individual-level regression models on participation in voting, 
party and movement politics in two sets of mature democracies 
 Voting Participation in party politics  Participation in movement 
politics 
 Mature 
democracies 
(n=11)  
Cyprus, 
Greece,  
Portugal, 
Spain 
Mature 
democracies 
(n=11)  
Cyprus, 
Greece,  
Portugal, 
Spain 
Mature 
democracies 
(n=11) 
Cyprus, 
Greece,  
Portugal, 
Spain 
 Model 1g Model 1h Model 1i Model 1j Model 1k Model 1l 
Constant 0.06**** 
(0.123) 
0.56***  
(0.177) 
0.09**** 
(0.101) 
0.03**** 
(0.181) 
0.39**** 
(0.089) 
0.05**** 
(0.175) 
Age 1.04**** 
(0.001) 
1.02**** 
(0.002) 
1.01**** 
(0.001) 
1.01**** 
(0.002) 
0.99**** 
(0.001) 
0.99**** 
(0.002) 
Gender 1.09**   
(0.041) 
1.27**** 
(0.064) 
1.07**   (0.032) 1.68**** 
(0.064) 
0.83**** 
(0.030) 
1.03     (0.062) 
Education 1.31**** 
(0.017) 
1.27**** 
(0.027) 
1.26**** 
(0.013) 
1.32**** 
(0.024) 
1.32**** 
(0.011) 
1.38*** 
(0.023) 
Perceived 
financial 
situation 
1.32**** 
(0.027) 
1.23**** 
(0.039) 
1.01     (0.023) 1.21**** 
(0.041) 
1.05**    (0.021) 1.26****  
(0.04) 
Social trust 1.17**** 
(0.012) 
0.98     (0.017) 1.05**** 
(0.010) 
0.99     (0.017) 1.05**** 
(0.009) 
1.07**** 
(0.017) 
       
Nagelkerke 
pseudo R2 
0.13 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.10 
N 18 225 7 272 19 570 7 774 19 530 7 788 
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.5. Conclusions and discussion  
 
In this chapter I have tested to what extent and how social trust and efficacy predict political 
participation. Moreover, I investigated whether these causal relationships differ between mature and 
post-communist European democracies. The conclusions concerning the three core claims I put 
forward in the theoretical framework are as follows.  
First, the results show that social trust is positively related with all forms of political 
participation. My findings thus lend empirical support to my first claim.  
Second, when we compare the impact of social trust on different modes of participation 
across mature and post-communist democracies, we see that the causal patterns explaining 
participation are similar; the hypothesized effects work in the similar direction. Thus, we can 
conclude that at the individual level the pattern of the relationship between social trust and political 
participation does not vary between counties.   
 
Third, I claimed that the association between social trust and political participation can be 
explained by the fact that trust enhances efficacy, which in turns stimulates participation. My 
findings show that this mediation effect of external efficacy indeed exists (for some forms of 
participation), but the claim does not hold for internal efficacy. Hence, political awareness has not a 
mediating effect in neither post-communist nor mature democracies. 
Moreover, this chapter shows that the relationship between social trust, political efficacy and 
the types of participation are roughly the same in the East and West. It means that, at the individual 
level, post-communist citizens’ decision to participate in politics is driven by the same socio-
economic resources, perceptions of social trust and efficacy and associational engagement that 
determine voter turnout in the mature democracies. Western models of political participation work 
relatively well for voting turnout and movement participation in new democracies. 
However, there are some notable exceptions to this general conclusion. In post-communist 
democracies, we found a significant positive mediation effect of political trust on participation in 
party politics activities and voting: trusters participate more often, because they feel more externally 
efficacious. In mature democracies, this mediation effect only exists for voting. Political trust does 
not significantly influence participation in party politics activities (other than voting). In sum, these 
findings suggest that the role of social trust in political engagement (by fostering efficacy, which in 
turn enhances participation) is more important in the post-communist region.  
Interestingly, there is a crucial difference between party politics and movement politics 
participation. External political efficacy stimulates voting and involvement in party activities, but 
refrains people from protesting. The direct effect of social trust on movement participation is 
positive, but at the same time the direct effect of political trust is negative. Simply put, in order to 
take to the streets, citizens need to trust their fellow citizens but distrust their politicians.  
In this chapter, I focused on causal relationships between individual-level variables. 
Different participation levels are only in part accounted for by reference to individual levels of 
social trust, efficacy and socio-economic factors. I have not addressed the question to what extent 
we can explain the differences between countries. Are levels of participation in the new 
democracies lower because citizens in these countries have lower levels of social trust and feel less 
efficacious? Or, for that matter, because incomes and education levels are generally lower? (i.e. is it 
a composition effect)? Alternatively, do “trusters” in post-communist countries participate less than 
“trusters” in Western democracies because of contextual effects? Addressing these follow-up 
questions will be the task I pick up in the next chapter. Thus, I presume that contextual variables 
specific to post-communist democracies also account for the difference in voting and protest 
participation between mature and post-communist democracies. 
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or if we leave only 11 of them instead: exp(B)=1.07 and exp(B) 1.17 respectively for voting and 
exp(B)=1.06 and exp(B) 1.05 for other party politics activities. Also for movement politics, the size 
of the exerted effect of social trust is very similar. The conclusion follows that at the individual 
level the patterns between the variables do not vary remarkably.  
 
Table 4.8 Parameter estimates from individual-level regression models on participation in voting, 
party and movement politics in two sets of mature democracies 
 Voting Participation in party politics  Participation in movement 
politics 
 Mature 
democracies 
(n=11)  
Cyprus, 
Greece,  
Portugal, 
Spain 
Mature 
democracies 
(n=11)  
Cyprus, 
Greece,  
Portugal, 
Spain 
Mature 
democracies 
(n=11) 
Cyprus, 
Greece,  
Portugal, 
Spain 
 Model 1g Model 1h Model 1i Model 1j Model 1k Model 1l 
Constant 0.06**** 
(0.123) 
0.56***  
(0.177) 
0.09**** 
(0.101) 
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(0.010) 
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4.5. Conclusions and discussion  
 
In this chapter I have tested to what extent and how social trust and efficacy predict political 
participation. Moreover, I investigated whether these causal relationships differ between mature and 
post-communist European democracies. The conclusions concerning the three core claims I put 
forward in the theoretical framework are as follows.  
First, the results show that social trust is positively related with all forms of political 
participation. My findings thus lend empirical support to my first claim.  
Second, when we compare the impact of social trust on different modes of participation 
across mature and post-communist democracies, we see that the causal patterns explaining 
participation are similar; the hypothesized effects work in the similar direction. Thus, we can 
conclude that at the individual level the pattern of the relationship between social trust and political 
participation does not vary between counties.   
 
Third, I claimed that the association between social trust and political participation can be 
explained by the fact that trust enhances efficacy, which in turns stimulates participation. My 
findings show that this mediation effect of external efficacy indeed exists (for some forms of 
participation), but the claim does not hold for internal efficacy. Hence, political awareness has not a 
mediating effect in neither post-communist nor mature democracies. 
Moreover, this chapter shows that the relationship between social trust, political efficacy and 
the types of participation are roughly the same in the East and West. It means that, at the individual 
level, post-communist citizens’ decision to participate in politics is driven by the same socio-
economic resources, perceptions of social trust and efficacy and associational engagement that 
determine voter turnout in the mature democracies. Western models of political participation work 
relatively well for voting turnout and movement participation in new democracies. 
However, there are some notable exceptions to this general conclusion. In post-communist 
democracies, we found a significant positive mediation effect of political trust on participation in 
party politics activities and voting: trusters participate more often, because they feel more externally 
efficacious. In mature democracies, this mediation effect only exists for voting. Political trust does 
not significantly influence participation in party politics activities (other than voting). In sum, these 
findings suggest that the role of social trust in political engagement (by fostering efficacy, which in 
turn enhances participation) is more important in the post-communist region.  
Interestingly, there is a crucial difference between party politics and movement politics 
participation. External political efficacy stimulates voting and involvement in party activities, but 
refrains people from protesting. The direct effect of social trust on movement participation is 
positive, but at the same time the direct effect of political trust is negative. Simply put, in order to 
take to the streets, citizens need to trust their fellow citizens but distrust their politicians.  
In this chapter, I focused on causal relationships between individual-level variables. 
Different participation levels are only in part accounted for by reference to individual levels of 
social trust, efficacy and socio-economic factors. I have not addressed the question to what extent 
we can explain the differences between countries. Are levels of participation in the new 
democracies lower because citizens in these countries have lower levels of social trust and feel less 
efficacious? Or, for that matter, because incomes and education levels are generally lower? (i.e. is it 
a composition effect)? Alternatively, do “trusters” in post-communist countries participate less than 
“trusters” in Western democracies because of contextual effects? Addressing these follow-up 
questions will be the task I pick up in the next chapter. Thus, I presume that contextual variables 
specific to post-communist democracies also account for the difference in voting and protest 
participation between mature and post-communist democracies. 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
So far, we have learned that the inclination of post-communist citizens to trust others and participate 
in political life is systematically lower compared with people living in mature democracies. At the 
same time, I have already described and considered a set of individual level effects (socio-economic 
variables, political efficacy and interest, social trust and social embeddedness) on political 
participation in chapter 4.  
In this chapter I focus on contextual explanations of political participation. I address the 
following central question: why are people in some countries more politically active than people in 
other countries? It examines whether contextual factors influence individuals’ political actions and 
to what extent they explain differences in aggregated rates of political activity. More specifically, I 
analyze factors that are associated with the communist legacy and post-communist transition and at 
the same time matter for individuals’ decisions to engage in politics. In line with, for instance, Van 
Deth, Montero, and Westholm (2007), I distinguish between three forms of participation: voting, 
participation in party politics, and protesting. Referring to other studies on political involvement, I 
expect six contextual predictors to be related to the individual willingness to participate in politics, 
namely, general atmosphere of social trust, economic growth, (in)equality, corruption levels, 
government effectiveness, and historical experience with democracy.  
Several recent studies have already suggested that contextual effects, like, corruption 
(Olsson, 2014), type of political regime, including post-communism (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; 
Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014; Letki, 2003), institutional effectiveness, inequality, and economic 
growth (Van Deth and Elff, 2004; Schroeder, 2008; Christensen, 2011; Hooghe and Marien, 2013) 
and other conditions (for instance, Geys, 2006; Kostadinova, 2003; Van der Meer, Van Deth, and 
Scheepers, 2009; Vráblíková, 2014) matter for individuals’ decision to engage in politics. However, 
one of the key notions pointed out by Putnam (1993) and others (cf. Fukuyama, 1995) – social trust 
as a contextual factor – has attracted less attention. Only a few scholars tested the impact of 
contextual social trust on political participation (Roller and Rudi, 2008; Bäck, 2011; Norris, 2002a; 
Rothstein, 2011; Kim, 2014). To my best knowledge, none of these studies though systematically 
compared trends in both conventional and unconventional participation in both mature and post-
communist democracies. 
Hence, there is still a significant lacuna in the existing literature as we lack comprehensive 
research on the connection between aggregated levels of social trust (among other country-level 
variables) and political participation. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to address this caveat and cut 
into the question whether the level of contextual social trust (the average level of social trust in a 
country) significantly shapes political participation. The cross-level interaction effect between 
 
contextual and individual levels of social trust on the modes of political participation tested in this 
research adds to the novelty of this study. Moreover, this effect is tested for three modes of political 
participation, which makes the analyses more fine-grained (in contrast to most other studies that 
only investigate one or two modes).  
Again, my primary focus is on post-communist societies. I disentangle the concept of post-
communism as a set of economic, political and social variables that define post-communism as a 
stage or context of political transformation. In the literature the definition of the “context” is used to 
describe the political system and economic conditions, as well the socio-demographic composition 
of a society. These factors are believed to exert an influence on individuals’ decisions and belong to 
the “external” or outside realm of one’s own influence sphere. In this study, I conceive post-
communism as a set of various contextual factors that influence the attitudes and behaviour of 
citizens in post-communist societies (Vráblíková, 2014; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2011; 
Klandermans and Van Stralen, 2014). These contextual effects refer to present institutional settings, 
economic conditions, common norms and values, as well as the past collective experience of the 
citizens that lived through the communist regime and its collapse. I expect that the contextual 
factors can partly explain the remarkable “divergence” of post-communist societies from mature 
democracies with regard to participation that we observed in cross-national datasets that I showed in 
the previous chapter.  
Multi-level analysis presupposes that, on the one hand, the lower levels of political 
participation in post-communist democracies could result from a so-called composition effect: 
because there are more people in post-communist countries who do not trust their fellow citizens, 
levels of political participation are lower. In a similar vein, the fact that some societies are more 
politically apathetic than others could be due to the fact that some societies have a larger proportion 
of people with lower levels of education, lower individual incomes, or lower levels of political 
interest.  
On the other hand, we have good reasons to believe that the levels of political engagement 
of post-communist citizens are shaped by country-level factors. In other words, I presume that the 
striking differences in participation between Western democracies and post-communist countries 
are also due to the nature of the societies in which these citizens live (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 
2011). This implies, for instance, that even well-educated, efficacious, and trusting post-communist 
citizens are less inclined to engage in political activities than their counterparts in mature 
democracies because they are embedded in a distrustful society (Sztompka, 1999). The overall 
context individuals are nested in has to be taken into account to explain varying levels of political 
participation. In sum, the analysis presented in this chapter cuts into the role of the context in 
shaping political participation.  
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will outline which individual and 
contextual factors arguably matter for political participation in both party and movement politics. I 
distinguish between economic, political and cultural facets of post-communism. Next, I present the 
data and research design, which will be followed by the results. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the findings.  
 
5.2 Explaining political participation: theories and hypotheses   
 
Does having experienced communism diminish political activeness? Post-communism as a certain 
stage of “democratic development” has many facets. We can think about the impact of “living in a 
post-communist country” on participation in two broad ways: individual and contextual. I will 
briefly focus in this section on the distinction between these two types of effects and the 
relationships between macro and micro level variables analyzed in this chapter (Figure 1).38 For 
reasons of brevity, I use the general variable “political participation” in this Figure, but it can be 
specified for different forms of political participation, such as voting and protesting. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The relationship between country characteristics and political participation 
 
Scholars have proposed a number of macro-level explanations to account for cross-country 
differences in political participation, such as differences in turnout (Geys, 2006; Dalton, 2004; 
Bühlmann and Freitag, 2006; in the post-communist region (Barnes and Simon, 1998; Kostadinova, 
2003; Armingeon, 2007) and non-electoral political participation (Vráblíková, 2014; Armingeon, 
2007).  
For now, it is important to acknowledge that the relationships observed at the macro-level, 
depicted as arrow A in Figure 1, can be the result of different underlying processes. Macro-level 
effects on individual political participation can arise in three different ways (Ruiter and Van 
Tubergen, 2009; Coleman, 1990). We can distinguish contextual, individual, and cross-level 
                                                 
38 The figure displays the causal relationships which I depict as arrows. However, I admit that the relationships between 
variables could be reciprocal (mutual): macro and micro level characteristics affect individual and national political 
participation, as well as the latter have influence on the former (Quintelier and van Deth, 2014).   
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interaction effects. First, macro-level effects can be compositional in nature. In that scenario, macro 
differences arise because of the unequal distribution of individual characteristics (arrow B), which 
in turn influence individuals’ political behaviour (arrow C). Second, in line with for instance 
Putnam’s current of thought (1993), country characteristics can also have a contextual effect on 
political participation. If that is the case, properties of countries have a direct effect on participation 
over and above individual characteristics (arrow E). In this theoretical section, I will discuss three 
contextual effects, based on three sets of country characteristics: their economic, political-
institutional, and cultural properties.  
Third, cross-national differences can be the result of cross-level interaction effects (i.e. 
arrow F type of relationships). If so, certain characteristics of countries condition the relationship 
between important individual characteristics and political participation. For instance, a higher 
income could perhaps lead to more participation in Western democracies, but decrease participation 
in post-communist countries.  
In all cases, the influence on individual political participation leads to aggregate outcomes in 
national political activeness (arrow D). In the following discussion, I will elaborate on the most 
prominent micro and macro effects on participation that (might) distinguish post-communist 
countries from other mature democracies, namely, economic, political-institutional, and cultural 
factors. In other words, I am going to investigate arrows C, E and F.  
 
5.2.1 Economic factors  
 
The first argument refers to a very popular belief that economic conditions explain the lower 
participation levels of post-communist citizens. Different theories of political participation, 
democratization and modernization argue that economic growth gives people “the luxury” to 
participate, because, on the one hand, it reduces material insecurities and, on the other hand, a 
higher income insures that people can invest more of their time in political issues – this is also what 
the post-materialist thesis suggests (Van Deth, 1983; Inglehart, 1997). Economic factors are closely 
related to the so-called socio-economic standard model (SES) of political participation research that 
has been developed by Verba and colleagues (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969; Verba and Nie, 1972: 
123-137; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). The socio-economic status of an individual is 
represented by three components: education, income, and occupational status; all three variables 
strongly positively correlate. Individuals with more intellectual resources (meaning a higher level of 
education) and more material resources (a higher income or higher occupational status) are more 
active in politics than persons with fewer resources. It is argued that resources lead to political 
participation in the sense that individuals with more resources can exert more pressure on 
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politicians. Moreover, resources stimulate political interest and form participatory political attitudes 
that make citizens more responsible for their country and thus more willing to participate (Dalton, 
2004). Thus, I assume that socio-economic status has a positive effect on all three modes of 
participation: People of higher socio-economic status are more likely engage in political 
participation, be it voting (H1a), party (H1b) or movement (H1c) activities. 
 The literature demonstrates that there is also a contextual effect of economic development 
on participation: in countries where people are economically better off, citizens vote and protest 
more often (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1971; Sedehi and Tabriztchi, 1974; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; 
Dalton, 2004; Teorell, Torcal, and Montero, 2007).  
There are several theories that illuminate this relationship. Some authors assume that active 
involvement of citizens in politics actually contributes to government’s effectiveness and economic 
development. Others explain it in a reverse way: the process of economic development leads to 
social change that also alters the political culture of a nation and that is associated with the rise of 
new forms of political participation (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969: 362; Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 
2004). The causal chains between economic development and political participation consist of a set 
of simultaneous processes that are acquired along economic growth: industrialization, urbanization, 
educational expansion, the rise of new communication (media) technologies, mobilization, and 
increasing political incorporation that helps people to get involved in political life in a society 
(Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2008: 1). Put it differently, national economic growth generates and 
creates the access to resources. However, it is difficult to actually distinguish between the individual 
and macro-level effects of economic factors on participation. Do people participate because they 
become better-off? Or do poorer people also participate more in richer countries?  
Empirical studies suggest that with the increases in the supply of material resources, the 
general level of participation increases naturally, even among the relatively poor (for instance, 
Inglehart, 1997). One argument for this is that rich countries generally implement extensive social 
welfare systems that not only facilitate the development of civic engagement, but also make citizens 
feel safer (because the system guarantees basic socio-economic needs) and consequently make them 
more willing to take a political action (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005; Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 
2011; Alber and Kohler, 2008). Another argument suggests that in wealthier countries people are 
more involved in civic associations, private charities, voluntary organizations that in turn teach 
“participatory” skills (Walzer, 1998; Pichler and Wallace, 2009). Moreover, Nie, Powell, and 
Prewitt (1969) argue that although individuals of higher social-economic class participate more 
(individual-level effect), their success in achieving political goals is presumably spread and 
motivates others to participate as well. Therefore, low socio-economic status citizens might 
henceforth participate more in the manner of high-SES participants (contextual-level effect). All in 
 
all, we might assume that national economic conditions have an influence on individual political 
activity. 
To sum up, the arguments above lead to the following hypothesis: People who live in 
countries with a higher level of socio-economic development more frequently vote (H2a) and 
participate more often in party (H2b) and movement (H2c) politics. 
If the hypothesis holds true, it could explain why economically less developed post-
communist countries have lower rates of participation than mature democracies. Moreover, it could 
account for differences among the post-communist countries, although Duch (1998) could not find 
support for this hypothesis within this region.  
 Equality is another contextual economic indicator that explains participation (Uslaner and 
Brown, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara; 2000; Van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007; Schroeder, 
2008). If resources are equally distributed, it means that access to participation is also more equal. 
Higher levels of political participation thus tend to be accompanied with higher levels of equality. 
The reverse is also true. A large literature on democratization argues that inequality erodes the sense 
of social trust and there is some evidence that inequality even lowers rates of political participation 
in democratic societies. As Lancee and Van de Werfhorst (2011) notice, in more unequal societies 
people tend to abstain from participation because they feel more disadvantaged and more anxious 
than they would have been in more egalitarian societies. In their empirical study, they find evidence 
that independent of individual resources, higher inequality indeed hinders political engagement. 
Uslaner and Brown (2005) support the argument by saying that in unequal societies people think 
that they are not represented; they feel powerless and therefore they engage in less societal 
interaction. Informed by these theoretical insights, I assume that relatively higher inequality rates in 
post-communist societies hinder individuals’ political involvement: In countries with more 
socioeconomic equalities, people politically participate more frequently in elections (H3a), party 
(H3b) and movement (H3c) politics.  
 
5.2.2 Political factors  
 
According to the second set of effects, it is plausible that political institutions and their outcomes 
have an impact on attitudes citizens hold about politics, and that the post-communist countries have 
distinct features in this regard. The literature considers a wide array of institutional effects on 
political behaviour, both subjective and contextual: political and electoral systems, political 
polarization, access to governmental institutions, different policies, citizens’ expectations, 
evaluations of political institutions, years of democratic experience and other (Freitag and 
Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010; Freitag, 2010; Powell, 1986; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991; Lijphart, 
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1999; Christensen, 2011). However, although acknowledging the importance of, for instance, the 
political and electoral systems (Lijphart, 1999), I am not going to delve into all these contextual 
factors, as I focus on the effect of post-communism and the variables that are particularly related to 
it.  
At the individual level, political efficacy is conceived as being one of the most decisive 
factors that spur individual’s inclination to participate (Lane, 1959; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 
1954; Warren, 1999; Morrell, 2005; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008; 
della Porta and Reiter, 2012). Political action is more likely to be undertaken by citizens who have 
the feeling that they can bring about changes. Following the conceptualization of Lane (1959), I 
distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. Internal efficacy is self-understood 
competence to influence political outcomes, whereas external efficacy reflects on perceived 
government’s responsiveness (Barber, 1984).  
Although there is empirical support for the claim that both dimensions of political efficacy 
positively contribute to all modes of participation (Almond and Verba, 1989; Barnes and Kaase, 
1979; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Karp and Banducci, 2008), it is popularly assumed that 
external political efficacy (a citizen thinks that his/her voice is heard) more strongly encourages 
conventional participation, while internal efficacy is a condition for both party and movement 
politics, as efficacious citizens not only learn about the political outcomes and consequences, but 
also know the ways how to influence those outcomes (Gamson, 1968: 48; Sheerin, 2007). Thus, I 
formulate the following expectations: Individual sense of external efficacy leads to more active 
involvement in electoral (H4a) and party (H4b) politics, and less active involvement in movement 
politics (H4c); Individual sense of internal efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral 
(H5a), party (H5b) and movement (H5c) politics.  
 From the contextual perspective, corruption features the ineffectiveness of an institutional 
setting of a country (Rothstein, 2011). Political corruption has been known for many damaging 
effects, including citizens’ political disengagement. Uslaner (2002) claims that corruption in a 
society proves to be a counter-motivator of political participation. The acceptance of corruption 
diminishes the importance of legal channels to influence politics. For instance, McCann and 
Dominguez (1998) find that the suspicion of corruption among political elites depressed 
participation in Mexican elections between 1986 and 1995. In a similar vein, scholars analyzing the 
US and Britain also come to the conclusion that electoral participation erodes as a result of 
corruption scandals (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Blass, Roberts, and Shaw, 2012). Hooghe and 
Quintelier (2014) find that higher corruption levels significantly negatively affect both 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation in European democracies. 
 
Kostadinova (2012) asserts that the negative impact of corruption is even more devastating 
in countries transitioning from a totalitarian system to democracy. When governments are 
dishonest, ordinary citizens lose trust in the new system and it deters them from public engagement. 
We should keep in mind that voluntary political participation is not yet a habit in post-communist 
countries. It simply means that corruption leaves no room for participatory skills and civic virtues to 
flourish. In her studies based on Eastern European democracies, Kostadinova (2003) finds that with 
regard to electoral behaviour, corruption perceptions discourage people from voting (for instance, 
because of the fear of buying votes). On the other hand, the World Values Survey and Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems data demonstrate that corruption instead propels some forms of protest 
participation. Kostadinova concludes that disenchanted citizens with little faith in the efficacy of the 
electoral process will search for other ways to express their anger about the practices of corrupt 
policies. Hence, we propose the following hypotheses: In countries with higher levels of corruption 
individuals less likely participate in voting (H6a) and party politics (H6b); In countries with higher 
levels of corruption individuals more likely participate in protest politics (H6c). 
Moreover, another political-institutional factor widely considered in the post-communist 
context is so-called government effectiveness. By government effectiveness I refer to the ability of 
a government (among other capabilities) to effectively implement decisions, provide qualified 
services and meet the objectives of a society (cf. World Bank Governance Indicators). The more a 
government is effective in this sense, the higher the level of social welfare in a country. Scholars 
argue that when post-communist democratic institutions are in a period of flux (instability), 
governments are not effective and therefore it creates barriers for participation (Duch, 1998). The 
Soviet-type legacies of the political/administrative setting are believed to be still rooted (to a certain 
level) in post-communist political institutions. As Norgaard, Ostrovska, and Hansen (2000) notice, 
“the extreme reliance on central (Moscow) decision making produced a “learned helplessness”, in 
local and regional administrations, who were used to receiving very detailed guidelines for any sort 
of decision”. Thus, there is a popular presumption that post-communist institutions (governments) 
are ineffective because structural properties are legacies of the incumbent socialist systems with 
certain (legal and illegal) rules and norms. The perceived clientelistic nature of the institutions 
hinders citizens’ belief that they can influence politics and thus diminish the willingness to 
participate in it. On the other hand, it might hold true that government ineffectiveness encourages 
people to take to the streets to protest against it. Thus, the subsequent hypotheses can be formulated: 
The more effective a government, the more likely individuals are to participate in elections (H7a) 
and party politics (H7b), but the less likely individuals are to participate in movement politics 
(H7c). 
Chapter 5116   |
 
1999; Christensen, 2011). However, although acknowledging the importance of, for instance, the 
political and electoral systems (Lijphart, 1999), I am not going to delve into all these contextual 
factors, as I focus on the effect of post-communism and the variables that are particularly related to 
it.  
At the individual level, political efficacy is conceived as being one of the most decisive 
factors that spur individual’s inclination to participate (Lane, 1959; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 
1954; Warren, 1999; Morrell, 2005; Klandermans, Van de Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008; 
della Porta and Reiter, 2012). Political action is more likely to be undertaken by citizens who have 
the feeling that they can bring about changes. Following the conceptualization of Lane (1959), I 
distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. Internal efficacy is self-understood 
competence to influence political outcomes, whereas external efficacy reflects on perceived 
government’s responsiveness (Barber, 1984).  
Although there is empirical support for the claim that both dimensions of political efficacy 
positively contribute to all modes of participation (Almond and Verba, 1989; Barnes and Kaase, 
1979; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Karp and Banducci, 2008), it is popularly assumed that 
external political efficacy (a citizen thinks that his/her voice is heard) more strongly encourages 
conventional participation, while internal efficacy is a condition for both party and movement 
politics, as efficacious citizens not only learn about the political outcomes and consequences, but 
also know the ways how to influence those outcomes (Gamson, 1968: 48; Sheerin, 2007). Thus, I 
formulate the following expectations: Individual sense of external efficacy leads to more active 
involvement in electoral (H4a) and party (H4b) politics, and less active involvement in movement 
politics (H4c); Individual sense of internal efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral 
(H5a), party (H5b) and movement (H5c) politics.  
 From the contextual perspective, corruption features the ineffectiveness of an institutional 
setting of a country (Rothstein, 2011). Political corruption has been known for many damaging 
effects, including citizens’ political disengagement. Uslaner (2002) claims that corruption in a 
society proves to be a counter-motivator of political participation. The acceptance of corruption 
diminishes the importance of legal channels to influence politics. For instance, McCann and 
Dominguez (1998) find that the suspicion of corruption among political elites depressed 
participation in Mexican elections between 1986 and 1995. In a similar vein, scholars analyzing the 
US and Britain also come to the conclusion that electoral participation erodes as a result of 
corruption scandals (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Blass, Roberts, and Shaw, 2012). Hooghe and 
Quintelier (2014) find that higher corruption levels significantly negatively affect both 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation in European democracies. 
 
Kostadinova (2012) asserts that the negative impact of corruption is even more devastating 
in countries transitioning from a totalitarian system to democracy. When governments are 
dishonest, ordinary citizens lose trust in the new system and it deters them from public engagement. 
We should keep in mind that voluntary political participation is not yet a habit in post-communist 
countries. It simply means that corruption leaves no room for participatory skills and civic virtues to 
flourish. In her studies based on Eastern European democracies, Kostadinova (2003) finds that with 
regard to electoral behaviour, corruption perceptions discourage people from voting (for instance, 
because of the fear of buying votes). On the other hand, the World Values Survey and Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems data demonstrate that corruption instead propels some forms of protest 
participation. Kostadinova concludes that disenchanted citizens with little faith in the efficacy of the 
electoral process will search for other ways to express their anger about the practices of corrupt 
policies. Hence, we propose the following hypotheses: In countries with higher levels of corruption 
individuals less likely participate in voting (H6a) and party politics (H6b); In countries with higher 
levels of corruption individuals more likely participate in protest politics (H6c). 
Moreover, another political-institutional factor widely considered in the post-communist 
context is so-called government effectiveness. By government effectiveness I refer to the ability of 
a government (among other capabilities) to effectively implement decisions, provide qualified 
services and meet the objectives of a society (cf. World Bank Governance Indicators). The more a 
government is effective in this sense, the higher the level of social welfare in a country. Scholars 
argue that when post-communist democratic institutions are in a period of flux (instability), 
governments are not effective and therefore it creates barriers for participation (Duch, 1998). The 
Soviet-type legacies of the political/administrative setting are believed to be still rooted (to a certain 
level) in post-communist political institutions. As Norgaard, Ostrovska, and Hansen (2000) notice, 
“the extreme reliance on central (Moscow) decision making produced a “learned helplessness”, in 
local and regional administrations, who were used to receiving very detailed guidelines for any sort 
of decision”. Thus, there is a popular presumption that post-communist institutions (governments) 
are ineffective because structural properties are legacies of the incumbent socialist systems with 
certain (legal and illegal) rules and norms. The perceived clientelistic nature of the institutions 
hinders citizens’ belief that they can influence politics and thus diminish the willingness to 
participate in it. On the other hand, it might hold true that government ineffectiveness encourages 
people to take to the streets to protest against it. Thus, the subsequent hypotheses can be formulated: 
The more effective a government, the more likely individuals are to participate in elections (H7a) 
and party politics (H7b), but the less likely individuals are to participate in movement politics 
(H7c). 
Why are post-communist citizens less active? |   117
Chapter
5
 
 Finally, I presume that the years of stable democracy of a country also has an impact on 
whether citizens more actively participate in politics (Van Deth and Elff, 2004; Hooghe and 
Quintelier, 2014). The assumption implies that through the years of democracy citizens learn 
democratic procedures and routines, including political participation. In other words, the longer 
citizens live in a democracy, the more they are used to the rules of the democratic game. It would 
not only help us to distinguish between mature and post-communist democracies, but also between 
so-called Western and Southern European countries that made democratic transitions in the 1970’s. 
The hypothesis thus suggests: the more years of democracy a country experiences, the more citizens 
are likely to participate in voting (H8a), party (H8b), and movement (H8c) politics. 
 
5.2.3 Social trust as a cultural factor 
 
A third set of effects stresses that citizens are exposed to their socio-cultural environment and its 
norms about participation (for instance, Schwartz, 2006). Social trust is one of the prominent 
attributes of the socio-cultural environment. I have already discussed in previous chapters that 
social trust as a personal trait might lead to individuals’ willingness to participate in politics. The 
explanation of this assertion is that trusting people care about each other and thus feel a moral duty 
to be involved in common affairs (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Seligman, 1997). It is argued that social 
trust encourages individuals to participate in the pursuit of the commons, as trust provides us with 
the assurance that political action will be worthwhile. Thus, it overcomes the rational choice 
dilemma of the lack of effectiveness of individual political action, since social trust is not only 
about what you get, but also what you give. In this manner, successful cooperation based on trust 
gives people satisfaction in what they do (Putnam, 1993; Fishkin, 1995: 148). Political action 
stimulated by social trust endows us with a sense of belonging to a collective identity and pride for 
struggling for good and right values (Klandermans, 2003; Dahl, 1998). Following the reasoning 
entrenched in social capital theories, I hypothesize that: Individual sense of social trust leads to 
more active participation in elections (H9a), party (H9b) and movement (H9c) politics.  
 Moreover, it may be that social trust makes us more active democrats because it is tightly 
related to social embeddedness or participation in voluntary civic organizations. Social capital 
theorists assert that more trustful people tend to join organizations, and vice versa, organizations 
teach individuals to have trust in other fellows (Van Deth, 2001; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). 
Networks of civic engagement function like “schools of democracy” where citizens learn skills of 
participation (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). The general claim is that participation in associations 
“spills over” to national-level participation in politics. Thus, I expect that: Individual’s involvement 
 
in social networks (social embeddedness) leads to more active participation in elections, party and 
movement politics (H10a, H10b and H10c, respectively). 
 From the culturalist perspective, social trust is a property of contexts, not only of individuals 
(Kawachi, Subramanian and Kim, 2008). Put differently, it is a collective level resource and 
comprises a contextual climate (Subramanian, Lochner, and Kawachi, 2003). This approach asserts 
that political participation differs cross-nationally because cultural settings and norms differ. In 
other words, cross-national differences in political behaviour are attributed to differences in culture 
(Duch, 1998). This type of explanation first of all refers to one of the most important arguments of 
Almond and Verba in their study The Civic Culture (1963), namely that the political culture 
influences whether and in what way people participate in politics. Their study for instance 
concludes that even those who possess a lower socio-economic status are inclined to actively 
participate when a civic culture is prevalent. Thus, the culturalist approach presupposes that an 
atmosphere of social trust in a country propels people to participate in determination of their own 
affairs. In a socially trusting environment people feel more comfortable with participation. Even 
distrustful people participate more if the general atmosphere is trustful. 
Empirical research also lends support to the argument that countries with a longer 
democratic tradition demonstrate higher levels of trust and political activism (Bäck, 2011; Inglehart, 
1997: 188; Almond and Verba, 1963; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014). For instance, Iglič and 
Fábregas (2007) show that trust as a contextual attribute is one of the strongest predictors of 
involvement in social networks in European democracies. Social networks are collective 
endeavours and participation (in these networks) largely depends on the contextual level of trust. 
Moreover, Warren (1999) tested the contextual effect of trust as a predictor of voting in the United 
States. Panel data demonstrate that in more trusting environments people tend to vote more often. 
He assumes that the same logic may apply to other types of participation. 
In a similar vein, Putnam argued that social trust serves as a “public good” with positive 
spill-over effects on political participation (Putnam, 1993; 2000). His study of the Italian regions 
pointed out that democracy works better in an environment of high social capital (hence, social 
trust): “Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and 
cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibrium with high levels of cooperation, trust, 
reciprocity, civic engagement and well-being, as well as honesty and law-abidingness” (Putnam, 
1993: 111, 177). In other words, Putnam (2000: 20) contends that there may be positive spill-over 
effects from the societal level to individuals, so that poorly connected individuals benefit from a 
well-connected community (cf. Bäck, 2011). Likewise, Uslaner (2001: 108) argues that people who 
live among trusters may not actually become trusters themselves, but they may adopt the behaviour 
of trusters (for instance, inhibit habits of participation).  
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The reverse is also true. Putnam (1993: 115) explains that societies can also be locked in a 
vicious circle of distrust. Distrust is defined as a common legacy of the post-communist countries. 
Sztompka (1999) has argued that the thorough dominance of social life by the Communist Party 
during the Soviet period produced a “block culture” characterized by widespread distrust of the 
social sphere. These cultural paths that are inherited from the past are resistant to change and 
influence our present.  
Hence, I presume that the culture of distrust has a significant harmful contextual effect on 
individuals’ readiness to participate in politics. Even if they are individually trusting, they will 
participate less when they live in a distrustful society. For this reason, the individual-level impact of 
generalized trust may vary across countries (Van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007). To sum up, 
I formulate the following hypothesis: people who live in more trustful countries have a higher 
propensity to be active in elections (H11a), party politics (H11b) and engage in movement politics 
participation (H11c).  
Moreover, I also expect a cross-level interaction effect between individual social trust and 
contextual factors. For instance, Iglič and Fábregas (2007) notice that individual social trust is a 
stronger predictor of political participation in Western cultures than in Eastern European societies. 
Thus, I hypothesize that in prosperous, politically advanced, and socially trustful societies, the 
effect of individual social trust on voting and participation in party and movement politics is 
stronger compared to less developed societies (H12a, H12b and H12c, respectively). In other 
words, I will test the interaction effects between individual social trust and all contextual indicators 
(GDP per capita, GINI, corruption perception, governments’ effectiveness, years of democracy, and 
contextual social trust) employed in the analyses. To conclude, all hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 5.1. 
  
 
Table 5.1 Overview of the hypotheses 
Factors Levels Hypotheses 
Economic 
factors 
Micro level H1a-c People of higher socio-economic status more likely engage in political 
participation, be it voting (H1a), party (H1b) or movement (H1c) activities. 
 
 
 
Macro level 
 
H2a-c People who live in countries with a higher level of socio-economic 
development more frequently vote (H2a) and participate in party (H2b) and 
movement (H2c) politics. 
 
H3a-c In countries with more socioeconomic equalities, people politically 
participate more frequently in elections (H3a), party (H3b) and movement (H3c) 
politics. 
 
Political 
factors 
Micro level 
 
H4a-c External efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral (H4a) and 
party (H4b) politics and less active involvement in movement politics (H4c);  
 
H5a-c Internal efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral (H5a), party 
(H5b) and movement (H5c) politics. 
 
 Macro level H6a-c In countries with lower levels of corruption individuals more likely 
participate in voting (H6a) and party politics (H6b), but less likely participate in 
protest politics (H6c).  
 
H7a-c The more effective a government, the more likely individuals participate in 
elections (H7a) and party politics (H7b), but the less likely individuals participate 
in movement politics (H7c). 
 
H8a-c The more years of democracy of a country, the more citizens are likely to 
participate in voting (H8a), party (H8b), and movement (H8c) politics. 
 
Cultural 
factors 
Micro level H9a-c Individual social trust leads to more active participation in elections (H9a), 
party (H9b) and movement (H9c) politics. 
 
H10a-c Individual involvement in social networks (social embeddedness) leads to 
more active voting (H10a), participation in party (H10b) and movement politics 
(H10c). 
 Macro level H11a-c People who live in more trustful countries have a higher propensity be 
active in elections (H11a), party politics (H11b) and engage in movement politics 
participation (H11c). 
 
Interaction 
effects 
Micro X Macro 
level 
H12a-c In societies that are more economically and politically advanced and have 
higher levels of contextual social trust, the effect of individual social trust on 
participation in elections, party and movement politics is stronger than in less 
advanced societies (H12a, H12b and H12c, respectively). 
 
5.3. Data and research design  
 
5.3.1 Data 
 
I will use the data from the fourth wave of the ESS (2008). Compared to the other waves (for 
instance, 2002, 2010 and 2012), the wave of 2008 embraces the largest number of European post-
communist democracies. In total 27 democratic societies were selected: 26 European countries plus 
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The reverse is also true. Putnam (1993: 115) explains that societies can also be locked in a 
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participate more frequently in elections (H3a), party (H3b) and movement (H3c) 
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Political 
factors 
Micro level 
 
H4a-c External efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral (H4a) and 
party (H4b) politics and less active involvement in movement politics (H4c);  
 
H5a-c Internal efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral (H5a), party 
(H5b) and movement (H5c) politics. 
 
 Macro level H6a-c In countries with lower levels of corruption individuals more likely 
participate in voting (H6a) and party politics (H6b), but less likely participate in 
protest politics (H6c).  
 
H7a-c The more effective a government, the more likely individuals participate in 
elections (H7a) and party politics (H7b), but the less likely individuals participate 
in movement politics (H7c). 
 
H8a-c The more years of democracy of a country, the more citizens are likely to 
participate in voting (H8a), party (H8b), and movement (H8c) politics. 
 
Cultural 
factors 
Micro level H9a-c Individual social trust leads to more active participation in elections (H9a), 
party (H9b) and movement (H9c) politics. 
 
H10a-c Individual involvement in social networks (social embeddedness) leads to 
more active voting (H10a), participation in party (H10b) and movement politics 
(H10c). 
 Macro level H11a-c People who live in more trustful countries have a higher propensity be 
active in elections (H11a), party politics (H11b) and engage in movement politics 
participation (H11c). 
 
Interaction 
effects 
Micro X Macro 
level 
H12a-c In societies that are more economically and politically advanced and have 
higher levels of contextual social trust, the effect of individual social trust on 
participation in elections, party and movement politics is stronger than in less 
advanced societies (H12a, H12b and H12c, respectively). 
 
5.3. Data and research design  
 
5.3.1 Data 
 
I will use the data from the fourth wave of the ESS (2008). Compared to the other waves (for 
instance, 2002, 2010 and 2012), the wave of 2008 embraces the largest number of European post-
communist democracies. In total 27 democratic societies were selected: 26 European countries plus 
Why are post-communist citizens less active? |   121
Chapter
5
 
East Germany as a post-communist society.39 Most of the countries included are members of the 
EU; I also added Norway and Switzerland, which are internationally acknowledged as fitting the 
highest democratic standards. All in all, the analyses include more than 40,000 respondents (N1) 
from 27 societies (N2).  
 
5.3.2 Dependent variables 
 
Voting. – I measure voting with the question: “Did you vote in the last [country] national election in 
[month/year]? Yes/No?” (variable name: vote40).  
Party politics participation. – Other party politics participation activities are tapped with 
these items: 1) Contacted politician or government official last 12 months (variable name: contplt); 
2) Worked in political party or action group last 12 months (wrkprty); 3) Worn or displayed 
campaign badge/sticker (badge); 4) Member of a political party (mmbprty). Answers: yes=1; no=0. 
The dichotomized scoring to measure participation in these activities is applied: 1 is given to the 
respondents who participated in at least one of the mentioned activities, and they get a 0 score if 
they did not participate in any of the activities. 
Movement politics participation. – Participation in movement politics is gauged by these 
indicators: 1) Signed a petition in last 12 months (sgnptit); 2) Taken part in lawful public 
demonstration last 12 months (pbldmn); 3) Boycotted certain products in last 12 months (bctprd). 
The answer categories consist of “yes” (1) and “no” (0). As the distributions is skewed (around 70 
per cent of the respondents did not participate in any activity), the dichotomized scoring was 
employed, score 1 meaning participation in at least one movement activity, and 0 indicating non-
participation.  
 
5.3.3 Independent variables 
 
Socio-economic status is measured by two indicators: education and (perceived) income. 
 Education. – Education level (edulvla) of respondents is measured as follows: 1 = “Less 
than lower secondary education”; 2 = “Lower secondary education completed”; 3 = “Upper 
secondary education completed”; 4 = “Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed”; 5 = 
“tertiary education completed”. 
Perceived income. – I measured perceived income with a question about how the 
respondents “feel about household’s income nowadays” (hincfel).41 The answer categories are 1 = 
                                                 
39 Countries/societies included as mature/established democracies are: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Germany-West, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Post-communist democracies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany-East, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
40 I also include the original variable names of the ESS database for the ease of the replication of the analyses. 
 
“Very difficult (to live) on present income”; 2 = “Coping on present income”; 3 = “Difficult (to 
live) on present income”; 4 = “Living comfortably on present income”.  
Socio-economic development. – The socio-economic level of a country is measured by its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (the household income, standardized by purchasing 
power parity/PPP in US$) in 2008. The figures are obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook. To avoid very small parameter estimates, in the analysis the real numbers of 
GDP were divided by 1000. 
Inequality. – The Gini coefficient measuring inequality of income and wealth is proposed to 
be an accurate indicator of actual inequality within a society. I use 2008 figures (or adjacent figures 
when figures were missing for 2008) obtained from The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). Data for Switzerland and Hungary are from 2009. Data for Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania come from the World Bank Organization (2008), for Bulgaria – 
2007, for Romania – 2009. The 2008 data for East Germany are found in Grabka, Goebel, and 
Schupp (2012). The Gini coefficient is measured after taxes and transfers of total population. 
Theoretically, the inequality index ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (perfect inequality). Thus I 
expect that the higher GINI inequality coefficient of a country is, the lower are the country’s 
participation rates.  
Political trust. – I use political trust as a proxy of external efficacy. The ESS 2008 survey 
does not provide the items that were originally used in the American Elections Studies to measure 
external political efficacy (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991). The closest indicator to it is political 
trust, which refers to the perceived trustworthiness of the governmental institution and assumingly 
renders a feeling that the respondent’s voice is heard. Political trust is operationalized by measuring 
trust in the most important institutions of a political system using this question: “Please tell me on a 
score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out”. The following 
institutions were presented a) the country’s parliament (trstprl); b) the legal system (trstlgl); c) the 
police (trstplc); d) politicians (trstplt); e) political parties (trstprt). The answer categories ranged 
from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). The general score of political trust for each individual 
is the mean of the items. Individuals are included if they at least provided an answer on two items 
(out of five); otherwise (if there is only one item or none) the case is missing.   
Political awareness. – This variable serves as a proxy of internal efficacy. The ESS 
questionnaire does not include questions that accurately measure internal political efficacy. In line 
with some other studies (for instance, Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 140), I use political awareness as 
                                                                                                                                                        
41 The original question to measure household’s income (Household's total net income, all sources) was not chosen 
because of many missings of this value. Instead, following Hooghe and Quintelier (2014), the perceived income was 
considered. Correlation between the two variables is 0.50. 
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East Germany as a post-communist society.39 Most of the countries included are members of the 
EU; I also added Norway and Switzerland, which are internationally acknowledged as fitting the 
highest democratic standards. All in all, the analyses include more than 40,000 respondents (N1) 
from 27 societies (N2).  
 
5.3.2 Dependent variables 
 
Voting. – I measure voting with the question: “Did you vote in the last [country] national election in 
[month/year]? Yes/No?” (variable name: vote40).  
Party politics participation. – Other party politics participation activities are tapped with 
these items: 1) Contacted politician or government official last 12 months (variable name: contplt); 
2) Worked in political party or action group last 12 months (wrkprty); 3) Worn or displayed 
campaign badge/sticker (badge); 4) Member of a political party (mmbprty). Answers: yes=1; no=0. 
The dichotomized scoring to measure participation in these activities is applied: 1 is given to the 
respondents who participated in at least one of the mentioned activities, and they get a 0 score if 
they did not participate in any of the activities. 
Movement politics participation. – Participation in movement politics is gauged by these 
indicators: 1) Signed a petition in last 12 months (sgnptit); 2) Taken part in lawful public 
demonstration last 12 months (pbldmn); 3) Boycotted certain products in last 12 months (bctprd). 
The answer categories consist of “yes” (1) and “no” (0). As the distributions is skewed (around 70 
per cent of the respondents did not participate in any activity), the dichotomized scoring was 
employed, score 1 meaning participation in at least one movement activity, and 0 indicating non-
participation.  
 
5.3.3 Independent variables 
 
Socio-economic status is measured by two indicators: education and (perceived) income. 
 Education. – Education level (edulvla) of respondents is measured as follows: 1 = “Less 
than lower secondary education”; 2 = “Lower secondary education completed”; 3 = “Upper 
secondary education completed”; 4 = “Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed”; 5 = 
“tertiary education completed”. 
Perceived income. – I measured perceived income with a question about how the 
respondents “feel about household’s income nowadays” (hincfel).41 The answer categories are 1 = 
                                                 
39 Countries/societies included as mature/established democracies are: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Germany-West, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Post-communist democracies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany-East, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
40 I also include the original variable names of the ESS database for the ease of the replication of the analyses. 
 
“Very difficult (to live) on present income”; 2 = “Coping on present income”; 3 = “Difficult (to 
live) on present income”; 4 = “Living comfortably on present income”.  
Socio-economic development. – The socio-economic level of a country is measured by its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (the household income, standardized by purchasing 
power parity/PPP in US$) in 2008. The figures are obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook. To avoid very small parameter estimates, in the analysis the real numbers of 
GDP were divided by 1000. 
Inequality. – The Gini coefficient measuring inequality of income and wealth is proposed to 
be an accurate indicator of actual inequality within a society. I use 2008 figures (or adjacent figures 
when figures were missing for 2008) obtained from The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). Data for Switzerland and Hungary are from 2009. Data for Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania come from the World Bank Organization (2008), for Bulgaria – 
2007, for Romania – 2009. The 2008 data for East Germany are found in Grabka, Goebel, and 
Schupp (2012). The Gini coefficient is measured after taxes and transfers of total population. 
Theoretically, the inequality index ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (perfect inequality). Thus I 
expect that the higher GINI inequality coefficient of a country is, the lower are the country’s 
participation rates.  
Political trust. – I use political trust as a proxy of external efficacy. The ESS 2008 survey 
does not provide the items that were originally used in the American Elections Studies to measure 
external political efficacy (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991). The closest indicator to it is political 
trust, which refers to the perceived trustworthiness of the governmental institution and assumingly 
renders a feeling that the respondent’s voice is heard. Political trust is operationalized by measuring 
trust in the most important institutions of a political system using this question: “Please tell me on a 
score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out”. The following 
institutions were presented a) the country’s parliament (trstprl); b) the legal system (trstlgl); c) the 
police (trstplc); d) politicians (trstplt); e) political parties (trstprt). The answer categories ranged 
from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). The general score of political trust for each individual 
is the mean of the items. Individuals are included if they at least provided an answer on two items 
(out of five); otherwise (if there is only one item or none) the case is missing.   
Political awareness. – This variable serves as a proxy of internal efficacy. The ESS 
questionnaire does not include questions that accurately measure internal political efficacy. In line 
with some other studies (for instance, Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 140), I use political awareness as 
                                                                                                                                                        
41 The original question to measure household’s income (Household's total net income, all sources) was not chosen 
because of many missings of this value. Instead, following Hooghe and Quintelier (2014), the perceived income was 
considered. Correlation between the two variables is 0.50. 
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a proxy variable representing internal efficacy, because the association between these two variables 
is strong. Political awareness is defined as the extent an individual pays attention to politics and 
understands what he or she has encountered (Zaller, 1992: 21). Political awareness at the individual 
level is measured by these two indicators: a) “How often does politics seem so complicated that you 
can’t really understand what is going on?” (polcmpl) (1 = frequently; 2 = regularly; 3 = 
occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never); b) “How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up 
about political issues?” (poldcs) (1 = very difficult, 2 = difficult; 3 = neither difficult, nor easy; 4 = 
easy; 5 = very easy). These two items moderately correlate (Pearson’s r = 0.47), which allows us to 
compose a single variable. The cases with an answer to only one question are also taken into 
account.  
Political interest. – Another important variable which assumingly predicts political 
participation is political interest. I will therefore add this as control variable. It is measured in the 
ESS survey with a standard question: “How interested would you say you are in politics?” (polintr) 
(1 = not at all interested; 2 = hardly interested; 3 = quite interested; 4 = very interested). I include 
political interest in the analysis because it is closely related to political awareness, however, I keep 
these two variables separate. 
Corruption. – The data for corruption perception come from the Eurobarometer (EB) 2009 
(“Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption”). The EB study was chosen above the Transparency 
International report, for the purpose to differentiate between West and East Germany. The 
differences with regard to the corruption perception levels between these two parts of Germany are 
noted by several studies (Clemens, 2000; Pázmándy, 2011). The additive index of corruption 
perception of the given countries is formed by Pázmándy (2011). He chose three questions to form 
the index: 1) “There is corruption in local institutions in (our country)”, 2) “There is corruption in 
regional institutions in (our country)”, 3) “There is corruption in national institutions in (our 
country)”. All of them have four answer categories: “Totally agree”, “Tend to agree”, “Tend to 
disagree”, “Totally disagree”. Paszmandy carries out a confirmatory factor analysis to prove the 
consistency of the index across all countries and regions. The analysis shows that the reliability of 
the index is high with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93. Pázmándy (2011: 63) concludes that “the three 
questions form an additive index with a scale from zero to nine. The respondent does not perceive 
any corruption at all when his answers result in a value of zero and perceives rampant corruption 
when his questions result in a value of nine”.42 
                                                 
42 However, data for Norway, Switzerland and Croatia were not available in the EB study. Thus, the values from the 
Transparency International were taken for these countries and the scores were adjusted to fit the same measurement 
scale. The data on the TI Corruption perception indexes are available online: 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009#results 
 
 
Government effectiveness. – The government effectiveness coefficient provided by the 
World Bank research programme is one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) capturing 
the dimensions of good governing across the countries. Government effectiveness captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Percentile rank of countries ranges 
from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The higher values of the coefficient indicate better governance 
scores (WGI, Country data reports, 1996 – 2012).  
Years of democracy is measured by the years of stable democracy since 1919. The accurate 
data is obtained from the Polity IV Annual Time Series. The Polity IV data series includes 
democracy and autocracy indicators for over 160 countries from 1800-2013. Both the democracy 
and autocracy indicators were constructed as 21-point scales based on an assessment of political 
competition and participation. The scale ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to 
autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, and 6 to 10 to democracies (The Polity Project). 
Social trust (individual level). – The ESS 2008 survey operationalizes social trust by using 
three questions: 1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (ppltrst); 2) Do you think that most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair? (pplfair); 3) Would you say 
that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out for themselves? 
(pplhlp). For each question, the respondents were asked to indicate their consent on a scale from 0 
to 10, where 0 means the lowest and 10 the highest agreement. A principal component analysis of 
the three trust questions showed that they load on one scale quite strongly (the first component 
explains between 58.7 and 78.3 per cent of the variance in each of the 27 societies). Other research 
(for instance, Zmerli and Newton, 2008) also demonstrate that trust and the perceptions that people 
are fair and helpful indicate a single dimension, therefore my decision is to summate each 
individual’s responses to these three questions and divide the number by three. In the cases where 
only one or two questions are answered, accordingly one score or the sum of the scores divided by 
two are counted.  
Social embeddedness. – The ESS measures the participation in (voluntary) associations 
using this question: “Worked in another [than political] organisation or association last 12 months” 
(wrkorg). In addition, I include two other types of associational participation: membership in labour 
unions and religious attendance. Participation in these organizations may foster face-to-face 
contacts and function as a stepping stone to political participation (Newton, 1999b; Van der Meer 
and Van Ingen, 2001; Warren, 2001; Norris, 2002a). Trade union membership (mbtru) is measured 
as a dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = no). Religious attendance (rlgatnd) measured how often 
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a proxy variable representing internal efficacy, because the association between these two variables 
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occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never); b) “How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up 
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easy; 5 = very easy). These two items moderately correlate (Pearson’s r = 0.47), which allows us to 
compose a single variable. The cases with an answer to only one question are also taken into 
account.  
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ESS survey with a standard question: “How interested would you say you are in politics?” (polintr) 
(1 = not at all interested; 2 = hardly interested; 3 = quite interested; 4 = very interested). I include 
political interest in the analysis because it is closely related to political awareness, however, I keep 
these two variables separate. 
Corruption. – The data for corruption perception come from the Eurobarometer (EB) 2009 
(“Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption”). The EB study was chosen above the Transparency 
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the index is high with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93. Pázmándy (2011: 63) concludes that “the three 
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Government effectiveness. – The government effectiveness coefficient provided by the 
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the dimensions of good governing across the countries. Government effectiveness captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Percentile rank of countries ranges 
from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The higher values of the coefficient indicate better governance 
scores (WGI, Country data reports, 1996 – 2012).  
Years of democracy is measured by the years of stable democracy since 1919. The accurate 
data is obtained from the Polity IV Annual Time Series. The Polity IV data series includes 
democracy and autocracy indicators for over 160 countries from 1800-2013. Both the democracy 
and autocracy indicators were constructed as 21-point scales based on an assessment of political 
competition and participation. The scale ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to 
autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, and 6 to 10 to democracies (The Polity Project). 
Social trust (individual level). – The ESS 2008 survey operationalizes social trust by using 
three questions: 1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (ppltrst); 2) Do you think that most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair? (pplfair); 3) Would you say 
that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out for themselves? 
(pplhlp). For each question, the respondents were asked to indicate their consent on a scale from 0 
to 10, where 0 means the lowest and 10 the highest agreement. A principal component analysis of 
the three trust questions showed that they load on one scale quite strongly (the first component 
explains between 58.7 and 78.3 per cent of the variance in each of the 27 societies). Other research 
(for instance, Zmerli and Newton, 2008) also demonstrate that trust and the perceptions that people 
are fair and helpful indicate a single dimension, therefore my decision is to summate each 
individual’s responses to these three questions and divide the number by three. In the cases where 
only one or two questions are answered, accordingly one score or the sum of the scores divided by 
two are counted.  
Social embeddedness. – The ESS measures the participation in (voluntary) associations 
using this question: “Worked in another [than political] organisation or association last 12 months” 
(wrkorg). In addition, I include two other types of associational participation: membership in labour 
unions and religious attendance. Participation in these organizations may foster face-to-face 
contacts and function as a stepping stone to political participation (Newton, 1999b; Van der Meer 
and Van Ingen, 2001; Warren, 2001; Norris, 2002a). Trade union membership (mbtru) is measured 
as a dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = no). Religious attendance (rlgatnd) measured how often 
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respondents attend religious services apart from special occasions. Answers ranged on a seven-point 
scale from “never” (1) “to more than once a week” (7). Due to the different nature and function of 
these organizations, I keep all three variables (social embeddedness, union membership and 
religious attendance) separate.   
Social trust (country level). – Aggregated mean of the items of social trust of individuals in 
a particular country is counted.  
Age and gender. – Age is measured in the ESS data with the variable “Respondent‘s exact 
age in years” (agea). Gender is coded as a dichotomous variable (gndr): (0) = Female, (1) = Male. 
 
5.3.4 Describing country differences  
 
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the 27 societies included in the study and their scores on the 
country-level variables. It shows that the mean levels of contextual social trust, corruption, 
government effectiveness, GDP, and years of democratic experience significantly differ between 
the two samples of societies. Thus, we observe that there is substance behind the notion of “post-
communism” that can be unraveled by a set of contextual-level factors. In contrast, some other 
scholars, for instance Lasinska (2013: 189), use post-communism as a dummy variable, but I 
deliberately did not include this dummy because it is already captured by theoretically more 
meaningful variables. In other words, the characteristic features of post-communist countries are 
already incorporated by the other measures in my study. 
It is important to note that one can also notice considerable differences within the two 
samples. For instance, levels of social trust are remarkably lower in Greece and Portugal, compared 
to other Western democracies, while in Estonia or East Germany contextual social trust is of the 
same level as in mature democracies. In regard to economic development, the two country-sets are 
more distinct, although Portugal, the poorest country among the mature democracies, would better 
fit in the post-communist context. It is also worth noting that there are no considerable differences 
between the country-sets with regard to income inequality, and within the groups the differences are 
also modest (except maybe for Portugal within the mature democracies, and Lithuania and Latvia 
within the post-communist ones). With regard to corruption, there is more variation within the 
sample of mature democracies (for instance, Greece and Cyprus are perceived as being highly 
corrupt). Last, but not least, post-communist governments seem to be less effective, with some 
noticeable differences, for instance, Estonia, Slovenia and Czech Republic.  
Because of the relatively small number of countries and specifics of the sample, I did not 
include several other country level variables, for instance, the Freedom House index (measuring the 
country’s degree of political freedoms and civil liberties) and Human Development index, as it is 
 
unlikely that these variables can account for the differences in political participation between the 
democratic countries in Europe. As I have explained in chapter 1, there are some minor differences 
between the chosen countries in regard to the Freedom House index, but these differences are rather 
small to have a significant impact on country’s level of participation. I proceed with the descriptive 
analysis of these participation levels.  
 
Table 5.2 Country-level characteristics  
 Contextual 
social trust 
(ESS) 
GDP (PPP) 
per capita 
2008* 
Gini 
inequality 
coefficient  
2008** 
Corruption 
perception 
index 
2009*** 
Government 
effectiveness 
coefficient  
2008**** 
Years of 
democracy 
since 1919  
until (and 
included) 
2008***** 
Mature 5.47 36,586 0.29 6.2 90.65 77 
Belgium 5.27 36,322 0.27 6.5 87.86 85 
Cyprus 4.54 28,381 0.29 7.7 89.32 44 
Denmark 6.79 38,208 0.24 3.3 99.51 85 
Finland 6.32 36,844 0.26 5.3 99.03 89 
France 4.91 34,262 0.29 6.4 91.26 84 
Germany – West 5.35 35,740 0.29 6.5 89.81 75 
Greece 3.65 30,661 0.33 8.1 71.84 67 
Ireland 5.88 42,780 0.29 7.3 88.83 88 
Netherlands 5.93 40,434 0.29 5.0 94.17 85 
Norway 6.51 55,199 0.25 5.2 97.09 85 
Portugal 4.17 22,264 0.35 7.4 82.04 54 
Spain 4.93 30,757 0.32 7.2 79.13 43 
Sweden 6.37 37,526 0.26 4.9 98.06 90 
Switzerland 5.90 42,841 0.30 5.1 98.54 90 
United Kingdom 5.52 36,571 0.34 6.3 93.20 90 
Post-comm.  4.45(*) 19,690(*) 0.30  7.3(*) 71.27(*) 26(*) 
Bulgaria 3.63 12,372 0.28 7.9 52.91 19 
Croatia 4.14 16,474 0.29 7.7 71.36 9 
Czech Republic 4.82 25,755 0.26 7.2 81.07 39 
Estonia 5.37 20,754 0.33 6.6 83.98 32 
Germany – East  5.10 23,040 0.24 6.9 89.81 33 
Hungary 4.32 19,830 0.27 7.8 75.24 19 
Latvia 4.80 17,801 0.37 7.5 70.87 32 
Lithuania 4.33 18,855 0.38 7.6 72.82 32 
Poland 4.23 17,560 0.31 6.6 67.48 26 
Romania 3.65 12,698 0.30 7.6 45.63 13 
Slovakia 4.31 22,242 0.26 7.0 77.67 39 
Slovenia 4.71 28,894 0.24 7.5 84.95 18 
Sources:*CIA World Factbook data 
**OECD data; WBO data; Grabka, Goebel, and Schupp, 2012.  
*** Eurobarometer 2009; Transparency International data. 
**** WBO data . 
***** The Center for Systemic Peace data.  
Notes: (*) indicates a significant difference from the mean of mature democracies (p <0.01; df=24). 
Countries are grouped as mature and post-communist democracies and ranked in alphabetical order.  
 
If we compare countries based on the aggregated data on three different modes of political 
participation, we observe remarkable differences in the average amount of political participation 
across countries, especially in party politics (other than voting) and movement politics activities 
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(Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). As we can see, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and Finland have the highest 
overall level of political participation and are much more active than the least engaged post-
communist countries, like, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Aggregated levels of voting 
Source: ESS 2008.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Aggregated levels of participation in party politics 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Reading example: 43% of the respondents in Norway participated in at least one party politics activity. 
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Figure 5.4 Aggregated levels of participation in movement politics 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Reading example: 61% of the respondents in Sweden participated in at least one movement politics activity. 
 
The data is summarized and the countries are grouped according to the levels of participation in 
Table 5.3. Although only party politics (other than voting) and movement politics participation is 
taken into account in this table, the same distribution of the countries would be found if we would 
consider voting (see Appendix 5.1), as party politics and participation in elections highly correlate 
with each other. The table depicts that almost all post-communist countries, together with Portugal 
and Greece, belong to the countries with the lowest average level of political activities. Belgium, 
Cyprus, Netherlands, Croatia and Spain take a moderate position. They constitute a first group of 
countries whose citizens engage more actively in politics than in the remaining post-communist 
region. Then we have France, Germany (both sides), Switzerland, Ireland and United Kingdom with 
high engagement in one type of political activities (party or movement politics). Furthermore, 
citizens of another group of mature democracies participate in politics on average even more: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have the highest level of participation in both party and 
movement politics. In Sweden, for instance, 61 per cent of the citizens reported to have been 
engaged in at least one social movement activity. 
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Table 5.3 Countries according to the levels of participation in party (other than voting) and 
movement politics  
 High level of 
participation in 
movement politics  
 
Moderate level of 
participation in 
movement politics  
Low level of 
participation in 
movement politics  
High level of 
participation in party 
politics  
Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden  
Ireland 
 
 
Moderate level of 
participation in party 
politics  
France, Germany-West, 
Germany-East, 
Switzerland, United 
Kingdom  
Netherlands, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Croatia 
 
Low level of 
participation in party 
politics  
 Spain, Slovakia Greece, Portugal, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia 
Source: ESS 2008.43 
 
To conclude, the aggregated-level data proves that post-communist citizens are indeed less likely to 
engage in a range of political actions than citizens of mature democracies. However, the 
mechanisms underlying these correlations have not yet been explored in sufficient detail in the 
political science literature, thereby leaving many unanswered questions. At this point, the following 
questions arise. Why are countries that experienced communism less politically active? Let us turn 
to this question in following sections.  
 
5.5 Analysis and results  
 
5.5.1 Method 
 
I focus on cross-national variations, rather than variation within countries. To investigate and 
decompose the country-level variance, I will make use of multilevel methods. This takes into 
account the hierarchical nature of our data, since individuals (level 1) are clustered within 
societies/countries (level 2) (Snijders and Bosker, 1999)44.  
Multi-level modelling (Goldstein, 1995; Snijders and Bosker, 1999) is a method explicitly 
designed to deal with clustered data. The two main reasons to use this method are, first, to obtain 
                                                 
43 High level of participation in party politics: >0.30 
Moderate level of participation in party politics: 0.21 – 0.30 
Low level of participation in party politics: <0.20 
High level of participation in movement politics: >0.40 
Moderate of level participation in movement politics: 0.21 – 0.40 
Low level of participation in movement politics: <0.20 
The participation in 2008 is considered. Therefore some countries, for instance, Greece, displayed at that time relatively 
low levels of movement politics participation compared to the following years (during the economic crisis).  
44 I used the genlinmixed command in SPSS. 
 
correct standard errors and test statistics, and, second, to model explicitly the degree of 
heterogeneity across clusters. I have more than 43,000 observations (43709 – when I use voting as a 
dependent variable; 46311 – other party politics activities; 46226 – movement politics activities) 
observations at the individual level and 27 at the society level. The dependent variables are 
dichotomous. For ease of interpretation, the estimates are translated into odds ratios (expB).  
 
5.5.2 Results 
 
I started with models with only an intercept (empty models). Thus, we can consider in which degree 
the variation in political participation is explained by the country in which people live. Respondents 
with one or more missing values on any of the variables were left out of the analyses. Hence, 
subsequent models are all based on the same set of respondents.  
In the empty model applied on voting the residual variance at the country level is 0.502. 
This means that the intra-class correlation (the ratio of the between-cluster variance to the total 
variance) is 0.13.45 It is the proportion of the total variance in Y that is accounted for by the 
clustering. It implies that 13% of the variation in voting is explained by the country in which people 
live. For the two other indicators of political activeness (participation in party politics and 
protesting), the residual variance at the country level is 0.243 and 0.811, respectively. Hence, 
respectively 7% and 20% of the variance of party politics participation and of protest participation 
is explained by the country in which people live.   
In sum, there are country level differences in political participation. The question is, whether 
these diminish when we control for all individual level variables. The second set of models takes 
these composition effects into account. 
 
Individual factors 
 
We explain differences between countries if the between country variance is reduced, either by 
context effects or by composition effects of the individual-level variables. First, I added all 
individual-level variables to the empty model. The estimates of these baseline models are depicted 
in Table 5.4. The results show that about 16% ([0.502 - 0.423]/0.502) of the cross-national variation 
in voting can be explained by the unequal distribution of individual characteristic across countries. 
Moreover, 46% ([0.243 - 0.132]/0.243) and 16% ([0.811 - 0.682]/0.811) of the variance in party 
politics and movement politics participation is explained, respectively. 
                                                 
45 The intra-class correlation is calculated with the following formula: ρ = var(0)/[var(0) + π2/3] (Snijders and Bosker 
1999: 224; cf. Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009: 878). In random-effects logistic models, the individual-level variance 
parameter is fixed a priori to π2/3 ≈ 3.289 (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 229; cf. Van Deth and Elff 2004: 490). 
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Which individual level factors explain cross-national variation in political participation? I 
will discuss the empirical evidence for the hypotheses one by one below. 
Hypotheses H1a–c stated that people of higher socio-economic status more often engage in 
political participation. As it was already mentioned, to measure socio-economic status I took 
education and perceived financial situation into consideration. In line with hypothesis H1a, the 
results show that education and perceived financial situation indeed both have a significant positive 
effect on the propensity to vote (expB= 1.131 and 1.170, respectively). It reads, for instance, that 
the odds of voting for people who score one unit higher on the perceived income scale are 17% 
higher than the odds of people with a lower perceived income. 
However, when it comes to other party politics activities, the hypothesis (H1b) is only 
partially confirmed, as perceived income is not a significant predictor, while education still is.  
Finally, the same results apply to movement politics (H1c): the effect of one’s perceived financial 
situation is not significant, whereas education stimulates engagement in protest behaviour. In sum, 
more educated people participate more, be it in voting, party and movement politics activities, while 
perceived income only significantly predicts voting. Hence, H1a–c are largely confirmed. 
Now we will turn to the individual levels of external and internal efficacy. I hypothesized 
that external efficacy leads to more active involvement in electoral (H4a) and party (H4b) politics, 
but less active involvement in movement politics (H4c). If we take a look at the individual level 
effects in Table 5.4, we indeed find empirical evidence for these hypotheses. Political trust, as a 
proxy of external efficacy, has a significant positive effect on the propensity to vote and be involved 
in party politics activities (H4a and H4b). In contrast, it is also true that people who are more 
politically trusting (and thus, we presume, have higher levels of external efficacy) participate in 
movement politics less often (expB = 0.933). Hence, a one unit increase in the individual level of 
political trust decreases the odds of movement politics participation by a factor of 0.93. To 
illustrate: put simply, if the average individual level of political trust would increase one unit (from 
4.27 to 5.27), we predict that involvement in protesting, which overall averages 29.0 per cent in 
these societies, would drop to 27.5 per cent.46  
We observe a slightly different picture if we consider the effects of internal political 
efficacy. In Hypotheses 5a–c we expected that internal efficacy leads to more active involvement in 
electoral, party, and movement politics. We took individual political awareness as a proxy of 
internal political efficacy. Indeed, the analysis shows that there is a significant positive effect of 
political awareness on voting (expB = 1.118), participation in party politics (expB =1.176) and 
                                                 
46 The calculation is as follows: the overall probability to be involved in movement politics is 0.29, the odds is therefore 
0.29/0.71 = 0.408 to 1. Multiplication by 0.93 yields the odds of 0.380, which is similar to a probability of 0.380/1.380 
= 27.5%. 
 
movement politics (expB =1.125). These findings thus corroborate the Hypotheses 5a–c: the more 
someone feels efficacious to understand and influence political affairs, the more s/he is ready to 
participate in different kinds of political activities. Furthermore, we also included political interest 
as a control variable and find a strong and significant effect of this variable for all types of 
participation (expB =1.726 for voting; expB =1.609 for party politics, and expB =1.556 for 
movement politics).  
Hypotheses H9a–c predicted that people with a stronger sense of social trust are more likely 
to actively participate in elections, party politics, and movement politics. The findings show that 
there is a positive significant effect of social trust on voting (H9a) and movement politics (H9c). 
For instance, the odds ratio for protesting is 1.049, meaning that those with a one unit higher score 
on the social trust scale are 1.05 times more likely to be active in protesting, holding all other 
factors constant. However, at the same time we find that the effect of social trust on other party 
politics activities is negative (thus H9b is rejected). This result is somewhat in line with Hooghe and 
Quintelier (2014), who find a non-significant effect of social trust on institutionalized participation 
(party politics activities except voting).  
Furthermore, the results show that social embeddedness is an important individual level 
predictor for voting, party and movement politics. A higher degree of social embeddedness 
increases the odds of voting by a factor of 1.67; for other institutionalized activities and movement 
politics the odds are even increased by a factor of 4.89 and 3.06, respectively. This clearly confirms 
Hypotheses H10a–c.  
Finally, we have also controlled for gender and age. The analysis shows that older people 
are more likely to go to the ballots, but less likely to protest and engage in party politics activities. 
Regarding gender, the ESS data reveal that women participate more in elections and in protest 
politics. Similar findings for non-institutionalized (movement) participation were obtained by 
Hooghe and Quintelier (2014).  
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as a control variable and find a strong and significant effect of this variable for all types of 
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(party politics activities except voting).  
Furthermore, the results show that social embeddedness is an important individual level 
predictor for voting, party and movement politics. A higher degree of social embeddedness 
increases the odds of voting by a factor of 1.67; for other institutionalized activities and movement 
politics the odds are even increased by a factor of 4.89 and 3.06, respectively. This clearly confirms 
Hypotheses H10a–c.  
Finally, we have also controlled for gender and age. The analysis shows that older people 
are more likely to go to the ballots, but less likely to protest and engage in party politics activities. 
Regarding gender, the ESS data reveal that women participate more in elections and in protest 
politics. Similar findings for non-institutionalized (movement) participation were obtained by 
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Table 5.4 Multi-level logistic regression of political participation in 15 mature and 12 post-
communist democracies 
 Voting Party politics Movement politics 
 exp B SE  exp B SE  exp B SE  
Constant 0.046 .151 0.021 .111 0.085 .177 
Individual:       
Age 1.021**** .001 0.997*** .001 0.982****  .001 
Gender 0.903**** .026 1.016 .026 0.750**** .025 
Education 1.131**** .012 1.106**** .011 1.234**** .010 
Perceived financial situation 1.170**** .017 0.998 .018 1.003 .016 
Social trust 1.033**** .007 0.979*** .008 1.049**** .007 
Political trust 1.127**** .007 1.017** .008 0.933**** .007 
Political awareness  1.118**** .015 1.176**** .016 1.125**** .015 
Political interest 1.726**** .018 1.609**** .017 1.556**** .016 
Embeddedness 1.669**** .052 4.868**** .033 3.062**** .033 
Trade union member 1.256**** .030 1.277**** .029 1.373**** .027 
Religious attendance 1.128**** .010 1.080**** .010 0.992 .009 
       
Variance country 0.423**** 0.120 0.132*** 0.038****   0.682 0.197  
N1 (Individuals) 43709  46311  46227  
N2 (Countries/Entities) 27  27  27  
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
 
Contextual factors  
 
The models with individual-level effects I have presented thus far form the baseline against which 
the contextual variables can be assessed. Following e.g. Van Deth and Elff (2004), I will expand the 
baseline model with each of the country-level variables separately, in order to trace the impact of 
these contextual factors. Hereby, I will rely on the comparison of models in terms of their respective 
country-level intra-class correlation and their respective country-level variance. I have computed 
the relative reduction of the country-level variance parameter and relative difference of the country-
level residual intra-class correlation (see Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7). Due to multicollinearity, parameter 
estimates and standard errors are biased if we would consider a full model.47 In each regression 
model of voting (also the base model), I also included a dummy variable (not shown in Table) to 
denote the countries in which voting is compulsory (Belgium, Greece, and Cyprus). 
Which factors in the model explain cross-national variation in political participation? I 
discuss the empirical evidence for the hypotheses one by one below. 
Economic factors. We find mixed support for hypothesis H1c. The results show that the 
GDP has no contextual effect on voting (the effect is not significant). Statistically significant 
positive effects of GDP are obtained for other party politics activities and protesting. Hence, in 
more prosperous societies, levels of collective actions are higher. This variable reduces both the 
                                                 
47 Especially corruption, social trust, and government effectiveness are strongly related. We find for instance high 
Pearson’s correlations (n=27) between social trust and corruption (-0.83), government effectiveness (0.85) and years of 
democracy (0.69).    
 
 
country-level variance and residual intra-class correlation by about 30 per cent (party politics) and 
50 per cent (movement politics). This finding is in line with previous research (for instance, Roller 
and Rudi, 2008) that argues that there is a stronger effect of socio-economic resources in the case of 
non-electoral participation compared to electoral participation.  
Economic inequality is another contextual aspect that was included in the analysis. I 
presumed that inequality might deter individuals from electoral participation. This negative effect is 
indeed significant. For the individual inclination to protest, inequality proves to have a significant 
negative effect as well, although it is rather small: the higher the economic inequality in a society, 
the less individuals are inclined to engage in movement politics. I however find an insignificant 
effect of GINI on party politics participation. Hence, H1d can be confirmed, with some 
reservations.  
Political factors. We observe that perceived levels of corruption have a non-significant 
effect on voting, but a small significant effect on party politics activities, and a highly significant 
effect on protesting. The results show that including corruption levels reduce the country level 
variance by about 50 per cent. A higher score on the corruption index (which means that the system 
is perceived as fair and transparent) leads to higher levels of protest. This finding contradicts my 
hypothesis, but is in line with Hooghe and Quintelier’s (2014) findings. Since corruption levels 
correlate with democratic experience (r=-0.70) and government effectiveness (r=-0.71), it is not 
surprising that we find similar results for the latter two political factors. They stimulate protest 
participation and, to a somewhat lesser degree, party politics participation. Years of democracy 
most strongly reduces the country-level variance in party politics participation (about 25 per cent). 
Cultural factors. The results show that one unit increase in the national level of social trust 
is associated with a 21% and 88% increase in the odds of participating in party politics and 
movement politics, respectively. Hence, contextual social trust proves to have an independent 
explanatory power of predicting the levels of political participation. This variable particularly 
decreases the country-level variance and intra-class correlation for movement politics; it reduces it 
by more than 40 per cent. The effect of contextual social trust on voting is however not significant.   
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country-level variance and residual intra-class correlation by about 30 per cent (party politics) and 
50 per cent (movement politics). This finding is in line with previous research (for instance, Roller 
and Rudi, 2008) that argues that there is a stronger effect of socio-economic resources in the case of 
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presumed that inequality might deter individuals from electoral participation. This negative effect is 
indeed significant. For the individual inclination to protest, inequality proves to have a significant 
negative effect as well, although it is rather small: the higher the economic inequality in a society, 
the less individuals are inclined to engage in movement politics. I however find an insignificant 
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Table 5.5 Multi-level logistic regression of voting in 15 mature and 12 post-communist 
countries  
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 Variance 
parameter 
  Intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio SE Estimate SE Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model + 
compulsory dummy 
-- -- 0.234*** 0.068  -- 0.0664 -- 
Country variables:        
Contextual social trust 1.055  0.110 0.242*** 0.071 -3.4 0.0685 -3.2 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.002 0.005 0.242*** 0.071  -3.4 0.0685 -3.2 
Gini inequality coeff. 0.004**  2.382 0.198*** 0.059  15.4 0.0568 14.5 
Corruption perc. index 1.035*  0.057 0.240*** 0.071 -2.3 0.0680 -2.4 
Government effectiv. 1.002 0.007 0.243*** 0.072  -3.8 0.0688 -3.6 
Years democracy 1.000 0.003 0.244*** 0.072  -4.3 0.0691 -4.0 
        
N1 43709       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model. In the base model 
also a (highly significant) dummy has been added for countries where voting is compulsory (Greece, Cyprus, Belgium). 
 
Table 5.6 Multi-level logistic regression of party politics in 15 mature and 12 post-
communist countries 
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 Variance 
parameter 
  Intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE  Estimate SE 
(sig) 
Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.132*** 0.038  -- 0.0386 -- 
Country variables:        
Social trust 1.208**  0.073 0.108*** 0.032 18.2 0.0318 17.6 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.010***  0.003 0.093*** 0.028  29.5 0.0275 28.8 
Gini inequality coeff. 0.087  1.939 0.129*** 0.038  2.3 0.0377 2.3 
Corruption perc. index 1.074* 0.040 0.121*** 0.036  8.3 0.0355 8.0 
Government effectiv. 1.011** 0.005 0.114*** 0.034  13.6 0.0335 13.2 
Years democracy 1.007*** 0.002 0.100*** 0.030 24.2 0.0295 23.6 
        
N1 46311       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model. 
 
  
 
Table 5.7 Multi-level logistic regression of protesting in 15 mature and 12 post-communist 
countries 
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 Variance 
parameter 
  Intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio 
(sig) 
SE  Estimate SE 
(sig) 
Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.682**** 0.197  -- 0.1717 -- 
Country variables:        
Social trust 1.882**** 0.132  0.367**** 0.183  46.2 0.1004 41.5 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.030**** 0.005  0.314**** 0.090  54.0 0.0871 49.3 
Gini inequality coeff. 0.001*  4.239 0.639**** 0.183  6.3 0.1627 5.2 
Corruption perc. index  1.443**** 0.061 0.302*** 0.087 55.7 0.0841 51.0 
Government effectiv.  1.045**** 0.008 0.328*** 0.094 51.9 0.0907 47.2 
Years democracy 1.021**** 0.004 0.339**** 0.097 42.8 0.0934 45.6 
        
N1 46226       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.   
 
Cross-level interactions 
 
I predicted that the context moderates the direct individual level effects of social trust on voting, 
participation in party politics, and movement politics (H12a–c). To test these interaction effects, I 
included cross-level interaction terms for social trust and each of the contextual effects (GDP per 
capita, GINI, corruption perception, governments’ effectiveness, years of democracy and contextual 
social trust). For reasons of space, I will only report the significant interaction effects. These are 
shown in Tables 5.8 to 5.10. To avoid multicollinearity, I mean-centered both the individual-level 
social trust and all contextual variables before computing the interaction terms.   
 With regard to voting, we only observed a significant (and positive) direct contextual effect 
of socio-economic equality. Table 5.8 shows that we find that GINI does not only matter due to its 
direct effect; it also has an impact on the relationship between social trust and voting. The negative 
effect implies that social trust has a weaker effect on the propensity to participate in the polls when 
a society is more unequal. All other interaction effects are positive, which indicates that the effect of 
social trust is stronger when a society is more trustful, more affluent, less corrupt, more effectively 
governed, and more mature regarding its democratic experience. However, the effects are not strong 
and, except for GINI, the models with interaction effects do not yield reductions of the country-
level variance and intra-class correlation.  
 When the interactions are included in the models of party politics (see Table 5.9), we 
observe again that social trust is negatively related with political engagement, holding all other 
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Table 5.5 Multi-level logistic regression of voting in 15 mature and 12 post-communist 
countries  
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 Variance 
parameter 
  Intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio SE Estimate SE Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model + 
compulsory dummy 
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Country variables:        
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Gini inequality coeff. 0.004**  2.382 0.198*** 0.059  15.4 0.0568 14.5 
Corruption perc. index 1.035*  0.057 0.240*** 0.071 -2.3 0.0680 -2.4 
Government effectiv. 1.002 0.007 0.243*** 0.072  -3.8 0.0688 -3.6 
Years democracy 1.000 0.003 0.244*** 0.072  -4.3 0.0691 -4.0 
        
N1 43709       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model. In the base model 
also a (highly significant) dummy has been added for countries where voting is compulsory (Greece, Cyprus, Belgium). 
 
Table 5.6 Multi-level logistic regression of party politics in 15 mature and 12 post-
communist countries 
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 Variance 
parameter 
  Intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE  Estimate SE 
(sig) 
Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.132*** 0.038  -- 0.0386 -- 
Country variables:        
Social trust 1.208**  0.073 0.108*** 0.032 18.2 0.0318 17.6 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.010***  0.003 0.093*** 0.028  29.5 0.0275 28.8 
Gini inequality coeff. 0.087  1.939 0.129*** 0.038  2.3 0.0377 2.3 
Corruption perc. index 1.074* 0.040 0.121*** 0.036  8.3 0.0355 8.0 
Government effectiv. 1.011** 0.005 0.114*** 0.034  13.6 0.0335 13.2 
Years democracy 1.007*** 0.002 0.100*** 0.030 24.2 0.0295 23.6 
        
N1 46311       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model. 
 
  
 
Table 5.7 Multi-level logistic regression of protesting in 15 mature and 12 post-communist 
countries 
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 Variance 
parameter 
  Intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio 
(sig) 
SE  Estimate SE 
(sig) 
Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.682**** 0.197  -- 0.1717 -- 
Country variables:        
Social trust 1.882**** 0.132  0.367**** 0.183  46.2 0.1004 41.5 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.030**** 0.005  0.314**** 0.090  54.0 0.0871 49.3 
Gini inequality coeff. 0.001*  4.239 0.639**** 0.183  6.3 0.1627 5.2 
Corruption perc. index  1.443**** 0.061 0.302*** 0.087 55.7 0.0841 51.0 
Government effectiv.  1.045**** 0.008 0.328*** 0.094 51.9 0.0907 47.2 
Years democracy 1.021**** 0.004 0.339**** 0.097 42.8 0.0934 45.6 
        
N1 46226       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.   
 
Cross-level interactions 
 
I predicted that the context moderates the direct individual level effects of social trust on voting, 
participation in party politics, and movement politics (H12a–c). To test these interaction effects, I 
included cross-level interaction terms for social trust and each of the contextual effects (GDP per 
capita, GINI, corruption perception, governments’ effectiveness, years of democracy and contextual 
social trust). For reasons of space, I will only report the significant interaction effects. These are 
shown in Tables 5.8 to 5.10. To avoid multicollinearity, I mean-centered both the individual-level 
social trust and all contextual variables before computing the interaction terms.   
 With regard to voting, we only observed a significant (and positive) direct contextual effect 
of socio-economic equality. Table 5.8 shows that we find that GINI does not only matter due to its 
direct effect; it also has an impact on the relationship between social trust and voting. The negative 
effect implies that social trust has a weaker effect on the propensity to participate in the polls when 
a society is more unequal. All other interaction effects are positive, which indicates that the effect of 
social trust is stronger when a society is more trustful, more affluent, less corrupt, more effectively 
governed, and more mature regarding its democratic experience. However, the effects are not strong 
and, except for GINI, the models with interaction effects do not yield reductions of the country-
level variance and intra-class correlation.  
 When the interactions are included in the models of party politics (see Table 5.9), we 
observe again that social trust is negatively related with political engagement, holding all other 
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individual factors constant. Furthermore, the results indicate that this negative relationship is 
significantly weaker the more the societal context is characterized by social trust, high standards of 
living, equality, low levels of corruption, governmental effectiveness, and long-term democratic 
experience. Apparently, it seems that being actively involved in institutionalized politics makes one 
socially cynical and is detrimental for one’s interpersonal trust, and this effect is stronger in 
unprosperous and dishonest societies. The extent to which the inclusion of the variables and the 
interaction terms reduces the country-level heterogeneity differs, but generally it is rather small. 
 
Table 5.8 Multi-level logistic regression of voting in 15 mature and 12 post-communist countries  
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 variance 
parameter 
  intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE Estimate SE  Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to 
baseline 
model 
(%) 
Base model + 
compulsory dummy 
-- -- 0.234*** 0.068  -- 0.0664 -- 
Cross-level interactions:        
Individual social trust 1.043**** 0.008      
Contextual social trust 1.047 0.109 0.235*** 0.069 -1.5 0.0667 -0.5 
Social trust * contextual 
social trust 
1.036**** 0.008      
        
Individual social trust 1.039*** 0.008      
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.002 0.046 0.240*** 0.071  -2.6 0.0680 -2.4 
Social trust * GDP  1.001** 0.0004      
        
Individual social trust 1.037**** 0.007      
Gini inequality coeff 0.004** 2.367 0.195*** 0.058 16.7 0.0560 15.7 
Social trust * Gini 0.638*** 0.170      
        
Individual social trust 1.041**** 0.008      
Corruption perception  1.034 0.055 0.237*** 0.070 -1.3 0.0672 -1.2 
Social trust * corruption 1.013*** 0.004      
        
Individual social trust 1.038**** 0.008      
Government 
effectiveness  
1.003 0.007 0.242*** 0.071 
 
-3.4 0.0685 -3.2 
Social trust * government 
effectiveness 
1.001** 
 
0.001      
        
Individual social trust 1.038**** 0.008      
Years democracy 1.000 0.003 0.241*** 0.071 -3.0 0.0683 -2.9 
Social trust * years 
democracy 
1.001** 
 
0.0002      
        
N1 43709       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
  
 
Table 5.9 Multi-level logistic regression of party politics in 15 mature and 12 post-communist 
countries 
 
   Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 variance 
parameter 
  intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE Estimate SE  Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.132*** 0.038  -- 0.0386 -- 
Cross-level interactions:        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.110*** 0.033 16.7 0.0324 16.1 
Contextual social trust 1.218***  0.074      
Social trust * contextual 
social trust 
0.972**** 
 
0.008      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.095*** 0.028 28.0 0.0281 27.2 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.011**** 0.003      
Social trust * GDP  0.998**** 0.0003      
        
Individual social trust 0.979*** 0.008 0.133*** 0.039 -0.8 0.0389 -0.8 
Gini inequality coef 0.085 1.967      
Social trust * Gini 1.761*** 0.195      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.122*** 0.036 7.6 0.0358 7.3 
Corruption perception  1.076* 0.040      
Social trust * corruption 0.985**** 0.004      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.119*** 0.035 9.8 0.0349 9.6 
Government 
effectiveness  
1.011* 
 
0.005      
Social trust * government 
effectiveness 
0.998**** 
 
0.001      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.102*** 0.030 22.7 0.0301 22.0 
Years democracy 1.007*** 0.002      
Social trust * years 
democracy 
0.999**** 
 
0.0002      
        
N1 46311       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.   
 
Lastly, concerning engagement in movement politics, all interaction terms are significant, except 
for GINI. The results depicted in Table 5.10 reveal that social trust stimulates participation in 
protest activities, and generally this effect is significantly stronger in societies that are less socially 
trustful, less affluent, more corrupt, have less effective governments, and a shorter democratic 
legacy. In for instance Bulgaria (ExpB=1.151; p=0.000) and Romania (ExpB=1.113; p=0.013) the 
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individual factors constant. Furthermore, the results indicate that this negative relationship is 
significantly weaker the more the societal context is characterized by social trust, high standards of 
living, equality, low levels of corruption, governmental effectiveness, and long-term democratic 
experience. Apparently, it seems that being actively involved in institutionalized politics makes one 
socially cynical and is detrimental for one’s interpersonal trust, and this effect is stronger in 
unprosperous and dishonest societies. The extent to which the inclusion of the variables and the 
interaction terms reduces the country-level heterogeneity differs, but generally it is rather small. 
 
Table 5.8 Multi-level logistic regression of voting in 15 mature and 12 post-communist countries  
  Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 variance 
parameter 
  intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE Estimate SE  Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to 
baseline 
model 
(%) 
Base model + 
compulsory dummy 
-- -- 0.234*** 0.068  -- 0.0664 -- 
Cross-level interactions:        
Individual social trust 1.043**** 0.008      
Contextual social trust 1.047 0.109 0.235*** 0.069 -1.5 0.0667 -0.5 
Social trust * contextual 
social trust 
1.036**** 0.008      
        
Individual social trust 1.039*** 0.008      
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.002 0.046 0.240*** 0.071  -2.6 0.0680 -2.4 
Social trust * GDP  1.001** 0.0004      
        
Individual social trust 1.037**** 0.007      
Gini inequality coeff 0.004** 2.367 0.195*** 0.058 16.7 0.0560 15.7 
Social trust * Gini 0.638*** 0.170      
        
Individual social trust 1.041**** 0.008      
Corruption perception  1.034 0.055 0.237*** 0.070 -1.3 0.0672 -1.2 
Social trust * corruption 1.013*** 0.004      
        
Individual social trust 1.038**** 0.008      
Government 
effectiveness  
1.003 0.007 0.242*** 0.071 
 
-3.4 0.0685 -3.2 
Social trust * government 
effectiveness 
1.001** 
 
0.001      
        
Individual social trust 1.038**** 0.008      
Years democracy 1.000 0.003 0.241*** 0.071 -3.0 0.0683 -2.9 
Social trust * years 
democracy 
1.001** 
 
0.0002      
        
N1 43709       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
  
 
Table 5.9 Multi-level logistic regression of party politics in 15 mature and 12 post-communist 
countries 
 
   Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 variance 
parameter 
  intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE Estimate SE  Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.132*** 0.038  -- 0.0386 -- 
Cross-level interactions:        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.110*** 0.033 16.7 0.0324 16.1 
Contextual social trust 1.218***  0.074      
Social trust * contextual 
social trust 
0.972**** 
 
0.008      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.095*** 0.028 28.0 0.0281 27.2 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.011**** 0.003      
Social trust * GDP  0.998**** 0.0003      
        
Individual social trust 0.979*** 0.008 0.133*** 0.039 -0.8 0.0389 -0.8 
Gini inequality coef 0.085 1.967      
Social trust * Gini 1.761*** 0.195      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.122*** 0.036 7.6 0.0358 7.3 
Corruption perception  1.076* 0.040      
Social trust * corruption 0.985**** 0.004      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.119*** 0.035 9.8 0.0349 9.6 
Government 
effectiveness  
1.011* 
 
0.005      
Social trust * government 
effectiveness 
0.998**** 
 
0.001      
        
Individual social trust 0.977*** 0.008 0.102*** 0.030 22.7 0.0301 22.0 
Years democracy 1.007*** 0.002      
Social trust * years 
democracy 
0.999**** 
 
0.0002      
        
N1 46311       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.   
 
Lastly, concerning engagement in movement politics, all interaction terms are significant, except 
for GINI. The results depicted in Table 5.10 reveal that social trust stimulates participation in 
protest activities, and generally this effect is significantly stronger in societies that are less socially 
trustful, less affluent, more corrupt, have less effective governments, and a shorter democratic 
legacy. In for instance Bulgaria (ExpB=1.151; p=0.000) and Romania (ExpB=1.113; p=0.013) the 
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direct effect of trust on protest participation is highly significant, in contrast to countries such as 
Denmark (ExpB=1.026; p=0.522) and the Netherlands (ExpB=1.092; p=0.047). 
 
Table 5.10 Multi-level logistic regression of movement politics in 15 mature and 12 post-
communist countries 
 
   Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 variance 
parameter 
  intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE Estimate SE  Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.682**** 0.197  -- 0.1717 -- 
Cross-level interactions:        
Individual social trust 1.049**** 0.007 0.365**** 0.104 46.5 0.0999 41.8 
Contextual social trust 1.898****  0.131      
Social trust * contextual 
social trust 
0.969**** 0.008      
        
Individual social trust 1.051**** 0.007 0.304**** 0.087 55.4 0.0846 50.7 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.030**** 0.005      
Social trust * GDP  0.999**** 0.0003      
        
Individual social trust 1.050**** 0.007 0.302*** 0.087 55.7 0.0841 51.0 
Corruption perception  1.425**** 0.061      
Social trust * corruption 0.986**** 0.004      
        
Individual social trust 1.050**** 0.007 0.336*** 0.097 50.7 0.0927 46.0 
Government 
effectiveness  
1.045**** 0.008      
Social trust * government 
effectiveness 
0.998**** 
 
0.001      
        
Individual social trust 1.050**** 0.007 0.341*** 0.098 50.0 0.0939 45.3 
Years democracy 1.021**** 0.004      
Social trust * years 
democracy 
0.999*** 0.0002      
        
N1 46227       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.   
 
5.6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this chapter I tried to explain why citizens in post-communist democracies engage less actively in 
politics. I did so by constructing a multi-level model that included individual level and country level 
variables. I assumed that low levels of political participation in the new democracies cannot be 
explained only by individual level factors. Even after two decades since the collapse of 
 
Communism, the new democracies differ substantively from the older democracies in several 
economic, political and cultural respects. Hence, the contextual explanatory levels must be 
considered. The empirical results of the multi-level models can be summarized in four points.   
The first obvious conclusion is that the analyses reveal compositional effects on the levels of 
participation. This means that the observed country differences in political activeness can be partly 
explained by different distributions of individual characteristics between countries. I found that 
almost all individual factors I included in this study have a significant effect on voting. Among 
them, the positive effect of political interest and social embeddedness are the most considerable. 
The tested individual-level variables also determine whether a citizen would embark on party 
politics activities, yet, quite surprisingly, perceived financial situation (the indicator of SES) proves 
to be less relevant. The latter variable is also insignificant for movement politics, while all other 
individual-level factors are predictors. So we can conclude that people mobilize for protest activities 
regardless from their financial resources. Protest politics is embarked on by both rich and poor 
people. It is worth noting that women and younger citizens protest more often and that protesters 
are less politically trustful.  
Second, I found that social trust is generally linked positively to voting and participation in 
movement politics, even when controlling for other factors. This finding thus confirms previous 
studies that suggest that social trust has a positive effect on collective actions, such as protesting. 
However, the effect appears to be modest compared to other factors at the individual level (in line 
with, for instance, Bäck, 2011; Van Deth, 2001; Nannestad, 2008; Roller and Rudi, 2008). To 
compare, the influence of social embeddedness (another component of social capital) on the 
willingness to engage in politics seems to be much stronger.  
Third, macro characteristics have an influence over and above the effect of the individual 
level variables. Hence, the hypothesized country-level variables (such as corruption levels, 
government effectiveness, economic prosperity) to explain political participation are important. My 
key variable of interest, contextual social trust, had a positive impact on being active in movement 
and party politics. More generally, my findings indicate that the cultural and institutional contextual 
aspects were less relevant for predicting voting and institutionalized participation, but it in 
particular did promote participation in non-institutionalized activities outside the formal political 
sphere.  
Yet, except inequality, none of the various contextual indicators play an important role in 
explaining cross-national differences in voting in Europe. Thus, it gives and extra argument that it is 
important to distinguish voting from other types of participation. Voting is a special case: for this 
form of political participation, only societal equality matters. I also controlled for compulsory 
voting, which reduced the country-level variance. It could very well be that voting is influenced by 
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direct effect of trust on protest participation is highly significant, in contrast to countries such as 
Denmark (ExpB=1.026; p=0.522) and the Netherlands (ExpB=1.092; p=0.047). 
 
Table 5.10 Multi-level logistic regression of movement politics in 15 mature and 12 post-
communist countries 
 
   Country-level residual variation 
 Effect of 
country 
variable 
 variance 
parameter 
  intra-class 
correlation 
 
 Odds ratio  SE Estimate SE  Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Estimate Relative 
difference 
to baseline 
model (%) 
Base model -- -- 0.682**** 0.197  -- 0.1717 -- 
Cross-level interactions:        
Individual social trust 1.049**** 0.007 0.365**** 0.104 46.5 0.0999 41.8 
Contextual social trust 1.898****  0.131      
Social trust * contextual 
social trust 
0.969**** 0.008      
        
Individual social trust 1.051**** 0.007 0.304**** 0.087 55.4 0.0846 50.7 
GDP per capita (:1000) 1.030**** 0.005      
Social trust * GDP  0.999**** 0.0003      
        
Individual social trust 1.050**** 0.007 0.302*** 0.087 55.7 0.0841 51.0 
Corruption perception  1.425**** 0.061      
Social trust * corruption 0.986**** 0.004      
        
Individual social trust 1.050**** 0.007 0.336*** 0.097 50.7 0.0927 46.0 
Government 
effectiveness  
1.045**** 0.008      
Social trust * government 
effectiveness 
0.998**** 
 
0.001      
        
Individual social trust 1.050**** 0.007 0.341*** 0.098 50.0 0.0939 45.3 
Years democracy 1.021**** 0.004      
Social trust * years 
democracy 
0.999*** 0.0002      
        
N1 46227       
N2 27       
Source: ESS 2008. 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. 
Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also 
contains all individual-level predictors (see Table 5.4). The estimates of the effects of these variables are omitted from 
this table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.   
 
5.6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this chapter I tried to explain why citizens in post-communist democracies engage less actively in 
politics. I did so by constructing a multi-level model that included individual level and country level 
variables. I assumed that low levels of political participation in the new democracies cannot be 
explained only by individual level factors. Even after two decades since the collapse of 
 
Communism, the new democracies differ substantively from the older democracies in several 
economic, political and cultural respects. Hence, the contextual explanatory levels must be 
considered. The empirical results of the multi-level models can be summarized in four points.   
The first obvious conclusion is that the analyses reveal compositional effects on the levels of 
participation. This means that the observed country differences in political activeness can be partly 
explained by different distributions of individual characteristics between countries. I found that 
almost all individual factors I included in this study have a significant effect on voting. Among 
them, the positive effect of political interest and social embeddedness are the most considerable. 
The tested individual-level variables also determine whether a citizen would embark on party 
politics activities, yet, quite surprisingly, perceived financial situation (the indicator of SES) proves 
to be less relevant. The latter variable is also insignificant for movement politics, while all other 
individual-level factors are predictors. So we can conclude that people mobilize for protest activities 
regardless from their financial resources. Protest politics is embarked on by both rich and poor 
people. It is worth noting that women and younger citizens protest more often and that protesters 
are less politically trustful.  
Second, I found that social trust is generally linked positively to voting and participation in 
movement politics, even when controlling for other factors. This finding thus confirms previous 
studies that suggest that social trust has a positive effect on collective actions, such as protesting. 
However, the effect appears to be modest compared to other factors at the individual level (in line 
with, for instance, Bäck, 2011; Van Deth, 2001; Nannestad, 2008; Roller and Rudi, 2008). To 
compare, the influence of social embeddedness (another component of social capital) on the 
willingness to engage in politics seems to be much stronger.  
Third, macro characteristics have an influence over and above the effect of the individual 
level variables. Hence, the hypothesized country-level variables (such as corruption levels, 
government effectiveness, economic prosperity) to explain political participation are important. My 
key variable of interest, contextual social trust, had a positive impact on being active in movement 
and party politics. More generally, my findings indicate that the cultural and institutional contextual 
aspects were less relevant for predicting voting and institutionalized participation, but it in 
particular did promote participation in non-institutionalized activities outside the formal political 
sphere.  
Yet, except inequality, none of the various contextual indicators play an important role in 
explaining cross-national differences in voting in Europe. Thus, it gives and extra argument that it is 
important to distinguish voting from other types of participation. Voting is a special case: for this 
form of political participation, only societal equality matters. I also controlled for compulsory 
voting, which reduced the country-level variance. It could very well be that voting is influenced by 
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other institutional factors I did not included, such as the type of electoral system (majoritarian or 
proportional), and, accordingly, the type of democracy (“Westminster” or consensus), in line with 
other studies, for instance, Roller and Rudi (2008). However, the distribution of different electoral 
systems does not seem to differ between Eastern and Western democracies.   
This apart, this research confirmed most of the “contextual” hypotheses: low income levels, 
lack of efficient government, high levels of corruption, few years of democracy and low contextual 
social trust have a strong negative effect on political participation levels. These findings are in line 
with previous research, of for instance Hooghe and Quintelier (2014).  
Fourth, I have also examined the interplay between social trust, forms of political 
participation, and the context, understood as cultural, socio-economic, and institutional societal 
aspects. The most remarkable finding concerned the interaction between the contextual 
circumstances and social trust in shaping political participation. The results showed that the effect 
of social trust on participation is moderated by the context. For instance, the interplay between 
individual and contextual social trust has a significant effect on voting, party politics activities and 
protesting. Moreover, the socio-economic and political-institutional aspects also proved to be 
relevant: they also shape the effect of social trust on the propensity to be politically active. 
However, the specific effect depends on both the forms of participation and the societal 
characteristic under consideration. The results show that there are differences in the direct effect of 
social trust, dependent on societal characteristics. The impact of social trust on participation 
depends on the context in which the political activities take place. Put simply, in more trustful, 
prosperous and advanced societies, social trust has a stronger positive effect on voting. Involvement 
in institutionalized politics is negatively related with social trust, and this association is stronger in 
unprosperous and dishonest societies. Finally, social trust stimulates protest participation, and this 
effect is stronger in societies that are less socially trustful, less affluent, more corrupt, have less 
effective governments, and a shorter democratic legacy. Taking this particular context of the study 
into account, in post-communist societies the merit of social trust on protest participation is more 
pronounced: in these countries the possession of social trust motivates citizens to involve in 
movement activities more vigorously compared to people from Western democracies who also 
possess the same amount of social trust.  
To conclude: the societal context matters. In this way, this study helps to shed new light on 
the often-debated question: why participation levels remain so low in post-communist democracies? 
The results of the analysis suggest that the historical legacy of having a communist regime is 
insufficient, but still important to explain these low levels. However, the specific effect of post-
communism is difficult to pin down, because many important variables (like corruption and social 
trust) correlate so strongly with each other. Therefore, one cannot easily single out only one 
 
contextual effect. Obviously, post-communism comprises a whole set of interrelated dimensions 
and it is difficult to disentangle all the context level variables. Consequently, it is difficult to 
unreservedly answer the question which factors are responsible for disenchantment from politics: 
did people return to the communist-era habits and political apathy, or does this process more 
accurately reflect the economic and political developments (or disillusions) of post-communism. 
The latter refers for instance to the fact that the effort of participation has not been rewarded by 
better living conditions. There is obviously more to say about this, but I will return to this issue in 
the final chapter. 
At this point, I will only point out that the main limitation of the ESS 2008 data used in this 
chapter is that it unfortunately does not contain accurate measurements of both internal and external 
political efficacy. In the next chapter, this issue will be addressed. I will focus on Lithuania. One of 
the reasons to do so is that I have a very good dataset at my disposal.  
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other institutional factors I did not included, such as the type of electoral system (majoritarian or 
proportional), and, accordingly, the type of democracy (“Westminster” or consensus), in line with 
other studies, for instance, Roller and Rudi (2008). However, the distribution of different electoral 
systems does not seem to differ between Eastern and Western democracies.   
This apart, this research confirmed most of the “contextual” hypotheses: low income levels, 
lack of efficient government, high levels of corruption, few years of democracy and low contextual 
social trust have a strong negative effect on political participation levels. These findings are in line 
with previous research, of for instance Hooghe and Quintelier (2014).  
Fourth, I have also examined the interplay between social trust, forms of political 
participation, and the context, understood as cultural, socio-economic, and institutional societal 
aspects. The most remarkable finding concerned the interaction between the contextual 
circumstances and social trust in shaping political participation. The results showed that the effect 
of social trust on participation is moderated by the context. For instance, the interplay between 
individual and contextual social trust has a significant effect on voting, party politics activities and 
protesting. Moreover, the socio-economic and political-institutional aspects also proved to be 
relevant: they also shape the effect of social trust on the propensity to be politically active. 
However, the specific effect depends on both the forms of participation and the societal 
characteristic under consideration. The results show that there are differences in the direct effect of 
social trust, dependent on societal characteristics. The impact of social trust on participation 
depends on the context in which the political activities take place. Put simply, in more trustful, 
prosperous and advanced societies, social trust has a stronger positive effect on voting. Involvement 
in institutionalized politics is negatively related with social trust, and this association is stronger in 
unprosperous and dishonest societies. Finally, social trust stimulates protest participation, and this 
effect is stronger in societies that are less socially trustful, less affluent, more corrupt, have less 
effective governments, and a shorter democratic legacy. Taking this particular context of the study 
into account, in post-communist societies the merit of social trust on protest participation is more 
pronounced: in these countries the possession of social trust motivates citizens to involve in 
movement activities more vigorously compared to people from Western democracies who also 
possess the same amount of social trust.  
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The lack of civic and political engagement in post-communist countries is perceived as one of the 
most challenging aspects of democratic consolidation in this region. As Howard (2003) noticed, 
despite the collapse of communism more than two decades ago, citizens in Eastern European 
countries are still less likely to engage actively in civil society practices than people from other 
post-authoritarian countries, and especially, mature Western democracies. Scholars often recoil on 
the cultural approach to explain the alarmingly low levels of participation in post-communist 
societies. The cultural-based argument derives from reflections on the communist past and the 
inherited attitudes and behavioural patterns.  
A possible explanation, many authors argue, is the observation that post-communist 
societies are less trusting than others (Bjørnskov, 2007; Bădescu and Uslaner, 2003; Kornai, 
Rothstein and Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Lovell, 2001; Markova, 2004; Mishler and Rose, 1997; 
Sztompka, 1999). However, the relationship between social trust and political participation in the 
post-communist context is yet empirically underresearched (except for a few notable exceptions, for 
instance, Letki, 2003; Uslaner, 2004; Armingeon, 2007; Sedláčková and Šafr, 2009; in Lithuania: 
Imbrasaitė, 2004; 2008; Žiliukaitė, 2005a; 2005b; Bartuškaitė and Žilys, 2011). Empirical work has 
been handicapped by a lack of detailed nation-wide data for the former communist countries. This 
chapter aims to fill this void, not only by focusing on the direct effect of social trust on 
participation, but also the mediating variables. I fortunately could use the Lithuanian national post-
election 2012 survey, which offers a rare opportunity to examine the relationship between social 
trust and participation in depth: the national database provides extensive information on political 
activities, attitudes and different aspects of trust. Moreover, my curiosity is also stimulated by the 
fact that Lithuania serves as an exemplar case of a post-communist society, typically characterized 
by low levels of political participation and social trust (Žiliukaitė, 2005a; 2005b; Ramonaitė, 2006b; 
2007; Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2006; Riekašius, 2003; Imbrasaitė, 2004; 2008; Matonytė, 2004; 
Gaidys et al., 2013). 
Social capital theories claim that social generalized trust induces political participation, both 
in conventional and unconventional politics (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Norris, 2002b; Uslaner, 2004). 
While the benefits of social trust in fostering political engagement in mature Western democracies 
have been thoroughly debated, some authors claim that the legacy of political participation is 
considerably different in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, Letki (2003) has identified only 
a weak impact of social trust on citizens’ political participation, and Letki and Evans (2005: 525) 
argued that it is necessary “to go beyond the assumptions put forward in models developed in 
Western liberal democratic contexts.” The contrasting patterns of participation between “East and 
 
West” are also acknowledged by several other authors (Barnes and Simon, 1998; Rueschemeyer, 
Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock, 1998; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Armingeon, 2007; Hooghe and 
Marien, 2013). 
The findings of previous research beg the question how far the assumptions of the Western 
model about social trust and participation can be extended to the distrustful post-communist region, 
and particularly to Lithuania. Do social trusters in Lithuania participate in politics more actively 
than others? And if so, which forms of political participation are more linked to social trust?  
As argued in chapter 2, in addition to social trust, external and internal political efficacy 
plays a crucial role to determine the paths of participation (Lane, 1959; Campbell, Gurin, and 
Miller, 1954; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). High levels of efficacy among citizens are 
usually viewed as desirable for active participation and the stability of democracy, because “in the 
modern democratic society, citizens should feel that they have some power to influence the actions 
of their government” (Wright, 1981: 69). However, to our best knowledge, there is no available 
research illuminating the path between social trust, political efficacy and political participation, 
except for a few hints in the literature (for instance, Van der Meer and Van Ingen (2009) study how 
associational membership affects political participation via one dimension of political efficacy, 
namely, civic skills). An even bigger lacuna in this regard is observed in the post-communist 
context and this is caused by the data limitations in both country-sets. 
Fortunately, I had a good opportunity to contribute myself to the Lithuanian post-election 
survey 2012 and make use of the accurate measurements of internal and external efficacy. This 
allowed me not only to operationalize all relevant variables, but also to accurately analyze the 
connections between them.Therefore, using the Lithuanian dataset, I am able to scrutinize whether 
social trust translates into efficacy (external, or internal, or both), or, to the contrary, efficacy does 
not mediate between social trust and political participation, but exerts a direct (independent) effect 
on participation.  
Specifically, addressing the Lithuanian context, I examine the following research questions: 
1. How strong is the direct effect of social trust on political participation? 
2. To what extent is the effect of social trust on participation mediated by political efficacy?  
 
In a broader light, this research can be defined as a theory testing case that aims at 
contributing to the academic discussion on political participation and its determinants with a special 
focus on the post-communist context. The chapter is organized as follows. I will briefly discuss 
more on the case of Lithuania in the next section. The third section provides the conceptualization 
of the variables used and briefly reviews the literature on the determinants of political participation. 
It also theorizes the role of social trust in regard to political activity and outlines the hypotheses. 
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Next, I will describe the data and research methods. The subsequent section presents the results. I 
will conclude with the interpretation of the results and reflections on the role of social trust and 
efficacy as predictors of political participation in Lithuania. 
 
6.2 Description of the context: Lithuania as an exemplar case of post-communist society  
 
Before the fall of Communism Lithuania has experienced only very few democratic rules, 
procedures or political freedoms. The democracy of the young state of Lithuania, which was 
established in 1918 after the First World War, was already thwarted in 1926 by a coup d’état by the 
anti-democratic and nationalistic political powers. Later, in 1939, the country was occupied by the 
Soviet Union, and lost any claims to political independency. Among the Soviet Union countries, 
Lithuania was clearly one of the leaders in terms of economic and industrial development, semi-
peripheral as most of the Central East European countries, rather homogeneous (compared to other 
Soviet states) and much more nationalistic than its counterparts (Norkus, 2008). Thus, it is not at all 
surprising that the opposition leaders of Lithuania were the first to proclaim and re-establish 
independency in the Soviet Union: they did so on 11 March, 1990, and this was followed by a so- 
called “domino effect”: thereafter other countries also stood up for their political freedom 
(Beissinger, 2002).  
As a “dangerous nationalistic case” within the Soviet Union, Lithuanians were under close 
political scrutiny, which gravely suppressed the freedoms of speech and associations in Lithuania. 
The Soviets executed massive deportations of Lithuanians to Siberia, drastically fought against the 
partisans, creating an atmosphere of fear and distrust among people. In the aftermath of the 
communist regime, the society was heavily divided between supporters, conformists and opponents 
of the regime, suspicious and generally inactive: most of the people did not actively participate in 
any formalistic political activities, but rather chose for more cultural, leisure-related and 
ethnographic assembles (Kavaliauskaitė and Ramonaitė, 2011).    
A society under transition, as Vihalemn, Lauristin and Tallo (1997) suggest, undergoes three 
stages of the development of political culture, and Lithuania is an acute example of that. The first 
stage (which occurred around 1988-1990) is mythological, related to the very high expectations 
about democracy, romanticizing the pre-communist past, and idealizing the future. Indeed, during 
the collapse of the communist regime, people in Lithuania massively gathered to the streets and 
squares, bravely fighting for their freedom. It was a precious emotional moment, as the people were 
the witnesses of the fall of totalitarianism, and their sense of political empowerment and efficacy 
grew rapidly (cf. Imbrasaitė, 2012). As a result, the first free parliamentary elections in Lithuania 
 
were attended by 71.7 % of the citizens, who chose for the anti-Soviet opposition (Ramonaitė, 
2006b).    
The second stage is ideological, stemming from establishment (and re-establishment) of 
political parties. This stage creates most of the tensions and the divisions within society as citizens 
start to politically identify themselves. Two major political powers dominated the scene during the 
early years of transition in Lithuania: the anti-Communist independence movement “Sąjūdis” and 
the ex-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP). Political interest of the common 
people reached its peak, as the future trajectory of the country was to be decided. In the aftermath, 
Lithuanians witnessed two of its highest electoral turnouts: 75.2 % in the parliament elections in 
1992 and 78.6 % in the presidential elections in 1993 (Ramonaitė, 2006b). Such a high turnout 
never occurred in independent Lithuania’s history ever again. 
The ideological stage continued until after the 1993 elections. However, shortly after the 
initial years of the transition, the enthusiasm about democracy evaporated. The disappointment in 
reforms and the governmental ineffectiveness (“lack of political content”) resulted in a dramatic 
decrease of political participation, be it voting or protesting, and brought about the disconcerting 
developments of a weakening civil society. For instance, compared to the latest parliament elections 
in 2012, the turnout decreased by 22 percentage points since 1992 (highest activity), and by around 
25 percentage points for presidential elections.  
Table 6.1 maps Lithuania among other post-communist countries. First, the European 
Election Survey data show that participation levels of post-communist citizens in parliamentary 
elections range from 47 to 67 %. As I mentioned, in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 2012 
the turnout reached the meagre 53 per cent, meaning that only around half of the citizens expressed 
their will by going to the polls, whereas in mature European democracies the average turnout 
generally reached 73 percent.49 Furthermore, Table 6.1 makes clear that protesting has not replaced 
traditional forms of participation in former communist countries. Lithuania is not an exception in 
this regard: only a relatively insignificant part (8 per cent) of the respondents reported to have 
attended a lawful demonstration in the past. At the same time, 39 per cent of the Lithuanians, and 
even more than half of the respondents in some other post-communist countries, admitted that they 
would never participate in such activity. Finally, the low levels of participation are accompanied by 
low levels of social trust. According to the European Value Survey 2008 data, 30% of the 
respondents in Lithuania and around one fifth of the respondents (ranging from 13 to 33%) in other 
post-communist societies agreed with the statement that most people could be trusted. By contrast, 
                                                 
49 The European Elections Survey data show that the turnout at national parliamentary elections in mature European 
Union democracies varies from 59 to 87%, excluding countries with compulsory voting. See European Elections 
database, 2014. National parliamentary elections [data], retrieved April 27/2014 from 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/. 
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generalized social trust in mature democracies varies between 31 % in Luxemburg and Italy to as 
high as 76 % in Denmark.   
 
Table 6.1 Levels of political participation and social trust in 10 post-communist countries 
 Participation in the 
last national 
parliament 
elections, turnout 
%, EED 
Attended lawful 
demonstrations, % 
of the respondents, 
EVS  
Would never 
participate in a 
demonstrations, % 
of the respondents, 
EVS  
Social trust 
(% of the 
respondents 
agreeing that most 
people could be 
trusted), EVS  
Bulgaria 61 8 57 18 
Czech Republic 63 12 48 30 
Estonia 64 6 59 33 
Hungary 61 4 75 21 
Latvia 59 17 40 26 
Lithuania 53 8 39 30 
Poland 49 9 47 28 
Romania 47 8  68 18 
Slovakia 59 5 68 13 
Slovenia 67 13 37 24 
Sources: European Election database (the latest data as of 23rd of April, 2014); European Values Survey 2008. 
 
Following Vihalemn, Lauristin and Tallo (1997), Lithuania, like other post-communist countries, is 
currently entering the critical-rational stage. On the one hand, the political system becomes more 
plural, participation more diversified, civil society more critical, and the elements of democratic 
political culture are entrenched. On the other hand, Lithuanians still feel detached from politics, 
lacking sense of efficacy, social and political trust. Different approaches are proposed to explain the 
absenteeism from political participation in Lithuania, both from institutional and cultural 
perspectives. It might very well be that the low level of participation, especially in elections, is 
caused by the weakness of political parties (lack of their accountability and failed promises), the 
huge corruption scandals that ruined political and interpersonal trust (for instance, the dramatic 
impeachment process against the president Rolandas Paksas), turbulent socio-economic 
developments and large-scale emigration from the country.50 However, although these factors 
undoubtedly account for the low levels of political activities, they are not sufficient to fully explain 
why people choose to participate (or not) in politics (Ramonaitė, 2006b: 94-99).    
To sum up, Lithuania is not a distinct case in the post-communist context. As the empirical 
evidence shows, the country is yet interlocked in the early stage of the critical-rational phase of 
political culture. Very similar trends are observed in other post-communist societies: the enthusiasm 
for the political events and mass participation was followed by the disappointment and passivity. In 
most of the countries of the post-communist region, the turnout declined (on average about 25 
                                                 
50 The department of statistics of Lithuania estimates that at present around 337 000 Lithuanians live abroad, which is 
about 10% of the Lithuanians. Only around 13 000 of emigrants voted in the elections of 2012.  
 
percentage points) or remained fluctuating (Kostelka, 2014; Ramonaitė, 2006b). The low levels of 
political participation hit bottom and calls into question: how to explain this lack of political 
engagement, not only by focusing on individual resources, but also by the social-psychological 
factor of social trust, that stem from the complex and even agonizing historical experiences of 
Lithuania. Before continuing with the empirical analysis, I will briefly recollect the main theoretical 
aspects that were already discussed in other chapters.    
 
6.3 Theoretical background 
 
6.3.1 Party and movement politics as dependent variables 
 
In democracies citizens have a wide range of instruments that they can use to influence political 
decision making. The literature suggests different ways to define types of political participation, 
including the most commonly used concepts of conventional vs. unconventional activity, electoral 
vs. non-electoral, institutional vs. non-institutional participation, individual vs. collective actions 
(Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). This chapter, 
following the reasoning of chapter 2, employs the conceptual labelling proposed by Klandermans 
(2013), who distinguishes between participation in party and movement politics. Participation in 
party politics refers to more institutional forms of political actions, such as voting, party 
membership, campaigning, contacting politicians via letters and directly, and doing voluntary work 
for a political party. However, I treat voting and other party politics actions as separate categories, 
due to the different nature of these participatory means: voting is the most regular and simplest form 
of participation, while other forms, above voting, are more intensive and require more initiatives 
from the citizens (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Participation in movement politics 
encompasses a range of less formalized forms of political actions, like signing petitions, 
demonstrating, striking, joining civic and political initiatives, boycotting and “buycotts” – and other 
ways citizens try to make their voice heard. Although traditional theories emphasize the vital role of 
participation in party-based politics in nurturing democracies, numerous scholars argue that 
movement politics is also important for a democratic political system (see, for instance, 
Klandermans and Van Stralen, 2015; Norris, 2002a; Rosanvallon, 2008). First, movement politics is 
less dependent on the established rhythm of electoral cycles, thus it helps to permanently express 
citizens’ preferences, dissatisfaction with policies and convey these messages to politicians. Second, 
the diverse forms of participation, including movement politics, strengthen political accountability 
and in return contribute to institutional effectiveness. Finally, movement politics as a mean to 
influence government is believed to be more efficacious to disadvantaged people compared to party 
politics participation (Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Smith, 2009). All in all, democratic experiences 
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Following Vihalemn, Lauristin and Tallo (1997), Lithuania, like other post-communist countries, is 
currently entering the critical-rational stage. On the one hand, the political system becomes more 
plural, participation more diversified, civil society more critical, and the elements of democratic 
political culture are entrenched. On the other hand, Lithuanians still feel detached from politics, 
lacking sense of efficacy, social and political trust. Different approaches are proposed to explain the 
absenteeism from political participation in Lithuania, both from institutional and cultural 
perspectives. It might very well be that the low level of participation, especially in elections, is 
caused by the weakness of political parties (lack of their accountability and failed promises), the 
huge corruption scandals that ruined political and interpersonal trust (for instance, the dramatic 
impeachment process against the president Rolandas Paksas), turbulent socio-economic 
developments and large-scale emigration from the country.50 However, although these factors 
undoubtedly account for the low levels of political activities, they are not sufficient to fully explain 
why people choose to participate (or not) in politics (Ramonaitė, 2006b: 94-99).    
To sum up, Lithuania is not a distinct case in the post-communist context. As the empirical 
evidence shows, the country is yet interlocked in the early stage of the critical-rational phase of 
political culture. Very similar trends are observed in other post-communist societies: the enthusiasm 
for the political events and mass participation was followed by the disappointment and passivity. In 
most of the countries of the post-communist region, the turnout declined (on average about 25 
                                                 
50 The department of statistics of Lithuania estimates that at present around 337 000 Lithuanians live abroad, which is 
about 10% of the Lithuanians. Only around 13 000 of emigrants voted in the elections of 2012.  
 
percentage points) or remained fluctuating (Kostelka, 2014; Ramonaitė, 2006b). The low levels of 
political participation hit bottom and calls into question: how to explain this lack of political 
engagement, not only by focusing on individual resources, but also by the social-psychological 
factor of social trust, that stem from the complex and even agonizing historical experiences of 
Lithuania. Before continuing with the empirical analysis, I will briefly recollect the main theoretical 
aspects that were already discussed in other chapters.    
 
6.3 Theoretical background 
 
6.3.1 Party and movement politics as dependent variables 
 
In democracies citizens have a wide range of instruments that they can use to influence political 
decision making. The literature suggests different ways to define types of political participation, 
including the most commonly used concepts of conventional vs. unconventional activity, electoral 
vs. non-electoral, institutional vs. non-institutional participation, individual vs. collective actions 
(Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). This chapter, 
following the reasoning of chapter 2, employs the conceptual labelling proposed by Klandermans 
(2013), who distinguishes between participation in party and movement politics. Participation in 
party politics refers to more institutional forms of political actions, such as voting, party 
membership, campaigning, contacting politicians via letters and directly, and doing voluntary work 
for a political party. However, I treat voting and other party politics actions as separate categories, 
due to the different nature of these participatory means: voting is the most regular and simplest form 
of participation, while other forms, above voting, are more intensive and require more initiatives 
from the citizens (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Participation in movement politics 
encompasses a range of less formalized forms of political actions, like signing petitions, 
demonstrating, striking, joining civic and political initiatives, boycotting and “buycotts” – and other 
ways citizens try to make their voice heard. Although traditional theories emphasize the vital role of 
participation in party-based politics in nurturing democracies, numerous scholars argue that 
movement politics is also important for a democratic political system (see, for instance, 
Klandermans and Van Stralen, 2015; Norris, 2002a; Rosanvallon, 2008). First, movement politics is 
less dependent on the established rhythm of electoral cycles, thus it helps to permanently express 
citizens’ preferences, dissatisfaction with policies and convey these messages to politicians. Second, 
the diverse forms of participation, including movement politics, strengthen political accountability 
and in return contribute to institutional effectiveness. Finally, movement politics as a mean to 
influence government is believed to be more efficacious to disadvantaged people compared to party 
politics participation (Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Smith, 2009). All in all, democratic experiences 
Political participation in Lithuania |   151
Chapter
6
 
demonstrate that movement politics serves as an additional political leverage of citizens that 
(despite some exceptions) has positive effects on the quality of democracy.  
Given this, the relevance of party and especially movement politics to the young post-
communist democracies cannot be overrated. I purposely emphasize the role of movement politics 
as a certain substitute to party politics as it reflects the trends of post-materialist and democratic 
values (Inglehart, 1997). As Dalton (1996) notices, post-materialists in fact demonstrate strong 
levels of support for democratic processes. Thus, movement politics implies the emerging initiatives 
from below – and, more importantly, on behalf of civil society. In this respect, taking different 
forms of political participation into account, many authors are specifically concerned with the 
revival or, in some cases, the emergence of civil society in post-communist countries. Although 
civil society has been acclaimed for its role in abolishing communism, authors observe the decline 
of civic/political engagement in post-communist countries, first, in comparison with the late 90’s, 
and second, in comparison to mature democracies (Howard, 2003; Barnes, 2006; Rueschemeyer, 
Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock, 1998). The literature on post-communism eagerly tries to find out 
why people, who managed to achieve the common goal of overthrowing the communist regime, 
became politically apathetic and absent from civic and political participation. Given this, the 
debates call into question why post-communist citizens participate or not in which type of political 
actions. In the following section I will discuss a series of suggested predictors. 
 
6.3.2 Predictors of participation: political efficacy and social trust 
 
As Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995: 22) observe in Voice and Equality, actors do not participate 
solely out of material benefits, but also because of other reasons, for instance, satisfying a sense of 
civic duty, the desire to influence policy, enjoying the other people involved. The findings of their 
study of American political involvement suggest that participation, besides demographic 
characteristics, is also determined by a sense of perceived political efficacy and social trust in 
fellow citizens. I will briefly elaborate on each of these two variables below.  
First, Verba and colleagues (1995) conclude that social connections lead to more 
participation. On the one hand, it could mean that social networks foster participation, as is argued 
by Krishna (2002b), Teorell (2003), Howard and Gilbert (2008), Maloney and Van Deth (2010). On 
the other hand, the odds that someone is politically active might be increased by generalized social 
trust, as several authors have noticed (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Bădescu, Sum, and Uslaner, 2004).  
By social trust I mean a non-exclusive type of trust in people you are not necessarily 
familiar with (or who are not similar to you). It expresses a broad perception of the individual’s 
“moral community” and conceptually stands against particularized trust, which is invested only in a 
 
certain group, such as one’s family, a religious or ethnic community, or people “that are like me” 
(Uslaner, 2002: 26; Newton and Zmerli, 2011). Thus having this in mind, it is not at all surprising 
that in the literature the notions of social trust and generalized trust are seldom used as synonyms, 
as I also do in my dissertation.  
Social trust is theorized as being conducive to democracy, because it promotes tolerance, 
makes cooperation possible, because it reduces a free-rider problem by maintaining a belief in the 
goodwill of others, and endows people with a sense of control and general optimism that most 
people can succeed in life (Leicht, 2002; Stolle, 2002; Seligman, 1997; Uslaner, 1999; 2002). All in 
all, there are therefore good reasons to believe that social trust promotes democratic and 
participatory attitudes. Following the idea, some authors propose that social trust makes 
participation less risky and more worthwhile, as we feel moral obligation and social responsibility 
to get involved in political affairs (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Uslaner, 2002). Social trust is an impetus of 
generalized morality and good willingness. While socially trusting, we also care about others and 
believe that others care about us. Mutual reciprocity gives a stimulus to also be politically active (to 
stand up for the issues of our community). Accordingly, as already explained in chapter 4, I 
formulate the following two hypotheses: social trust has a positive direct effect on participation in 
voting (H1a), party politics (H1b) and movement politics (H1c). 
From a sociological perspective, being embedded in social networks and social trust are 
treated as two facets of social capital. Additionally to social trust, I will also include formal social 
embeddedness as a control variable in our explanatory framework. By this term I mean involvement 
in voluntary civil society organizations, but not in private networks, like friends or family 
(Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Active involvement in formal social 
networks is proposed as a predictor of political participation in the sense that those who are 
involved in non-political associations are more likely to participate in politics (Barnes, 2006). This 
holds both for conventional and unconventional political participation as involvement in social 
networks provide the resources necessary for collective actions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Paxton, 
2002; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). However, I would like to 
emphasize that I do not focus on social networks (as one of the facets of social capital) as a 
mediating variable, as I am more interested in attitudinal dispositions of individuals, and 
particularly, in social trust. Associational membership is not an attitudinal variable. Moreover, the 
relationship between membership and social trust is not evident, since certain memberships 
comprise so-called unsocial capital (for instance, Levi, 1996; in post-communist societies: Letki, 
2003; Imbrasaitė, 2004; Beresnevičiūtė, 2006). 
Second, Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s Voice and Equality (1995) points out that 
participation is not only determined by one’s socioeconomic status and social characteristics, but 
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demonstrate that movement politics serves as an additional political leverage of citizens that 
(despite some exceptions) has positive effects on the quality of democracy.  
Given this, the relevance of party and especially movement politics to the young post-
communist democracies cannot be overrated. I purposely emphasize the role of movement politics 
as a certain substitute to party politics as it reflects the trends of post-materialist and democratic 
values (Inglehart, 1997). As Dalton (1996) notices, post-materialists in fact demonstrate strong 
levels of support for democratic processes. Thus, movement politics implies the emerging initiatives 
from below – and, more importantly, on behalf of civil society. In this respect, taking different 
forms of political participation into account, many authors are specifically concerned with the 
revival or, in some cases, the emergence of civil society in post-communist countries. Although 
civil society has been acclaimed for its role in abolishing communism, authors observe the decline 
of civic/political engagement in post-communist countries, first, in comparison with the late 90’s, 
and second, in comparison to mature democracies (Howard, 2003; Barnes, 2006; Rueschemeyer, 
Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock, 1998). The literature on post-communism eagerly tries to find out 
why people, who managed to achieve the common goal of overthrowing the communist regime, 
became politically apathetic and absent from civic and political participation. Given this, the 
debates call into question why post-communist citizens participate or not in which type of political 
actions. In the following section I will discuss a series of suggested predictors. 
 
6.3.2 Predictors of participation: political efficacy and social trust 
 
As Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995: 22) observe in Voice and Equality, actors do not participate 
solely out of material benefits, but also because of other reasons, for instance, satisfying a sense of 
civic duty, the desire to influence policy, enjoying the other people involved. The findings of their 
study of American political involvement suggest that participation, besides demographic 
characteristics, is also determined by a sense of perceived political efficacy and social trust in 
fellow citizens. I will briefly elaborate on each of these two variables below.  
First, Verba and colleagues (1995) conclude that social connections lead to more 
participation. On the one hand, it could mean that social networks foster participation, as is argued 
by Krishna (2002b), Teorell (2003), Howard and Gilbert (2008), Maloney and Van Deth (2010). On 
the other hand, the odds that someone is politically active might be increased by generalized social 
trust, as several authors have noticed (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Bădescu, Sum, and Uslaner, 2004).  
By social trust I mean a non-exclusive type of trust in people you are not necessarily 
familiar with (or who are not similar to you). It expresses a broad perception of the individual’s 
“moral community” and conceptually stands against particularized trust, which is invested only in a 
 
certain group, such as one’s family, a religious or ethnic community, or people “that are like me” 
(Uslaner, 2002: 26; Newton and Zmerli, 2011). Thus having this in mind, it is not at all surprising 
that in the literature the notions of social trust and generalized trust are seldom used as synonyms, 
as I also do in my dissertation.  
Social trust is theorized as being conducive to democracy, because it promotes tolerance, 
makes cooperation possible, because it reduces a free-rider problem by maintaining a belief in the 
goodwill of others, and endows people with a sense of control and general optimism that most 
people can succeed in life (Leicht, 2002; Stolle, 2002; Seligman, 1997; Uslaner, 1999; 2002). All in 
all, there are therefore good reasons to believe that social trust promotes democratic and 
participatory attitudes. Following the idea, some authors propose that social trust makes 
participation less risky and more worthwhile, as we feel moral obligation and social responsibility 
to get involved in political affairs (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Uslaner, 2002). Social trust is an impetus of 
generalized morality and good willingness. While socially trusting, we also care about others and 
believe that others care about us. Mutual reciprocity gives a stimulus to also be politically active (to 
stand up for the issues of our community). Accordingly, as already explained in chapter 4, I 
formulate the following two hypotheses: social trust has a positive direct effect on participation in 
voting (H1a), party politics (H1b) and movement politics (H1c). 
From a sociological perspective, being embedded in social networks and social trust are 
treated as two facets of social capital. Additionally to social trust, I will also include formal social 
embeddedness as a control variable in our explanatory framework. By this term I mean involvement 
in voluntary civil society organizations, but not in private networks, like friends or family 
(Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Active involvement in formal social 
networks is proposed as a predictor of political participation in the sense that those who are 
involved in non-political associations are more likely to participate in politics (Barnes, 2006). This 
holds both for conventional and unconventional political participation as involvement in social 
networks provide the resources necessary for collective actions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Paxton, 
2002; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg, 2008). However, I would like to 
emphasize that I do not focus on social networks (as one of the facets of social capital) as a 
mediating variable, as I am more interested in attitudinal dispositions of individuals, and 
particularly, in social trust. Associational membership is not an attitudinal variable. Moreover, the 
relationship between membership and social trust is not evident, since certain memberships 
comprise so-called unsocial capital (for instance, Levi, 1996; in post-communist societies: Letki, 
2003; Imbrasaitė, 2004; Beresnevičiūtė, 2006). 
Second, Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s Voice and Equality (1995) points out that 
participation is not only determined by one’s socioeconomic status and social characteristics, but 
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also by a sense of political efficacy: both external and internal (cf. Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 
1991).Traditional theories suggest that external efficacy is closely related to political trust and 
works in harmony to strengthen party politics (Fraser, 1970; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Norris, 
1999; Dalton, 2004). Internal efficacy, theorists argue, is more likely to spur both party and 
movement politics, as it unfolds individual’s self-confidence (self-efficacy) and points towards the 
way in which we could influence politics (Gamson, 1968: 48). Some authors claim that internal 
efficacy is associated with political interest, which is an “internal motivating force” and key 
determinant of whether or not citizens would be willing to participate in political action (Guo and 
Moy, 1998; Fiske, Kinder, and Larter, 1983).  
If we compare the predictors of party and movement politics, some differences come into 
account. For instance, it is suggested that movement politics, contrary to party politics, tends to be 
negatively correlated with political trust, as protest is traditionally conceived as an action directed 
against elite-based institutions, or, elite-challenging (Gamson, 1968: 48; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 
1999; Kaase, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Hooghe and Marien, 2013). Similarly, citizens who 
believe that the government is responsive to citizens’ needs are thought to be more willing to 
participate in party politics, but not in movement politics: people who protest are generally 
dissatisfied with political and economic conditions or the way the government is dealing with it 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). The next section discusses how social trust might foster 
political efficacy, and thus also indirectly (via efficacy) affect political participation.   
 
6.3.3 Connecting social trust with political efficacy and political participation  
 
The second research question of this chapter “To what extent is the effect of social trust on 
participation mediated by political efficacy?” calls into debate why it is important to focus our 
attention particularly on the mediation effects of internal and external political efficacy in the 
analysis of the relationship between social trust and political participation. This debate centers 
around social capital and political capital literatures, explaining how social trust, as a social attitude, 
can convert into political skills. So it is important from the perspective that individual’s social 
environment matters for his/her political inclinations and decisions. In other words, the mediation 
effect would demonstrate that social resources could be transformed into individual political 
resources. 
As we have already discussed, the literature on how social trust exactly affects political 
participation is quite ambiguous. Some studies find a positive effect of social trust on most forms of 
political participation (Kaase, 1999; Putnam, 1993; 2000; Rossteutscher, 2008: 228; Marien and 
Christensen, 2013), while others come across relatively weak, non-existent or even negative 
 
relationships, depending on the forms of political activity (Millner, 2000; Van Deth, 2000; 
Muhlberger, 2003; Rubenson, 2005; Armingeon, 2007; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Hooghe and 
Quintellier, 2014). Generally, voting and movement politics in most studies occur to be positively 
associated with social trust, while the relationship with other institutionalized forms of participation 
is less clear. Moreover, social capital theories also suggest that social trust might have an indirect 
effect on political participation mediated by political efficacy. For instance, in his acclaimed study 
Making Democracy Work Putnam (1993) notices that social trust empowers people to solve more 
complicated problems in dealing with the institutional structures. So here the pivotal connection 
between social trust and political efficacy enters.  
Putnam (1993) observes that in more trustful communities a sense of efficacy of common 
citizens is higher. He explains this phenomenon by referring to the egalitarian nature of the society. 
If the societies’ structure is horizontal and based on social trust, people feel more powerful and 
capable of influencing political issues, because they expect that other people would behave 
similarly to them. In vertical and distrustful societies people perceive themselves being exploited, 
submissive and dependent, and therefore a sense of political efficacy is constrained.  
In the civil society or civic culture literature, social trust, efficacy and participation are 
interlinked less explicitly. Here, social trust is prescribed to a certain set of mutual obligations 
together with political participation, respect for human rights, citizenry duties, perceptions of the 
common good and common responsibility. In Civic Culture, for instance, Almond and Verba (1963) 
argued that subjective competence, participation, self-empowerment and social trust are connected 
through the socio-economic status and education level, which promote political efficacy, a sense of 
social trust and political activity. But as it was already mentioned, the research on this relationship 
is quite scarce, except for a few studies (for instance, Hsung, 2014; Anderson, 2010; Van Deth and 
Scarbrough (1998), and some theoretical aspects are discussed in Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 
2009), Hooghe and Marien (2013)). Other authors provide some hints on how social trust positively 
contributes to political literacy and awareness (Milner, 2002), self-confidence, and also to political 
support and political trust (Newton, 1999a; Norris, 2002a). 
Drawing on the literature, I consider three indirect positive effects of trust on participation. 
First, while placing trust in other individuals and receiving this trust reciprocally, we feel a moral 
duty to be involved in common affairs (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Seligman, 1997). It is argued that 
social trust leads individuals to participate in the pursuit of the commons, as trust provides us with 
assurance that political action will be appreciated and at least potentially effective. In return, 
successful cooperation based on trust gives people satisfaction in what they do (Putnam, 1993). 
Social trust endows us with the feeling of being part of a larger community and provides us with a 
sense that we, people, can make a difference. This first point refers to both external and internal 
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also by a sense of political efficacy: both external and internal (cf. Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 
1991).Traditional theories suggest that external efficacy is closely related to political trust and 
works in harmony to strengthen party politics (Fraser, 1970; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Norris, 
1999; Dalton, 2004). Internal efficacy, theorists argue, is more likely to spur both party and 
movement politics, as it unfolds individual’s self-confidence (self-efficacy) and points towards the 
way in which we could influence politics (Gamson, 1968: 48). Some authors claim that internal 
efficacy is associated with political interest, which is an “internal motivating force” and key 
determinant of whether or not citizens would be willing to participate in political action (Guo and 
Moy, 1998; Fiske, Kinder, and Larter, 1983).  
If we compare the predictors of party and movement politics, some differences come into 
account. For instance, it is suggested that movement politics, contrary to party politics, tends to be 
negatively correlated with political trust, as protest is traditionally conceived as an action directed 
against elite-based institutions, or, elite-challenging (Gamson, 1968: 48; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 
1999; Kaase, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Hooghe and Marien, 2013). Similarly, citizens who 
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participate in party politics, but not in movement politics: people who protest are generally 
dissatisfied with political and economic conditions or the way the government is dealing with it 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). The next section discusses how social trust might foster 
political efficacy, and thus also indirectly (via efficacy) affect political participation.   
 
6.3.3 Connecting social trust with political efficacy and political participation  
 
The second research question of this chapter “To what extent is the effect of social trust on 
participation mediated by political efficacy?” calls into debate why it is important to focus our 
attention particularly on the mediation effects of internal and external political efficacy in the 
analysis of the relationship between social trust and political participation. This debate centers 
around social capital and political capital literatures, explaining how social trust, as a social attitude, 
can convert into political skills. So it is important from the perspective that individual’s social 
environment matters for his/her political inclinations and decisions. In other words, the mediation 
effect would demonstrate that social resources could be transformed into individual political 
resources. 
As we have already discussed, the literature on how social trust exactly affects political 
participation is quite ambiguous. Some studies find a positive effect of social trust on most forms of 
political participation (Kaase, 1999; Putnam, 1993; 2000; Rossteutscher, 2008: 228; Marien and 
Christensen, 2013), while others come across relatively weak, non-existent or even negative 
 
relationships, depending on the forms of political activity (Millner, 2000; Van Deth, 2000; 
Muhlberger, 2003; Rubenson, 2005; Armingeon, 2007; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Hooghe and 
Quintellier, 2014). Generally, voting and movement politics in most studies occur to be positively 
associated with social trust, while the relationship with other institutionalized forms of participation 
is less clear. Moreover, social capital theories also suggest that social trust might have an indirect 
effect on political participation mediated by political efficacy. For instance, in his acclaimed study 
Making Democracy Work Putnam (1993) notices that social trust empowers people to solve more 
complicated problems in dealing with the institutional structures. So here the pivotal connection 
between social trust and political efficacy enters.  
Putnam (1993) observes that in more trustful communities a sense of efficacy of common 
citizens is higher. He explains this phenomenon by referring to the egalitarian nature of the society. 
If the societies’ structure is horizontal and based on social trust, people feel more powerful and 
capable of influencing political issues, because they expect that other people would behave 
similarly to them. In vertical and distrustful societies people perceive themselves being exploited, 
submissive and dependent, and therefore a sense of political efficacy is constrained.  
In the civil society or civic culture literature, social trust, efficacy and participation are 
interlinked less explicitly. Here, social trust is prescribed to a certain set of mutual obligations 
together with political participation, respect for human rights, citizenry duties, perceptions of the 
common good and common responsibility. In Civic Culture, for instance, Almond and Verba (1963) 
argued that subjective competence, participation, self-empowerment and social trust are connected 
through the socio-economic status and education level, which promote political efficacy, a sense of 
social trust and political activity. But as it was already mentioned, the research on this relationship 
is quite scarce, except for a few studies (for instance, Hsung, 2014; Anderson, 2010; Van Deth and 
Scarbrough (1998), and some theoretical aspects are discussed in Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 
2009), Hooghe and Marien (2013)). Other authors provide some hints on how social trust positively 
contributes to political literacy and awareness (Milner, 2002), self-confidence, and also to political 
support and political trust (Newton, 1999a; Norris, 2002a). 
Drawing on the literature, I consider three indirect positive effects of trust on participation. 
First, while placing trust in other individuals and receiving this trust reciprocally, we feel a moral 
duty to be involved in common affairs (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Seligman, 1997). It is argued that 
social trust leads individuals to participate in the pursuit of the commons, as trust provides us with 
assurance that political action will be appreciated and at least potentially effective. In return, 
successful cooperation based on trust gives people satisfaction in what they do (Putnam, 1993). 
Social trust endows us with the feeling of being part of a larger community and provides us with a 
sense that we, people, can make a difference. This first point refers to both external and internal 
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efficacy. Second, while trusting, people more likely acquire political knowledge and information in 
general about the subjects to be acted on and the methods to employ such actions (internal efficacy). 
Third, trust empowers us politically as we believe that institutions we deal with are fair and people 
we trust are going to behave by the rules. When we trust people, we expect them to act in a similar 
manner and it gives us a sense of control (predictability). Sustained confidence in the motives of 
others encourages and facilitates participation (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert, 2004). If we are sure that 
the rules are not going to be violated, we feel more certain about involvement in political life 
(external efficacy).  
In sum, I expect socially trusting people to develop a feeling of external and internal 
political efficacy. Hence, the theoretical presumptions lead to the following hypotheses: external 
political efficacy plays a mediating role between social trust and participation in voting (H2a), party 
(H2b) and movement (H2c) politics; internal political efficacy plays a mediating role between 
social trust and participation in voting (H3a), party (H3b) and movement (H3c) politics. It is 
important to note that I hypothesize that all indirect effects are positive, except for H3c: higher 
levels of social trust will decrease the willingness to engage in protesting, because external efficacy 
is expected to be negatively correlated with participation in movement politics. 
 
6.3.4 Testing hypotheses in post-communist Lithuania 
 
These hypotheses that are presumed to make sense in mature democracies, still lack empirical 
support in the post-communist context. The reason for that stems from the nature of trust in post-
communist societies. Different authors argue that trust was heavily ruined at political as well as 
social levels due to the destructive effects of the communist regime and traumatic experiences of 
the post-communist transformation (Sztompka, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Bădescu and 
Uslaner, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Imbrasaitė, 2004). 
As I explained earlier, Howard (2002: 161-163) distinguishes three reasons why political 
engagement might be weak in post-communist societies compared to mature democracies: 1) the 
legacy of distrust in communist organizations; 2) post-communist disappointment; 3) the 
persistence of family and friendship-based networks that replaces generalized sense of social trust. 
These features, as I will discuss below, are also evident in Lithuanian political culture. The insights 
could be also helpful for considering why the link between social trust and political participation 
might work differently in Lithuania and other post-communist countries, although Howard does not 
illuminate this relationship directly. 
First, negative experiences with communist organizations escalated distrust in the latter-day 
organizations, actuates apathy and reluctance to participate in public/political life. For instance, 
 
different surveys reveal that around 80 percent of Lithuanians do not belong to any organization or 
association (Žiliukaitė, 2006; Imbrasaitė, 2004). Under the communist regime, voluntary 
organizations and political institutions were discredited, as participation in them usually was 
obligatory. Like under communism, participation still resembles subordination to someone’s will, 
especially given the anti-legal culture in the transition period. Howard (2003: 38-39) notices that in 
contemporary post-communist societies there is still-alive perceived antinomy between individuals 
and the state. Given that, people are not willing to join organizations and thus have no ability to 
learn civic democratic skills, flourish social trust and generalized morality, as it is presumed by 
social capital theories.  
Second, disappointment in the post-communist transition made people apathetic about civic 
activities. Dramatically increased inequality, widespread corruption and struggle for survival in a 
very hostile economic environment left little room for collective aspirations, shared idealistic goals 
and values. Citizens’ faith in democracy fell short, as the willingness to participate in political 
action. Theoretically speaking, the supply-side of the political process rapidly declined. Moreover, 
analysts notice, common threat is not relevant anymore, so there is no need to organize for 
collective actions. As Imbrasaitė (2004; 2008) observes, Lithuanians are either abstaining from the 
political process or choose more for individual political actions above collective ones. One of the 
reasons for it is that the solidarity of people, which seemed to be quite high during the revolution 
period, was disrupted, and social trust between people (both generalized and particularized or 
personal) was even more damaged (Rose-Ackerman, 2001: 415). 
Third, instead of joining organizations and participating in public life, people prefer 
spending their private time as they used to do, in their own private circles. As Howard (2002: 163) 
put it: “Unlike in many Western societies – where voluntary organizations have become a central 
part of the social and political culture, and where people join organizations in order to meet new 
people and to expand their horizons through public activities – in post-communist societies, many 
people are still vested in their own private circles, and they simply feel no need, much less desire, to 
join and participate in civil society organizations.” So supposing that in Western democracies 
people participate in political life because of their needs and desires, people in post-communist 
societies assume that their social needs are already fulfilled in family-based circles. This trend is 
also very symptomatic for Lithuanians, who chose to spend their time with family and friends, 
rather than with strangers (Imbrasaitė, 2004; Ramonaitė, 2006a; Bartuškaitė and Žilys, 2011).  
 Letki (2003) interlinks the weakness of civil society and low levels of citizens’ involvement 
in East-Central Europe with the low stocks of social capital. There is a vicious circle: on the one 
hand, social capital cannot be produced and maintained through the absent civic networks. At the 
same time, the absence of social capital discourages people to act collectively. Imbrasaitė (2004) 
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indeed observes in her research that in Lithuania social capital has an effect only on collective 
means of political participation, but not on individual political actions. Thus, the low levels of social 
capital would explain why individuals do not embark on collective political actions.  
Some authors even go further by arguing that civic engagement in post-communist societies 
has nothing to do with trust. It is hypothesized that decisions to participate in organizations still 
remain an involuntary choice (most likely, that “someone asked to participate” and it is conceived 
as a duty). In this respect some researchers suggest that participation in post-communist societies 
might be less natural, but imitable. For instance, a study of Bădescu and colleagues (2004) revealed 
that organization members in the Eastern bloc are less active than those in the West. Similar results 
are also discussed by Žiliukaitė (2006) in Lithuania. Moreover, activists are less willing to 
cooperate with people or groups from outside their organizations, which goes along well with the 
relationship patterns inherited from communism (Beresnevičiūtė, 2006). As Bartuškaitė and Žilys 
(2011: 33) observe, activists not only face the competition with other organizations (for resources), 
but, more importantly, they are neglected by governmental institutions. The lack of cooperation 
within and outside the organizations deprives from stimulating initiatives and breeding social trust. 
The same logic could be applied not only for civic organizations, but also for political participation 
and especially social movements that implement the same motives of cooperation. Hence, these 
considerations call into question whether social trust as indicated in Western societies really 
contributes to political participation and translates into a sense of political efficacy in post-
communist Lithuania.  
 
6.4 Data and measurements  
 
The data for studying the hypotheses come from the Lithuanian National Election Study (hereafter: 
LNES), which is a post-election survey carried out in 2012, November – December. In total 1500 
residents in Lithuania who are 18 years and older were interviewed in 161 localities. The sample 
was selected in a stratified random way. Each district was represented proportionally to its 
residents’ share to the total Lithuanian population. The sample includes residents regardless of their 
citizenship, nationality, religion, language or legal status. Face-to-face interviews at the 
respondents’ homes were performed. The response rate was 61 % (Survey Field Report, 2012; 
Ramonaitė et al, 2014).  
 
6.4.1 Dependent variables 
 
As already described in previous chapters, due to the specific nature of participation, I leave voting 
and other activities in party politics as separate variables. Voting is gauged by the question: Did 
 
you vote on the national parliamentary elections day, 13th of September, 2012? Answers: yes=1; 
no=0. Involvement in other forms of party politics participation is tapped by the following 
question: Did you work in a political party or participated in its activity during the last 12 months? 
(Yes/No).   
Movement politics participation is measured by these 5 indicators: 1) Participated in a 
civic action/movement, which was not related with charity in the last 12 months; 2) Signed a 
petition (not via internet) in the last 12 months; 3) Took part in a demonstration or picket in the last 
12 months; 4) Participated in a strike in the last 12 months; 5) Bought or boycotted certain products 
because of ethic (moral) or political reasons in the last 12 months; Answer categories: 1 = yes, 0 = 
no.51 The distribution of the summed variable is highly skewed: the majority of the respondents did 
not participate at all in any movement action. Therefore we decided to apply a dichotomised 
scoring: We give a score of 1 to participants who participated at least in one movement politics 
activity, and a score of 0 to the non-participants. 
 
6.4.2 Independent variables  
 
Social trust is measured with a standard question “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful?” Measurement: 0 = you can’t be too careful; 10 = 
most people can be trusted.52  
I measure external political efficacy as perceived government’s responsiveness, which is 
captured with the question “Do average citizens have an influence on the important decisions in the 
country?” Measurement: 0 = No influence, 10 = Very big influence.53 
Internal political efficacy is tapped by four items, measuring agreement or disagreement 
with the following statements: 1) “I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics”; 
2) “I feel I have a good understanding of the most important political issues facing our country” 3) 
“I feel that I could do as good job in public office as most other people”; 4) “I think that I am better 
informed about politics and governing than most people”.54 Answers ranged from Disagree strongly 
(1) to Strongly agree (5). Including all respondents with at least one non-missing value on the items, 
the general score for each individual is a mean of the items. Cronbach’s α of the four items is 0.91.   
                                                 
51 Questions 2, 3 and 5 are formulated in accordance to the ESS (round 4, 2008) and ISSP Survey (Citizenship, 2004). 
52 The same question is used in the major global surveys (EVS, ESS, ISSP). The 0 to 10 scale is employed in the ESS 
questionnaire. 
53 In America’s National Election Study and the ISSP 2006 survey, two different items are used to measure external 
efficacy, namely: “People like me don't have any say about what the government does”; “The average citizen has 
considerable influence on politics”. Unfortunately, these items are not included in the Lithuanian National Elections 
Study, but we presume the two measurements are closely related to each other. 
54 Identical questions to measure internal political efficacy are formulated in ISSP 2004 survey “Citizenship” and the 
American National Election Study. 
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We also include political trust a predictor of political participation, which is assumed to be 
closely related to external political efficacy. We operationalize political trust by measuring trust in 
political institutions: 1) the country's parliament; 2) courts; 3) the police; 4) political parties; 5) the 
government; 6) the president. Measurement: 0 = no trust at all; 10 = complete trust.55 A principal 
component analysis indicated that the items load strongly on a single dimension. We included 
respondents with at least two non-missing values; the political trust score for each individual is the 
mean of the items (Cronbach’s α = 0.86). 
Political interest and actual political knowledge (including political information) are believed 
to be linked to a sense of internal political efficacy, thus worth including in the analysis as control 
variables. Political interest is gauged with a standard question: “In general, are you interested in 
politics?” (1 = not at all interested; 2 = hardly interested; 3 = interested; 4 = very interested).56 
Political information is measured with four items capturing the knowledge about the Lithuanian 
political system. The respondents were asked to indicate whether the following statements were true 
or false 1) “According to the Constitutional law, the president can give an order to the judges what 
decision to make in one or another case”; 2) “Lithuanian Parliament is composed of 181 members”; 
3) “Mayors are elected directly in Lithuania”; 4) “In the PM office of A. Kubilius, the post of the 
minister of Foreign Affairs was held by Audronius Ažubalis”. The measurement: 0 = did not 
answer any question correctly; 4 = answered 4 questions correctly.  
To measure social embeddedness of a respondent, I focus on what Putnam labelled as 
‘secondary organizations’. Thus, I identify the density of social embeddedness of a respondent by 
taking the following two forms of civic sociability into account: 1) Worked in another [other than 
political, TG] organisation or association during the last 12 months; 2) Participated in the activities 
of the local community during the last 12 months; (answers: yes=1; no=0). The two items are 
strongly correlated with each other (r = 0.67). A respondent with the highest embeddedness would 
score 2; the minimum score is 0. In addition, I include embeddednes in two other types of 
organizations as control variables: labour unions and religious communities. Due to the different 
nature and function of these organizations, I keep all three variables (social embeddedness, union 
membership and religious attendance) separate. Trade union participation is measured as a 
dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = no), indicating whether a respondent has participated in trade 
union activities during the last 12 months. Religious attendance indicates how often respondents 
attend religious services apart from special occasions. Answers ranged on a seven-point scale from 
“never, almost never” (1) to “more than once a week” (7). Missing values (don’t know, no answer) 
                                                 
55 The political trust questions are formulated in line with the ESS (round 4) survey. The ESS also uses a 0-10 point 
scale. 
56 The variable “How interested in politics” is used in the ESS, EVS and ISSP (2004) surveys with a 4-point scale 
measurement.   
 
were recoded into 1 if respondents answered “no” on another question, namely whether they had 
participated in religious community activities.   
  Other individual characteristics. A standard set of demographic variables is also included 
in the analysis: age, gender, level of education, social status, and financial situation. Age: 
respondent’s exact age in years. Gender is coded as (0) = Female, (1) = Male. Education level is 
measured by the Lithuanian educational system scale from 0 (not completed primary) to 16 
(Doctorate degree or Candidate of Sciences (equivalent to PhD)). Social status is measured by the 
item “What social status are you considered to be in?”, whereby answer categories ranged from “the 
lowest position” (1) to “the highest position” (10). The financial situation of the respondent’s family 
was measured by a 1-5 scale that ranged from “we do not even have enough money for food” (1) to 
“we can afford anything we want” (5). 
 
6.4.3 Descriptives  
 
Before examining the hypotheses, I scrutinize the descriptives of the key variables. Table C1 in 
Appendix C shows that the levels of participation in movement politics is considerably lower than 
electoral participation in Lithuania: 65% of the respondents reported to have voted in the elections, 
whereas at least one of the movement actions were undertaken only by 15 %. Petitions were signed 
by 9 %, demonstrations attended by 4 % of the respondents. A vast majority (81 %) did not 
participate in any movement politics at all. Only 5.5 % of the respondent engaged in party politics 
activities (other than voting). 
Social trust is recorded below the average level (the mean is 4.13, on a 0-10 scale), 
suggesting that most respondents think that they cannot be “too careful” with other people. When it 
comes to external and internal political efficacy, the descriptives show a big gap between these 
variables: the external efficacy of the respondents is considerably lower (2.46 on a 0-10 scale) than 
internal efficacy (2.49 on a 1-5 scale). Put differently, the belief that the government is responsive 
to citizens’ demands is more than twice as low as the confidence in one’s own ability to participate 
in politics.  
Additionally, political trust is lower than average, thus complying with a low sense of 
external efficacy. Political interest scores about 2 (“hardly interested”) on average, whereas the 
stocks of the actual political information is considerably above the average (2.8), implying that 
respondents possess a relatively good knowledge about the political system. This is in line with the 
assertions of other scholars that people in Lithuania are aware of political issues, but political 
institutions are treated as non-responsive and distrustful (Mažylytė, 2011; Ramonaitė, 2006b). 
Chapter 6160   |
 
We also include political trust a predictor of political participation, which is assumed to be 
closely related to external political efficacy. We operationalize political trust by measuring trust in 
political institutions: 1) the country's parliament; 2) courts; 3) the police; 4) political parties; 5) the 
government; 6) the president. Measurement: 0 = no trust at all; 10 = complete trust.55 A principal 
component analysis indicated that the items load strongly on a single dimension. We included 
respondents with at least two non-missing values; the political trust score for each individual is the 
mean of the items (Cronbach’s α = 0.86). 
Political interest and actual political knowledge (including political information) are believed 
to be linked to a sense of internal political efficacy, thus worth including in the analysis as control 
variables. Political interest is gauged with a standard question: “In general, are you interested in 
politics?” (1 = not at all interested; 2 = hardly interested; 3 = interested; 4 = very interested).56 
Political information is measured with four items capturing the knowledge about the Lithuanian 
political system. The respondents were asked to indicate whether the following statements were true 
or false 1) “According to the Constitutional law, the president can give an order to the judges what 
decision to make in one or another case”; 2) “Lithuanian Parliament is composed of 181 members”; 
3) “Mayors are elected directly in Lithuania”; 4) “In the PM office of A. Kubilius, the post of the 
minister of Foreign Affairs was held by Audronius Ažubalis”. The measurement: 0 = did not 
answer any question correctly; 4 = answered 4 questions correctly.  
To measure social embeddedness of a respondent, I focus on what Putnam labelled as 
‘secondary organizations’. Thus, I identify the density of social embeddedness of a respondent by 
taking the following two forms of civic sociability into account: 1) Worked in another [other than 
political, TG] organisation or association during the last 12 months; 2) Participated in the activities 
of the local community during the last 12 months; (answers: yes=1; no=0). The two items are 
strongly correlated with each other (r = 0.67). A respondent with the highest embeddedness would 
score 2; the minimum score is 0. In addition, I include embeddednes in two other types of 
organizations as control variables: labour unions and religious communities. Due to the different 
nature and function of these organizations, I keep all three variables (social embeddedness, union 
membership and religious attendance) separate. Trade union participation is measured as a 
dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = no), indicating whether a respondent has participated in trade 
union activities during the last 12 months. Religious attendance indicates how often respondents 
attend religious services apart from special occasions. Answers ranged on a seven-point scale from 
“never, almost never” (1) to “more than once a week” (7). Missing values (don’t know, no answer) 
                                                 
55 The political trust questions are formulated in line with the ESS (round 4) survey. The ESS also uses a 0-10 point 
scale. 
56 The variable “How interested in politics” is used in the ESS, EVS and ISSP (2004) surveys with a 4-point scale 
measurement.   
 
were recoded into 1 if respondents answered “no” on another question, namely whether they had 
participated in religious community activities.   
  Other individual characteristics. A standard set of demographic variables is also included 
in the analysis: age, gender, level of education, social status, and financial situation. Age: 
respondent’s exact age in years. Gender is coded as (0) = Female, (1) = Male. Education level is 
measured by the Lithuanian educational system scale from 0 (not completed primary) to 16 
(Doctorate degree or Candidate of Sciences (equivalent to PhD)). Social status is measured by the 
item “What social status are you considered to be in?”, whereby answer categories ranged from “the 
lowest position” (1) to “the highest position” (10). The financial situation of the respondent’s family 
was measured by a 1-5 scale that ranged from “we do not even have enough money for food” (1) to 
“we can afford anything we want” (5). 
 
6.4.3 Descriptives  
 
Before examining the hypotheses, I scrutinize the descriptives of the key variables. Table C1 in 
Appendix C shows that the levels of participation in movement politics is considerably lower than 
electoral participation in Lithuania: 65% of the respondents reported to have voted in the elections, 
whereas at least one of the movement actions were undertaken only by 15 %. Petitions were signed 
by 9 %, demonstrations attended by 4 % of the respondents. A vast majority (81 %) did not 
participate in any movement politics at all. Only 5.5 % of the respondent engaged in party politics 
activities (other than voting). 
Social trust is recorded below the average level (the mean is 4.13, on a 0-10 scale), 
suggesting that most respondents think that they cannot be “too careful” with other people. When it 
comes to external and internal political efficacy, the descriptives show a big gap between these 
variables: the external efficacy of the respondents is considerably lower (2.46 on a 0-10 scale) than 
internal efficacy (2.49 on a 1-5 scale). Put differently, the belief that the government is responsive 
to citizens’ demands is more than twice as low as the confidence in one’s own ability to participate 
in politics.  
Additionally, political trust is lower than average, thus complying with a low sense of 
external efficacy. Political interest scores about 2 (“hardly interested”) on average, whereas the 
stocks of the actual political information is considerably above the average (2.8), implying that 
respondents possess a relatively good knowledge about the political system. This is in line with the 
assertions of other scholars that people in Lithuania are aware of political issues, but political 
institutions are treated as non-responsive and distrustful (Mažylytė, 2011; Ramonaitė, 2006b). 
Political participation in Lithuania |   161
Chapter
6
 
Finally, involvement in social networks is not large at all, indicating only a very insignificant part of 
the respondents being bonded by some social networks in the public realm.  
To assess to what extent the variables are related to each other, it is expedient to consider the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients (Table 6.2). The results show that participation in elections and 
other party politics activities significantly correlates with all central variables, thus supporting the 
traditional paradigm of explaining conventional participation: civic values of a good citizen 
endorses his/her activity in institutional politics. Yet, the correlation with social trust is rather weak 
(Pearson’s r = 0.10). Movement political participation is significantly correlated with social 
embeddedness (0.29), internal efficacy (0.22) and political interest (0.22). As for social trust, it most 
firmly goes along with external efficacy (0.30) and political trust (0.27), but only weakly correlates 
with embeddedness in formal social networks (0.09), trade unions (0.04) and religious attendance 
(0.06). The latter finding, however, is not very surprising for Lithuania, as it complies with the 
theoretical insights discussed in previous theoretical sections.  
 
Table 6.2 Pearson’s correlations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Voting x                (2) Party polit. part. .158 x .              (3) Mov. polit. part. .166 .195 x              (4) Social trust .095 .025 .040 x             (5) External efficacy .219 .075 .130 .300 x            (6) Political trust .200 .124 .060 .272 .349 x           (7) Internal efficacy .246 .248 .215 .133 .263 .187 x          (8) Political interest .442 .248 .217 .084 .187 .189 .419 x         (9) Polit. 
information 
.282 .109 .140 .140 .071 .140 .264 .311 x  
 
     
(10) Embeddedness .208 .407 .292 .086 .139 .171 .242 .256 .178 x       
(11) Trade union  .056 .150 .212 .041 .073 .069 .149 .092 .040 .208 x      
(12) Religious 
attend. 
.202 .028 .026 .062 .110 .131 .022 .170 .085 .093 -.021 x     
(13) Age .180 .018 -.056 -.095 -.097 .034 -.036 .243 .123 .028 -.019 .314 x    
(14) Gender .030 -.019 -.043 -.016 .001 .060 .135 .095 .090 -.059 -.036 -.255 -.060 x   
(15) Education .232 .144 .114 .057 .134 .022 .332 .251 .123 .183 .138 -.041 -.145 -.103 x  
(16) Financial sit. .069 .130 .034 .123 .185 .151 .297 .156 .112 .193 .128 -.034 -.254 .040 .285 x 
(17) Social status .116 .070* .056 .201 .268 .179 .302 .153 .118 .144 .083 -.002 -.263 .016 .323 .559 
Source: LNES 2012.  
Note: significance (p<0.01) in bold. 
 
6.5 Results  
 
Two logistic regressions were performed for each form of political participation.57 Table 6.3 
displays the results for participation in elections. Model 1 only includes socio-demographic 
variables (age, gender, education, social status, financial situation) and social trust. Model 2 adds 
external and internal political efficacy and a few related variables to examine whether the effect of 
social trust is mediated.  
The results of model 1 in Table 6.3 demonstrate that social trust has a significant positive 
impact on the propensity that an individual takes part in the ballot. I have reported the 
                                                 
57 Examination of multicollinearity statistics indicated no concerns with respect to multicollinearity for all analyses. 
 
exponentiated b-coefficient (Exp(B)), which is the change in the odds ratio (OR) associated with 
one unit increase in the predictor variable, as well as the predicted probabilities. One unit increase 
in the amount of social trust increases the odds of voting by a factor of 1.11. Simply put, this 
implies that if we could raise the average level of social trust by one unit (from 4.13 to 5.13), we 
predict that the turnout, which is currently 65.0 per cent, would increase to 67.3 per cent.58 The 
depicted predicted probabilities show that citizens with the minimum amount of social trust have a 
much lower propensity (60%) to go to the polls compared with citizens who have the highest level 
of trust (81%), holding all other variables constant.   
Hypothesis 1a (Social trust has a positive direct effect on participation in elections) is 
therefore tentatively confirmed by the results. Moreover, education and age prove to be significant 
predictors for electoral participation. Older and more highly educated people are more likely to 
vote. These findings go well along with previous research (for instance, Ramonaitė, 2006b; 
Imbrasaitė, 2008).  
Model 2 shows the results if we include a set of political efficacy variables. I find that 
political interest (Exp(B)=2.837), external efficacy (Exp(B)=1.191) and political information 
(Exp(B)=1.227) are highly significant predictors of voting, as conventional theories on political 
participation would assert. The impact of social embeddedness is also significant; individuals who 
are strongly involved in the community (score 2) have a much higher probability to vote (90%) than 
people who score lowest on social embeddedness (71%), holding other variables constant. Taken 
these variables into account, social trust becomes insignificant. Our results thus indicate that these 
variables actually mediate between social trust and involvement in electoral politics.  
In this respect, hypothesis 2b (External political efficacy plays a mediating role between 
social trust and participation in voting) is empirically supported.59 This conclusion also holds when I 
test the mediation effects of external and internal efficacy in a more sophisticated way by using the 
PROCESS macro for SPSS developed by Hayes (see Table 6.4).60 The results in Table 6.4 show 
furthermore that there is also a significant indirect effect of social trust on voting via political trust. 
 However, as can be seen in Table 6.3, internal political efficacy has no significant effect on 
the propensity to vote. This might be explained by the fact that I have controlled for both political 
information possessed and political interest; particularly the latter correlates strongly with internal 
efficacy. A closer inspection using Hayes’ process analysis indeed reveals that if we would not 
                                                 
58 The calculation is as follows: the probability to vote is 0.65, the odds is therefore 0.65/0.35 = 1.86 to 1. Multiplication 
by 1.11 yields an odds of 2.06, which is similar to a probability of 2.06/3.06 = 67.3%. 
59 When only external efficacy is added to model 1, the effect of generalized trust (Exp(B)) = 1.062; SE(B) =0.030) is 
also significantly reduced though still significant (p=0.045).    
60 This method allows to simultaneously test the direct and indirect effects of social trust via both types of efficacy on 
participation in one model, while controlling for all confounding variables. See: Hayes (2013). The macro is freely 
available at Hayes’s website: http://www.afhayes.com/introduction-to-mediation-moderation-and-conditional-process-
analysis.html. 
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Finally, involvement in social networks is not large at all, indicating only a very insignificant part of 
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 However, as can be seen in Table 6.3, internal political efficacy has no significant effect on 
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control for these two variables, hypothesis 2a (Internal political efficacy plays a mediating role 
between social trust and voting) could be confirmed. In that case, the effect of internal efficacy 
(Exp(B) = 1.634; SE(B) = 0.080) on voting becomes substantial and highly significant. However, if 
one strictly considers political interest and political information as different concepts than internal 
efficacy that need to be controlled for, we indeed have to reject Hypothesis 2a. 
 
Table 6.3 Logistic regression analysis of voting  
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Exp (B) SE (B) Probabilities Exp (B) SE (B) Probabilities 
   x=min x=max   x=min x=max 
Constant 0.068**** 0.027   0.018**** 0.009   
Age 1.029**** 0.004 0.502 0.875 1.010** 0.005 0.686 0.808 
Gender 1.057 0.137 0.695 0.706 0.888 0.138 0.754 0.732 
Education 1.158**** 0.022 0.394 0.872 1.100**** 0.024 0.558 0.853 
Social status 1.071 0.048 0.636 0.764 0.993 0.049 0.749 0.737 
Financial situation 1.027 0.092 0.690 0.713 0.817** 0.083 0.807 0.650 
Social trust  1.108**** 0.033 0.603 0.810 0.996 0.035 0.747 0.739 
External efficacy      1.191**** 0.048 0.652 0.916 
Political trust      1.094** 0.045 0.670 0.833 
Internal efficacy      1.121 0.108 0.709 0.794 
Political information      1.227**** 0.072 0.616 0.784 
Political interest     2.837**** 0.339 0.467 0.952 
Embeddedness      1.904*** 0.392 0.714 0.900 
Union membership     0.775 0.354 0.745 0.694 
Religious attendance      1.119** 0.057 0.682 0.808 
         
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.142    0.343    
N 1241    1241    
Source: LNES 2012. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
Concerning party politics activities (other than voting), Table 6.5 shows that there is no effect of 
social trust. This refutes hypothesis H1b and re-confirms the argument that very competitive and 
conflict-based atmosphere of party politics is not related to cooperative attitudes in Lithuania (cf. 
Imbrasaitė, 2008). I obviously neither find support for my hypotheses about the mediation effect of 
efficacy (H2b and H3b). Nevertheless, the results reveal that both internal efficacy and political 
trust significantly increase participation in party politics activities. At the same time, I find that 
social trust (not shown in Table 6.5) stimulates external efficacy and political trust. In sum, my 
findings suggest that involvement in party politics is driven by particular interests, rather than 
generalized social trust and altruistic behaviour. 
 
  
 
Table 6.4 Parallel multiple mediation analyses examining indirect effects of social trust on voting, 
party politics, and movement politics via external efficacy, political trust, and internal efficacy  
  95% confidence interval 
 B coefficient  SE (B) Lower Upper 
Voting (n=1249)     
Direct effect -0.0044 0.0353 -0.0735 0.0648 
Indirect total effect 0.0639* 0.0138 0.0388 0.0918 
Indirect effect via external efficacy 0.0427* 0.0119 0.0222 0.0657 
Indirect effect via political trust 0.0192* 0.0092 0.0015 0.0371 
Indirect effect via internal efficacy  0.0021 0.0026 -0.0009 0.0098 
     
Participation in party politics (n=1249)     
Direct effect -0.0870 0.0755 -0.2350 0.0610 
Indirect total effect 0.0418 0.0293 -0.0158 0.1022 
Indirect effect via external efficacy -0.0108 0.0225 -0.0574 0.0326 
Indirect effect via political trust 0.0386 0.0217 -0.0032 0.0808 
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0140 0.0099 -0.0017 0.0389 
     
Participation in movement politics 
(n=1250) 
    
Direct effect -0.0269 0.0138 -0.0040 0.0574 
Indirect total effect 0.0213 0.0120 -0.0010 0.0486 
Indirect effect via external efficacy 0.0277* 0.0115 0.0065 0.0533 
Indirect effect via political trust -0.0117 0.0039 -0.0396 0.0077 
Indirect effect via internal efficacy  0.0053* 0.0043 0.0001 0.0169 
     
Source: LNES 2012. 
Notes: *p < 0.05. Results are based on 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples. 
For the statistical controls that were included see Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.5 Logistic regression analysis of participation in party politics  
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Exp (B) SE (B) Probabilities Exp (B) SE (B) Probabilities 
   x=min x=max   x=min x=max 
Constant 0.002**** 0.001   0.0001**** 0.0002   
Age 1.014* 0.008 0.031 0.075 0.989 0.010 0.020 0.010 
Gender 0.899 0.223 0.048 0.044 0.620 0.198 0.019 0.012 
Education 1.164**** 0.046 0.013 0.128 1.041 0.050 0.011 0.020 
Social status 0.941 0.081 0.059 0.035 0.771** 0.087 0.043 0.004 
Financial situation 1.811**** 0.325 0.016 0.151 1.523* 0.338 0.001 0.036 
Social trust  1.031 0.060 0.041 0.055 0.917 0.069 0.021 0.009 
External efficacy      0.957 0.071 0.017 0.011 
Political trust      1.200** 0.102 0.007 0.043 
Internal efficacy      2.196**** 0.468 0.005 0.095 
Political information      1.133 0.192 0.010 0.017 
Political interest     2.986**** 0.773 0.004 0.103 
Embeddedness      4.330**** 0.858 0.011 0.167 
Union membership     1.264 0.629 0.015 0.019 
Religious attendance      0.981 0.102 0.016 0.014 
         
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.167    0.437    
N 1251    1251    
Source: LNES 2012. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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The analysis of movement politics participation (Table 6.6) indicates that there is no direct effect of 
social trust on this type of political activities (the effect is insignificant; see Model 1). Hence, we 
have to reject H1c (Social trust has a positive direct effect on participation in movement politics). 
Yet, the finding is not very surprising and leads us to consider that people are recruited to protest on 
the basis of particularized trust (strong ties between people we know), rather than generalized social 
trust (week ties between strangers). This was also observed at the beginning of the independence 
movement in 1987 (Ramonaitė, 2011). I will elaborate more on this point in the discussion section.  
When I include other variables in my analysis (Model 2), the results show that both internal 
and external efficacy have a positive effect on engagement in protest behaviour. They both 
considerably spur social movement activities: the predicted amount of engagement increases from 8 
and 9 per cent to 21 and 23 per cent, respectively, if we compare people who score lowest and 
highest on both scales. Contrary to the results of voting, internal efficacy has an independent 
(significant) effect on protests actions, even if we control for political information and political 
interest. As one might expect, I find that political interest and information are also positively 
associated with the likelihood that an individual engages in movement activities, and these effects 
are significant.   
 
Table 6.6 Logistic regression analysis of participation in movement politics  
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Exp (B) SE (B) Probabilities Exp (B) SE (B) Probabilities 
   x=min x=max   x=min x=max 
Constant 0.101**** 0.479   0.087**** 0.050   
Age 0.995 0.005 0.168 0.130 0.975**** 0.006 0.215 0.048 
Gender 0.853 0.137 0.161 0.140 0.690* 0.133 0.135 0.097 
Education 1.101**** 0.026 0.071 0.264 1.002 0.028 0.113 0.118 
Social status 0.997 0.055 0.152 0.149 0.930 0.059 0.151 0.085 
Financial situation 0.938 0.105 0.166 0.133 0.683*** 0.087 0.206 0.054 
Social trust  1.051 0.039 0.126 0.191 0.973 0.042 0.127 0.100 
External efficacy      1.119** 0.050 0.090 0.233 
Political trust      0.947 0.048 0.139 0.086 
Internal efficacy      1.347** 0.161 0.076 0.214 
Political information      1.197** 0.102 0.072 0.137 
Political interest     2.003**** 0.287 0.056 0.322 
Embeddedness      2.546**** 0.377 0.095 0.405 
Union membership     5.423**** 1.984 0.109 0.400 
Religious attendance    
 
  1.059 0.069 0.101 0.137 
         
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.030    0.255    
N 1243    1243    
Source: LNES 2012. 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
Although the effect of social trust remains insignificant, surprisingly, the sign of the effect has 
changed from positive to negative in model 2. Regarding the mediation, the analysis using the 
above-mentioned macro of Hayes (see Table 6.4) reveals that the indirect effects of social trust on 
 
protesting via external and internal efficacy are both significant. Hence, these indirect paths results 
from the fact that social trust is a strong predictor of both internal and external efficacy and, in its 
turn, efficacy fosters participation. H2c and H2d are corroborated; these two hypotheses claimed 
that external and internal political efficacy, respectively, play a mediating role between social trust 
and participation in movement politics.  
Finally, two points are worth noting. First, the significant positive effect of external efficacy 
on movement participation contradicts the theoretical assumption that disappointment in 
government’s responsiveness leads to protests actions. Although political trust has no significant 
effect, the direction of the effect is negative, suggesting that the more individuals trust political 
institutions, the less they tend to protest. Therefore, in total (considering all mediators at the same 
time), there is no indirect effect of social trust on protesting. The findings importantly indicate that 
the conviction that politicians are responsive works out quite differently than the conviction that 
they are trustful: the former leads to activism, the latter might yield apathy.  
Second, although social trust has no direct impact, I find a highly significant effect of 
embeddedness on movement politics (Exp(B) = 4.330). In a broader view, the findings imply that 
formal social networks are apparently not connected to a sense of social trust. I indeed already 
showed in the descriptive analysis (Table 6.2) that the relationship between these two variables is 
very weak, if not non-existent, and that social trust is not associated with participation in two other 
formal networks (trade unions and religious communities) either. I will talk more about it in the 
discussion. 
 
6.6 Discussion  
 
This chapter investigated the role of social trust in connection to political efficacy in determining 
political participation in Lithuania, a society which possesses the attributes of a political culture 
typically found in post-communist countries. More particularly, drawing from the data, Lithuanians 
can be described as low social trusters, endowed with low levels of external efficacy and being 
relatively passive in political participation.  
My results showed an indirect positive effect of social trust on participation in elections. The 
results thus support the claim that social trust translates into a sense of external efficacy and 
political trust, which in turn enhances the likelihood that an individual takes part in the ballot. We 
thus have a reason to believe that trust in other people is related to positive evaluations of 
government responsiveness and reduces the distance between citizens and institutions. Yet, the 
mediating role of internal efficacy is not fully empirically supported, which may be partially due to 
the fact that the latter is tightly related to political information and political interest. For engagement 
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Age 0.995 0.005 0.168 0.130 0.975**** 0.006 0.215 0.048 
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Although the effect of social trust remains insignificant, surprisingly, the sign of the effect has 
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from the fact that social trust is a strong predictor of both internal and external efficacy and, in its 
turn, efficacy fosters participation. H2c and H2d are corroborated; these two hypotheses claimed 
that external and internal political efficacy, respectively, play a mediating role between social trust 
and participation in movement politics.  
Finally, two points are worth noting. First, the significant positive effect of external efficacy 
on movement participation contradicts the theoretical assumption that disappointment in 
government’s responsiveness leads to protests actions. Although political trust has no significant 
effect, the direction of the effect is negative, suggesting that the more individuals trust political 
institutions, the less they tend to protest. Therefore, in total (considering all mediators at the same 
time), there is no indirect effect of social trust on protesting. The findings importantly indicate that 
the conviction that politicians are responsive works out quite differently than the conviction that 
they are trustful: the former leads to activism, the latter might yield apathy.  
Second, although social trust has no direct impact, I find a highly significant effect of 
embeddedness on movement politics (Exp(B) = 4.330). In a broader view, the findings imply that 
formal social networks are apparently not connected to a sense of social trust. I indeed already 
showed in the descriptive analysis (Table 6.2) that the relationship between these two variables is 
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results thus support the claim that social trust translates into a sense of external efficacy and 
political trust, which in turn enhances the likelihood that an individual takes part in the ballot. We 
thus have a reason to believe that trust in other people is related to positive evaluations of 
government responsiveness and reduces the distance between citizens and institutions. Yet, the 
mediating role of internal efficacy is not fully empirically supported, which may be partially due to 
the fact that the latter is tightly related to political information and political interest. For engagement 
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in party politics, however, I did not find any effect of social trust. Apart from this, internal efficacy 
and political trust stimulates this form of participation, whereas external efficacy is surprisingly not 
associated with party political participation.  
Furthermore, it is worth paying attention to the fact that I found no direct effect of social 
trust on movement political activities. Yet, there are small but positive indirect effects: when 
controlling for the other mediator (political trust), we can conclude that social trust increases 
external and internal efficacy, which in turn enhances protest behaviour. Remarkably, however, 
political trust is not a significant mediator. In a comparative view, protesters are apparently not the 
same type of people as those who take part in conventional politics. Social trust is indeed positively 
related to political trust, but the latter actually seems to decrease, rather than increase participation 
in movement politics.  
Given that movement politics participation is commonly conceived as a manifestation of 
collective action, we have to conclude that social trust plays a limited role as a collective resource 
that fosters the mobilization of people for the common good in Lithuania. The conclusions comply 
with other research on social capital and political/civic participation in Lithuania, for instance, by 
Imbrasaitė (2004; 2008), Bartuškaitė and Žilys (2011). The possible explanation for this is offered 
by Ramonaitė (2011) who, using the example of the independence movement in 1987-1988, 
assumes that the initial stimulus of mobilization for protest activities rests upon particularized, or, 
bonding social trust: individuals need to be recruited for participation, and the success of the 
recruitment heavily depends on trust in people you know. Ramonaitė (2011) admits that the 
importance of particularized, or, bonding, social trust is more pronounced in risky political 
environments (like revolutions). It might very well be that the fear of participation inherited from 
the communist period makes Lithuanians more suspicious and more frightened of the consequences 
of their actions (as it used to be under the communist regime), although in a democratic setting 
these fears are less rationally grounded.   
Finally, it is interesting to note that my analysis reveals strong empirical evidence for the 
argument that social embeddedness is tremendously important for any kind of political 
participation. Civic engagement strongly affects the odds of individuals to be involved in political 
activities. And the opposite is also true: the lack of political engagement in Lithuania is caused by a 
lack of civic engagement. As Žiliukaitė (2006: 28) notices, people in Lithuania most often choose 
“freedom not to participate” in any civic and political actions. And the main reasons for that are the 
lack of interest, the lack of resources and the absence of mobilizing agents. Moreover, people in 
Lithuania tend to embark on individualist, but not collectivist civic/political actions (Imbrasaitė, 
2008). That would explain why the role of trust for the civic activities is limited.  
 
Indeed, the empirical analysis suggests that social trust might not be a significant attribute of 
social embeddednes (or social capital in a wider perspective) in Lithuania, and, applying to a 
broader context, in post-communist societies in general. Although this presumption contradicts the 
basic ideas of social capital theories, which implicitly connect social trust and membership in 
voluntary organizations, this relationship is not necessarily found in post-communist societies 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Uslaner, 2004; Beresnevičiūtė, 2006; Karakoc, 2013; Matonytė, 2004; 
Bartuškaitė and Žilys, 2011). 
To conclude, I provide two possible explanations why social trust is not (or only weakly) 
related to formal networks, which (as the data demonstrated) importantly enhanced participation in 
both party and movement politics. 
The first explanation is based on the nature of post-communist societies and the structural 
legacies inherited from the communist regime. In Soviet Lithuania, civic associations served as a 
shelter against the system and thus generated suspicious feelings towards strangers (Kavaliauskaitė 
and Ramonaitė, 2011). On the other hand, formal associations as trade unions were subordinated to 
the Communist party and were aimed to escalate the tensions within society (as a mean to control it) 
(Matonytė, 2004). All in all, both formal and informal organizations were functioning on the basis 
of particularized, but not generalized social trust, and these legacies might very well have been 
transferred to the contemporary society. 
Furthermore, associational activity based on particularized trust was possibly even deepened 
by increased socioeconomic inequality during the post-communist transition. As Karakoc (2013) 
observes, the less economically privileged people prefer associations whose members are alike or 
choose not to participate at all. As a result, these people have less chances to increase interactions 
with different others, they less likely feel a part of the “imagined community” and, in turn, they tend 
to not cherish a feeling of generalized social trust (Uslaner, 2002).   
Adding to that, some authors notice, civic associations in post-communist countries are not 
used to work in a collective manner; many of them are still very hierarchical (for instance, Letki, 
2004). The non-egalitarian nature of decision-making processes might even reduce the stocks of 
social trust of members of organizations. Moreover, the institutional setting the organizations 
operate in, is very competitive due to the limited resources. Activists from the different 
organizations consider each other as competitors rather than collaborators. A very similar logic 
applies to movement politics, as civic organizations play indeed the biggest role in mobilizing 
people for protest activities. Thus, although social embeddedness promotes political participation, 
especially social movements, it does not necessarily go along with social trust. 
The second possible explanation relies on the social movements literature and might also be 
applicable to the post-communist context. Different activities of movement politics reflect the 
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variance in the motivations of the participants on the axis of universalistic (or post-materialistic) vs 
particularistic (or materialistic) values. Inglehart (1990; 1997) claims that political actions are 
usually taken by the educated elite, primed by post-material values. Such conclusions could be also 
drawn from Table 6.6 which shows that high education and low perceived financial situation is 
positively associated with movement politics and implies, for instance, that many of the protesters 
might be students. Often they are aimed at the causes emphasizing peace and justice instead of 
material goods. However, citizens in post-communist societies are not yet sufficiently well-off to 
become post-materialists, but they rather possess materialistic values of survival (Uslaner, 2004). 
Hence, we might expect that most of the protesters who take part in movement activities in 
Lithuania are driven by their particularistic motivations and are less concerned with the common 
goods. This type of activists are usually low trusters.  
Both explanations are not necessarily conflicting, but follow-up empirical research is needed 
to find out which account is most accurate. Based on our results, we presuppose that civic 
organizations in Lithuania are still not likely to generate trust in strangers. Even the fabric of 
democratic participatory attitudes – local communities – , in a Putnamian sense, are not associated 
with social trust, supporting Levi’s (1996) claim that not all voluntary organizations are creating 
social capital, but instead rest on unsocial capital.    
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7.1 Research questions and theoretical perspectives  
 
The main aim of this dissertation was to explain why political participation in post-communist 
societies is so much lower than in Western democracies, considering social trust as a stimulus for 
political engagement. I maintain that the exploration of social trust and its connection to political 
participation in the former communist countries is relevant for at least three reasons. The first 
reason is related to the empirical evidence of strikingly low levels of political participation in the 
post-communist region, the second point emphasizes the efforts to understand the weakness of civil 
society through the lens of social trust from both a historical and contemporary perspective, and the 
third point is directed to the empirical gaps this study aims to fill. 
The theoretical perspectives of this dissertation (chapter 2) suggest that, based on the 
experiences of Western democracies, social trust might function as a positive attitudinal stimulus 
for almost all means of political participation. Moreover, I presuppose that social trust has not only 
this positive direct effect on political involvement per se, but also leads to political efficacy, which 
in turn to a large extent determines whether an individual will embark on political actions or not. 
Thus, political efficacy is defined as an underlying mechanism (mediating variable) between social 
trust and political participation. The underlying reasoning for these hypotheses arises from the 
following two theoretical assumptions.   
 My first assumption is based on the ample social capital literature, which acknowledges the 
role of social connectedness for the decision to participate in political life, although cause and result 
are debated (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Almond and Verba, 1963; 1989; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 
1995). It argues that placing social trust in others and receiving it back bounds us with the norms of 
reciprocity: trusting makes us trustworthy and the other way around. For this reason, we feel 
responsibility and a moral duty to be involved in common affairs (Putnam, 1993; Seligman, 1997). I 
have argued that social trust leads individuals to participate in the pursuit of the commons, as trust 
provides us with assurance that political action will be worthwhile, appreciated, and at least 
potentially effective. In return, successful cooperation based on trust gives people satisfaction in 
what they do (Putnam 1993; Fishkin, 1995: 148). Many studies show that social trust stimulates 
participation in civic associations and political processes in general as it overcomes collection 
action problems in producing public goods (Van Deth, 2001; Uslaner and Brown, 2005). This holds 
for electoral, but even more for movement politics, which, at times, could be risky and thus requires 
reliance on other people.  
The ambiguousness of the associations between social trust and different political actions 
leads us to distinguish different forms of political participation. That is to say, I expect that social 
trust might spur political actions differently, depending on the nature of political action. I 
 
differentiate between three forms of political participation, namely, voting, party politics 
(conventional, other than voting) and movement (non-conventional) participation. Although there is 
no clear empirical evidence on how social trust is related to each of these forms of participation, 
based on the latest findings, I presumed that social trust enhances voting and movement 
participation. Yest the relationship of social trust with other institutionalized forms of party politics 
is less evident (Armingeon, 2007; Hooghe and Marien, 2014; Bäck, 2011; Hooghe and Quintelier, 
2014). The argumentation here is that while movement politics is often driven by a sense of 
belonging to a wider community (politicized identity), party politics (except for more routinized 
actions such as voting) relies on the competition of different ideas and values that should be 
pursued.  
My second theoretical assumption refers to the more specific question of my dissertation, 
namely, to what extent (if any) is the effect of social trust on participation mediated by political 
efficacy? This debate centers around social capital and political culture literatures, explaining how 
social trust, as a social attitude, can convert into political skills. Trust is important from the 
perspective that individual’s social environment matters for his/her political inclinations and 
decisions. In other words, the mediation effect would demonstrate that social resources could be 
translated into individual political resources. To my best knowledge, this relationship is 
underresearched; only a few studies illuminate this connection (for instance, Van Deth and 
Scarbrough, 1998; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009; Hsung, 2014; Anderson, 2010).  
This dissertation distinguishes between external and internal dimensions of political efficacy 
(Lane, 1959; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991). External efficacy, or the feeling that “my voice is 
heard” by the government, leads to more institutionalized forms of participation, like voting and 
party politics. Internal efficacy, or the conviction that I am capable to make a difference, fosters any 
kind of political activity, be it party or movement politics. Drawing on the literature, I consider two 
indirect (mediated) positive effects of trust on participation. First, while trusting, people more likely 
acquire political knowledge and information in general about the subjects to be acted on and the 
methods to employ such actions (the effect on internal efficacy). Moreover, trust empowers us 
politically as we believe that institutions we deal with are fair and people we trust are going to 
behave by the rules. If we are sure that the rules are not going to be violated, we feel more certain 
about the effectiveness of involvement in political life (the effect of external efficacy).  
However, it is not clear from the scholarly literature and the available empirical evidence 
whether what applies to advanced democracies in terms of democratic developments is also 
appropriate to the post-communist region. Only some scarce evidence on how trust contributes (or 
not) to citizens’ political involvement in post-communist societies can be detected. Mierina (2011) 
and Barnes and Simon (1998) conclude that social trust has a positive impact on participation in a 
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few post-communist societies, suggesting that the effect of trust on political activity is related to a 
country’s level of democraticness. On the other hand, Letki (2003), Letki and Evans (2005), 
Uslaner (2004) find no positive or no significant effect of social trust on political activities.  
The lack of empirical support for the association between social trust and political 
participation could be due to the fact that the nature of trust in post-communist societies is 
significantly distinctive. I have elaborated this notion in chapter 3. I have pointed out that different 
authors argue that social trust was heavily impaired due to the destructive effects of the communist 
regime and traumatic experiences of the post-communist transformation (Sztompka, 1999; Mishler 
and Rose, 1997; Bădescu and Uslaner, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Imbrasaitė, 2004). Referring to 
Howard (2002: 161-163), we might assume that social trust is not connected to political 
engagement in post-communist countries because of the weak civil societies that result from 1) the 
legacy of distrust in communist organizations; 2) post-communist disappointment; 3) the 
persistence of family and friendship-based networks that replaces generalized sense of social trust. 
To elaborate more on these points, negative experiences with communist organizations escalated 
distrust in the current organizations. People are not willing to join organizations and thus have no 
ability to learn civic democratic skills, flourish social trust and generalized morality, as it is 
presumed by social capital theories. Second, peoples’ social trust was arguably even more gravely 
undermined during the post-communist transition. Increased inequality, widespread crime and 
corruption, and struggle for survival in a very hostile economic environment left little room for 
collective aspirations, shared idealistic goals and values. Finally, social trust is disconnected from 
political engagement as individuals’ satisfy their social needs not in voluntary organizations (as it is 
the case in many Western societies), but in their own private/family circles. People in post-
communist societies do not learn trusting others in associations, they prefer not to join association 
and thus this stepping stone mechanism between social trust and participation is missing (Letki, 
2003). 
Moreover, social trust in post-communist democracies lacks attitudes based on good will 
and mostly relies on “strategically egoistic” attitudes in order to fulfill one’s needs. This perception 
of social trust has become pervasively and robustly attached to rational calculations as a result of 
being exposed by constant fear (for instance, Bartuškaitė and Žilys, 2011; Markova, 2004). This is 
why social trust did not generalize to wider societal levels and, consequently, why post-communist 
citizens restrain from being active in political life. However, it also holds true that if fear was the 
main factor distracting people from politics, now the apathy, instead of fear, takes its turn and leads 
to political alienations. Apathy is a legacy of fear and a lack of generalized morality.  
Having discussed these theoretical aspects, we inevitably direct our attention not only to the 
individual-level effects (chapter 4), but also to the contexts individuals are nested in (chapter 5). 
 
Why are people in some countries more politically active than in others, or putting it differently, 
why the inclination of post-communist citizens to participate in political life is systematically lower 
compared with people living in mature democracies? Explanations can be grouped in two broad 
perspectives: (1) because of a different composition of a society (e.g. there are fewer highly 
educated, richer and socially trusting people living in post-communist countries and therefore the 
average levels of participation of these countries are lower); (2) contextual economic, political and 
cultural factors shape individual’s willingness to engage in politics. Chapter 5 offered the contextual 
layer of explaining political participation, focusing on inequality, and economic growth (Van Deth 
and Elff, 2004; Schroeder, 2008; Christensen, 2011; Hooghe and Marien, 2013), corruption 
(Olsson, 2014; Kostadinova, 2003), institutional effectiveness and experience of democracy (Van 
der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; Vráblíková, 2014). I assert that these predictors 
disentangle the equivocal concept of “post-communism”, which is often untenably used as a 
dummy variable. In addition, I also consider a cultural account which describes “post-communism” 
as a general atmosphere of social distrust. The role of this cultural interpretation of political 
participation is emphasized by Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995) and more recent ones, for 
instance, Bäck (2011), Norris (2002a), Rothstein (2011), Kim (2014). Thus, one of the aims of this 
dissertation was to cut into the question whether the level of contextual social trust (the average 
level of social trust in a country) significantly shapes political participation. I tested whether the 
contextual economic, political and cultural factors, that express the experiences of post-communist 
citizens, can explain the remarkable “divergence” of post-communist societies from mature 
democracies with regard to participation that we observe in cross-national datasets. If so, certain 
characteristics of countries condition the relationship between important individual characteristics 
and political participation. For instance, a higher income could perhaps lead to more participation in 
Western democracies, but decrease participation in post-communist countries.  
As I have already mentioned, the dissertation aimed to fulfil some empirical gaps. The 
novelty of this study lies in its discovery of (1) mediation effects of different dimensions of political 
efficacy between social trust and political participation in two different country-sets, namely, 
mature and post-communist democracies; (2) contextual effect of social trust and cross-level 
interaction effects of individual social trust and societal characteristics on the individual propensity 
to participate in politics. Referring to the first point, the existing research has been scarce and not of 
the comparative manner. These attitudinal values are rarely connected in the literature. Moreover, 
the limitation of the global survey data is that they often not accurately operationalize the 
dimensions of political efficacy. Fortunately, I had the opportunity to use the Lithuanian post-
election survey 2012 data and employ accurate measurements of internal and external efficacy, as it 
is done in the American National Survey (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991). This allowed me not 
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only to operationalize the variables, but also to accurately analyze the mediation effects between 
social trust and political participation (chapter 6).  
Regarding the second point, another added value of this study is the detailed analysis of the 
contextual effect of social trust. Do people who live in socially trusting environments participate 
more often, over and above the individual effect of social trust? And does individual social trust 
affect political participation significantly different in less trusting post-communist societies? The 
literature does not give clear answers to these questions, leaving an empirical lacuna in the 
scholarship of political participation. Scrutinizing social trust as a societal characteristic provides 
more insight in the trends of political participation and the means to enhance it. This is what my 
dissertation was about. 
 
7.2 Overview of the results  
 
The first part of the empirical study (chapter 4) focused on the impact of social trust on political 
participation at the individual level, taking two country-sets – mature and post-communist 
democracies – in a comparative view. Chapters 2 and 3 have given theoretical support to the 
argument that social trust positively affects political participation directly and moreover mediates 
via external and internal political efficacy. The results showed that social capital theories largely 
hold true: social trust is indeed positively related with all forms of political participation. 
First, I found that there is a direct significant effect of social trust on the propensity to vote 
in mature and post-communist democracies. Additional analyses also demonstrated that the effect 
of social trust on voting is positive and significant in almost all countries, except for Cyprus, 
Greece, which have mandatory voting system, and Latvia. However, voting is the most routinized 
mean of participation (especially in mature democracies), thus the positive association between 
social trust and voting might reflect the outcomes of socio-economic and political developments.  
Second, when it comes to other party-politics activities (beyond voting), we again observed 
very similar patterns between mature and post-communist democracies: social trust has a positive 
and significant direct effect on party politics participation in both country-sets. However, more 
detailed analyses show that there is more variation in this regard within countries. For instance, in 
nine countries (out of 27 cases) I found negative connections – interestingly enough, five of these 
nine countries are Western post-authoritarian or post-communist democracies. So it also might be 
true that social trust is not necessary an attribute of someone getting actively involved in political 
parties and campaigning.   
Third, participation in movement politics also fits in this general pattern: socially trusting 
people tend to protest more in both country-sets, although the effect is somewhat weaker in post-
 
communist societies. Additional analyses for each country separately also demonstrate that the 
association between movement politics and social trust is generally positive. Thus we can conclude 
that movement politics indeed inherits the logic of civic participation: more socially trusting people 
tend to join the more alternative and elite-challenging activities.  
To sum up, the observed positive effects of social trust on different forms of political 
participation lend support for the social capital theories and perhaps even fortify (with some 
exceptions) its universal applicability. 
By the same token, I investigated whether the relationship between social trust and the 
forms of political participation is mediated by internal and external efficacy and whether these 
causal relationships differ between mature and post-communist European democracies. The pattern 
of social trust affecting individual’s inclination to vote is comparatively similar in both country-
groups, however, there are some notable exceptions to this general conclusion. Although I found a 
significant positive mediation effect of political trust (proxy of external efficacy in the ESS dataset) 
on voting in both mature and post-communist democracies, the same claim does not hold for 
political awareness (proxy of internal efficacy). Put it differently, socially trusting people vote 
because they tend to be politically trusting. However, voters who are socially trusting, do not 
necessarily feel politically aware: the exerted effect of political awareness plays an independent role 
above and beyond social trust. Hence, political awareness has no mediating effect in neither post-
communist nor mature democracies. 
Interestingly enough, a similar mediation effect (of external efficacy) is also observed for 
other forms of party politics participation (that not include voting) in post-communist societies, 
while in mature democracies it only exists for voting. Political trust does not (at least significantly) 
influence participation in party politics activities in mature democracies, but it does so in post-
communist democracies. Thus we can conclude that the role of social trust in political engagement 
(by fostering external efficacy, which in turn enhances participation) is more important in the post-
communist region.  
The direct effect of social trust on movement participation is positive, but at the same time 
the direct effect of political trust (proxy of external efficacy in the ESS dataset) is negative in both 
country-sets. In other words, citizens need to trust others in order to express their demands by 
protesting, but at the same time distrust their politicians.  
Political awareness (proxy of internal efficacy) positively affects movement politics, but is 
not a mediator either. Thus the results support my assumption that in movement politics, an 
individual indeed relies on his/her fellow citizens. This holds for both mature and post-communist 
countries. However, the results are conditional. For instance, additional analyses in each country 
reveal that social trust has no significant effect on movement politics in 7 post-communist societies 
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out of 12, whereas this link is more significant in mature (not post-authoritarian) European 
democracies (Table A5 in Appendix). This insight is also supported by Lithuanian data.  
All in all, the relationship between social trust, political efficacy and the types of 
participation are, with a few exceptions, more or less the same in the East and West. It means that, 
at the individual level, post-communist citizens’ decision to participate in politics is driven by the 
same socio-economic resources, perceptions of social trust and efficacy, and associational 
engagement that determine voter turnout in the mature democracies. Western models of political 
participation work relatively well for voting turnout and movement participation in new 
democracies. 
As the descriptive analyses in chapters 4 and 5 revealed that the levels of political 
participation in post-communist societies are low, in the second empirical part of this dissertation 
(chapter 5) the focus of attention was shifted to the possible explanations why citizens in post-
communist democracies engage less actively in politics. What factors – individual or societal– are 
more important in determining citizens’ political participation? Does the context shape individuals’ 
readiness to embark on political actions? I tested individual and contextual predictors of 
participation by conducting multi-level regressions. Given the fact that the empirical evidence 
shows there are persistent differences in the quality of democracy, political and civic culture 
between Western and Eastern European societies, apart from already tested individual-level 
variables, a set of contextual explanations was included – namely, economic, political and cultural 
components that in all define the “stage” of post-communism.  
 The multi-level analyses revealed compositional effects on the levels of participation. This 
means that the observed country differences in political activeness can be partly explained by 
different distributions of individual characteristics between countries. I found that almost all 
individual factors I included in this study predict voting. However, this is not very surprising, 
keeping in mind that voting is the most routinized form of political participation, so all the attitudes 
assigned to a good citizenry increase the odds of going to the ballot. But “being a good citizen” not 
necessarily refers only to voting.  Differently from voting, citizens’ perceived financial situation 
does not determine whether a citizen would embark on party-politics activities or movement 
politics. Put it differently, protest actions are taken by both rich and poor people, as far as 
someone’s subjective perception of wealth is concerned. 
More importantly, social trust is generally linked positively to voting and participation in 
movement politics, even when controlling for other factors. For other party politics activities social 
trust, however, renders a non-significant negative effect and this complies with other research (for 
instance, Van der Meer, 2009; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014). Among all individual level predictors, 
nonetheless, political interest and social embeddedness are the most pronounced variables. Yet, it 
 
remains unclear whether this latter variable does not indeed measure the different side of the “same 
coin”. Participation in (other than political) organizations might be considered as a dependent 
variable to be explained, rather than causal factor that precedes political activity. It is furthermore 
worth noting that religious attendance, unlike social embeddedness, refrains citizens from 
protesting. In the wider context, it could also explain why more traditional societies with a bigger 
proportion of religious people are less active in unconventional participation. In contrast, more 
secular and post-materialist societies express higher levels of protests activities (Norris, 2002b; 
Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 2006).   
The country level characteristics remain very important for both institutionalized and non-
institutionalized participation. Even two decades after democratic transition, the post-communist 
countries clearly expose lower levels of political participation that cannot be explained by 
individual level factors only. The multilevel analysis shows that not only fewer years of democracy 
(or authoritarian history) is important, but also corruption, lack of effective government and 
economic backwardness have a negative effect on political participation levels. Moreover, 
contextual social trust proved to be positively related with being active in movement and party 
politics. More generally, my findings indicate that the cultural and institutional contextual aspects 
were less relevant for predicting voting and institutionalized participation, but it in particular 
accounted for participation in movement politics.  
Voting is an interesting case and an exception from other means of participation. The 
analysis showed that none of the various contextual indicators explain cross-national differences in 
voting in Europe. Only societal inequality makes a difference: in more unequal societies people go 
to the ballots less.  
Furthermore, my research focused on the interplay between social trust, forms of political 
participation, and the context, understood as cultural, socio-economic, and institutional aspects. The 
most remarkable finding concerned the interaction between the contextual circumstances and social 
trust in shaping political participation. The results showed that the effect of social trust on 
participation is moderated by the societal context. For instance, the interplay between individual 
and contextual social trust has a significant effect on voting, party politics activities and protesting. 
The socio-economic and political-institutional aspects (GDP, government effectiveness, corruption, 
democratic experience), also proved to be relevant: they also shape the effect of social trust on the 
propensity to be active in the political activities under consideration. In more trustful, prosperous 
and advanced societies, social trust has a stronger positive effect on voting. Involvement in 
institutionalized politics is negatively related with social trust, and this negative association is 
stronger in unprosperous and dishonest societies.  
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Finally, the results showed that social trust stimulates protest participation, and this effect is 
stronger in societies that are less socially trustful, less affluent, more corrupt, have less effective 
governments, and a shorter democratic legacy. Taking this particular context of the study into 
account, in post-communist societies the merit of social trust on protest participation is generally 
more pronounced: in these countries an increase in social trust motivates citizens to involve in 
movement activities more vigorously compared to people from Western democracies who increase 
the same amount of social trust.   
Although the societal context matters, the specific effect of post-communism is difficult to 
pin down, because many important variables (like corruption and social trust) correlate so strongly 
with each other. Therefore, one cannot easily single out only one contextual effect. Obviously, post-
communism comprises a whole set of interrelated dimensions and it is difficult to disentangle all the 
context level variables. Consequently, it is difficult to unreservedly answer the question which 
factors are responsible for disenchantment from politics: did people return to the communist-era 
habits and political apathy, or does this process more accurately reflect the economic and political 
developments and disappointment with democratic transformation? The latter refers for instance to 
the fact that the effort of participation has not been rewarded by better living conditions. 
The last part of this research investigated the relationship between social trust, political 
efficacy and political participation in post-communist Lithuania (chapter 6). The extensive 
Lithuanian post-electoral dataset could solve the limitations of the ESS 2008 data and provide the 
accurate measurements of internal and external political efficacy. So it allowed scrutinizing 
mediating relationships in more detail.  
More generally, Lithuanians can be described as low social trusters, feeling helpless about 
political decisions and relatively passive in political participation. That is to say, Lithuania 
possesses the attributes of a political culture typically found in post-communist countries 
(Matonytė, 2004; Ramonaitė, 2006b; 2007; Žiliukaitė et al., 2006; Imbrasaitė, 2008). These aspects 
of political culture suggest indeed why the levels of political participation in Lithuania are low.  
My results showed that social trust is indeed positively associated with citizens’ propensity 
to vote, but it is not significant for other party politics activities. Regarding the mediation effects, 
social trust leads to voting via both external efficacy and political trust. In other words, social trust 
also determines whether a citizen in Lithuania trusts the institutions and whether s/he considers 
these institutions being responsive to peoples’ needs. So in this regard, when it comes to voting, 
social trust and political trust are related categories.  
The connection between social trust and internal political efficacy of voters is less clear, 
especially if I control for political information and political interest of the respondents. If I exclude 
these two variables, internal political efficacy plays indeed a mediating role between social trust and 
 
participation in voting. The question here remains to what extent political interest and political 
information could be considered as a part of internal political efficacy. Either way, the results 
suggest that it is reasonable to distinguish between subjective and more objective political 
knowledge/skills: political interest and internal political efficacy might form one single variable, 
while political information should be entered as an independent dimension.  
Movement politics is again an interesting case. There is no direct effect of social trust on 
this type of political participation, in contrast with my findings in chapter 4. Yet, the results showed 
that both internal and external efficacy considerably spur social movement activities. The mediation 
analysis revealed that the indirect effects of social trust on protesting via both internal and external 
efficacy are significant. The results are somewhat contradicting the dominant theoretical assumption 
that external efficacy makes people refrain from movement participation. Contrarily, I found that 
people, who feel that the Lithuanian government is responsive, tend to protest. This contradicting 
finding can be explained by the fact that when it comes to protesting, external efficacy and political 
trust, work in different directions:  perceived responsiveness leads to activism, while at the same 
time my findings suggest that political distrust yields apathy. One does not necessarily trust political 
institutions, but still tends to believe that government might respond to the citizens’ demands or 
average citizens can influence it. 
Moreover, it is worth observing that although social trust has no direct impact on movement 
politics, I found a highly significant effect of embeddedness. In a broader view, the findings imply 
that formal social networks are apparently not connected to a sense of social trust. I showed in the 
descriptive analysis that the relationship between these two variables is very weak, if not non-
existent. Social trust is not associated with participation in two other formal networks either, namely 
trade unions and religious communities. 
To sum up the results based on the Lithuanian dataset, we see that in a comparative view, 
protesters are apparently not the same type of people as those who take part in conventional politics. 
Social trust is indeed positively related to political trust, but the latter actually seems to decrease, 
rather than increase participation in movement politics.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that my analysis revealed strong empirical evidence for the 
argument that social embeddedness is tremendously important for any kind of political 
participation. Civic engagement strongly affects the odds of individuals to be involved in political 
activities. And the opposite is also true: the lack of political engagement in Lithuania is caused by a 
lack of civic engagement. As Žiliukaitė (2006: 28) notices, people in Lithuania often choose 
“freedom not to participate” in any civic and political actions. And the main reasons for that are the 
lack of interest, the lack of resources and the absence of mobilizing agents. Moreover, people in 
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Lithuania tend to embark on individualist, but not collectivist civic/political actions (Imbrasaitė, 
2008). That would explain why the role of trust for civic activities is limited.  
The findings of chapters 4 and 6 concerning the causal model are in summarized in Figures 
7.1-7.3 below. 
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Figure 7.1 Summary of findings (Lithuania, chapter 6) 
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Figure 7.2 Summary of findings (mature democracies, chapter 4) 
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Figure 7.3 Summary of findings (post-communist democracies, chapter 4) 
 
 
7.3 Discussion and wider relevance of the findings 
 
In this section, I discuss three points of interest that arise from the empirical results. The first point 
relates to neo-Tocquevillean social capital theory and the applicability of it to the post-communist 
context. The second point refers to the cultural/moral implications of social trust. My third point 
considers a wider context of post-communist transformation and its perspectives from the cultural 
point of view. 
First, although I found a positive relationship between social trust and political participation 
in most of the countries, at least for voting, this link is still debatable for movement politics, 
especially in the post-communist context. This concern is also empirically supported by Lithuanian 
data: this case suggests that social trust is not a resource that spurs protest participation, or at least 
the role of social trust as a collective resource is debatable. The possible explanation for this is that, 
when we consider post-authoritarian and post-communist societies, we should take not only 
generalized, but also particularized trust (thick relations between people) into account. Under the 
perception of a risky environment, individuals might very well be mobilized on the basis of 
particularized trust, rather than generalized trust (Ramonaitė, 2011; McAdam, 1986). Although the 
political situation in Lithuania, like other EU post-communist societies, de jure (and de facto) is not 
threatening for human rights and freedoms, the fear inherited from totalitarian experiences hampers 
bottom-up initiatives that are mostly based on generalized social trust and altruism.  
I emphasize the relationship between social trust and movement politics participation 
purposely, as it indeed provokes the discussion to what extent social trust is a collective resource. 
While voting is considered to be an individual action (you cast a ballot as a single person and your 
preferences may remain confidential, if your wish), while participation in movement politics is a 
manifestation of a collective action and often requires courage and reliance on other social actors. 
Social movements literature emphasizes that indeed, non-institutionalized/protest politics follow the 
same causal pattern as participation in civic associations, that is, socially trusting people join civic 
associations, they learn habits of cooperation, and they transfer these habits and skills to the 
political realm (Stolle, 1996; Maloney and Van Deth, 2010; Van Deth, 2001). I observed this 
connection in Lithuania: social trust enhances protest, because it increases internal and external 
efficacy. However, the total effect of social trust on protest is absent, because it likely also leads to 
political trust, which, in turn, diminishes protest participation. Equally interesting, is the fact, that 
social embeddedness, be it in mature democracies and post-communist countries, taken together, 
and Lithuania, taken solely, has a prominent effect on movement politics participation. More 
specifically, with social embeddedness, I do not mean labour union activities (that somewhat 
complies or even replicates activities of movement politics) or religious attendance, but 
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membership in other (than political) associations. It leads us to the remarkable observation that 
social trust is not connected to social embeddedness (and protest politics), questioning the validity 
of neo-Tocquevillean approach.  
The Lithuanian case indeed proves that there is little evidence that social trust is connected 
to social embeddedness; and this could be applicable to a broader post-communist context (Rose-
Ackerman, 2001; Uslaner, 2004; Karakoc, 2013; Matonytė, 2004). It could be, first, because of the 
nature of post-communist societies and the legacies of the communist regime. Formal associations 
were subordinated to the communist party or secretly served as a shelter against the system and thus 
generated suspicious feelings towards strangers (Kavaliauskaitė and Ramonaitė, 2011). Thus both 
formal and informal organizations were functioning on the basis of particularized, but not social 
trust, and these legacies might very well have been transferred to the contemporary society. The 
second possible reason why trust and embeddedness are not connected refers to the observation that 
different activities of movement politics reflect the variance in the motivations. It might be that 
protests in Lithuania (and other post-communist societies) attract less socially trusting people. As 
we know from social movements literature, participants in elite-challenging activities are driven by 
universalistic (or post-materialistic) or particularistic (or materialistic) values. Protesters that are 
primed with post-materialist values are aimed at the causes emphasizing peace and justice instead of 
material goods. However, citizens in post-communist societies are not yet sufficiently well-off to 
become post-materialists, but they rather possess materialistic values of survival (Uslaner, 2004). 
The disillusionment with the socio-economic developments refrain citizens from activities based on 
the altruistic behaviour and social trust, since their motivation to participate is driven by more 
pressing survival (and particularistic) issues. This type of activists are usually low trusters, because 
their social trust was not only impaired by the communist regime, but even more damaged during 
the post-communist transition.   
Adding to that, we might also consider the specific character of memberships in 
organizations in post-communist societies, which are still encumbered with the communist legacy 
and thus weakly linked with political and civic culture (Sedláčková and Šafr, 2009).  I presuppose 
that civic organizations in post-communist societies are still not likely to generate trust in strangers. 
It could be due to the authoritarian nature of these organizations and lack of democratic decision-
making processes within them. This especially applies to so-called “old” associations with path 
dependency inherited from the communist regime, so to say, with the formal and somehow 
profitable purpose of the membership (as trade unions and some leisure-time associations).  
All in all, these observations are tendencies, but not the general rule of the whole post-
communist region. The problem is conditional as the analyses yield slightly different results in 
different countries on how social trust is related to movement politics. In this discussion, I mainly 
 
referred to the Lithuanian context. However, as discussed in previous section, the pooled sample of 
the countries and multi-level analysis revealed that social trust is indeed important for someone to 
engage in protest politics, and it becomes even more relevant in more corrupt, less institutionally 
and socio-economically developed societies. Thus the weakness of the link between social trust and 
movement politics is debatable.  
The second point also refers to the interpretation of the link between social trust and 
political efficacy, or so to say, the implications of social trust. The empirical evidence made it clear 
that social trust is intrinsically connected to our perception of the external world, or to be more 
specific, of the political system. Quite interestingly, we observe that socially trusting people are 
indeed more politically trusting and politically efficacious. That is, social trust leads (or is 
connected) to a general inclination that political institutions can be trusted and these institutions are 
responsive to people’s demands. This observation is in line with the culturalist theories stating that 
social and political trust are related categories, and the latter one does not necessarily depends on 
the evaluations of political outcomes.  If this holds true, the merits of social trust in post-communist 
societies cannot be overrated: it would not only bring about the solidarity of the people, but also 
bring those people closer to the political institutions. From the perspective of social capital theories, 
the fact that social trust enhances external political efficacy indeed leads us to the question “in what 
way or how social trust spurs political participation?” It does so because socially trusting people 
think that they can influence political institutions.  
But there is another side of the connection between social trust and political efficacy: 
namely, the side of internal political efficacy. We learned that social trust does generally not lead to 
political awareness, in neither post-communist nor mature democracies, neither in the context of 
voting, nor protesting. The more refined Lithuanian analysis also revealed that social trust is not 
strongly associated with internal political efficacy, particularly when we control for political interest 
and knowledge. The analysis has relevance for the consideration of the nature of social trust. The 
idea here is twofold: one, that socially trusting people not necessarily gain political skills (for 
instance, via organizations), and, flowing from that, social trust is not necessarily driven by the 
rationale of intelligence, or by something you learn. As Sztompka (1999) observes, social trust is 
not only an individual, but also a cultural phenomenon and is thus both intuitively and rationally 
grounded. You cannot learn it on the rational basis solely, but yet it can develop and grow in 
reaction to positive experiences. In post-communist societies, the variation of social trust levels 
among the people generally reflects the positions of “winners” and “losers” of post-communist 
democratic transformation, as well as views about the world and the humanity in general. Thus 
social trust has many facets and it is scientifically challenging to interpret its implications for 
political systems.   
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The third point of the discussion refers to the interpretation of the departure from 
communism or how culturalist theories, including ones about social trust, could be helpful to 
understand the process of democratization and of democratic consolidation. The leading theories of 
post-communism are centered around the so-called transitologist paradigm, which stems from the 
experiences of transition in Southern Europe and Latin America. It regards the post-communist 
region as a certain experiment-field suitable to “solve the problems of Western societies” 
(Przeworski, 1991; di Palma, 1990; 1991; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986; Huntington, 
1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996). The notion of transition itself suggests that the process of 
democratization is conceptually teleological, progressive, expressed with a clear linear course and 
the predictable results, where institutions play the main role, leaving cultural aspects behind the 
scenes (Przeworski, 1991; Berdahl, 2000: 2; Kollmorgen, 2013). This paradigm asserts that 
democratization of institutions leads to a democratic political culture, or, put it differently: the 
institutional consolidation would have a “spill-over” effect on civic and political society, assuming 
a  causal link between the new economic relations and other aspects of transformation, like 
behavioural patterns and attitudes (Illner, 1996). 
However, the real practice of post-communist societies shows that the transition model is 
not capable of explaining the pathways and outcomes of democratization. That is why Carothers 
(2002) in his seminal article proclaimed the end of the transition paradigm. He argues that 
transitional thinking is not appropriate in trying to understand the developments and peculiarities of 
post-communist societies, underestimating the social and cultural legacies of communism. The 
implantation of institutions and rules from one socio-cultural setting to another inevitably created a 
gap between the establishment and the citizens: on the one hand, post-communist societies have 
institutions that are supposed to function on participatory attitudes and inclusive social orientations; 
on the other hand, most citizens are not yet ready to participate, as they need to “learn” democracy. 
Although in the procedural democracy citizens have more individual freedom and could seek for 
more political rights, paradoxically they do not miss these rights and do not fight for them (Kuolys, 
2010). Low levels of peoples’ involvement in the CEE countries leads to the risk of “selective 
democracy”, in which political elites adopt exclusionary policies in order to overrule political 
competition. That is, the withdrawal of citizens from the political processes creates the opportunity 
for political elites to mobilize the radicalized voters and exclude the potentially rival groups from 
political life and thus endanger democracy (Varga and Freyberg-Inan, 2012). In sum, political 
disengagement leads to the “exclusionism” of the political elite, which in turn produces political 
distrust and escalates dissatisfaction with democracy. This inverse circulation locks down the 
political process, therefore it is so important to study what bring people both to the ballots and to 
the streets to express and defend their grievances and demands.  
 
The historical and sociological debate about social trust and civil society in general deepen 
our comprehension of post-communist societies and their chosen “freedom” not to participate in 
politics. Moreover, the cultural insight might be helpful to understand why post-communist 
transformation is cyclical, rather than linear. It goes with interruptions, frustration, drawbacks and is 
exposed by open-ended consequences (Bunce, 2003). Thus the scenarios of transformation cannot 
be predicted, as some elements of democratization might be deconstructed and deformed (Norkus, 
2008: 317). It holds for all post-communist societies, both inside and outside the EU. In 
democratically consolidated post-communist societies (the EU members) transformation resulted in 
varieties of capitalism, in which cultural factors, including social trust, plays a huge role. In fact, 
Norkus (2008) argues, cultural factors are responsible for the success of the implementation of 
different forms of capitalism and the pathways the countries are developing (diverging from or 
converging with the Western mature democracies). In this Weberian-based view, institutions are 
shaped by culture, and democracy as well as market economy needs to be culturally embedded 
(Pollack, 2003: xvi). 
Different authors also argue that cultural factors and the absence of democratic political 
values accounts for the failed democratization of the non-EU post-communist countries, or at least 
add to the institutional explanations why some countries, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
others, get ‘frozen” in their democratization process and end up in permanent political instability 
(Šatūnienė, 2006). One cultural explanation, among others, could be that for instance, family-based 
and particularized networks of social trust prevented the development of full-fledged politically 
orientated civil society that could resist and vigilantly thwart the non-democratic regime. The lack 
of generalized trust, instead, makes people more reliant on their families and submissive to their 
authorities, for, they cannot make a change, but to comply.     
In sum, although the new behavioral models were also introduced within the process of 
democratization, it did not utterly replace the communist mentality. Rather the communist legacies 
were absorbed by the new models, but still maintain the significant influence on them. During the 
transition communist legacies clearly did not vanish. It remained vital in the behavioral patterns, 
attitudes, perceptions, values. Post-communism is an integral narrative of past, present and future. 
In its essence, Sztompka (2004: 171) says, transformation is the traumatic process, since it ruptures 
culture from the background of the old system. The new system requires from individuals the new 
set of civilizational competences – rules, norms, values, habits, orientations and codes that frame 
the ground of the modern social structures (Sztompka, 1993: 89). Thus transformation is a deep 
mental process, which is shaped not only by institutions and formal rules. As Dahrendorf 
metaphorically describes, democratization runs at three different paces: “The hour of the lawyer” is 
the shortest; legal changes can be enacted in months. “The hour of the economist” is longer; 
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dismantling command economies and establishing functioning markets must take years. But the 
longest is “the hour of the citizens’; transforming ingrained habits, mental attitudes, cultural codes, 
value systems and pervasive discourses. This may take decades and presents the greatest 
challenge” (Dahrendorf, 1990).  
 
7.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
Despite its contributions, the dissertation has a number of limitations and shortcomings, which will 
be discussed in this section, as well as suggestions for future research that may fill the gaps this 
study leaves.  
Firstly, as it was already mentioned several times, one of the shortages in the study was 
unavailability of accurate operationalization of external and internal political efficacy in the ESS 
2008 data. Due to this limitation, I have used the measure of political trust as a proxy of external 
efficacy and political awareness as a proxy of internal efficacy (cf. Hooghe and Marien, 2013).The 
more detailed measurement of these items using Lithuanian post-electoral survey data indicates that 
external efficacy is not the same as political trust and can even work in different directions (for 
instance, for movement politics), whereas political awareness indeed comes very close to internal 
political efficacy. However, more exact operationalization of these variables in global surveys 
would allow us to learn more about the nature of internal and external efficacy and how these 
categories are related to social trust. Similarly, to what extent external political efficacy mediates 
between social trust and voting, and, more intriguingly, movement politics? So apart from only 
looking at political trust which is at work here, it would be expedient to also include the proper 
measurement of external political efficacy, at it is defined in American post-electoral survey 
(Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991), and to compare countries in this regard. 
The second point refers to the diversification of political activities, especially of movement 
politics, when considering the relationship of these activities with social trust. More particularly, the 
question here arises: what kind of protests and demonstrations people participate in? Are these 
protests driven by universalistic or paternalistic motifs? How social trust relates to each kind of 
these activities? Some research, for instance, by Sedláčková and Šafr (2009) in Czech Republic, 
show that social trust is positively linked to only one kind of movement politics, namely, donating, 
which commonly flows from the altruistic motifs. What are the patterns of different kind of protest 
actions in post-communist and mature democracies? This question still remains unanswered due to 
the limitations of most of the global datasets (including the ESS and EVS). It is also due to the 
difficulties to methodologically categorize protests (“taxonomy of the protests”), assigning them to 
specific issues (especially, based on cross-country data). Efforts to classify protests and the motives 
 
of protesters are recorded in more Western environments (for instance, the “Caught in the act of 
protest: Contextualizing Contestation” project (see more: Van Stekelenburg et al., 2012), whereas 
post-communist societies are less investigated in this respect. Therefore, future research should 
distinguish between the issues protests and demonstrations are centred around.  
Furthermore, related to that, the third limitation is that the study ignored the supply-side, 
that is – organizations and political parties – and focused on the demand side, or 
preferences/attitudes of people. Due to the data limitations the study cannot give an answer about 
what type of organizations mobilize for social movements in different countries. Moreover, do 
associations generate generalized social trust and how they differ in this account? Is it true that 
“old” (stemming from the communist regime) organizations escalate only particularized trust or 
distrust towards others, whereas new, more post-materialist-driven associations enhance a 
generalized sense of social trust? Another aspect of the demand side is of course politicians and 
political parties. When we talk about social trust and efficacy, we can phrase the problem of lack of 
participation in two ways: people feel helpless or politicians are not listening (cf. Hay, 2007). The 
study did not aim at elaborating the hypothesis that people are not efficacious because politicians 
are not responsive or parties are not adjusting to their demands. So the future research could focus 
more on the “weaknesses” of post-communist governments and how it is reflected in levels of 
citizens’ political helplessness or why citizens’ initiatives are being ignored. The issue is worrisome 
and worth investigating because non-responsiveness of a government tend to lead to more 
aggressive political actions, while common citizens become politically outrageous and apathetic 
(Foley and Edwards, 1996). These developments become more apparent in the political scenes of 
post-communist societies. 
The fourth shortage of the analysis addresses the more thorough analysis of social trust 
based on longitudinal data. Has the pattern of the relationship between social trust and political 
participation changed over the years of democratization in post-communist societies? Is social trust 
becoming more and more important for political participation? Or is the relationship more or less 
stable? The question is especially interesting if we consider the remarkable fluctuations of levels of 
voting and protesting during the transition years, and especially compared to the Revolutions of 
1988-1991. This unique historical moment is in particular intriguing to be investigated. On the one 
hand, the post-communist region experienced huge protests and massive involvement in elections. 
But on the other hand, citizens operated on a soil of low social capital in Putnamian way: “Many of 
the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and 
totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital” (Putnam, 1993: 183). So this 
question remains for follow-up study: does only generalized social trust lead to political 
participation, or can political activeness also arise from particularized, in-group social trust, as some 
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authors, for instance, Ramonaitė (2011), argue? Although the particularized trust is more difficult to 
measure, the attention could be drawn on the mobilization agents of protest politics in post-
communist societies. Adding to that, the specific interest lies in the comparative study in the 
importance of the type of social trust (thick/particularized or thin/generalized) for mobilizing people 
in mature and post-communist democracies.  
Not directly touched here in this dissertation is the issue of longitudinal data measuring of 
the same issues. A fruitful avenue for future research is to investigate how social trust and political 
efficacy reinforce each other. Does social trust lead to efficacy or the other way around? The same 
could be applied for social trust and political participation. How political engagement leads to social 
trust? Is it true that the more people participate, the more they become efficacious and socially 
trusting? To illustrate this issue of a longitudinal analysis of civic and political values to the case of 
Lithuanians: how do they change and how does it reflect the process of democratization? Based on 
the Lithuanian post-electoral survey, we see that the mean of social trust indeed increases for those 
who are younger (Appendix C2). It gives us hope that with the generational change people will 
become more socially trusting and thus more willing to participate in politics. However, we cannot 
really see if the same individuals elaborate stronger feelings of social trust in a democratic society 
compared to the years spent under communism. 
The fifth limitation deals with the emigration and nationalism. First, how the problem of 
emigration in Eastern Europe affects the levels of participation? Let me illustrate this again with the 
Lithuanian case. The recent elections revealed that indeed the percentage of voters residing in 
foreign countries is very low and equals only around 4-5 percent of all emigrated citizens that are 
eligible to vote. So it could very well be that the low turnout of elections in Lithuania is partly due 
to the fact that emigrants are not actively involved in political life. However, the problem of 
emigration should not be overestimated keeping in mind that the sample of Lithuanian post-
electoral data, which comprises citizens living in Lithuania, yields similar patterns – that is, the 
actual and the reported turnout is comparatively low. Another relevant aspect of discussion which 
this study did not embrace is the national dimension, or how social trust relates to national identity. 
Levels of social trust in a country are also determined by the ethnic composition of the society. In 
other words, it might very well be that social trust in Eastern Europe is lower due to the greater 
ethnic heterogeneity. Social trust refers to the “imagined communities” that, in most cases, are 
nationally based. Thus I would expect that levels of social trust differ between national groups 
within countries. Within Lithuania, for instance, between Lithuanians, Polish and Russians 
(however, the Lithuanian data-set does not reveal significant differences between the minorities, 
although the trend is that the minorities are indeed less social trusting).  
 
Finally, the sixth limitation of my study is related to the applicability of the results to other 
former Soviet countries. Would we find the same patterns between social trust and political 
participation, or do social capital theories work in different ways in less democratically advanced 
societies? The question is particularly pertinent keeping in mind the latest political developments in 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and especially, Ukraine. Future research can investigate the effect of 
social trust in these different political settings. These countries did not yet undergo the institutional 
democratization and the nature as well as the functions of social trust might indeed not transform 
into collective resource: there are other more important factors restraining political participation. 
Paraphrasing Dahrendorf, the “hour of citizen” is still yet to come in these societies: there is a need 
for a lawyer and an economist first before a full-fledged citizen entrenches.  
 
7.5 Implications and concluding remarks 
 
The last point of the discussion asserts the implications of this research for practice. What can for 
instance policy makers, NGO’s, think-tanks learn from this study on political participation in post-
communist societies and Lithuania, and the role of social trust in generating it? How could it be 
applicable in the practical realm, for instance, by political institutions and non-governmental 
associations? The suggestions that derive from my research results are two-folded: directed towards 
the means to increase political participation in post-communist societies in general (for instance, by 
making voting compulsory), and directed more specifically towards the means to increase collective 
political and civic actions that are based on social trust. The latter is more desirable for sustaining a 
full-fledged democracy.  
Concerning the first aspect, the attention should be shifted to the effectiveness of political 
institutions and their responsiveness that would in return empower people politically: make them 
more politically efficacious. The results clearly show that citizens in post-communist societies 
participate less because they feel less efficacious than their counterparts in Western democracies. 
The efforts to increase citizens’ efficacy is both a top-down and bottom-up process. The 
institutional ways refer to the transparency of political decisions, fighting corruption, and creating 
an environment in which common citizens feel that they can make a difference. The bottom-up 
process of strengthening efficacy actually closely relates to the second aspect of the implications: 
how to increase civic actions (and thus political efficacy) based on social trust? The post-communist 
societies would greatly benefit from strengthening the democratic setting and the role of civic 
organizations, changing them to “schools of democracy”, endowing skills of political duties and 
responsibilities. People learn participating by participating. Thus more involvement of the younger 
generation is crucially important, as they participate in politics less. Equally relevant is to 
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democratize the internal environment of organizations, transforming them in more open, more 
cooperative and less conflicting groups. That would attract more citizens willing to invest their time 
outside their family and friends’ circles.  
When it comes to post-communist societies that experienced massive emigration, such as 
Lithuania, the practical advice would be to think of the strategies how to attract emigrated well 
educated and young citizens – living abroad – to contribute to the political processes in the country. 
By well educated and young, I imply that these citizens are primed by post-materialist values and 
would indeed embark on collectivist political actions that are driven by generalized social trust.  
To sum up, refraining from political practices of citizens is an actual concern of post-
communist democracies. Withdrawing from political life also means the rejection to participate in 
the creation of civil society. The communist legacy made people apathetic and even afraid to 
participate or become “too active”, just not to jeopardize their “stable” and “secure” life 
(Dahrendorf, 1990). The paradox remains that withdrawing from political life does not bring about 
the “safety” and “stability” in a democratic system: on the contrary, by being apathetic, citizens 
voluntary give away a part of their political freedoms (Genys, 2012: 133 - 134). Thus instead of 
trying to improve their living conditions and pursuing their civic dreams, the absence from political 
life creates contra-effects, as it strengthens the political positions of already privileged, more 
successful citizens that create their own rules and thrust them on others. This is where social trust 
can get at work: solidarizing people at empowering them and thus breaking the vicious circle of 
political passivity and long-lasting disappointment with post-communist transformation. Before this 
circle is broken, for years yet to come these and other related aspects of political culture will 
undoubtedly stand at the core of future research in social capital of Eastern European societies. 
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democratize the internal environment of organizations, transforming them in more open, more 
cooperative and less conflicting groups. That would attract more citizens willing to invest their time 
outside their family and friends’ circles.  
When it comes to post-communist societies that experienced massive emigration, such as 
Lithuania, the practical advice would be to think of the strategies how to attract emigrated well 
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By well educated and young, I imply that these citizens are primed by post-materialist values and 
would indeed embark on collectivist political actions that are driven by generalized social trust.  
To sum up, refraining from political practices of citizens is an actual concern of post-
communist democracies. Withdrawing from political life also means the rejection to participate in 
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participate or become “too active”, just not to jeopardize their “stable” and “secure” life 
(Dahrendorf, 1990). The paradox remains that withdrawing from political life does not bring about 
the “safety” and “stability” in a democratic system: on the contrary, by being apathetic, citizens 
voluntary give away a part of their political freedoms (Genys, 2012: 133 - 134). Thus instead of 
trying to improve their living conditions and pursuing their civic dreams, the absence from political 
life creates contra-effects, as it strengthens the political positions of already privileged, more 
successful citizens that create their own rules and thrust them on others. This is where social trust 
can get at work: solidarizing people at empowering them and thus breaking the vicious circle of 
political passivity and long-lasting disappointment with post-communist transformation. Before this 
circle is broken, for years yet to come these and other related aspects of political culture will 
undoubtedly stand at the core of future research in social capital of Eastern European societies. 
 
  
 
Appendix A. Trends of voting and demonstrating in different data-sets (chapter 4) 
 
Table A1 Trends of voting  
 Voting EED                                           Voting ESS 
 1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2004-
2009  
2010-
2014 
Trend  
1990-
2014 
2002 2008 2012 Trend 
2002/8
-2012 
Belgium 92.72  90.86 91.63 91.08 89.22 -3.5 85.2 92.1 89.3 - 4.1 
Cyprus 93.00 92.94 91. 75 89.00 78.70 -14.30 - 93.3 80.3 - 13.0 
Denmark 83.55 85.95 87.15 85.57 87.74  4.19 93.7 94.2 93.9 0.2 
Finland 68.39 66.93 66.71  65.02 67.33 -1.99 81.7 83.2 85.0 3.3 
France 69.32 68.44 64.41 60.42 56.32 -13.00 74.9 77.6 78.9 4.0 
Germany 78.37 81.99 79.08 74.23 71.5  -6.87 84.6 82.6 82.0 - 2.6 
Greece 79.23 76.35 75.74 72.54 65.10 -14.13 89.6 87.0 - - 2.6 
Ireland 68.49 65.92 62.57 67.03 69.90 1.41 77.8 79.7 74.4 - 3.4 
Netherlands 78.81 73.23 79.55 80.35 75.00 -3.81 86.4 85.6 83.7 - 2.7 
Norway 75.85 78.33 75.48 76.90 78.30 2.45 84.8 85.7 86.7 - 2.1 
Portugal 67.78 63.70 61.48 61.05 56.54 -11.24 72.5 72.8 69.1 - 3.4 
Spain 76.44  77.38 68.71 73.85 68.94 -7.5 78.7 81.3 76.4 - 2.3 
Sweden 86.78 81.38 78.89 81.99 83.97 -2.81 87.0 91.1 90.5 3.5 
Switzerland 46.05 42.76 45.23 48.28 48.50  2.45 68.7 63.3 66.3 - 2.4 
UK 77.70 71.40  59.38 61.36 65.10 -12.60  72.6 70.8 71.7 - 0.9 
Total 
(mature) 
76.17 74.50 71.14 72.58 70.81 -5.36 86.5 82.6 80.6 -5.9 
Bulgaria 84.38 62.93 67.03 59.20 51.33 -33.05 - 72.2 73.8 1.6 
Croatia 79.80 68.79 67.46 59.48 54.32 -25.48 - 78.7 - - 
Czech Rep. 90.83 75.38 57.95 64.42 61.04 -29.79 64.2 57.8 64.8 0.6 
Estonia 67.84 63.25 58.24 61.91 63.53 -4.31 - 64.7 68.2 - 
Hungary 66.91 56.21 70.47 67.87 63.06 -3.85 80.9 80.0 72.9 8.0 
Latvia 86.25 71.80 70.83 60.49 60.75 -25.50 - 62.8 - - 
Lithuania 75.30 52.90 58.63 47.34 52.93 -22.37 - 48.6 56.0 -7.4 
Poland 47.67 47.90 46.18 44.34 48.92 1.25 66.3 73.4 69.1 2.8 
Romania 81.25 76.01 60.96 37.30 47.11 -34.14 - 67.7 - - 
Slovakia 84.95 84.15 69.99  54.67 58.98 -25.97 - 77.5 76.3 - 1.2 
Slovenia 85.67 69.33 68.02 61.87 58.67  -27.00 80.0 72.6 73.2 - 6.8 
Total  
(post-com) 
77.35 66.24 63.25 56.26 56.42 -20.93 72.9 68.7 69.3 - 3.6 
Sources: 1. European Election Database 1990 – 2014. The voter turnout of parliamentary elections is counted. If there 
were several elections in a concrete period of time, the average of the voter turnout is taken. For example: in 1995 – 
2000 two parliamentary elections were held in Belgium, namely, in 1995 (voter turnout: 91.15) and in 1999 (90.56). 
Hence, the average turnout is: 90.86. Note: Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on 
material from the "European Election Database". The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made 
available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the 
analyses/interpretation of the data presented here.  
2. ESS data. Voting is measured with the question: “Did you vote in the last national elections?”. (Percentage of 
respondents who answered “Yes”).  
  
 
Table A2 Trends of demonstrating  
Country Demonstrations (ESS) Demonstrations  (EVS) 
 2002 2008 2012 Trend 
2002/8 - 
2012 
1990 2008 Trend 
1999 - 
2008 
Belgium 8.4 7.4 5.2 - 3.2 22.8 29.7 6.9 
Cyprus - 2.3 4.8 2.5  24.8 - 
Denmark 8.3 9.3 4.3 - 4.0 27.4 34.4 7.0 
Finland 2.0 2.5 1.5 - 0.5 14.2 16.0 1.8 
France 16.9 14.6 11.0 - 5.9 32.7 44.8 12.1 
Germany 11.4 8.0 9.1 - 2.3 33.6 30.4 -3.2 
Greece 4.3 5.9 - 1.6 - 22.8 - 
Ireland 6.7 9.2 10.5 2.5 16.5 15.9 -0.6 
Netherlands 2.7 3.3 3.0 0.3 25.3 21.5 -3.8 
Norway 9.0 7.2 9.6 0.6 19.5 30.1 10.6 
Portugal 4.2 3.7 7.4 3.2 21.2 11.7 -9.5 
Spain 15.9 15.8 25.9 10.0 23.3 37.6 14.3 
Sweden 6.4 6.4 7.3 0.9 22.6 22.9 0.3 
Switzerland 7.7 7.5 4.4 - 3.3 - 25.4 - 
United Kingdom 4.4 3.9 3.5 - 1.1 14.0 14.9 0.9 
Total (mature) 7.9 7.1 7.7 - 0.2 22.8 25.8 3.0 
Bulgaria - 3.6 5.5 0.9 14.5 8.4 6.1 
Croatia - 7.4 - - - 8.8 - 
Czech Republic 4.3 4.2 6.7 2.4 35.5 12.0 -23.5 
Estonia - 2.1 4.0 1.9 25.9 5.9 -20 
Hungary 3.7 2.2 3.6 -0.1 4.4 4.0 -0.4 
Latvia - 6.9 - - 35.6 17.4 -18.2 
Lithuania - 3.9 1.9 -2.0 34.0 7.7 -26.3 
Poland 1.4 1.6 2.4 1.0 19.3 8.5 -10.8 
Romania - 3.7 - - - 7.3 - 
Slovakia - 1.8 3.5 1.7 22.9 5.4 -17.5 
Slovenia 2.7 1.6 3.4 0.7 10.1 12.7 2.6 
Total (post-com) 3.0 3.6 3.9 0.9 22.5 8.9 -13.6 
Sources: ESS: 1. Voting: 2. Demonstrations: Have you taken part in lawful public demonstration in the last 12 months?  
EVS: Have actually done any of these things: “attending lawful demonstrations” (Percentage of respondents who 
answered “Yes”). 
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Sources: 1. European Election Database 1990 – 2014. The voter turnout of parliamentary elections is counted. If there 
were several elections in a concrete period of time, the average of the voter turnout is taken. For example: in 1995 – 
2000 two parliamentary elections were held in Belgium, namely, in 1995 (voter turnout: 91.15) and in 1999 (90.56). 
Hence, the average turnout is: 90.86. Note: Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on 
material from the "European Election Database". The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made 
available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the 
analyses/interpretation of the data presented here.  
2. ESS data. Voting is measured with the question: “Did you vote in the last national elections?”. (Percentage of 
respondents who answered “Yes”).  
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Germany 11.4 8.0 9.1 - 2.3 33.6 30.4 -3.2 
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Czech Republic 4.3 4.2 6.7 2.4 35.5 12.0 -23.5 
Estonia - 2.1 4.0 1.9 25.9 5.9 -20 
Hungary 3.7 2.2 3.6 -0.1 4.4 4.0 -0.4 
Latvia - 6.9 - - 35.6 17.4 -18.2 
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Sources: ESS: 1. Voting: 2. Demonstrations: Have you taken part in lawful public demonstration in the last 12 months?  
EVS: Have actually done any of these things: “attending lawful demonstrations” (Percentage of respondents who 
answered “Yes”). 
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Table A3 Descriptive statistics of all variables (mature democracies)  
Variable Mean SD Range N 
Dependent variables     
Voting 0.82 0.38 0/1 26 851 
Participating in party politics (except for voting) 0.24 0.43 0/1 29 674 
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months 0.15 0.36 0/1 29 676 
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months 0.04 0.19 0/1 29 691 
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months 0.09 0.28 0/1 29 689 
Member of political party 0.05 0.22 0/1 29 634 
Participating in movement politics 0.37 0.48 0/1 29 640 
Signed petition last 12 months 0.26 0.44 0/1 29 626 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months 0.07 0.26 0/1 29 686 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months 0.19 0.39 0/1 29 672 
Independent variables      
Social trust (three-item scale) 5.40 1.90 0/10 29 697 
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful 5.27 2.36 0/10 29 663 
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair 5.85 2.20 0/10 29 601 
Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 5.08 2.24 0/10 29 632 
Political trust 4.92 1.95 0/10 29 593 
Trust in country's parliament 4.89 2.41 0/10 28 903 
Trust in the legal system 5.52 2.51 0/10 29 222 
Trust in the police 6.37 2.33 0/10 29 575 
Trust in politicians 3.90 2.30 0/10 29 313 
Trust in political parties 3.89 2.27 0/10 29 146 
Political awareness  2.93 0.93 1/5 29 611 
Politics too complicated to understand 3.11 1.13 1/5 29 488 
Making mind up about political issues 2.97 1.05 1/5 29 458 
Political interest (How interested in politics) 2.55 0.91 1/4 29 681 
Social embeddedness (Worked in another organisation or association 
last 12 months) 
0.17 0.38 0/1 29 688 
Union membership 0.40 0.49 0/1 29 711 
Religious attendance  2.51 1.51 1/7 29 711 
1 = Never* 35.4 %   10 528 
2 = Less often 20.8 %   6 194 
3 = Only on special holy days 19.2 %   5 716 
4 = At least once a month 10.5 %   3 132 
5 = Once a week 10.7 %   3 168 
6 = More than once a week 2.5 %    734 
7 = Every day 0.8 %   239 
Control variables     
Education 3.06 1.45 1/5 29 647 
1 = Less than lower secondary education 18.1 %   5 371 
2 = Lower secondary education completed 18.4 %   5 448 
3 = Upper secondary education completed  32.0 %   9 481 
4 = Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed 2.4 %   712 
5 = Tertiary education completed 29.1 %   8635 
Perceived income 3.10 0.83 1/4 29492 
1 = Very difficult on present income 4.9%   1442 
2 = Difficult on present income 15.5%   4576 
3 = Coping on present income 44.8%   13211 
4 = Living comfortably on present income 34.5%   10263 
Gender (Male=1) 0.47 0.50 0/1 29701 
Age 49.13 17.86 18/123 28700 
Source: ESS, 2008.  Note: Unweighted results of pooled data.  
*This category also includes those respondents who refused to answer or did not know the answer. 
  
 
Table A4 Descriptive statistics of all variables (post-communist democracies)  
Variable Mean SD Range N 
Dependent variables     
Voting 0.69 0.46 0/1 19400 
Participating in party politics (except for voting) 0.15 0.36 0/1 20645 
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months 0.10 0.29 0/1 20620 
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months 0.03 0.17 0/1 20611 
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months 0.03 0.18 0/1 20597 
Member of political party 0.04 0.20 0/1 20661 
Participating in movement politics 0.16 0.37 0/1 20525 
Signed petition last 12 months 0.11 0.31 0/1 20588 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months 0.04 0.19 0/1 20609 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months 0.06 0.24 0/1 20524 
Independent variables      
Social trust (three-item scale) 4.37 2.09 0/10 20707 
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful 4.23 2.54 0/10 20646 
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair 4.80 2.46 0/10 20424 
Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 4.09 2.44 0/10 20573 
Political trust 3.34 2.07 0/10 20477 
Trust in country's parliament 3.10 2.47 0/10 20228 
Trust in the legal system 3.79 2.60 0/10 19948 
Trust in the police 4.67 2.72 0/10 20346 
Trust in politicians 2.53 2.26 0/10 20245 
Trust in political parties 2.57 2.24 0/10 20126 
Political awareness  2.87 0.94 1/5 20266 
Politics too complicated to understand 3.20 1.13 1/5 19908 
Making mind up about political issues 2.97 0.99 1/5 19683 
Political interest (How interested in politics) 2.75 0.87 1/4 20632 
Social embeddedness (Worked in another organisation or association 
last 12 months) 
0.06 0.23 0/1 20589 
Union membership 0.43 0.50 0/1 20747 
Religious attendance  2.79 % 1.50 1/7 20747 
1 = Never* 26.3 %   5450 
2 = Less often 18.9 %   3927 
3 = Only on special holy days 26.5 %   5504 
4 = At least once a month 11.6 %   2401 
5 = Once a week 12.9 %   2666 
6 = More than once a week 2.8 %   574 
7 = Every day 1.1 %   225 
Control variables     
Education 3.13 1.14 1/5 20695 
1 = Less than lower secondary education 5.4 %   1127 
2 = Lower secondary education completed 22.0 %   4559 
3 = Upper secondary education completed  48.3 %   10023 
4 = Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed 2.6 %   536 
5 = Tertiary education completed 21.4 %   4450 
Perceived income 2.55  0.86 1/4 20481 
1 = Very difficult on present income 13.7 %   2810 
2 = Difficult on present income 28.9 %   5909 
3 = Coping on present income 46.2 %   9462 
4 = Living comfortably on present income 11.2 %   2300 
Gender (Male=1) 0.45 0.50 0/1 20727 
Age 48.67 17.81 18/96 20055 
Source: ESS, 2008. Note: Unweighted results of pooled data.  
*This category also includes those respondents who refused to answer or did not know the answer. 
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Trust in the legal system 3.79 2.60 0/10 19948 
Trust in the police 4.67 2.72 0/10 20346 
Trust in politicians 2.53 2.26 0/10 20245 
Trust in political parties 2.57 2.24 0/10 20126 
Political awareness  2.87 0.94 1/5 20266 
Politics too complicated to understand 3.20 1.13 1/5 19908 
Making mind up about political issues 2.97 0.99 1/5 19683 
Political interest (How interested in politics) 2.75 0.87 1/4 20632 
Social embeddedness (Worked in another organisation or association 
last 12 months) 
0.06 0.23 0/1 20589 
Union membership 0.43 0.50 0/1 20747 
Religious attendance  2.79 % 1.50 1/7 20747 
1 = Never* 26.3 %   5450 
2 = Less often 18.9 %   3927 
3 = Only on special holy days 26.5 %   5504 
4 = At least once a month 11.6 %   2401 
5 = Once a week 12.9 %   2666 
6 = More than once a week 2.8 %   574 
7 = Every day 1.1 %   225 
Control variables     
Education 3.13 1.14 1/5 20695 
1 = Less than lower secondary education 5.4 %   1127 
2 = Lower secondary education completed 22.0 %   4559 
3 = Upper secondary education completed  48.3 %   10023 
4 = Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed 2.6 %   536 
5 = Tertiary education completed 21.4 %   4450 
Perceived income 2.55  0.86 1/4 20481 
1 = Very difficult on present income 13.7 %   2810 
2 = Difficult on present income 28.9 %   5909 
3 = Coping on present income 46.2 %   9462 
4 = Living comfortably on present income 11.2 %   2300 
Gender (Male=1) 0.45 0.50 0/1 20727 
Age 48.67 17.81 18/96 20055 
Source: ESS, 2008. Note: Unweighted results of pooled data.  
*This category also includes those respondents who refused to answer or did not know the answer. 
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Table A5 Individual level effect of social trust on voting, participation in party and movement 
politics 
 Voting Participation in party 
politics 
Participation in 
movement politics 
Positive Belgium (1.159)* 
Bulgaria (1.154)**** 
Croatia (1.091)*** 
Czech Republic (1.089)*** 
Denmark (1.093) 
Estonia (1.137)****  
Finland(1.177)**** 
France (1.158)**** 
Germany-East (1.154)***  
Germany-West (1.107)** 
Hungary (1.015) 
Ireland (1.134)*** 
Lithuania (1.108)****  
Norway (1.097)*  
Poland (1.114)***  
Portugal (1.012) 
Romania (1.073)*** 
Slovakia (1.050) 
Slovenia (1.035) 
Spain (1.042) 
Sweden (1.231)****  
Switzerland (1.164)**** 
The Netherlands (1.166)***   
United Kingdom (1.192)****  
Belgium (1.034) 
Bulgaria (1.058)* 
Czech Republic (1.003) 
Denmark (1.019) 
Estonia (1.000) 
Germany-East (1.086)* 
Germany-West (1.071)* 
Greece (1.010) 
Latvia (1.160)**** 
Lithuania (1.058) 
Poland (1.048) 
Romania (1.044)* 
Slovakia (1.043) 
Slovenia (1.050) 
Sweden (1.073)** 
Switzerland (1.054) 
The Netherlands (1.002) 
United Kingdom (1.039) 
Belgium (1.097)*** 
Bulgaria (1.148)*** 
Croatia (1.116)**** 
Czech Republic (1.009) 
Denmark (1.015) 
Estonia (1.056) 
Germany-East (1.046) 
Germany-West (1.065)** 
Greece (1.092)*** 
Hungary (0.973) 
Latvia (1.030) 
Lithuania (1.031) 
Norway (1.054) 
Poland (1.053) 
Portugal (1.065) 
Romania (1.102)*** 
Slovakia (1.097)***  
Slovenia (1.160)*** 
Spain (1.022) 
Sweden (1.104)*** 
Switzerland (1.014) 
The Netherlands (1.102)** 
United Kingdom (1.070)*** 
 
Negative Cyprus (0.918) 
Greece (0.932)*  
Latvia (0.986) 
 
Croatia (0.994) 
Cyprus (0.975) 
Finland (0.958) 
France (0.994) 
Hungary (0.901)** 
Ireland (0.941)*  
Norway (0.928)** Portugal 
(0.987) 
Spain (0.980) 
Finland (0.917)*** Cyprus 
(0.980) 
France (0.970) 
Ireland (0.993) 
 
Source: ESS 2008.  
Notes: the effect sizes exp(B) in parentheses.  
Significant: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 
  
 
Appendix B. Cross-national variation of participation (chapter 5) 
 
Table B1 Countries according to the levels of participation in elections and movement politics  
 High level of 
participation in 
movement politics  
Moderate level of 
participation in 
movement politics  
Low level of 
participation in 
movement politics  
High level of 
participation in elections 
Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Germany-West 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Moderate level of 
participation in elections  
France, Finland, Germany-
East 
Spain, Croatia, Slovakia, 
Ireland 
Hungary 
Low level of 
participation in elections 
Switzerland, United 
Kingdom 
 Portugal, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia 
Source: ESS 2008.61 
Note: voting is compulsory (enforced or not enforced) in Belgium, Cyprus and Greece.  
  
                                                 
61 High level of participation in elections: >0.85 
Moderate of level participation in elections: 0.75 – 0.85 
Low level of participation in elections: <0.75 
High level of participation in movement politics: >0.30 
Moderate of level participation in movement politics: 0.21 – 0.30 
Low level of participation in movement politics: <0.20 
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Appendix C. Descriptives of the Lithuanian National Election Study data (chapter 6) 
 
Table C1 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Voting      
Voted in the last elections (2012) 0.65 0.48 0 1 1486 
      
Party politics participation      
Worked in a political party or participated in its activity 
during the last 12 months 
0.06 0.23 0 1 1491 
      
Movement politics participation 0.15 0.36 0 1 1471 
Participated in a civic action 0.05 0.23 0 1 1485 
Signed petition 0.09 0.29 0 1 1485 
Participated in a demonstration 0.04 0.20 0 1 1487 
Participated in a strike 0.01 0.12 0 1 1484 
Boycotted certain products 0.02 0.16 0 1 1484 
      
Generalized trust 4.13 2.21 0 10 1480 
      
External efficacy       
Do average citizens have an influence on the important 
decisions in the country 
2.46 2.13 0 10 1459 
      
Political trust  3.90 1.97 0 10 1481 
Trust in country’s parliament  2.97 2.42 0 10 1457 
Trust in courts 3.69 2.64 0 10 1451 
Trust in the police 5.31 2.69 0 10 1458 
Trust in political parties 3.24 2.27 0 10 1433 
Trust in government 3.62 2.50 0 10 1447 
Trust in president 4.54 2.82 0 10 1454 
      
Internal efficacy 2.49 0.91 1 5 1441 
I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in 
politics 
2.49 1.05 1 5 1412 
I feel I have a good understanding about the most 
important political issues facing our country 
2.74 1.09 1 5 1427 
I feel that I could do as good job in public office as most 
as other people 
2.37 1.02 1 5 1390 
I think that I am better informed about politics and 
governing than most people 
2.33 0.99 1 5 1399 
      
Political interest 2.09 0.76 1 4 1438 
      
Political information  2.81 1.29 0 4 1500 
      
Social embeddedness   0.23 0.51 0 2 1484 
Worked in organization or association 0.06 0.23 0 1 1486 
Participated in the activities of a local community 0.17 0.37 0 1 1488 
      
Trade union activities 0.03 0.18 0 1 1487 
      
Religious attendance  2.59 1.60 1 7 1500 
1 = Never, Almost never* 19.3 %    290 
2 = Less than once a year 7.0 %    105 
3 = Only on special holy days 7.2 %    108 
4 = Once a month 39.8 %    597 
5 = Once a week 15.9 %    239 
6 = More than once a week 10.1 %    151 
7 = Every day 0.7 %    10 
      
 
Education 8.55 3.81 0 16 1500 
0 = Not completed primary 0.6 %    9 
1= Primary 3.4 %    51 
2 = Vocational (without completing basic) 1.7 %    26 
3 = Basic (including youth schools) 7.9 %    119 
4 = Vocational (completing basic) 5.3 %    79 
5 = Vocational (after completing basic) 2.9 %    44 
6 = Vocational after completing basic, when the studies of 
vocational lasted two or more years 
4.9 %    74 
7 = Secondary (including gymnasium schools) 15.5 %    232 
8 = Special secondary (including high technical schools) 6.3 %    95 
9 = Vocational (after completing secondary) 8.1 %    121 
10 = Further education or special secondary obtained after 
basic 
9.3 %    139 
11 = Further education or special secondary obtained after 
secondary 
6.6 %    99 
12 = Higher vocational (non-university degree) 7.0 %    105 
13 = Higher (university degree), Bachelor degree 10.8 %    162 
14 = Higher (university degree), Extramular studies 6.9 %    103 
15 = Higher (university degree), Master degree 2.7 %    40 
16 = Doctoral or candidate of sciences degree 0.1 %    2 
      
Perceived financial situation 2.79 0.88 1 5 1443 
1 = We don't have enough money even for food 7.6 %    110 
2 = We have money only for food, but not enough for 
clothes 
27.0 %    389 
3 = We have money only for food and clothes, but not for 
more expensive goods 
44.8 %    646 
4 = We can afford some expensive things, for instance, 
TV set, refrigerator 
19.7 %    284 
5 = We can afford anything we want 1.0 %    14 
      
Perceived social status 5.22 1.84 1 10 1452 
1 = The lowest position 1.7 %    24 
2 7.0 %    102 
3 9.8 %    143 
4 15.6 %    226 
5 21.2 %    308 
6 17.9 %    260 
7 15.9 %    231 
8 8.5 %    123 
9 2.2 %    32 
10 = The highest position 0.2 %    3 
      
Gender (Male=1) 0.50 0.50 0 1   1500 
Age 46.41 17.50 18 87 1500 
*This category also includes those respondents who refused to answer or did not know the answer.  
 
Table C2 Levels of social trust by the age cohorts 
 Age cohort 
 1925 - 1935 1936 - 1945 1946 - 1955 1956 - 1965 1966 - 1975 1976 - 1985 1986 - 1995 
 Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count 
Social 
trust 
3.69 39 3.97 203 3.97 227 4.01 302 4.12 225 4.17 248 4.60 256 
Source: LNES 2012. 
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The main aim of this dissertation is to explain why political participation in post-communist 
societies is so much lower than in Western democracies, considering social trust as a stimulus for 
political engagement. The empirical puzzle of the research draws from the observations that since 
its democratization in the early 1990s, the post-communist region has experienced a dramatic 
decline of both participation in electoral politics and social movements. The lack of civic and 
political engagement in post-communist countries is perceived as one of the hardships of 
democratic development in the region. Although formal institutions in the post-communist region 
are displaying attributes of consolidated democracies, citizens generally feel distant from political 
life, and are unaware of political decisions and means to influence politics. 
Admitting that an institutional approach does not provide a full answer to the question why 
citizens feel detached from politics in post-communist societies, theorists often recoil on cultural 
arguments. The cultural-based approach derives from the deeper reflections on the communist past 
and the continuity of both social and personal memories. This dissertation suggests that low levels 
of political participation in post-communist democracies result from low levels of social trust, 
which was heavily ruined during the communist regime and right after its collapse. Social trust in 
this research is considered as both explanandum (chapter 3) and explanans (chapter 2).  
In the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 2, first, social trust is defined as generalized 
impersonal trust in other people, including strangers, whom a truster is not necessarily familiar 
with. The notion of generalized trust stands in contrast with particularized trust, or trust inside 
specific groups. Social trust generally it refers to trust in the citizenry as a whole. 
Second, social trust is regarded as an independent variable of political participation. Social 
capital theories argue that social trust sustains a cooperative social climate, civic norms and a regard 
for public interests. Thus, social trust is conceived to be conducive to democracy. More specifically, 
referring to a wide scholarship of social capital and political/civic culture, socially trusting people 
are more prone to participate in public affairs. This study differentiates between three forms of 
political participation, namely, voting, party politics (conventional, other than voting) and 
movement (non-conventional) participation.  It is also presupposed that social trust has not only 
direct positive effects on political involvement, but also leads to political efficacy, which in turn 
stimulates individuals to embark on political actions. In other words, my assumption is that social 
resources (social trust) translate into political resources (political efficacy). This dissertation 
distinguishes between external and internal political efficacy. External efficacy expresses the 
feeling that “my voice is heard” by the government, while internal efficacy is the conviction that I 
am skilled enough to influence politics. Social trust enhances political efficacy in a way that 
socially trusting people more likely acquire political knowledge and information in general about 
 
the subjects to be acted on and the methods to employ such actions. Moreover, social trust 
empowers citizens politically, as they believe that institutions we deal with are fair and people we 
trust are going to behave by the rules.  
 In chapter 3, social trust is scrutinized as a dependent variable. Using a comparative 
historical approach, this dissertation considers the development of social trust in post-communist 
societies. More particularly, this chapter discusses how communist legacies affected the essence of 
trust and, moreover, how social trust developed in the period of democratic transition after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The chapter explains how communism and the democratic transition 
had a formidable negative impact on trust, as well as on the abilities of citizens to cooperate for a 
common good. First, communism deterred individuals from participating in organizations by 
making this form of participation obligatory. The notion of volunteering as such was discredited. 
Second, civic and political involvement falls short because of the post-communist disappointment. 
The economic hardships and efforts invested in “insuring basic survival” leaves no room and no 
motivation for civic engagement. Third, due to oppressive government, political censorship and 
harsh economic conditions, post-communist citizens are used to spending their time in family and 
friendship-based networks instead of spreading their contacts outside these circles. The legacy of 
spending time within close-knit networks accurately characterizes the contemporary post-
communist society. In turn, as an effect of a vicious circle, since citizens are not being keen on 
expanding their social contacts with strangers, they lack to opportunities to increase social trust.  
The theoretical chapters are followed by empirical chapter 4. Two country-sets – mature and 
post-communist democracies – are compared based on the European Social Survey 2008 data. The 
chapter investigates the causal relationship between social trust and political participation at the 
individual level. It posits political efficacy as the linking variable of this relationship. The results 
show that social capital theories largely hold true: social trust is indeed positively related with all 
forms of political participation in both mature and post-communist democracies, although I observe 
some variation between countries, especially for party politics activities (not voting). For instance, 
in nine countries (out of 27 cases) I found negative connections between social trust and party 
politics. So it also might be true that social trust is not necessary an attribute of someone getting 
actively involved in political parties and campaigning.   
The results also showed that the pattern of social trust affecting individual’s decision to vote 
is generally similar in both country-groups. The research corroborates the hypothesis that socially 
trusting people vote because they tend to be politically trusting (proxy of external efficacy in the 
ESS dataset). However, voters who are more socially trusting do not necessarily feel more 
politically aware (proxy of internal efficacy): political awareness plays an independent role above 
and beyond social trust.  
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Moreover, political trust does not influence participation in party politics activities in mature 
democracies, but it does so (positively) in post-communist democracies. When it comes to 
movement participation, the direct effect of political trust is negative in both country-sets. In other 
words, citizens need to trust others, but at the same time distrust their politicians, in order to express 
their demands by protesting. Thus, the results support my assumption that in movement politics, an 
individual indeed relies on his/her fellow citizens. This holds for both mature and post-communist 
countries. Political awareness positively affects movement politics, independently of social trust.  
All in all, the relationship between social trust, political efficacy and the types of 
participation are, with a few exceptions, more or less the same in the East and West. It means that, 
at the individual level, post-communist citizens’ decision to participate in politics is driven by the 
same factors that determine voter turnout in the mature democracies. Western models of political 
participation work relatively well for voting turnout and movement participation (and less for other 
party politics activities) in new democracies. 
The second empirical part of this dissertation (chapter 5) focuses on the possible 
explanations why citizens in post-communist democracies engage less actively in politics. The 
individual and contextual predictors of participation by conducting multi-level regressions were 
tested – namely, economic, political and cultural components that in all define the “stage” of post-
communism. The analyses revealed that the observed country differences in political activeness can 
be partly explained by different distributions of individual characteristics between countries (so-
called compositional effects).  
Moreover, the analyses display that the country level characteristics remain very important 
for both institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation. Not only democratic experience is 
important, but also corruption, lack of effective government, and economic backwardness have a 
negative effect on political participation levels. Furthermore, contextual social trust proved to be 
positively related with being active in movement and party politics. However, the specific effect of 
post-communism is difficult to pin down, because many important variables (like corruption and 
social trust) correlate so strongly with each other. Therefore, one cannot easily single out only one 
contextual effect. Obviously, post-communism comprises a whole set of interrelated dimensions 
and it is difficult to disentangle all the context level variables. More generally, the findings indicate 
that the cultural and institutional contextual aspects were less relevant for predicting 
institutionalized participation, but it in particular accounted for participation in movement politics.  
Furthermore, chapter 5 focused on the interplay between social trust, forms of political 
participation, and the cultural, socio-economic, and institutional context. The most remarkable 
finding concerned the interaction between the contextual circumstances and the individual effect of 
social trust in shaping political participation. The results showed that in more trustful, prosperous 
 
and advanced societies, social trust has a stronger positive effect on voting. Involvement in 
institutionalized politics is negatively related with social trust, and this negative association is 
stronger in unprosperous and corrupt societies. Finally, the results showed that social trust 
stimulates protest participation, and this effect is stronger in societies that are less socially trustful, 
less affluent, more corrupt, have less effective governments, and a shorter democratic legacy. In 
post-communist societies the merit of social trust on protest participation is generally more 
pronounced: in these countries an increase in social trust motivates citizens to involve in movement 
activities more vigorously compared to people from Western democracies.   
The last part of this research investigated the relationship between social trust, political 
efficacy and political participation in post-communist Lithuania, using the national post-election 
survey of 2012 (chapter 6). The results showed that social trust is indeed positively associated with 
citizens’ propensity to vote, but it is not significant for participation in other party politics activities. 
Regarding the mediation effects, social trust leads to voting via both external efficacy and political 
trust. In other words, social trust positively affects whether a citizen in Lithuania trusts the 
institutions and whether s/he considers these institutions being responsive to peoples’ needs; in turn, 
political trust and perceived responsiveness fosters voting.   
The mediation analysis furthermore revealed that the indirect effects of social trust on 
protesting via both internal and external efficacy are significant. The more people feel that the 
Lithuanian government is responsive, the more they tend to protest. Remarkably, when it comes to 
protesting, external efficacy and political trust work in different directions: perceived 
responsiveness leads to activism, while at the same time my findings demonstrate that political 
distrust yields apathy.  
Moreover, it is worth observing that although social trust has no direct impact on movement 
politics, I found a highly significant effect of social embeddedness. Civic engagement strongly 
affects the odds of individuals to be involved in political activities. And the opposite is also true: the 
lack of political engagement in Lithuania is caused by a lack of civic engagement. Interestingly 
enough, the findings imply that formal social networks are apparently not connected to a sense of 
social trust. The descriptive analysis disclosed that the relationship between these two variables is 
very weak, if not non-existent. Social trust is not associated with participation in two other formal 
networks either, namely trade unions and religious communities.  
 In sum, this dissertation increased our understanding of the development of post-communist 
civil society from a historical and contemporary perspective. It explains the deterioration of social 
trust during the communist regime and after its fall, and points out how low levels of social trust 
undermine individuals’ willingness to participate in politics. This study adds to current scholarship 
that the weakness of civil society and low levels of citizens’ political involvement in East-Central 
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Europe is associated with the low stocks of social capital, that is, low social trust and limited social 
contacts. By doing so, this study underlines that Eastern European democracies are still fragile in 
terms of the penetration of the political system from below. As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
(1995) wrote, there is not much democracy in a country where only few citizens engage in decision-
making. Mass withdrawal from political participation leads to the risk of “selective democracy” and 
creates the opportunity for political elites to center their policies around the radicalized voters and 
exclude potential rivals. This “childhood illness” of post-communist systems might constitute a 
threat for democracy, therefore it is so important to study what bring people both to the ballots and 
to the streets and how to enhance different forms of civic and political activities. After all, it is 
much easier to implement political reforms than to foster a cultural shift towards more democratic 
values. 
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